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Jac: Brown
from his brother
E. Kirby



POSTHUMOUS WORKS

OF

FREDERIC II.

KING OF PRUSSIA.

VOL. I.

FRÉDÉRIC II.

Heath sculp.

Published as the Act directs Feb.ry 4.th 1789, by G. Robinson and Co.

May Genl Brown

THE

HISTORY

OF

MY OWN TIMES.

PART I.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

THOMAS HOLCROFT.

LONDON:

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Advertiſement by the Tranſlator.

THE royal author of the following memoirs has ſometimes affected familiarity of ſtyle, and the uſe of words ſeldom employed but in the converſation of the common people: for this reaſon ſome accidental liberties of language have been taken, to give ſentences a more uniform and hiſtorical air. He wrote with all the eaſy indifference of a king; the tranſlator might have been accuſed of negligence, perhaps of vulgarity, had he too ſervilely copied his manner, and of which it is probable he has ſtill been too reſpectful: to avoid being colloquial was impoſſible. But not the ſmalleſt deviations from the meaning of the text have been wilfully admitted. The nature of the work, and the ſtyle of the monarch, have inevitably occaſioned a repetition of words and phraſes; for which before the tranſlator is cenſured the juſtice doubtleſs will be done him to conſult the original.

In ſpeaking of commanders the king ſeldom notices their rank; but writes M. de Soubiſe, M. de Schwerin, &c. inſtead of the prince de Soubiſe, or marſhal Schwerin. As it was impoſſible the tranſlator ſhould,

by any induſtry, diſcover the different ranks of all the commanders, whether of armies or of ſmall detached parties, mentioned in this hiſtory, he has adopted a general method of writing the ſurname without any epithet. On ſome occaſions, when the perſons ſpoken of are evidently German, he has for the ſake of propriety ſubſtituted the epithet *von*, which is prefixed to German proper names of rank, inſtead of the epithet *de*, uſed in like manner by the French. The reader, unacquainted with the German language, is requeſted likewiſe to obſerve that when the article *the* is found before the proper name of a place it will as frequently denote a hill or a rock as a river; as, *the* Baſberg, *the* Kohlberg, *the* Lilienſtein, *the* Königſtein, &c. and it is ſometimes placed before the name of a wood, as the Nonnen-Buſch, &c. The proper names Königſtein, Silberberg, Sonnenſtein (and others compounded after the ſame manner) are ſometimes written without the article; and probably they refer to ſome neighbouring town or village when ſo written.

As an additional aid to the geographer it may not be amiſs to obſerve that in the German language *Berg* ſignifies hill; *Burg*,

or *Stadt*, a town; *Stein*, ſtone; *Buſch*, wood or copſe; and that wherever rivers or brooks are ſpoken of, they will generally be known by the deſcription of the march or encampment of the troops. In the firſt part of the firſt volume the king diſtinguiſhed the ſpelling of the river Neiſſe from the town of Neiſs; this diſtinction he has afterward dropped, but the tranſlator has retained, perhaps erroneouſly. It is therefore his duty to warn the reader. There is indeed no ſpecies of literary confuſion ſo great as that of the ſpelling the proper names of places in geography. Sounds are imitated, in one language, and the ſpelling copied, by another; though in the ſecond inſtance the ſound ſhall be totally different. The burg of the German (pronounced boorg) is written bourg by the French and by the Engliſh burg, burgh, bourg, or borough; though the laſt is now become obſolete: thus—Peterſburg, Peterſburgh, Peterſbourg. Other variations deſtructive of all accuracy are frequent: As—Marburg, Marpurg, Marbourg—Nuremberg, Nurenberg, Nurnberg, and ſtill more erroneouſly Nurem*burg*.

Though it is remarked in a note, it may

not be improper here to repeat, that the king has not been conſiſtent in his numerical epithets to Auguſtus, the laſt king of Poland. As king of Poland, he was Auguſtus II. but, as elector of Saxony, he was Auguſtus III. He is in the text indifferently called Auguſtus II. or Auguſtus III. In the firſt part of the firſt volume, where the king has mentioned philoſophers who wrote before the year 1740, ſome erroneous dates have been corrected. It is alſo neceſſary to notice that the recapitulation of numbers, given by the king at the end of the ſecond part of the firſt volume, is in ſome inſtances different from the numbers given by him in his relations of the actions to which they both refer, as the reader will perhaps obſerve: in this caſe the tranſlator could not correct, he could only faithfully tranſcribe.

Several Engliſh names in the ſervice of Auſtria and that of Pruſſia are ſo diſguiſed by German ſpelling as not to be known: ſuch are marſhal Braun, generals Laudon, Laſcy, Okelli, Obirn, Macquire, and others; inſtead of Brown, Loudon, Lacy, O'Kelly, O'Burne, and Maguire.

PREFACE.

MOST of our hiſtorians are compilers of falſehood interſperſed occaſionally with truth. Among the prodigious number of events which are tranſmitted to poſterity, none may be perfectly relied on except thoſe which concern ſome hiſtorical epocha, whether of the riſe or of the fall of empires. It appears indubitable that the battle of Salamis was fought, and that the Perſians were vanquiſhed. There can be no doubt but that Alexander the Great conquered the empire of Darius, that the Romans ſubjected the Carthaginians, and that Antiochus vanquiſhed Perſia. Such evidence is confirmed by the conquerors having taken poſſeſſion of the countries. Hiſtory acquires additional credit in what

relates to the civil wars between Marius and Sylla, Pompey and Cæſar, Anthony and Auguſtus, by the authenticity of cotemporary authors, who have deſcribed theſe events. The fall of the weſtern and the eaſtern empires cannot be diſputed, for kingdoms have ariſen and been formed from the diſmemberment of the Roman domains. But when invited by curioſity we would examine circumſtantially facts which happened in times ſo remote, we loſe ourſelves in a labyrinth abounding in obſcurities and contradictions, without any clue to guide us in reſearch. The love of the marvellous, the prejudices of hiſtorians, their ill-placed zeal for their own nation, and their hatred to its enemies, have each inſpired paſſions which have influenced their opinions; and the ages that have paſſed away, ſince they have written, have ſo much altered, by diſguiſing, facts that to develope them at preſent would be impoſſible, even did we poſſeſs the eyes of the Lynx.

Nevertheleſs among the multitude of ancient authors we diſtinguiſh with pleaſure the

the deſcription which Xenophon has given of the retreat of the ten thouſand, commanded by himſelf, and brought back into Greece. Thucydides enjoys nearly the ſame advantages. We are delighted to find in the fragments we poſſeſs of Polybius, who was the friend and companion of Scipio Africanus, events recorded of which the writer was himſelf a witneſs. The letters of Cicero to his friend Atticus bear the ſame ſtamp. He was an actor in the grand ſcenes which he delineates. I ſhall not forget the Commentaries of Cæſar, written with the noble ſimplicity of a great man, and, whatever may be affirmed by Hirtius, the narratives of other hiſtorians are conformable in all reſpects to the incidents deſcribed in his Commentaries. But from the time of Cæſar hiſtory contains nothing but panegyric or ſatire. The barbariſm of ſucceeding times has made the hiſtory of the lower empire a chaos, in which not any thing intereſting is to be found, except the memoirs written by the daughter of the emperor Alexis Comnenes, a princeſs who re-

lates what ſhe herſelf beheld. The monks, who alone poſſeſſed ſome knowledge, have left annals found in their convents which appertain to the hiſtory of Germany. But what materials are theſe for hiſtory! The French alſo have had their biſhop of Tours, their Joinville, and their Journaliſt de l'Etoile; compilers who wrote what they learned by chance, but who muſt have written feebly, for they ſcarcely could have been well informed. Since the revival of letters, the paſſion for writing is become ungovernable; we have now but too many memoirs, anecdotes, and narratives. Among the authors of theſe we muſt ſelect the few who have held employments, who have been themſelves in action, who have reſided at courts, or who have had the permiſſion of ſovereigns to ſearch the archives; ſuch as the ſtate preſident de Thou; Philip de Comines; Vargas, fiſcal of the council of Trent; Mademoiſelle d'Orleans; the cardinal de Retz, &c. To theſe let us add the letters of d'Eſtrades, and the memoirs of de Torcy, well worthy of curioſity, eſpecially

cially the latter, for they develope the truth of the will of Charles II. king of Spain, concerning which there has been ſuch diverſity of opinions.

Reflections like theſe on the incertitude of hiſtory, which I have often made, gave birth to the idea of tranſmitting to poſterity the principal events in which I have taken part, or of which I have been a witneſs, in order that thoſe who hereafter ſhall govern the kingdom may know the true ſituation of affairs, when I came to the crown; the reaſons that impelled me to act; what were my means; what the ſnares of our enemies; what the various negotiations, wars, and particularly what the heroic actions of our officers were, by which they have juſtly acquired immortality.

Since the revolutions which overthrew firſt the empire of the weſt, afterward that of the eaſt; ſince the wonderful ſucceſs attendant on Charlemagne; ſince the famous reign of Charles V. ſince the troubles which were excited by the reformation in Germany, and which were of thirty years con-

tinuance; and laſtly, ſince the war which aroſe for the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, there have been no events more remarkable or more intereſting than thoſe produced by the death of the emperor Charles VI. the laſt male deſcendant of the houſe of Hapſburg.

The court of Vienna ſaw itſelf attacked by a prince whom it could not ſuppoſe ſufficiently ſtrong to undertake ſo difficult an enterpriſe. A conſpiracy of kings and ſovereigns was ſoon after formed, all determined to have ſome part of that immenſe ſucceſſion. The imperial crown paſſed into the houſe of Bavaria; and, when every incident ſeemed to concur in the ruin of the youthful queen of Hungary, that princeſs by her fortitude and addreſs extricated herſelf from a ſituation thus dangerous, and ſupported her monarchy by ſacrificing Sileſia, and a ſmall part of the Milaneſe. This was all which could be expected from ſo young a princeſs who, ſcarcely a queen, was imbued with the ſpirit of government, and became the ſoul of her council.

This work being deſtined for poſterity,

I am

I am relieved from that reſtraint which bids us reſpect the living, and obſerve certain delicacies incompatible with the freedom of truth. I am permitted to ſpeak without reſerve, and aloud, what might otherwiſe only be thought: I ſhall paint princes as they are, without prejudice in favour of my allies, or hatred for my enemies; I ſhall mention myſelf only when obliged by neceſſity, and muſt be permitted, after the example of Cæſar, to ſpeak of what relates to myſelf in the third perſon, to avoid the diſagreeable effects of egotiſm. By poſterity we muſt be judged; but if we are prudent we ſhall anticipate poſterity by rigorouſly judging ourſelves. The true merit of an excellent prince is to have a ſincere love of the public good, of his country, and of fame; I ſay of fame, for that happy inſtinct which animates men with the deſire of acquiring fame is the true principle of heroic actions. It is that impulſe of the ſoul which raiſes it from its lethargy, inciting it to uſeful, neceſſary and worthy enterpriſes.

Whatever is affirmed in theſe memoirs, whether it reſpects negotiations, letters of ſovereign princes, or treaties ſigned, is affirmed from proofs preſerved in the archives. Concerning military facts I may be credited, as an ocular witneſs. Accounts of battles were deferred two or three days to render them more exact and conformable to truth.

Poſterity, perhaps, will ſee with ſurpriſe, in theſe memoirs, a recital of treaties concluded and broken. Numerous as ſuch examples are, example would not juſtify the author of this work, if he had not better reaſons to excuſe his conduct.

The intereſt of the ſtate ought to ſerve as the rule to the monarch.

Caſes in which alliances may be broken are, 1. When the ally fails in fulfilling his engagements; 2. When the ally meditates deceit, and there is no other reſource than that of being the firſt to deceive; 3. When a ſuperior force oppreſſes and renders the breaking of a treaty an act of neceſſity; 4, and laſtly, The want of means to continue

tinue the war. That deſpicable thing called money, by I know not what fatality, influences all affairs. Princes are ſlaves to their means; the intereſt of the ſtate preſcribes law to them, and that law is inviolable. If the prince is under an obligation even to ſacrifice his life for the ſafety of his ſubjects, how much more ought he to ſacrifice thoſe connections the continuation of which would to them become prejudicial! Examples of treaties in like manner broken are frequent. It is not our intention to juſtify them all, yet dare we affirm there are ſome treaties which either neceſſity, wiſdom, prudence, or the good of the nation, oblige us to tranſgreſs; for kings only poſſeſs theſe means of avoiding ruin. Had Francis I. fulfilled the treaty of Madrid, he would, by the loſs of Burgundy, have eſtabliſhed an enemy in the heart of his dominions. This would have reduced France to the unhappy condition in which ſhe was in the reign of Louis XI. and Louis XII. If after the battle of Muhlberg, won by Charles V. the proteſtant

teſtant league in Germany had not ſtrengthened itſelf by the ſupport of France, it could not but have worn thoſe chains which the emperor had long been forging. Had not the Engliſh broken the alliance, ſo contrary to their intereſts, by which Charles II. was united with Louis XIV. a diminution of their power would have been riſked, and the more ſo becauſe France would have had greatly the advantage over England in the political balance of Europe. Sages, who predict effects from cauſes, ought early to reſiſt all ſuch cauſes as are thus diametrically oppoſite to their intereſts. Suffer me to explain myſelf exactly, on ſo delicate a ſubject, which has ſeldom been otherwiſe than dogmatically treated. To me it appears evident that a private perſon ought to be ſcrupulouſly tenacious of his promiſe, though he ſhould have made it inconſiderately. If he is injured he can have recourſe to the protection of the laws, and, be the iſſue what it may, an individual only ſuffers. But where is the tribunal that can redreſs a monarch's wrongs, ſhould another

another monarch forfeit his engagement? The word of an individual can only involve an individual in misfortune, while that of a ſovereign may draw down calamities on nations. The queſtion then will be reduced to this, muſt the people periſh or muſt the prince infringe a treaty? And where is the man weak enough to heſitate a moment concerning his anſwer? Hence, from the caſe we have ſuppoſed, is deduced the neceſſity of firſt carefully examining the circumſtances under which the monarch acts, the conduct of his allies, the reſources he may be able to obtain, or his incapacity to fulfil his engagements, before any deciſive judgment ought to be paſſed upon his proceedings. For, as we have already ſaid, the good or ill ſtate of the finances is the pulſe of the kingdom, which has a greater influence than is either known or believed on political and military operations. Ignorant of this, the public judges only from appearances, and conſequently is deceived in its judgments. Prudence will not admit that they ſhould be better informed, for it would

would be the excefs of phrenzy to vain-glorioufly publifh the weak fide of a nation. Delighted by fuch a difcovery, its enemies would not fail to profit by the intelligence. Wifdom therefore requires we fhould leave to the public the rafh liberty of deciding, and, unable to juftify ourfelves, while we live, without danger to the ftate, we muft reft fatisfied with that juftification which may be obtained from difintereffted pofterity.

No one perhaps will take offence if I add fome general reflections on what I have faid, concerning events which happened in my own times. I have feen fmall ftates able to maintain themfelves againft the greateft monarchies, when thefe ftates poffeffed induftry and great order in their affairs. I find that large empires, fertile in abufes, are full of confufion, and only are fuftained by their vaft refources, and the intrinfic weight of the body. Thofe intrigues which exift in fuch courts would bring deftruction on lefs powerful princes. They always injure, but they do not prevent

vent numerous armies from preſerving their preponderance. I obſerve that all wars carried far from the frontiers of the people by whom they are undertaken, have not equal ſucceſs with thoſe which are made nearer home. Is not this the reſult of a ſentiment natural to man, who feels it is more juſt to defend himſelf than to rob his neighbour? It may be indeed that the phyſical reaſon is too mighty for the moral, becauſe of the difficulty of finding proviſions when the diſtance from the frontiers is great, and of furniſhing recruits, horſes, clothing, ammunition, &c. Let us add, alſo, that the farther troops have adventured into diſtant countries the more they fear left retreat ſhould there be cut off, or rendered difficult. I view the undoubted ſuperiority of the Engliſh fleets over thoſe of France and Spain united, and I wonder how it could happen that the naval force of Philip II. which formerly had ſo much the aſcendant over that of the Engliſh and the Dutch, did not preſerve advantages ſo great: I further remark, with ſurpriſe, that

all

all theſe naval armaments are rather for oſtentation than effect, and that inſtead of protecting commerce they do not impede its deſtruction. Here we behold the king of Spain, ſovereign of Potoſi, overwhelmed by debt in Europe, and accepting credit at Madrid from his officers and domeſtics: there the king of England profuſely ſcattering his guineas, which thirty years of induſtry had accumulated in Great Britain, to ſuſtain the queen of Hungary and the Pragmatic ſanction; independant of which this ſame queen is obliged to ſacrifice ſome provinces that ſhe may preſerve thoſe that remain. The capital of the Chriſtian world receives the firſt invader; and the pope, not daring to utter anathemas on thoſe who lay it under contribution, is obliged to give them his benediction. Foreigners inundate Italy, who combat each other to accompliſh its ſubjection. The example of the Engliſh, like a torrent, draws the Dutch into a war with which they have no concern; and thoſe republicans, who, when the heroes Eugene and Marl-

Marlborough commanded their armies, ſent their deputies to regulate military operations, no longer ſend any when a duke of Cumberland finds himſelf at the head of their troops. The brand is kindled in the north, and a war fatal to Sweden is the conſequence. Denmark awakes, is agitated, and is calmed; Saxony twice changes its party, and gains nothing with either: on the contrary the Pruſſians are introduced into the country, and it is ruined. Conflicting events alter the cauſe of diſpute; effects however continue, though the motive has ceaſed; fortune rapidly flies from ſide to ſide, but ambition and the deſire of vengeance feed and maintain the flames of war. We ſeem to view an aſſembly of gameſters who demand their revenge, and who refuſe to quit play till they are totally ruined. If an Engliſh miniſter be aſked what madneſs induces him to prolong the war, he replies, becauſe France cannot furniſh the expences of the next campaign. Should a ſimilar queſtion be put to the French miniſter, the anſwer

would be much the ſame. The moſt deplorable effect of ſuch policy is that the lives of men are ſported with, and human blood is ineffectually and profuſely ſhed. Could war fix any certain limits to the frontiers of ſtates, and preſerve that balance of power ſo neceſſary among the nations of Europe, we might regard thoſe who have periſhed as victims ſacrificed to the tranquillity and ſafety of the public. But American provinces are objects of cupidity, and ſoon we ſee all Europe engaged, on different ſides, to combat by ſea and land. The ambitious ought never to forget that arms and military diſcipline, being nearly the ſame throughout Europe, and that alliances having the general effect of producing equality between the forces of the belligerent parties, all that princes may hope from the greateſt advantages, in theſe times, is to acquire, after accumulated ſucceſs, either ſome ſmall town on the frontiers, or ſome ſuburb which will not pay intereſt for the debts incurred by war, and the population of which is far inferior to

the number of inhabitants which have perished in the field.

Whoever has a heart capable of compassion, when he coolly examines such objects, must be agitated at the remembrance of evils which statesmen, either from the want of wisdom, or hurried on by their passions, have brought upon nations. Reason prescribes a rule on this subject from which it appears to me that no statesman ought to depart: which is to seize occasion, and when that is favourable to be enterprising; but neither to force occasion, nor leave every thing to chance. There are moments which require us to exert all our activity, in order to profit by them; but there are others in which prudence requires we should remain inactive. This is an affair worthy of the most profound reflection; for, it is requisite, not only perfectly to examine the present state of things, but, to foresee all the consequences of any undertaking, and to weigh the means we ourselves possess, in opposition to those of our enemies, in order to find which must ultimately pre-

ponderate. If reaſon alone does not decide, and if paſſion takes any part, it is impoſſible that ſucceſs ſhould be the reſult. State politics exact patience; and the height of wiſdom in a great man is to do all things in their proper ſeaſon. Hiſtory ſupplies us with too many examples of wars inconſiderately undertaken. To be convinced of this we have only to read the life of Francis I. and what Brantome tells us was the cauſe of the unhappy expedition into the Milaneſe, where this king was made priſoner at Pavia. We have but to caſt a retroſpect on all the advantages Charles V. derived from the opportunity he had, after the battle of Muhlberg, to ſubjugate Germany. We have but to examine the hiſtory of Frederic V. the elector Palatine, and the precipitation with which he engaged in a conteſt ſo much above his ſtrength. In our own times let us recal to mind the conduct of Maximillian of Bavaria, who, in the war of the ſucceſſion, when his country may be ſaid to have been blockaded by the allies, took part with France, only

to ſee himſelf ſtripped of his ſtates. Charles XII. will furniſh us with a more recent, and more ſtriking example ſtill, of the fatal conſequences which the headlong and falſe conduct of monarchs entails upon their ſubjects. Hiſtory is the ſchool of princes; it is their duty to inform themſelves of the errors of paſt ages, in order to ſhun them, to learn how eſſential it is for them to form a ſyſtem, and purſue it ſtep by ſtep; and that he, among them, who beſt calculates conſequences, is the competitor who alone is able to carry the prize, from others who act leſs rationally than himſelf.

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TRANSLATOR's PREFACE*.

VARIOUS circumſtances and reaſons, which have occurred in the courſe of the tranſlation, have induced me to write a general preface to the verſion which I have given of the Poſthumous Works of the King of Pruſſia. Though the period ſince they were publiſhed be but ſhort, they have already, by thoſe who underſtand the French language, been generally read. A man ſo remarkable, in youth, manhood, and age, and for his contentions and opinions, public and private, could not fail to excite general curioſity; nor will curioſity, in the peruſal of his works, find itſelf diſappointed. No

* The preceding advertiſement appertains to the hiſtorical part only, which, in order to gratify the public curioſity as ſoon as poſſible, was publiſhed before the remainder was completed.

man can give ſo true a picture of the mind of another as that mind will infallibly give of itſelf, whatever diſguiſe may be attempted. To the hiſtorian, the writings of Frederic II. are an ineſtimable treaſure; the man of wit will find great amuſement in them; and the philoſopher ample and precious materials. The true hiſtorian, the true philoſopher, will read the very ſoul of this king, which ſoul had an influence almoſt incredible upon the general politics of his age, its wars, its governments, and its revolutions. Europe, it is true, is rouſing from her ſlumbers. Men begin to underſtand ſomething of their own worth, and the general ſyſtem of deſpotiſm totters. Yet is there no aſſurance that the meaſures he took, to extend the individual grandeur of the houſe of Hohenzollern, will not excite ſtruggles the moſt violent, and again, and perhaps again, deluge Chriſtendom in blood. That his mind was ardent, reſtleſs, and capacious, his acts prove; his writings contribute to ſhew the manner in which it was ſo: and the object is ſo grand that it ſcarcely can be examined too minutely, or ſurveyed with too much admiration.

Having

Having faithfully tranſlated his opinions and aſſertions of every kind, and in general without noticing any of them, however pernicious they might be at ſome moments, and virtuous or magnanimous at others; I have ſaid thus much, leſt it might be imagined that no ſuch thoughts, no ſuch ſenſations, had paſſed through my mind. But he who could perform my taſk, and like me think it his duty to refrain from counteracting doctrines deſtructive of political virtue, which is the higheſt of virtues, and from applauding the tolerant ſpirit of Frederic, for which he will deſerve eternal praiſe—he, I repeat, who ſhould tranſcribe, yet feel no pain, on ſuch occaſions, muſt be incapable of moral dignity, and indeed of the taſk he had undertaken. Some very few notes of ſuch a kind I have added, for which I have to aſk pardon: it was erroneous; for it implies, as far as the reader confides in the judgment of the tranſlator, that there was nothing in the work which merited like animadverſion, except this or that ſolitary paſſage. To have made as many remarks as might have been neceſſary would have

been to have doubled the ſize of the work; and, in all probability, their diffuſe and deſultory nature would have rendered them ineffectual: there ought therefore to have been none. I wiſh the reader to diſtinguiſh that I do not ſpeak of the notes in general, which I have added, but only of thoſe of this deſcription; of which, if I rightly recollect, there are not ſix.

The works I have tranſlated are of five claſſes; hiſtorical, political, philoſophical, belles lettres, and epiſtolary. Of the hiſtorical, it may be obſerved that, in his youth, Frederic, like Cæſar, was ambitious of being the narrator of his own exploits: all his readers will regret that this ambition declined with age. While Prince Royal, he had imbibed a certain portion of the ſpirit of candour; and with a certain portion of this ſpirit he began to write the Hiſtory of his own Times: inſomuch that Voltaire, to whom he ſhewed the work, thought proper to warn him of the concluſions which the world would draw from his own words. Of this falſe complaiſance Voltaire afterward very juſtly repented. It is the duty

of the philoſopher carefully to collect data of the progreſs of the mind, toward vice or virtue, and not to deſtroy ſuch data.

It is now generally ſaid that the Hiſtory of the Seven Years War, after having been written, was burnt by the negligence of a ſervant; and that the King wrote the work entirely anew. The ſame authority aſſerts that the copy burnt was much ſuperior to the copy publiſhed. Of this I know nothing; I only repeat what I have read. If the ſuppoſed ſuperiority be real, the accident is highly to be lamented: nevertheleſs, the work preſerved will, as I have ſaid, be an ineſtimable addition to the annals of the age; and a leſſon of terror to ſtates, in their advances toward wiſdom.

The narrative of the means Frederic took to repeople and recover his ruined provinces, after the peace, will produce a forgiving ſigh for the ravages of pride and ambition; and again will impel the philoſopher to enquire how it happens that a great mind can approach ſo near wiſdom, and yet remain in error; and thus can mingle and confound virtue and vice.

That ſo little ſhould be ſaid of the partition of Poland, it was but natural to expect. Nor is this the place to make further mention of the tranſaction; except to expreſs that abhorrence of it which it deſerves.

The Bavarian war is a very oppoſite theme, and is the only one, in which Frederic was engaged, that was as reconcilable to true policy as to the degraded policy of kings and nations. It was to prevent the encroachment of ill-confided power.

In the political eſſays and doctrines of Frederic II. the ſage will not expect to find perfect wiſdom. His principles were inevitably warped by his practice; and he who actually, but falſely, imagined he governed all Pruſſia, and could have governed the world, was ill fitted to diſcuſs forms of government; except to prove his total ignorance of the ſcience of government. I know this will, by many, be thought an abſurd aſſertion; but I leave poſterity to render it full juſtice. Frederic wrote as well in favour of abſolute monarchies, nay better, than moſt men could have written; and will have his admirers, though I do not happen to be one of them.

Among

Among the Dialogues of the Dead, that between Marcus Aurelius and a Recollet Friar was written by Voltaire, and not by the King of Pruſſia; it is inſerted in the Berlin edition, and in other editions, as the King's, and I was not ſoon enough aware of the miſtake.

The Reflections on the Character and Military Talents of Charles XII. as the leader of an army, could ſcarcely be other than excellent. Of the horrible trade of war Frederic was an almoſt perfect maſter.

The divine ſpirit of religious freedom requires that each man ſhould be left to form his own opinions on the metaphyſical and theological doctrines of the King. I have rendered them ſuch as I found them: on a ſubject ſo ſerious, ſo vaſt, if I ſaid any thing, I would ſay more than the ſcanty limits of a preface can contain.

The writing of comedies is indeed an arduous taſk; nor can I think it miraculous that no king ever yet wrote ſuch works in a manner equal to Congreve and Moliere. Frederic has written ſufficiently well to afford a degree of amuſement, though he cer-

tainly made no judicious, proper, or manly choice of a ſubject, in his Tantalus at Law.

And here I think it my duty to counteract the impreſſions which the King's ſatirical ſallies, and narrative, concerning Voltaire, might occaſion, by relating the truth, and by obſerving they were the ſallies of paſſion, and the narrative of falſe information. In behalf of himſelf, as in behalf of truth, Voltaire was ſo ardently active, while he imagined himſelf right, that he was ſometimes precipitately led to do wrong: but of the acts of which he is accuſed in this comedy, and in the ſtatement of the caſe, he was utterly incapable. He ſo far forgot himſelf, I own, as to wiſh to purchaſe the *Steuer* bills of Saxony; he had the King's example in his juſtification, and he certainly had too great a deſire to amaſs money. This deſire blinded him ſo far that he did not conſider the practice with that deteſtation which it deſerved, and which it was ſtrange that Voltaire did not feel. The truth is this:

Steuer or government bills had been iſſued by the court of Saxony to an amount beyond its ability to pay. Theſe bills were

ſunken

ſunken in their value fifty per cent. At the peace of Dreſden, Frederic ſtipulated with Auguſtus III. elector of Saxony, that the Pruſſian ſubjects holding Steuer bills ſhould be indemnified; that is, that the bills ſhould be paid to the full amount. The negligent, the ſluggiſh Auguſtus forgot to enquire what this amount was; and to buy up Steuer bills for half their value, and to bring them to the bank of Dreſden for full payment, became a traffic with the Pruſſians: Hanway * and others aſſure us the King himſelf was one of theſe traders. That Voltaire ſhould wiſh to profit by ſuch illicit commerce was ſtrange. He however employed a Jew of the name of Hirſch, or Herſcheld, to purchaſe Steuer bills for him in Saxony, and for this purpoſe furniſhed his agent with money and notes. As a ſecurity for this truſt, the Jew left ſome diamonds in the poſſeſſion of Voltaire, which were the property of M. Chaſot, a French officer, and a favourite with the King, as well as with the

* See Hanway's Travels; quarto, London, 1762, vol. i. p. 444.

ducheſs

ducheſs of Mecklenburg, from whom he himſelf had received them. Of this Voltaire being informed, and learning that he was trading with a ſuſpected knave, he haſtily ſent in queſt of him into Saxony, forbade him to negociate the bills of exchange, and wrote to Paris to have them proteſted. A demand of two hundred crowns was made by the Jew, to defray the expences of his journey, and theſe were paid; but an additional fallacious charge of five hundred Voltaire reſolved not to defray.

Deceived in his hopes, the Jew refuſed to receive the diamonds; pretending that, in lieu of large, ſmall brilliants had been ſubſtituted. He became daring by being openly protected by Maupertuis, and all the French who were of his cabal. Jealous of their rivals the French, the German literati rejoiced, and fomented the quarrel. The King was told that Voltaire treated his poetry with contempt; orders were given to the divine author of the Henriade not to appear at Potſdam; and, leſt the judges ſhould wink at miſdemeanour in his ſuppoſed favourite, count Rothemburg was ſent by Frederic to his grand chancellor,

Cocceii,

Cocceii, directing him to adminiſter ſtrict juſtice: and Voltaire, the ſo lately univerſal, potent, ſublime genius, in whoſe preſence hiſtorians, orators, poets, philoſophers, nay the gods themſelves, ſhrunk into dwarfiſhneſs, was in danger of being recorded a villain.

Some months elapſed before the cauſe was tried, but truth at length was triumphant. The never-indolent Voltaire, impelled by all the indignation of impending infamy, was peculiarly active in the detection of a foe ſo contemptible. The Jew was caſt, in deſpite of Maupertuis, his cabal, and the German literati; and ſoon afterward, for forgeries and other crimes not relative to this cauſe, was condemned to impriſonment in the citadel of Magdeburg *.

Thus much is due to genius, truth, and Voltaire.

Of the correſpondence between Frederic II. and other conſpicuous men, that with Voltaire holds the firſt rank. Thoſe who are but partially acquainted with the hiſtory of this poet, will here receive infinite pleaſure and information. I do not by praiſing

* See Vie de Fred. II. tome iv. page 41; à Straſbourg, chez Treuttel, edition de 1788, in-8vo.

mean

mean to exculpate Voltaire from the charge of flattery; for, though much may be urged to ſoften this charge, it cannot be annulled. Voltaire was of a nation which, by the perverſity of its government, was habituated to adulation. What would here, and will ſoon there, be thought fulſome, was ſcarcely ſufficient for the common forms of good breeding. The language of a paraſite, in a free country, would not, in the courteſy of its terms, equal that of the moſt independent of the children of Deſpotiſm. This however was a truth too obvious long to lie concealed from the genius of Voltaire; but his writings in favour of freedom were ſo pointed, and ſuppoſed to be ſo dangerous, that the moſt powerful patronage was neceſſary, to ſave him from deſtruction. Yes; the hard conceſſion is wrung from us, that Voltaire muſt either have been ſilent, a fawner, or a martyr. That he was not ſilent, that he was not a martyr, are the happineſs and the glory of France. The only error he was guilty of was that of overacting adulation. Let this be remembered, while his letters are read, and the pleaſure they will afford will indeed be great. Frederic

may

may juſtly be called his pupil, in all that he underſtood of virtue; for, though others no doubt were as willing as Voltaire to teach him virtue, who could teach it with the ſame inimitable art?

I would not be thought the unqualified panegyriſt of Voltaire; many of his actions merit cenſure, and many of them were cenſured by himſelf. But the powers of his mind, and the general diſplay of thoſe powers, it is impoſſible ſufficiently to admire, or to praiſe.

The correſpondence of Frederic with Jordan and D'Arget, exhibits his turn for wit and humour, and highly contributes to pourtray character. His pretenſions to genuine friendſhip, contraſted with the ſarcaſms, and even ſomething more than ſarcaſm, with which he treats his *friends*, not only teach the philoſopher what Frederic was, but what his equals, minds of high worth, are ever in danger of becoming, under ſimilar circumſtances. Small things in this are equal to great, for they do not leſs emphatically mark the dangerous conſequences of exceſſive power. It is ſcarcely

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hyperbolical to ſay that none but an angel can be an Alfred and a king.

For ſimilar, and for additional reaſons, the correſpondence with the marquis d'Argens is ſtill more precious. Poſſeſſed of ſuch materials, the true hiſtorian can ſeldom be miſtaken in facts, and never in the man. The irritation of humbled haughtineſs, the dignity of conſcious courage, the ſpleen of wit, the magnanimity of deſponding fortitude, and the exultation of reviving hope, are energetically contraſted. Such remarks are almoſt ſuperfluous. I ſhould have but a mean opinion of the underſtanding of the man who ſhould read this correſpondence, and not feel, though he might not trouble himſelf accurately to define, theſe emotions.

Excluſive of other merits, the correſpondence with D'Alembert has, in conjunction with that of Voltaire, the peculiar one of affording materials to the hiſtorian, as well as of gratifying curioſity, during thoſe years of peace when the ordinary vehicles of intelligence make little mention of the acts of kings, and nations. After what has been ſaid of adulation, it were in vain to accuſe

D'Alembert.

D'Alembert. He had as much independence of mind as a man of his talents, ſo ſituated, could have; to expect more were unjuſt. I would only warn thoſe of my readers who wiſh to be very polite, and who, perhaps from good motives ill underſtood, might imitate that repetition of fulſome phraſeology, which is ſo often iterated by D'Alembert, and indeed by other of the correſpondents of the king, that ſuch phraſes are as unſuitable to the Engliſh language as they are to the ſpirit of the Engliſh nation. Few are conſciouſly mean, though many are ſo from example.

As an illuſtration of the character of Frederic, the reader no doubt will be glad to learn, from himſelf, what his opinions were of many of the moſt famous literati of the age; but there is little fear that the ſarcaſtic and ſevere manner in which men like Linnæus, Euler, Helvetius, the abbé Raynal, both the Rouſſeaus, and various other perſons are treated ſhould miſlead any one: their true worth is too generally known to fear defamation. The contempt of the king for mathematicians was ſingular. When he held

held geometry to be inferior to ethics, and the knowledge of the human heart, he judged ſoundly; but when he thought it of little value, nay ridiculous, his error was extreme and aſtoniſhing. D'Alembert has been cenſured, for never having recommended a man of genius to Frederic, except M. la Grange, the mathematician, and the ſucceſſor in the academy of Berlin to M. Euler; but the cenſure perhaps will be thought unjuſt, when it is remembered that this only man of genius of his recommendation, who was with difficulty obtained from the court of Sardinia by Frederic, removed to Berlin there to live in equal if not in greater neglect than that in which he had lived at Turin. Count Mirabeau, in the *Hiſtoire Secrette de la Cour de Berlin* *, pleads with great energy, to M. de Calonne, to obtain an aſylum for him in France, after the death of Frederic, by whom he was left, notwithſtanding the labours with which he had enriched the Memoirs of the Academy

* The Secret Hiſtory of the Court of Berlin—a book the moſt ſingular, and in ſome reſpects the moſt inſtructive and amuſing, of any the world has lately ſeen.

of

of Berlin, without, as I believe, the ſmalleſt additional promotion, or reward. La Grange no doubt poſſeſſed that proper philoſophic dignity which diſdains adulation, and importunity. Kings are aſſaulted by men of leſs modeſty and worth, and when not reminded are prone to forget the man of merit. I know no better apology for their conduct. To be ſarcaſtic was habitual with Frederic II.; and confirmed habits are too mechanical to be at all times juſt and wiſe.

The remainder of the correſpondence, though not of equal conſequence, is of ſome; as it contributes to form a whole, and as it ſhews the progreſs of the mind of Frederic, from that period when, while prince royal, he wrote to Rollin and Fontenelle, to the laſt ſtage, in which he correſponded with Grimm and Condorcet.

How much is it to be regretted that this whole correſpondence has been garbled by the editors of Berlin! Let me be juſt: of this we have not at preſent any poſitive, but we have the ſtrongeſt preſumptive, proofs. The king's memory muſt be reſpected; the

feelings of the living muſt not be inſulted; yet, in what is publiſhed, the memory of the king is not reſpected, and the feelings of the living are inſulted. Theſe are contemptible pleas; yet men of the honour and worth of the editors of Berlin are actuated by ſuch motives, for they can have no better. When will mankind know that the egotiſm of individuals ought not to ſtand in competition with the leſſons which facts afford; and that, of all reſpectable things, truth is the moſt reſpectable? How noble an example has Jean Jaques Rouſſeau afforded mankind, by writing his Confeſſions! Where is the ſelfiſh coward who would not damn his own fame, could he by that teach wiſdom to the world? Let us hope theſe editors will repent of their error: at leaſt let us hope that, though they have curtailed, they have not annihilated; but that they have left their ſucceſſors the power of being honeſt. It is neceſſary I ſhould add that the omiſſions, which I ſuſpect, appear rather to be important for their contents than for their bulk. I imagine them to be few, but eſſential.

I have now to give ſome account of the work in Engliſh, and of myſelf as the tranſlator. Conſiderable time and attention have been beſtowed, firſt on the arrangement of the whole, and afterward of certain parts of the correſpondence. Where I have differed in arrangement from every other edition, it has been with a view to conſiſtency, and the connexion of parts that relate to each other. The inattention of the editors of Berlin, to arrangement, ſpeaks a very blameable degree of indolence. Inſtead of inſerting each letter with its correſponding anſwer, they have printed the letters of the individual correſpondents ſeparately; and left the trouble of ſeeking for order and connexion, through different volumes, to the reader. Nay, they have occaſionally jumbled the letters together, without ſo much as claſſing them according to their dates; or, when they wanted dates, enquiring from the contents to what period they ought to belong. Rumour ſays theſe editors are ſcholars, courtiers, and men of wit and breeding; but, if they thought the taſk beneath them, why not commit it to others?

The key to this enigma ſeems to be the fear of having the edition pirated; better however pirated than ſpoiled. The labour rejected, by the editors of Berlin, thoſe of the edition printed at Baſil beſtowed, but ſtill not with ſufficient accuracy. The latter appear to have been deceived in obtaining a copy to print from ſo ſoon as they had hoped, and wanted leiſure to equal their intentions. Nor can I boaſt of having completely reſtored order. There are ſome, but very few, undated letters, to which I could aſſign no poſitive place.

As the dates frequently differ, in the two editions of Berlin and of Baſil, I generally have inſerted one date in the text and the other in a note. Errors of the preſs ſeem to be more frequent in dates, and in figures, than in any other part of printing.

I have inſerted ſome pieces not to be found in any of the editions I have ſeen, of which pieces I happened to have collected copies. Theſe are the Prince of Pruſſia's Correſpondence: The Eulogium on Voltaire: The Catechiſm for the Young Nobility: and The Eſſay on German Literature. Of theſe I imagine

imagine the world will be glad to be in poſſeſſion. The Prince of Pruſſia's Correſpondence is indeed peculiarly intereſting, and amalgamates exceedingly well with that between the King and General Fouquet. As far as they go, they both form an additional and excellent commentary, for the lovers of hiſtory, on the ſeven years war.

As a ſpecies of compoſition, there cannot perhaps be a worſe than that of eulogium; but, as a ſpecimen of this compoſition, there can be but few happier ſubjects than Voltaire.

Of catechiſm I ſhould ſay the very reverſe; it is logic of the moſt concluſive and effectual kind: and, though there be ſome, there is but little falſe logic in Frederic's Catechiſm for the Nobility.

The Eſſay on German Literature is a memorable example of the power of prejudice; and it is not a little ſingular that, after having evidently paid ſo much court to the literati of France, to whom Frederic appeared to appeal for future fame, he ſhould ſo outrageouſly attack the whole army of ſcholars, and of wits, which Germany could produce. Still however, in the midſt of error, his intentions

tentions were good; and error itſelf may here, as it often has been, be productive of good effects: it may induce the learned to ſpeak the truth, and the whole truth, of him by whom they have not been flattered; and, which is better, it may excite them to rectify the abuſes he enumerates, which, though exaggerated, were many of them real. To this it muſt be added that the Eſſay contains many marks of good taſte.

Of the poetry, not mingled with proſe, I have given no tranſlation. The wiſh to be a poet was with Frederic much greater than the power. Whoever ſhould tranſlate his poetry, and leave it ſuch as it is, would endanger his own reputation, with the few readers whom he ſhould have; and even to infuſe beauties, not in the original, would expoſe the tranſlator to blame. Ages have united in allowing the tranſlation of proſe to be a taſk almoſt inſuperably difficult; and there is no temerity in adding that a poetical, accurate, and literal verſion of poetry is impoſſible.

As there is much poetry in the proſe which I have tranſlated, it is proper here to add what I intend to ſay on that ſubject.

The

The number of verſes thus tranſlated are ſufficient to fill a tolerably large volume; yet are they divided into ſeveral hundred ſhort ſcraps, many of which are the trifling, the ſportive effuſions of men who did not think of poetry, but of rhiming. I have, in ſome few inſtances, imitated much of their manner, for which I imagine myſelf to be in danger of cenſure; that is, I have, in perhaps a dozen inſtances, written with that jocular careleſſneſs which diſregards poetical language and harmony; though theſe, next to the ſubject, form the very ſoul of poetry. I doubt the poſſibility of an exact imitation of ſuch poetry as the King wrote ſo gaily, and ſo much at his eaſe: the ſpirit of it was frequently good; I cannot ſay ſo much of the performance. The ſpecimens I have given are chiefly in the correſpondence with Jordan, and are found in and after Letter CXLVI. I confeſs I would not wiſh any man, in the leaſt poſſeſſed of the ſoul of poetry, to be obliged again to undertake the tranſlation of theſe morſels. To talk of inkſtands, printers, pens, counters, and pills, and to introduce ſuch names as Remuſberg, Alga-

Algarotti, Baltimore, and Bonarotti, with a thouſand et cæteras, in all the raptures of poetry, is a taſk not greatly to be envied. Like the French, the King was, moſt unfortunately for the tranſlator, a great admirer of a mixture of poetry and proſe; in imitation of the *Voyage de Bachaumont et Chapelle*, Voltaire's Temple of Taſte, and ſimilar productions. A rigid adherence to the author, in a poetical verſion of poems like theſe, is a virtue which I renounce. If to conſult the ſpirit of the ſubject rather than the words, if to endeavour to catch an Engliſh ſpirit of poetry, congenial to the poem, and, when the mind was awakened, not ſeverely to reject an additional correſponding thought—if theſe be unpardonable, there are many paſſages in which I do not wait to be arraigned; I plead guilty. The King himſelf ſays, vol. viii. p. 150, "A few ſoleciſms "and bad rhymes ought not to be conſi-"dered as defects, when the poetry of an "emperor is tranſlated." I might with truth ſay the ſame of the poetry of a king: but I have endeavoured to obviate the neceſſity of ſuch a plea.

I have

I have not only omitted the poetry, ſome of which was indeed too indecent for tranſlation, but likewiſe the Dialogue between the Virgin Mary and Madame Pompadour, and the Thoughts on Religion. The Dialogue is only ſhort, would have given great offence to many very worthy people, and might have produced much miſchief, without any proſpect of good. The Thoughts on Religion, notwithſtanding their being in total contradiction to the religious opinions of Europe, ought to have been tranſlated, had they been written by the King, becauſe they are argumentative, and arguments on all ſides ought to be heard: if falſe, there is no danger but they will be refuted; if true, truth ought not to be concealed. But, as many reaſons are urged, which ſeem more than plauſible, that the work is not the production of the King *, juſtice to him requires the queſtion ſhould be aſcertained, before it is given as authentic.

None but the notes with the ſignature T. are mine. Some readers will think many

* See Vie de Fréderic II. tom. vii. p. 258, à Straſbourg, chez Treuttel, édition de 1789, in 8vo.

of the notes I have added ſuperfluous, and perhaps impertinent; but the majority will be ſorry I have not added more. Neither of them however will eaſily conceive the time and trouble that were neceſſary, or the numerous books that were conſulted, in order to aſcertain certain things that were doubtful, and to rectify others that were erroneous. Memory muſt not be truſted; neither is the reading of any man ſufficient to embrace the reading of all men. A tranſlator is not indeed culpable, if he preſerve the errors of his original; but to correct them appears to be meritorious.

Whether it be likewiſe meritorious to preſerve errors of metaphor, and of language, is a queſtion on which men differ. Some allege they wiſh to ſee the author as he is, and not the author new dreſſed; but a tranſlator on this point feels his own danger, and feels juſtly. Moſt of his readers would attribute the blunders of metaphor and of ſtyle to him, and not to the original. Beſide, let his abilities and care be what they will, the chances are, in a work of magnitude, that he ſhall commit ſome ſuch

himſelf. There are metaphors too in which one language indulges, although they almoſt appear abſurd in another: yet ſome of theſe a tranſlator will be almoſt compelled to retain; ſuch, for example, as the word *monument*, when ſpeaking of literary productions, to which I frequently could find no equivalent with which I was ſatisfied, and which therefore is preſerved. The ſame will be found true of others. The firſt duty of a tranſlator is, as far as poſſible, to give the exact *value* of the author's idea. Hence, when the languages correſpond, the very words of the original, if not offenſive to idiom, and as far as they are of the ſame exact value, ought to be tranſmitted. Indeed much more has been ſaid againſt idiom itſelf than it deſerves. Languages mutually enrich each other, by the introduction of new idioms, as well as of new words; and many of the charms of our greateſt poets, is the novelty which they have introduced, by the aid of idioms caught from the ancient and modern languages. Theſe, no doubt, were ſometimes introduced purpoſely; but we may

may ſuppoſe they generally were floating unconſciouſly in the imagination.

By an overſight, the French ſpelling Mayence is ſometimes followed, inſtead of Mentz, a city in Germany.

I have nothing further to add, but that I believe I have faithfully diſcharged my duty to my readers; and that, againſt thoſe of my readers who ſhall not be equally juſt to me, I ſhall cheriſh no enmity. Each of them will have thoughts, and opinions, literary, political, and moral, different, more or leſs, from mine. Let opinions be diſcuſſed; let them be praiſed, blamed, ridiculed, nay contemned; but let them be free.

Newman-ſtreet, London,
March, 1790.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAP. I.

State of Prussia at the Death of Frederic William. Characters of the European Princes, their Ministers, and Generals. An Estimate of their Strength, Resources, and Influence in the System of Europe. State of the Sciences and fine Arts. Origin of the War against the House of Austria.

1740. AT the death of Frederic William, king of Prussia, the revenues of the kingdom amounted only to seven millions four hundred thousand crowns; population, in the various provinces, to three millions*. The late king left behind him eight millions seven hundred thousand crowns, unincumbered by debts, and the finances well administered, but with few resources. The balance of trade annually lost one million two hundred thousand crowns, which money enriched foreign nations. The army was seventy-

* This is a round number which the king has put: population in 1740 really amounted only to 2,240,000.

ſix thouſand ſtrong, and about twenty-ſix thouſand of the ſoldiery were foreigners. This proves it to have been an effort beyond the natural ſtrength of the kingdom, and that three millions of inhabitants were inſufficient to recruit even fifty thouſand men, eſpecially in time of war. Frederic William entered into no alliances; he wiſhed to leave his ſucceſſor entirely at liberty, concerning the choice of thoſe he ſhould form, and which after his death might be the moſt advantageous to the nation.

Europe was in a ſtate of peace, England and Spain excepted, which nations made war in the New World for two Engliſh ears cut off by the Spaniards. Theſe powers mutually expended immenſe ſums concerning a contraband trade highly unworthy of the great efforts they mutually made. The emperor Charles VI. had lately concluded peace with the Turks at Belgrade, through the mediation of Mr. de Villeneuve, the French ambaſſador at Conſtantinople. By this peace the emperor ceded to the grand ſeignior the kingdom of Servia, a part of Moldavia, and the important city of Belgrade. The latter years of the emperor Charles VI. had been ſo unfortunate that he had ſeen himſelf ſtripped of the kingdom of Naples, of Sicily, and a part of the Milaneſe, by the French, the Spaniards, and the Sardinians.

Sardinians. He had, likewiſe, by the peace of 1737, ceded the dutchy of Lorrain to France, which had been in poſſeſſion of the family of the duke his ſon-in-law from time immemorial. By this treaty the emperor beſtowed provinces, and France vain guarantees. Tuſcany excepted, which muſt be regarded as a precarious poſſeſſion, France guarantied to the emperor a family law, which he had publiſhed concerning the ſucceſſion, ſo well known in Europe by the name of the Pragmatic Sanction. The purport of this law was to aſcertain the ſucceſſion undivided to his daughter. There is, no doubt, good reaſon to be ſurpriſed at perceiving the end of the reign of Charles VI. ſo inferiour to the renown of its commencement. We ought to attribute the cauſe of the misfortunes of this monarch to the loſs of prince Eugene. Charles had no one to replace this great man. After his death, the ſtate loſt its vigour, became languid, and its members periſhed. Charles VI. had received from nature qualities which conſtitute the good citizen, but none of thoſe which form the great man. He was generous but without diſcernment; his mind was limited, and deſtitute of penetration; he had induſtry, but not genius; ſo that, while he laboured much, he performed little. He well underſtood the

German conſtitutional forms, and ſpoke ſeveral languages, particularly the Latin, in which he excelled. He was a good father, a good huſband, but a ſuperſtitious bigot, like all the princes of the houſe of Auſtria. He had been educated to obey, not to command. His miniſters amuſed him by making him a judge of ſuits in the Aulic council, and by punctually attaching him to the minutiæ of ceremony, and the etiquette of the houſe of Burgundy. Thus, while he was employed in trifles like theſe, or waſting his time in hunting, his miniſters, the true maſters of the monarchy, diſpoſed of all.

The good fortune of the houſe of Auſtria had brought into its ſervice prince Eugene of Savoy, of whom we have juſt ſpoken. This prince had worn the clerical band in France. Louis XIV. refuſed him a benefice; Eugene requeſted a company of dragoons; this he was likewiſe refuſed, becauſe they miſtook his genius, and becauſe the young lords of the court had given him the nick-name of Dame Claude. Eugene, perceiving every gate of fortune ſhut upon him, left his mother, madame de Soiſſons, and France, and offered his ſervices to the emperor Leopold. He became colonel, and obtained a regiment. His merit made rapid ſtrides. The ſignal ſervices he performed, and the ſuperiority

of

of his talents, ſoon raiſed him to the firſt military commands. He was generaliſſimo, preſident of the council of war, and, finally, prime-miniſter to the emperor Charles VI. This prince ſaw himſelf the chief of the Imperial army; he governed not only the Auſtrian provinces but the empire itſelf; properly ſpeaking he was emperor. So long as prince Eugene preſerved the vigour of his mind, the arms and negotiations of Auſtria proſpered; but the head which had ſo long laboured for the welfare of the Imperial houſe was, when enfeebled by age and infirmities, incapable of continuing the ſame labours, and of rendering the ſame ſervices. How humiliating to our vanity are reflections like theſe! A Conde, an Eugene, a Marlborough, behold the underſtanding extinct while the body continues to live, and men of the moſt boundleſs genius end in imbecillity! Pride thyſelf hereafter, poor Humanity, in thy powers if thou dareſt. The mental decline of prince Eugene was the moment of intrigue among all the Auſtrian miniſters. Count Zintzendorf acquired the moſt control over the mind of his maſter; he had little induſtry, but was fond of good cheer; he was the Apicius of the Imperial court, and the emperor ſaid that the excellent ragouts of his miniſter were the cauſe of the

ill ſucceſs of his affairs. The count was inſolent and haughty; he imagined himſelf an Agrippa, a Mecenas; the princes of the empire were offended at the ſeverity of his government, very different, in that reſpect, from the government of prince Eugene, who employed gentleneſs only, by which he guided the Germanic body at his pleaſure.

When count Zintzendorf was employed at the congreſs of Cambray, he imagined he had penetrated into the character of cardinal de Fleuri. The Frenchman, more artful than the German, deceived him, and Zintzendorf returned to Vienna perſuaded that he governed the court of Verſailles as he did that of the emperor. Soon after this, prince Eugene, who ſaw the emperor was continually occupied on the means of maintaining the Pragmatic ſanction, told him the moſt effectual would be to keep up an army of an hundred and eighty thouſand men, and that he would indicate how the ſupplies might be obtained for the payment of this augmentation, if the emperor would conſent. The genius of Charles, ſubjected to that of Eugene, dared not to refuſe. An augmentation of forty thouſand men was reſolved upon, and the army was preſently completed. The counts of Zintzendorf and Stahrenberg, enemies of prince Eugene,

Eugene, repreſented to the emperor that his provinces, labouring under enormous contributions, were inſufficient for the maintenance of ſo vaſt an army, and, unleſs he would intirely ruin Auſtria, Bohemia, and his other ſtates, he muſt diſband the new-raiſed troops. Charles VI. who knew as little of the finances as he did of the countries he governed, yielded to the remonſtrances of his miniſters, and diſbanded theſe forty thouſand men, a little before the deceaſe of Auguſtus I. king of Poland.

Two candidates roſe up, deſirous of aſcending the vacant throne of Poland. The one was Auguſtus, elector of Saxony, ſon of the late king, and ſupported by the emperor, the empreſs of Ruſſia, and the money and men of Saxony. The other was Staniſlaus Lezinſky, invited by the wiſhes of the Poles, and protected by his ſon-in-law Louis XV. But the aid which he obtained from France conſiſted only in four battalions. He once more ſaw Poland, was beſieged in Dantzic, and, unable to maintain himſelf there, a ſecond time renounced the mournful diſtinction of being the king of a republic in which anarchy reigned.

Zintzendorf depended ſo intirely on the pacific ſpirit of the cardinal de Fleuri that he inconſiderately engaged his court in the troubles of

Poland. The pleaſure of beſtowing the crown of this kingdom coſt the emperor three kingdoms and ſome fine provinces. The French had paſſed the Rhine, and were beſieging Kehl at the very time when the people of Vienna were laying wagers concerning their inactivity. The war that had been undertaken was the work of vanity, and the peace which followed that of weakneſs. The name of prince Eugene, which ſtill was awful, ſuſtained the Auſtrian arms upon the Rhine during the campaigns of 1734 and 1735. He ceaſed to live ſoon after, but too late for his own glory. The command of the army and the preſidency of the council of war, which united places had been held by prince Eugene, were ſeparated. Count de Harrach was made preſident, and Königſeck, Wallis, Seckendorff, Neuperg, Schmettau, Khevenhuller, and the prince of Hildbourghauſen, intrigued for the dangerous honour of commanding the Imperial armies. To wreſtle againſt the reputation of prince Eugene, and to occupy a poſt which he with ſo much honour had held, was a conteſt highly liable to diſgrace. Theſe generals were, beſide, as much divided among themſelves as were the ſucceſſors of Alexander. As a ſubſtitute for the merit they wanted, they had recourſe to faction. Seckendorff and the prince of Hildbourghauſen relied on the credit

credit of the empreſs, and that of the miniſter, named Bartenſtein, a native of Alſatia, of low extraction, but laborious, and who, with two aſſociates, Knorr and Weber, formed a triumvirate who at that time governed the affairs of the empire. Khevenhuller had a party in the council of war; and Wallis, who gloried in hating and being hated by the whole world, had no party any where. The Ruſſians were then at war with the Turks. The ſucceſs of the former inflamed the courage of the Auſtrians. Bartenſtein imagined the Turks might be driven out of Europe. Seckendorff had the command of the army. Theſe two perſons, under the pretence that the emperor ought to aſſiſt the Ruſſians, his allies, againſt the enemy of the Chriſtian name, plunged the houſe of Auſtria into an abyſs of ills. Every body was ambitious of giving the emperor advice. His miniſters, the empreſs, the duke of Lorrain, each and all were in cabals. Every new day new projects iſſued from the Imperial council. The factions of the great, who laboured for each other's ruin, and the jealouſy of the generals, cauſed every enterpriſe to fail. The orders which the commanders daily received from the court were each contradictory to the other, and obliged them to undertake things impra-

impracticable. Such domeſtic diſorder became more fatal to the Auſtrian arms than to the power of the infidels. The Hoſt was carried in proceſſion at Vienna, while battles were loſt in Hungary, and recourſe was had to the ſorceries of ſuperſtition to repair the errors of incapacity. Seckendorff was impriſoned at the concluſion of the firſt campaign, becauſe it was alleged his hereſy drew down celeſtial wrath. Königſeck, after having commanded the ſecond year, was made grand maſter of the empreſs. This gave occaſion to Wallis, who had the command the third year, to ſay that his firſt predeceſſor had been caged, the ſecond was become a eunuch of the ſeraglio, and that it remained for him to be beheaded. He was but little wide of the truth, for, after the loſs of the battle of Kreutzka, he was impriſoned in the caſtle of Brunn. Neuperg, whom the emperor and the duke of Lorrain had ſtrongly conjured to accelerate peace, concluded a treaty with the Turks at Belgrade, and, in recompenſe, was, on his return, confined in the caſtle of Glatz. Thus the court of Vienna, not daring to examine the origin of its misfortunes, and to which its moſt auguſt members had contributed, puniſhed its ſubaltern inſtruments to obtain conſolation.

1739.

1739. After the concluſion of this peace the Auſtrian army was found to be in a dreadfully ruinous ſtate. It had ſuſtained conſiderable loſſes at Widden, and Meudia, Panchova, Timoc and Kreutzka. Foul air and unhealthy water had occaſioned epidemic diſeaſes, and from the neighbourhood of the Turks it had caught the plague; it was at the ſame time diſcouraged and deſtroyed. Moſt of the troops, after the peace, remained in Hungary, but their number did not exceed forty-three thouſand men, and no one thought of re-eſtabliſhing the army. Beſide theſe, the emperor had not more than ſixteen thouſand men in Italy, twelve thouſand, at the moſt, in Flanders, and five or ſix regiments diſperſed through his hereditary domains. Thus, inſtead of the army amounting to one hundred and ſeventy-five thouſand men, its effective force was leſs than eighty-two thouſand. In the year 1733 it had been computed that the revenues of the emperor might be about twenty-eight millions *. Since this period he had loſt much, and the expences of two ſucceſſive wars had over-

* In the French language the word millions, without another explanatory ſubſtantive, uſually ſuppoſes millions of livres; but in this work it ſeems to ſuppoſe crowns of 3 livres, or 2s. 6d. value. T.

whelmed

whelmed him with debts, which he ſcarcely could pay with twenty millions, which ſtill remained; his finances were, beſide, in the utmoſt confuſion; diſcord openly reigned among his miniſters, and jealouſy between his generals. The emperor himſelf, diſcouraged by ſuch repeated ill ſucceſs, was diſguſted with the vanity of grandeur. The Auſtrian empire, however, notwithſtanding its hidden vices and weak parts, was enumerated among the moſt mighty of the European powers in the year 1740; its reſources were remembered, and how poſſible it was for an active mind to effect a total change! Meantime, its pride ſupplied its want of ſtrength, and its paſt glory ſcreened its preſent humiliation.

France was in a very different ſtate. This kingdom had not found itſelf in a more proſperous ſituation ſince the year 1672. It was indebted for a part of its advantages to the ſage adminiſtration of cardinal de Fleuri. Louis XIV. had made this cardinal, then biſhop of Frejus, the preceptor of his grandſon. Prieſts are as ambitious as other men, and often more ſubtle. After the death of the regent, duke of Orleans, Fleuri drove the duke of Bourbon, who then occupied that place, into exile, that he might obtain it himſelf. His manner of governing

verning was rather prudent than active. While in the arms of his miſtreſſes he perſecuted the Janſeniſts. He would have only orthodox biſhops, and yet, during a dangerous fit of ſickneſs, he refuſed receiving the ſacraments of the church. All the reſpect which the pride of pomp can inſpire had been exhauſted by Richlieu and Mazarin. Fleuri, in contraſt, would have his grandeur to conſiſt in ſimplicity. He left but little wealth to his deſcendants, but he enriched them by immenſe benefactions, which were liberally ſhowered among them by the king. This prime-miniſter preferred negotiation to war, becauſe in faction he was powerful, but knew not how to command armies. He affected to be pacific, that he might become the umpire rather than the conqueror of kings: he was bold in his projects, but timid in execution; an œconomiſt of the revenues of the ſtate, and endowed with the ſpirit of order; qualities which rendered him uſeful to France, the finances of which had been exhauſted by the war of the ſucceſſion, and a vicious adminiſtration. He neglected the army too much, and was too much prejudiced in favour of the financiers. The naval force was almoſt annihilated while he governed, and the military ſo much neglected that they could not erect their tents during

during the firſt campaign of 1733. With ſome good qualities for interior adminiſtration, the character of this miniſter in Europe was that of weakneſs and knavery; vices which he derived from the church in which he had been educated. The good œconomy of the cardinal, however, procured the kingdom the means of liquidating a part of the immenſe debt contracted under the reign of Louis XIV. He repaired the diſorders of the regency, and, by temporiſing means, France recovered from the confuſion in which ſhe had been thrown by the ſyſtem of Law.

Twenty years of peace were neceſſary to this monarchy, after ſo many calamities. Chauvelin, the ſub-miniſter, who acted under the cardinal, rouzed the kingdom from its inactivity; it was he who brought France to undertake the war in 1733; the pretext for which was king Staniſlaus, but by which France gained Lorrain. The courtiers at Verſailles ſaid that Chauvelin had juggled the cardinal into war, but that the cardinal had juggled him into peace. Chauvelin, encouraged, and triumphant to ſee his firſt eſſay ſo ſucceſsful, flattered himſelf he might become prime-miniſter. To effect this it was neceſſary to dethrone the cardinal, and calumny was not ſpared, in order to blacken

blacken him in the mind of Louis XV.: but this monarch, ſubordinate to the cardinal, whom he ſtill ſuppoſed his preceptor, retold all he heard. Chauvelin fell the victim of his ambition; his place was given by the cardinal to Mr. Amelot, a man without genius, in whom the prime-miniſter boldly confided, becauſe he poſſeſſed no dangerous talents. The long peace which France had enjoyed had deprived the army of a ſucceſſion of great generals. Villars, who had commanded the firſt campaign in Italy, was dead. Broglio, Noailles, and De Coigni, were men of mediocre abilities; nor were they ſurpaſſed by Maillebois. Noailles was accuſed of wanting that warlike inſtinct which confides in its own powers. He one day found a ſword hung before his door, with the inſcription, THOU SHALT DO NO MURDER. The genius of marechal Saxe was not yet developed. marechal Belleiſle, among military men, moſt had won the affection of the public. He was regarded as the ſupport of military diſcipline; his mind was vaſt, his wit brilliant, his courage daring; the trade of war was his paſſion, but he yielded, without reſerve, to his imagination. He invented projects, and his brother reduced them to order. The mare-

chal was called Fancy, and his brother Good-ſenſe.

After the peace of Vienna, France became the arbitreſs of Europe. In Italy, as in Germany, her arms were triumphant. Her ambaſſador, Villeneuve, had concluded the peace of Belgrade. She held the courts of Vienna, Madrid, and Stockholm, in a kind of dependance. Her military forces conſiſted in a hundred and eighty battalions, each of ſix hundred men; two hundred and twenty-four ſquadrons, of a hundred men each; which together amount to one hundred and thirty thouſand four hundred men, beſide thirty-ſix thouſand militia. Her marine was conſiderable; ſhe could fit out eighty veſſels of different rates, including frigates; and, for the ſervice of theſe fleets, ſixty-thouſand ſailors were enregiſtered. In the year 1740 the revenues of the kingdom amounted to ſixty millions of crowns, ten millions of which were ſet apart to pay the intereſt of debts that ſtill remained of the war of the ſucceſſion. The cardinal de Fleuri called the farmers general, who ſuperintended theſe revenues, the forty pillars of the ſtate; becauſe he conſidered the wealth of theſe farmers as the moſt certain reſource of the kingdom. That rank of men which is moſt uſeful to ſociety, called the people, and who culti-

cultivated the earth, were poor and oppreſſed, eſpecially in what were called the conquered provinces. In revenge, the luxury and opulence of Paris equalled, perhaps, the profuſe ſplendor of ancient Rome in the time of Lucullus. It was ſuppoſed there were more than ten millions of wrought ſilver in the houſes of the individuals of that immenſe capital: but manners were become degenerate; the French, and eſpecially the inhabitants of Paris, were Sybarites, enervated by voluptuouſneſs and effeminacy. The money which the cardinal had amaſſed during his adminiſtration was ſpent; part of it in the war of 1733, and the remainder in the fearful famine of the year 1740; which ruined the moſt flouriſhing provinces of the kingdom. Out of the evils which Law had brought upon France a kind of good had reſulted, which conſiſted in the South-ſea company, eſtabliſhed at Port Orient: but the ſuperiority of the Engliſh fleets ruining this commerce in every war, which the naval force of France could not ſufficiently protect, at length the company was no longer able to ſuſtain itſelf. Such was the ſituation of France in the year 1740; reſpected abroad, abounding in abuſes at home, and under the government of a weak prince, who

had abandoned himself and his kingdom to the direction of cardinal de Fleuri.

Philip V. for whom Louis XIV. had ruined himself to seat him on the Spanish throne, still there reigned sovereign. This prince had the misfortune to be subject to attacks of gloomy melancholy, which much resembled lunacy. He had abdicated the crown, in 1726, in favour of his son Louis, and again took the reins of government in 1727, after the death of that prince. This abdication was contrary to the will of the queen, Elizabeth of Farnese, born princess of Parma. She would have governed the whole world; she could exist only on the throne.

That she might prevent the king in future from being disgusted with sovereignty, she continually engaged him to undertake new wars against the Moors, the English, or the house of Austria. The pride of a Spartan, the obstinacy of an Englishman, the cunning of an Italian, and the vivacity of a Frenchman, jointly formed the character of this singular woman; who marched audaciously to the accomplishment of her designs; whom nothing could surprise, nothing could impede.

Cardinal Alberoni, a man so celebrated in his time, had a genius resembling that of this princess;

princeſs; he long acted under her. This miniſter was undone by the conſpiracy of prince Celamare, and the queen was obliged to baniſh him, in ſatisfaction to the vengeance of the duke of Orleans, regent of France. A Dutchman named Ripperda ſupplied the important poſt he had held. Ripperda had underſtanding, but his malverſations made it impoſſible he ſhould long continue in office. Theſe changes of the miniſtry were not perceptible in Spain, becauſe the miniſters were but the inſtruments of the queen, and becauſe it was her will which at all times regulated affairs.

In the year 1740 Spain glorioufly terminated the war of Italy. Don Carlos, whom the Engliſh had eſcorted into Tuſcany, to ſucceed Coſmo, the laſt duke of the houſe of Medicis; Don Carlos, I ſay, was become king of Naples, and Francis of Lorrain had received Tuſcany in recompenſe for Lorrain, which France had united to her monarchy. Thus theſe very Engliſh who had fought with ſuch fury againſt Philip V. were the promoters of the Spaniſh power in Italy; ſo liable are politics to change, and ſo variable are the opinions of men!

The Spaniards are not ſo rich in Europe as they might be, becauſe they are not induſtrious. The treaſures of the new world are the property

of other nations, who have appropriated this commerce to themſelves, under Spaniſh names. The French, Dutch, and Engliſh, properly ſpeaking, enjoy Peru and Mexico; Spain is become a ſtore-houſe, whence riches glide, and where thoſe who are the cunningeſt catch the moſt. Spain has not inhabitants enough to cultivate the earth; wiſe laws have hitherto been neglected, and ſuperſtition has placed this witty people in the rank of the moſt feeble nations.

The revenues of the king amount to twenty-four millions of crowns, but the government is indebted. Spain maintained from fifty-five to ſixty thouſand regular troops: her naval force might amount to fifty ſhips of the line. The ties of kindred, which unite the two houſes of Bourbon, had produced a ſtrict alliance; but the queen, however, was enraged at the peace of 1737, which cardinal de Fleuri had concluded without her knowledge: to revenge herſelf, ſhe involved France in every vexation which was in her power.

Spain was then at war with England, for protecting her ſmugglers. The cutting off an Engliſh ſailor's ears kindled the fire, and the armaments of the two nations coſt immenſe ſums; trade ſuffered, and, according to cuſtom, merchants and private perſons expiated the follies of the great. Cardinal de Fleuri was not ſorry for this war; he

he was in expectation of acting the part of mediator, or arbitrator, that he might increaſe the commercial advantages of France.

Portugal made no figure in Europe: Don Juan was conſpicuous only for his abſurd paſſion for the ceremonies of the church. By a brief from the Pope he obtained the privilege of having a patriarch; and, by another brief, the right of ſaying maſs, conſecration excepted. His pleaſures were the performance of ſacerdotal functions, and the building of convents; his armies were monks, his miſtreſſes nuns.

England of all the European nations was the moſt opulent; ſhe traded over the whole earth; her wealth was exceſſive, her reſources almoſt inexhauſtible: yet, endowed with all theſe advantages, ſhe held not that rank among nations which ſeemed to be her due.

George II. elector of Hanover, was then king of England: he poſſeſſed virtues and abilities, but his paſſions were warm to exceſs; he was firm in his reſolutions; rather avaricious than œconomical; capable of labour, incapable of patience; valiant, violent, but governing England according to the intereſts of his electorate, and too little maſter of himſelf to manage a nation whoſe idol was liberty.

The miniſter of this monarch was Sir Robert

Walpole. He had captivated the king by the ſavings he had made out of the civil liſt, from which George filled his Hanoverian treaſury. Walpole directed the national ſpirit by the places and penſions which he timely beſtowed, that he might procure a majority in the Houſe of Commons. His genius could not extend itſelf beyond the ſhores of England; he depended on the ſagacity of his brother for what related to the general affairs of Europe. One day, when ſome ladies perſuaded him to make one at a card party, he replied, I abandon play and Europe to my brother. He underſtood nothing of the political ſyſtem: this occaſioned his enemies to calumniate him, and to accuſe him of being corrupt.

Notwithſtanding all the knowledge which Walpole had of internal government, he undertook an important project, in which he failed *. He wiſhed to introduce the exciſe in England. Had he ſucceeded, the ſums which this tax would have produced would have been ſufficient to render the royal authority deſpotic. The nation felt it, and took the alarm. The members of parliament told Walpole that he paid them the currency of common follies, but this was a folly beyond all purchaſe.

* 1727.

Walpole

Walpole was attacked as he left the parliament-houſe; they ſeized his roquelaur, which he quitted in good time, and eſcaped by the aſſiſtance of a captain of the guards, who, fortunately for him, happened to be in the crowd. This experiment taught the king to reſpect Engliſh liberty; the affair of the exciſe fell to the ground, and his prudence ſeated him more firmly on the throne. The inteſtine troubles of England prevented the nation taking part in the war of 1733. War ſoon after broke out with Spain, contrary to the wiſhes of the court. The city merchants produced the ears of the Engliſh ſmuggler, which had been cut off by the Spaniards, before the Houſe of Commons. The bloody robe of Cæſar, diſplayed by Antony before the Roman people, cauſed not ſenſations more ſtrong at Rome than theſe ears excited at London: the minds of men were agitated, war was tumultuouſly determined on, and the miniſtry was obliged to conſent. The court derived no other advantage from this war than that of ſending admiral Haddock from London, whoſe eloquence was more prevalent in the Houſe of Commons than the corruption of Walpole; and the miniſter, who had ſaid he knew the price of every Engliſhman, becauſe there were none whom he had not attempted to bribe

or buy, ſaw that his gold could not always conquer the ſtrength and evidence of reaſon.

England at that time had eighty ſhips of the four firſt rates, and fifty inferior veſſels, with about thirty thouſand land forces: her revenues in time of peace amounted to twenty-four millions of crowns, beſide which ſhe had immenſe reſources in the purſes of individuals, and the eaſe with which taxes might be levied on her opulent ſubjects. She granted ſubſidies to Denmark for the maintenance of ſix thouſand men, and to Heſſe for the like number, which, added to twenty-two thouſand Hanoverians, furniſhed her with a body of thirty-four thouſand men, at her diſpoſal, in Germany. Wager and Ogle enjoyed the reputation of being her beſt admirals: the duke of Argyle and the earl of Stair were the only perſons who had any well-founded pretenſions to head the military, though neither of them had ever commanded armies.

Littleton was ſaid to be the moſt vehement orator, lord Hardwick the beſt informed man, lord Cheſterfield the moſt witty, and lord Carteret the moſt violent politician.

Though the arts and ſciences had taken root in the kingdom, their native mildneſs had not ſoftened the ferocity of the national manners.

The

The unfeeling character of the Engliſh required tragedies of blood: they perpetuated thoſe combats of gladiators which are the diſgrace of humanity. They had produced the great Newton, but no painter, no ſculptor, no good muſician. Pope ſtill flouriſhed, and adorned poetry with thoſe bold opinions with which he was ſupplied by Shafteſbury and Bolingbroke. Swift, whoſe parallel is no where to be found, was ſuperior to his countrymen in taſte, and ſignalized himſelf by refined criticiſms on manners and cuſtoms. The city of London exceeded that of Paris in population by two hundred thouſand ſouls. The inhabitants of the three kingdoms amounted to nearly eight millions. Scotland, then full of Jacobites, groaned under the Engliſh yoke; and the Catholics of Ireland complained of the oppreſſion in which they were held by the high church.

Holland followed after this nation as a ſloop follows the track of a ſhip of war, to which ſhe is laſhed. After the abolition of the ſtadtholderſhip, that republic had aſſumed an ariſtocratical form. The grand Penſionary, aſſiſted by his clerk, propoſed public affairs to the aſſembly of the States General, gave audiences to foreign miniſters, and laid the reports before the council. The deliberations of theſe aſſemblies

blies are ſlow; ſecrets are ill kept, becauſe they muſt be communicated to too great a number of deputies. As citizens, the Dutch abhor the ſtadtholderſhip, which they regard as the high road to tyranny; and, as merchants, their only policy is their intereſt. By the principles of their government they are better enabled to defend themſelves than to attack their neighbours.

With ſurpriſe and mingled admiration we conſider this republic, ſituated in a marſhy and ſterile country, and half ſurrounded by the ocean, which threatens to waſh away its dykes, and inundate its provinces. Two millions of people there enjoy that opulence which they owe to commerce and to thoſe wonders which induſtry has effected. The city of Amſterdam, it is true, complained that the Daniſh Eaſt-India Company, and that of the French, eſtabliſhed at Port Orient, was of ſome prejudice to its trade. Theſe were the complaints of the envious; a more real calamity afflicted the republic; a ſpecies of worms found in the Aſiatic ports had been brought home in their ſhips, and afterward had introduced themſelves into the piles that ſupport the dykes. Theſe worms deſtroyed both the ſhips and the piles, and Holland dreaded leſt its

bulwarks

bulwarks ſhould be thrown down by the firſt tempeſt. The council aſſembled, but could find no better remedy for the evil than that of ordaining faſt-days throughout the country. A wit obſerved that the worms ought to have been ordained to faſt. The ſtate was, nevertheleſs, exceedingly rich; it had debts which had remained ſince the war of the ſucceſſion, but which rather ſtrengthened than enfeebled the national credit. The Penſionary, Vander Heym, who governed Holland, was ſaid to be but a common man, phlegmatic, circumſpect, and even timid, but attached to England from habit, religion, and the fear in which he ſtood of France.

The revenues of the republic might be twelve millions of crowns, without eſtimating the reſources of credit. She could ſend forty ſhips of war to ſea. She maintained thirty thouſand regular troops, which principally ſerved to guard her borders, as had been reſolved upon at the peace of Utrecht; but her army was no longer, as formerly, the ſchool of heroes. After the battle of Malplaquet, in which the Dutch loſt the flower of their ſoldiery, and the nurſery of their officers, and ſince the abolition of the ſtadtholderſhip, their troops declined for want of diſcipline and reſpect.

ſpect. They no longer had generals capable of commanding. A peace of eight and twenty years continuance had deprived them of their old officers, and they had neglected to form new. The young prince of Orange, William of Naſſau, flattered himſelf that, being of the family of the ſtadtholders, he might obtain the ſtadtholderſhip himſelf. He had but a ſmall party, however, in the province of Guelderland, and all the zealous republicans were his opponents: his biting and ſatirical wit had made him enemies, and he had wanted opportunities to diſplay his talents. In this ſituation was the republic of Holland; practiſed upon by her neighbours, of little conſideration in general affairs, pacific from principle, and warlike from accident.

If from Holland we caſt our eyes northward, we there behold Denmark and Sweden; kingdoms nearly equal in power, but leſs famous than they had formerly been.

Denmark, under the reign of Frederic IV. had uſurped Sleſwic from the houſe of Holſtein: under Chriſtian VI. it was wiſhed alſo to uſurp the kingdom of heaven. Queen Magdelaine of Bareuth employed bigotry, that this ſacred bridle might prevent her huſband from deſerting her bed; and the king, become an out-

outrageous partiſan of Luther, had, by his example, led the whole court into a ſtate of fanaticiſm. A prince whoſe imagination is full of the holy Jeruſalem diſdains the dirty earth; the moments ſpent on the affairs of this world are ſuppoſed to be loſt; political axioms become caſes of conſcience, the rules of the goſpel a military code, and the intrigues of prieſts influence the deliberations of the ſtate. From the pious Eneas to the cruſades of St. Louis hiſtory affords no example of fanatic heroes. Mahomet, far from being a bigot, was only a knave, who made religion a ſtalking-horſe to acquire dominion and eſtabliſh an empire. The king maintained thirty-ſix thouſand regular forces; he bought recruits in Germany, and ſold his troops to the power who could pay him beſt. He could collect thirty-thouſand militia; among which the Norwegian had the character of being the beſt. The naval force of Denmark conſiſts in twenty-ſeven ſhips of the line, and thirty-three of an inferior rate, and the marine is the moſt perfect part of the adminiſtration in this country; it is praiſed by all who underſtand naval affairs. The revenues of Denmark do not exceed five millions ſix hundred thouſand crowns. She was then in the pay of the Engliſh, from whom ſhe received a

ſubſidy

ſubſidy of a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns for the maintenance of ſix thouſand men. The prince of Culmbach Bareuth commanded the land forces. Neither this prince nor any of the other Daniſh generals merit to be farther named in theſe memoirs. The miniſter, Schulin, ought to be placed in the ſame rank. The reſult of what we have ſaid is, that Denmark muſt be numbered among the ſecondary powers of Europe, and, as an acceſſary, might throw a grain into the balance of that nation with which ſhe ſhould take part.

If we paſs from Denmark to Sweden, we ſhall find nothing in common between them, except the avidity of obtaining ſubſidies. The Swediſh government is a mixture of ariſtocracy, democracy, and monarchy; of which the two firſt were the moſt prevalent. The general diet aſſembled every three years, and elected a marſhal, who had the utmoſt influence over all deliberations. If their votes were equally divided, the caſting vote remained with the king. The diet ſelected three candidates for the king to chooſe which of them he pleaſed, to ſupply vacant places: it elected a ſecret committee of a hundred members, taken from the nobility, clergy, burgeſſes, and peaſants, which examined the conduct of the king and the

the ſenate, during thoſe intervals when the diet did not ſit, and gave inſtruction to the ſenate concerning the adminiſtration as well of home as of foreign affairs. Queen Ulrica, ſiſter of Charles XII. had given up the reins of government to her huſband, Frederic of Heſſe. This new king ſcrupulouſly reſpected the rights of the nation; he conſidered his poſt much as an old invalid lieutenant-colonel conſiders the ſmall government which procures him an honourable retreat. Before he married queen Ulrica, this prince loſt the battle of Mont-Caſſel, in Lombardy, that he might ſhow his father, who was then in the army, what a battle was. Count Oxenſtiern had been chancellor of the kingdom, and was diſplaced by count Gillenburg. This count won over the officers, and by that means procured a conſiderable party in Sweden: he wiſhed for war, flattering himſelf he could again make his nation reſpectable by conqueſt. France ſtill more earneſtly wiſhed to make uſe of the Swedes; hoping by them to lower Ruſſian haughtineſs, and revenge the affronts her ambaſſador, Monti, who had been made priſoner at Dantzic, had ſuffered at Peterſburgh. For this purpoſe France paid Sweden an annual ſubſidy of three hun-

dred thouſand crowns; which, however, did not oblige her to the commiſſion of hoſtilities.

Sweden no longer was what ſhe had been: the nine laſt years of the reign of Charles XII. had been ſignalized by misfortunes; the kingdom had loſt Livonia, a great part of Pomerania, and the dutchies of Bremen and Verden: this diſmemberment had robbed it of revenues, ſoldiers and corn, which it had formerly procured from theſe provinces. Livonia had been its ſtorehouſe of abundance. Though Sweden only contains two millions of ſouls, its ſterile ſoil and numerous barren mountains, with which it is covered, do not ſupply ſufficient food for this feeble population. The ceſſion of Livonia reduced it to the extremity of diſtreſs. Sweden, notwithſtanding all the misfortunes brought upon it, revered the memory of Charles XII. yet with inconſtancy, which is ſo common to the human mind, inſulted it, after his death, by bringing Görtz to the block, as if the miniſter had been guilty of the errors of the king.

The revenues of this kingdom amounted to nearly four millions of crowns, which maintained only ſeven thouſand ſtanding troops; there was a different fund for the payment of thirty-three thouſand militia. In the time of Charles XI. lands had been beſtowed on this number of peaſants,

peaſants, who were likewiſe ſoldiers, and obliged to aſſemble every Sunday to perform their exerciſes, and learn to combat in defence of their country; but when Sweden ſent theſe troops out of the kingdom they then were paid from the public treaſury. Her ports contained twenty-four ſhips of the line and thirty-ſix frigates: a long peace had rendered her ſoldiers huſbandmen; her beſt generals were dead. Buddenbröck and Löwenhaupt were not comparable to Reinſchild; but the nation ſtill was animated with a warlike inſtinct, and a little diſcipline and good commanders only were wanting. It is the land of Pharaſmanes, which produces only iron and ſoldiers. Of all the nations in Europe Sweden is the pooreſt. Gold and ſilver (I do not include ſubſidies) are there as little known as they were at Lacedemon. Large plates of ſtamped copper paſſed inſtead of money; and, to avoid the inconvenience of carrying ſuch heavy pieces, paper had been ſubſtituted. The exportation of this kingdom is confined to copper, iron, and wood; but Sweden annually loſes five hundred thouſand crowns in the balance of trade, becauſe that her wants are greater than her ſuperfluities. The ſevere climate in which this country is ſituated prohibits all induſtry; its coarſe wool

can only produce clothing for the common people. The fineſt buildings of Stockholm, and the beſt country ſeats of the nobility, were erected during the war of thirty years.

This kingdom was, in effect, governed by a triumvirate, conſiſting of the counts Thuro Bjelke, Eckeblat, and Roſen. Sweden, under a republican form of government, ſtill preſerved the haughtineſs of monarchical times. The Swede ſuppoſed himſelf ſuperior to the citizen of any other nation; the genius of Guſtavus Adolphus, and of Charles XII. had made ſuch deep impreſſions on the minds of the people that they were not to be effaced either by time or the viciſſitudes of fortune. Sweden underwent the fate of all monarchical ſtates which become republican. She was enfeebled; the love of fame was changed into the ſpirit of faction; diſintereſtedneſs into avidity; and the public was ſacrificed to perſonal welfare. Corruption increaſed ſo much that ſometimes the French, and ſometimes the Ruſſian faction, was ſuperior in the diet; but no one ſupported the national party. With theſe defects the Swedes ſtill preſerved the ſpirit of conqueſt, directly oppoſite to the republican ſpirit, which ought to be pacific if it would continue the eſtabliſhed form of government. This kingdom, ſuch as

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it is here deſcribed, could have but little influence on the general affairs of Europe; conſequently, had loſt much of that reſpect in which it had formerly been held.

Sweden has one of the moſt formidable of powers for its neighbour. From the utmoſt north, beginning at the frozen ſea, to the ſhores of the Euxine; and from Samogitia to the frontiers of China; a ſpace including eight hundred German miles in length, and from three to four hundred in width, the empire of Ruſſia extends. This formerly barbarous country had been unknown in Europe till the time of the czar Iwan Baſilides. In order to poliſh the nation, Peter I. worked upon it as aqua fortis does upon iron; he was the legiſlator and founder of this vaſt empire; he created men ſoldiers and miniſters; founded the city of Peterſburgh; eſtabliſhed a conſiderable marine, and made his nation and his ſingular abilities reſpectable over all Europe. Anne Iwanowna, * the niece of Peter I. at this time governed the vaſt empire of Ruſſia. She was the ſucceſſor of Peter II. the ſon of the firſt emperor. The reign of Anne was remarkable for a multitude of memorable events, and, by the aid of ſome great men, whom ſhe had the wiſdom to employ,

* 1740.

her arms gave Poland a king. She ſent ten thouſand Ruſſians on the banks of the Rhine *, a country where this nation had before been little known, to the ſuccour of the emperor Charles VI. The war ſhe made on the Turks was one ſucceſſion of proſperities and triumphs; and, at the time that the emperor Charles ſent to ſolicit peace in the Turkiſh camp, ſhe dictated laws to the Ottoman empire. The ſciences were protected by her in her country; ſhe even ſent learned men to Kamſchatka to find a ſhorter route, which might favour the trade between the Muſcovites and the Chineſe. This princeſs poſſeſſed qualities that rendered her worthy of the rank ſhe held. She had fortitude and elevation of mind; was liberal in rewarding, ſevere in her chaſtiſements; conſtitutionally good; and voluptuous, without being diſorderly.

She had created her favourite and miniſter, Biron, duke of Courland. The gentlemen of his country diſputed even his title to nobility: he was the only perſon who had an evident aſcendant over the mind of the empreſs. He was naturally vain, unpoliſhed, and cruel; but firm in his adminiſtration, and did not recede from enterpriſes the moſt vaſt. It was his

* 1735.

ambi-

ambition to make the name of his miſtreſs famous to the fartheſt ends of the world. He was equally avaricious in amaſſing and prodigal in expending wealth; he had many uſeful qualities, without poſſeſſing ſuch as were either good or agreeable.

Experience had formed, under the reign of Peter I. a man made to ſuſtain the weight of government beneath the ſucceſſors of this prince. This was count Oſtermann, who, like an able pilot, with a ſteady hand ſteered the ſtate during the ſtorms of revolution. He was originally of the county of Marck in Weſtphalia, and of obſcure birth; but talents are diſtributed by nature, without the leaſt reſpect to genealogy. Muſcovy was as well known to this miniſter as the human body to Verney. Bold or circumſpect as occaſions required, he renounced the factions of a court, that he might preſerve the direction of affairs.

Beſide count Oſtermann, we may include count Löwenwolde, and old count Golowkin, among the miniſters who might be ſerviceable to Ruſſia. Count Munich, who had left the ſervice of Saxony for that of Peter I. was at the head of the Ruſſian army: he was the prince Eugene of Muſcovy; he had the virtues and the vices of great generals; was able, enter-

prizing and fortunate; but haughty, magnificent, ambitious, and ſometimes too deſpotic; and would ſacrifice the lives of ſoldiers to his renown. Laſcy, Keith, Löwendahl, and other able generals, were formed in his ſchool. The government maintained at that time ten thouſand guards, a hundred battalions, amounting to ſixty thouſand men, twenty thouſand dragoons, two thouſand cuiraſſiers; which in the total amounted to ninety-two thouſand regular forces; and thirty thouſand militia, with as many Coſſacs, Tartars and Calmucs as they wiſhed to collect; ſo that this monarchy could bring without any effort a hundred and ſeventy thouſand men into the field. The Ruſſian fleet at that time was eſtimated at twelve ſhips of the line, twenty-ſix of an inferior rate, and forty gallies. The revenues of the empire amounted to fourteen or fifteen millions of crowns. This appears to be but a moderate ſum, if we compare it to the immenſe extent of theſe countries; but every thing there is cheap. The commodity which ſovereigns ſtand moſt in need of, ſoldiers, do not coſt the half for their maintenance which is paid by the other powers of Europe. The Ruſſian ſoldier only receives eight rubles a year, and proviſions, which are but at a low price. Theſe proviſions occaſion that enormous bag-

gage

gage which is dragged after their armies. In the campaign made by marſhal Munich, during the year 1737 againſt the Turks, it was ſuppoſed that his army contained as many carts as combatants. Peter I. had formed a project, ſuch as had never been conceived by any prince; inſtead of extending like other conquerors, he wiſhed to retrench his frontiers. The reaſon was that his provinces were ill peopled, comparatively with their vaſt extent. He wiſhed to collect between Peterſburgh, Moſcow, Caſan, and the Ukraine, the twelve millions of inhabitants who were ſcattered throughout his empire, that he might well people and cultivate that country, which might be eaſily defended, becauſe of the deſerts by which it would have been ſeparated from the Perſians, Turks, and Tartars. This project, with many others, was rendered abortive by the death of that great man.

The czar had only time to form the outlines of commerce; the merchant fleets of the Ruſſians, under the empreſs Ann, could not any way be compared to thoſe of the ſouthern powers; all things however predicted that the population of this empire, its forces, its wealth and commerce, would make moſt conſiderable progreſs. The national character is a mixture of ſuſpicion and art. Indolent, but intereſted,

the Ruſſians poſſeſs the capability of imitation, but not inventive genius. The grandees are factious, the guards formidable to their monarchs, and the people ſtupid, drunken, ſuperſtitious, and unhappy. This ſtate of things, ſuch as we have deſcribed, has no doubt hitherto been the cauſe that the academy of ſciences has never produced any men of eminence, who were natives. After the death of Charles XII. and the re-eſtabliſhment of Auguſtus of Saxony in Poland, and eſpecially after the victories of marſhal Munich over the Turks, the Ruſſians became the real arbiters of the North. They were ſo formidable that no power might hope to gain by an attack, having what may be called deſerts to traverſe in order to come to them; but had every thing to loſe, by being reduced to a defenſive war, ſhould the Ruſſians themſelves attack. What gives the latter this advantage is the number of Tartars, Coſſacs and Calmucs that they have in their armies. Theſe vagabond hordes of marauders and incendiaries are capable, by their incurſions, of carrying deſtruction into the moſt flouriſhing provinces, though they never ſhould be entered by their army. To avoid ſuch devaſtations, all their neighbours are obliged to temporize; and the Ruſſians conſider the alliances which they contract with foreign ſtates as a protection granted to their clients.

The

The influence of Ruſſia is more directly extended over Poland than over its other neighbours. After the death of Auguſtus I. this republic was obliged to elect Auguſtus II. as their ſovereign. The national voice was for Staniſlaus, but the wiſhes of the people were obliged to be ſubject to the will of the Ruſſians. Poland is in a perpetual ſtate of anarchy; the great families are all divided by intereſt; their individual advantage is preferred to the public welfare; and they are only unanimous in the ſeverity with which they oppreſs their ſubjects, whom they rather treat as beaſts of burden than as men. The Poles are vain, haughty when fortune ſmiles upon them, and mean in adverſity; capable of any act to amaſs money, which, having obtained, they ſcatter without care; frivolous, wanting in judgment, ever ready to change parties without a motive, and by their inconſiſtent conduct to plunge themſelves into the moſt diſagreeable ſituations. Laws they have; but theſe they do not obſerve, for they have no executive juſtice. The party of the court increaſes whenever places become vacant; the king has the privilege of diſpoſing of theſe, and by every new grant of incurring new ingratitude. The diet aſſembles every three years, ſometimes at Grodno, ſometimes at Warſaw. The court exerts its politics in ſecuring the election

election of a marſhal of the diet in favour of one of its partiſans. During the reign of Auguſtus II. its whole influence could not give ſtability to any one diet, except the diet of pacification. This cannot be otherwiſe, ſince any ſingle deputy who ſhall oppoſe the deliberations of theſe aſſemblies can break up the diet. Theirs is the *veto* of the ancient tribunes of Rome.

The principal families of Poland at this time were Czartorinſki, Potocki, Tarlo, and Lubomirſki. The human mind in this kingdom is become feminine, the women are the ſupporters of all factions, and diſpoſe of every thing while their huſbands are getting drunk. The fruits of the earth are abundant in Poland; the inhabitants are not ſufficient for their conſumption. Their only cities are Warſaw, Crakow, Dantzic, and Leopold; for the remainder would be eſteemed bad villages in any other country. As the republic is entirely in want of manufactures, the ſurplus of wheat alone after the national conſumption amounts to two hundred thouſand winſpels *. To theſe may be added wood, pot-aſhes, raw hides, black-cattle and horſes, with which they ſupply their neighbours. So many branches of exportation render the ba-

* Or wiſpel. Twenty-four buſhels. T.

lance

lance of trade advantageous. The merchandize is ſold at the cities of Breſlau, Leipſic, Dantzic, Frankfort, and Königſberg, the inhabitants of which profit by the traffic, and make this ignorant people pay dearly for their agency. Poland maintains twenty-four thouſand effective men, ill diſciplined. In times of public danger, ſhe can proclaim the arriere ban, known by the title of Poſpolite Ruſzenie. It was in vain however that Auguſtus I. would have enforced it againſt Charles XII.

What has been ſaid proves how eaſy it was for Ruſſia, though the government had been more perfect, to benefit by the weakneſs of this neighbouring country, and to gain an aſcendant in a ſtate ſo little advanced. The revenues of the king do not ſurpaſs a million of crowns. The Saxon ſovereigns employed the greateſt part of this in corruption, hoping by that means to perpetuate the government in their family, and in time to render the kingdom hereditary. Auguſtus II. was mild through indolence, prodigal from vanity; the ſlave of his confeſſor and his wife, though deſtitute of love or religion; to which we may add his inclination to ſubmit to the directions of his favourite count Bruhl. His indolence was the grand impediment that was to be vanquiſhed in order to place him on the throne

throne of Poland. The queen, his wife, was the daughter of the emperor Joſeph, and the ſiſter of the electreſs of Bavaria. She was moroſe, haughty, and ſuperſtitious. She wiſhed to have converted Saxony to the catholic religion; but this was not the work of a day. Count Bruhl and Hænachen were the Saxon miniſters; the firſt had been a page, the ſecond a laquais. Bruhl had been in the confidence of the former king, and became the principal inſtrument of placing Auguſtus II. on the throne, for which the latter in gratitude made him the aſſociate of his then favourite Sulkowſki. Competition excites jealouſy, which preſently flamed between theſe two rivals.

Sulkowſki had formed a project, by which Auguſtus was to ſeize on Bohemia, after the death of the emperor Charles VI. as on a ſucceſſion which reverted to him in right of his wife, who was the daughter of the emperor Joſeph, the eldeſt of the two brothers, and who conſequently ought to ſucceed in preference to the daughter of the younger brother. The king began to approve the plan; and Bruhl, in order to dethrone his competitor, communicated this project to the court of Vienna, which concurred with him, in procuring the baniſhment of the author of a deſign ſo oppoſite to

its

its intereſt; but by this ſtep Bruhl became enſlaved as it were to the advancement of the new houſe of Auſtria.

This miniſter underſtood only the ſubtleties and arts which conſtitute the politics of petty princes. Of all the men of his time he had the moſt coats, watches, laced ruffles, boots, ſhoes, and ſlippers. Cæſar would have ranked his head among thoſe which are ſo well perfumed and pomatumed that they have nothing to fear. A ſovereign ſuch as Auguſtus II. was neceſſary, for a man like count Bruhl to act the part of prime miniſter. The Saxon generals certainly were not the greateſt commanders in Europe. The duke of Weiſſenfells had courage but not ſufficient genius. Rutowſki, the baſtard of Auguſtus I. had diſtinguiſhed himſelf at the affair of the Timoc; but he was too much an Epicurean, and too indolent for the command. Saxony poſſeſſed ſome people of underſtanding, whom the jealouſy of Bruhl kept out of employment. The court was well ſerved by its ſpies, and ill by its miniſters; it was ſo dependent on Ruſſia that it durſt not contract any engagement without the permiſſion of that power. Ruſſia, Auſtria, England, and Saxony, were then in alliance. Saxony is one of the moſt opulent provinces of Germany, for which it is indebted

to the goodneſs of its ſoil, and the induſtry of its people, which have cauſed manufactures to flouriſh. The revenues of the prince amount to ſix millions, of which fifteen hundred thouſand crowns are ſubtracted for the acquittal of the debts which have been incurred by the two Poliſh elections. The elector maintained twenty-four thouſand regular troops, and the country could furniſh a militia of eight thouſand men.

Next to the elector of Saxony, the elector of Bavaria is one of the moſt powerful princes of Germany. Charles was at that time the reigning prince; his father Maximilian took part with France in the war of the ſucceſſion, and with the battle of Höckſtedt loſt his ſtates and his children. Charles himſelf had been educated at Vienna in captivity. When he ſucceeded to his father, he found nothing but evils to redreſs. He was mild, beneficent, and perhaps too pliant. Count Törring was both prime miniſter and general, and perhaps equally incapable of executing either office. Bavaria yields a revenue of five millions, about one of which are employed as in Saxony for the liquidation of old debts. France at that time paid the elector a ſubſidy of three hundred thouſand crowns. Bavaria of all the countries of Germany is that where there is the leaſt genius and the greateſt fertility;

fertility; it is a terreſtrial paradiſe inhabited by beaſts *. The electoral troops were in a ruinous condition. Of the ſix thouſand men which the elector had ſent into Hungary, in the ſervice of the emperor, not one half had returned. Bavaria could not bring more than twelve thouſand men into the field.

The elector of Cologne, brother to the elector of Bavaria, had placed as many mitres on his own head as he could procure. He was elector of Cologne, biſhop of Munſter, Paderborn, Oſnabruck, and grand maſter of the Teutonic order. He maintained from eight to twelve thouſand men, whom he bought and ſold as graſiers do cattle. At this period he was purchaſed by the houſe of Auſtria.

The elector of Mayence, dean of the electoral college, has not the reſources of the elector of Cologne. Of all the electors he of Treves is the worſt provided for. Baron Eltz, then elector of Mayence, had the character of being a good citizen, a worthy man, and the friend of his country. As he was without paſſions and prejudices, he did not blindly make himſelf the ſlave of the court of Vienna. The elector of Treves was capable only of crawling.

* The French word *bêtes* is here employed as a pun, and cannot be tranſlated. T.

The elector palatine did not enact any great part. He had maintained a neutrality in the war of 1733, and his country suffered all the disorders committed in it by the two armies. He keeps from eight to ten thousand men, has two fortresses, Manheim and Dusseldorff, but has not soldiers for their defence.

The remainder of the dukes, princes, and provinces, of the empire were governed by the Imperial court with an iron sceptre; the feeble were slaves, the powerful free. The domains of the duke of Mecklenburgh were in sequestration. The commissaries of the court of Vienna fomented dissension between the duke and his subjects, and devoured both the one and the other. Petty princes wore the yoke, because they were unable to shake it off; and their ministers, receiving bribes and titles from the emperors, subjected them to Austrian despotism. Consider the number of kings, electors, and princes, which compose the Germanic body, and it will appear puissant; examine the various interests by which its members are divided, and its debility will be evident. The diet of Ratisbon is but a kind of phantom, which recalls to mind what it formerly was; an assembly of civilians attached to forms rather than to substantials. The envoy which a sovereign sends thither resembles

ſembles a yard-dog who bays at the moon. If it be a queſtion concerning war, the Imperial court very artfully confounds its individual quarrels with the intereſts of the empire, that it may employ the ſtrength of the empire as an inſtrument to forward its ambitious views.

The different religions tolerated in Germany no longer, as formerly, occaſion violent convulſions; the ſectaries remain, but their zeal is become lukewarm. Many politicians are aſtoniſhed that a government ſo ſingular as that of Germany could ſo long have ſubſiſted, and, with very little reaſon, attribute its duration to national phlegm: they are wrong. The emperors were elective, and, ſince the extinction of the race of Charlemagne, princes of various families have been raiſed to the imperial dignity. Theſe had quarrels with their neighbours. They had the famous diſpute with the popes, concerning the inveſtiture of biſhops with the croſier and the ring: they were obliged to be crowned at Rome. Theſe were each of them ſhackles which impeded the eſtabliſhment of deſpotiſm in the empire. On the other part the electors and ſome princes and biſhops, by uniting, were ſufficiently powerful to oppoſe the ambition of the emperors, but not to change the form of the government. Since the Imperial crown has

been perpetuated in the houſe of Auſtria, the danger of deſpotiſm has become more apparent. Charles V. after the battle of Muhlberg, might have made himſelf abſolute; but he let the moment eſcape: and when the Ferdinands, his ſucceſſors, would have attempted the ſame thing, they were foiled by the jealouſy of the French and the Swedes. With reſpect to the chief part of the princes of the empire, their reciprocal equilibrium and mutual envy prevent their aggrandizement.

Proceeding weſtward from the ſouth of Germany, we meet with that ſingular republic annexed, as it may be ſaid, to the Germanic body; and in ſome manner free. Switzerland from the time of Cæſar had preſerved its liberty, a ſhort period excepted, during which it was ſubjected to the houſe of Habſpourg. It did not long bear this yoke. The Auſtrian emperors in vain attempted on different occaſions to ſubdue theſe warlike mountaineers: their love of liberty and their ſteep rocks defended them againſt the ambition of their neighbours. During the war of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, the count du Luc, ambaſſador for France, incited an inteſtine war in Switzerland, under the pretence of religion, that the republic might

might be prevented from interfering in the troubles of Europe. The thirteen cantons held a general diet once in two years, over which a Schultheifs from Bern or Zurich alternately preſides. The canton of Bern holds the ſame power in that republic as does the city of Amſterdam in the republic of Holland, and enjoys a decided preponderance. Two thirds of the Swiſs are Calviniſts; the remainder are catholics: the former, from their rigidity, reſemble the preſbyterians of England and the moſt fanatical of the catholics of Spain. The wiſdom of the government conſiſts in not oppreſſing the people, but ſuffering them to enjoy ſuch happineſs as is conſiſtent with their condition. Thus, by never departing from principles of moderation, they have ſagely preſerved their independence. The republic can without effort aſſemble a hundred thouſand men for its defence; and it has accumulated ſufficient treaſures to pay this number of troops for three years. All theſe worthy and wiſe regulations ſeem degraded by the barbarous cuſtom of ſelling their ſubjects to ſuch as can pay for them. Hence it happens that the Swiſs of one canton in the ſervice of France make war on the Swiſs of another in the ſervice of Holland. Where in this world may perfection be found!

If from Switzerland we caſt a glance on Italy, we there ſhall find that ancient empire of the Romans diſmembered as much as poſſible by the ambition of its princes. Lombardy is divided between the Venetians, Auſtrians, Savoyards, and Genoeſe. Of theſe poſſeſſions the king of Sardinia appears to have the greateſt part. Charles Emanuel * had lately concluded the war which he had ſuſtained againſt the houſe of Auſtria, by which he had intrenched upon the dutchy of Milan. The revenues of his various ſtates amounted to about five millions; with which, during peace, he maintained thirty-thouſand men, and theſe, in time of war, he could augment to forty-thouſand. In Italy he had the character, among the beſt informed, of a prince well acquainted with politics and his own intereſts. His miniſter, the marquis of Ormée, had the reputation of being a ſucceſsful pupil of the ſchool of Machiavel. The policy of the ſtate conſiſted in maintaining an equilibrium between the houſe of Auſtria and the two branches of the houſe of Bourbon, that by management it might acquire the means of extending its

* The text erroneouſly reads Victor Amadeus. T.

poſſeſſions.

poſſeſſions. His father, Victor Amadeus, had often ſaid, "The Milaneſe ſon is like an artichoke, which muſt be eaten leaf after leaf." At this period the king of Sardinia, ill diſpoſed toward the houſe of Bourbon reſpecting the peace of 1737, which cardinal de Fleuri had concluded without his knowledge, inclined to favour the houſe of Auſtria.

The remainder of Lombardy was divided, as we have ſaid: the emperor poſſeſſed the Milaneſe, the provinces of Mantua and Placenza, and had eſtabliſhed his ſon-in-law, the duke of Lorrain, in Tuſcany. The republic of Genoa, ſituated on the weſt of Savoy, ſtill was famous for its bank, its remains of trade, and its beautiful marble palaces. Corſica had rebelled: the firſt revolt had been appeaſed by the forces the emperor had ſent thither in the year 1732; the ſecond by the French, under the command of the count de Maillebois: but theſe foreign ſuccours did but for a time ſtifle the fire which they could not well extinguiſh.

Venice, ſituated toward the eaſt, is a more conſiderable city than Genoa. This ſuperb place, ſtanding on ſeventy-two iſlands, and containing two hundred thouſand inhabitants,

is governed by a council, at the head of which is a doge, ſubjected to the ridiculous ceremony of being annually married to the Adriatic ſea. The republic loſt the iſland of Candia in the ſeventeenth century, and the Morea in the eighteenth, when allied to the Auſtrians, at the time that the great Eugene conquered Belgrade and Temeſwar. Venice poſſeſſes ſhips (in 1740), but not ſufficiently numerous to form a fleet. She maintains fifteen thouſand land forces; the general of which is the ſame Schulenbourg who, in the Poliſh war, eſcaped by his dexterity from Charles XII. at the battle of Frauſtadt, and made the famous retreat into Sileſia at the paſſage of the Bartſch.

The Venetians and Genoeſe, previous to the diſcovery of the compaſs, ſupplied Germany with all the merchandize which luxury collects from the extremities of Aſia. The Engliſh and Dutch, having at preſent deprived them of this trade, have robbed them of their former advantages.

The war of 1733 had removed don Carlos from Tuſcany to the throne of Naples. This kingdom had been wreſted from Louis XII. by Gonſalvez de Cordova, ſurnamed the great captain, for Ferdinand the catholic. The death of Charles II. king of Spain occaſioned it to paſs

into the power of Auſtria during the war of the ſucceſſion; and the victory of the battle of Bitonto, in the war of 1733, again reſtored it to Spain and don Carlos. This prince, too young to govern, was guided by the count St. Eſtevau, who did but execute the orders of the queen of Spain. The kingdom of Naples, including Sicily, yields but four millions to its ſovereign, who only maintains twelve thouſand men.

In this abſtract we ſhall make no mention of the duke of Modena, the republic of Lucca, nor that of Raguſa; they are miniatures miſplaced in a grand gallery of paintings.

The holy ſeat had lately become vacant by the death of Clement XII. of the houſe of Corſini. The conclave remained ſitting twelve months. The Holy Ghoſt was held in ſuſpence till the factions of the powers of Europe could agree. Tired with theſe delays, cardinal Lambertini, addreſſing the other cardinals, ſaid, "I "adviſe you to come to a deciſion: if you "wiſh for a bigot, chooſe Aldobrandi; if you "prefer a man of learning, elect Coſcia; if you "like a buffoon, here I am." The choice of the Holy Ghoſt fell on this merry cardinal. Lambertini was elected pope, and aſſumed the name of Benedict XIV. Rome and her biſhops

no longer governed the world as formerly, when he acquired the pontificate; the emperors no longer were the footſtools of the pope; nor did they travel to Rome to degrade themſelves like Frederic Barbaroſſa. Charles V. had taught them to feel his power: nor were they treated with greater mildneſs by the emperor Joſeph, when he ſeized on Comachio. In the year 1740 the pope was only the firſt Chriſtian biſhop: he was ſuffered to be at the head of the department of the faith, but he no longer had any influence in politics. The revival of letters and the reformation had given ſuperſtition a mortal blow. Some ſaints occaſionally were canonized, that the ceremony might not be forgotten; but the pope who would have preached a cruſade in the eighteenth century would not have had twenty ragged followers. He was reduced to the humiliating office of exerciſing his ſacerdotal functions, and haſtily making the fortunes of his relations and baſtards. The only ſervice the pope could render the emperor when, in the year 1737, he was at war with the Turks was, to authorize by his briefs a levy of the tenths on the poſſeſſions of the eccleſiaſtics, and to ſend miſſionaries to erect croſſes in all the towns dependant on him; round which the people crowded to ejaculate

their

their holy imprecations on the Turks. To theſe the Ottoman empire ſeemed to be inſenſible; though beaten by the Ruſſians, they were every where victorious over the Auſtrians.

The famous adventurer, Bonneval, was then at Conſtantinople: he had left the ſervice of France for that of the emperor; which, from levity of temper, he had forſaken to turn Turk. He was not deſtitute of talents. He propoſed to the grand vizir the forming of the artillery according to the European mode, to diſcipline the janiſſaries, and to introduce order into that innumerable multitude of troops who fight only in confuſion. This plan might have become dangerous to the neighbours of the Ottomans; but it was rejected, as contrary to the Alcoran, in which Mahomet eſpecially recommends no infringement ſhould ever be made on ancient uſage. The Turks are naturally endowed with underſtanding; it is ignorance that has rendered them ſtupid: they are brave, but artleſs; they do not underſtand internal government, and external politics ſtill leſs. The doctrine of fatality, in which they have great faith, cauſes them to impute all their misfortunes to God, and is the reaſon why they never correct their errors. The city of Conſtantinople contains two millions of inhabitants. The puiſſance of the

the empire conſiſts in its vaſt extent: it could not, however, longer ſubſiſt were it not ſupported by the jealouſies of the European princes. The Padiſchah, Mahomet V. was then ſultan. A revolution had drawn him from the priſons of the ſeraglio, and ſeated him on the throne. He had been rendered by nature as impotent as his eunuchs; and his was the moſt unfortunate of reigns for the beauties of the ſeraglio. The moſt formidable neighbour of the Turks was Nadir Schach, known by the name of Thamas Kouli Khan. It was he who enſlaved Perſia and ſubjected the mogul. He often gave employment to the Porte, and was a counterpoize to power that would otherwiſe have undertaken warlike enterpriſes againſt the Chriſtian ſtates.

Such is the ſketch of what the forces and intereſts of the courts of Europe were toward the year 1740. It was an outline neceſſary to make the following memoirs better underſtood. We have only to give ſome account of the progreſs of the human mind in philoſophy, ſcience, the fine arts, the art of war, and what immediately relates to certain eſtabliſhed cuſtoms. The progreſs of philoſophy, political œconomy, the art of war itſelf, and manners, undoubtedly afford more intereſting matter of reflec-

reflection than the recollection of thrones on which imbecillity is seated, clothed in purple, knavery adorned with the tiara, and those subaltern kings called ministers; few of whom merit a place in the annals of posterity. Whoever industriously shall read history will perceive that the same scenes are continually reproduced, and that they have only to change the names of the actors. But to trace the discovery of truths till then unknown, to penetrate into the causes which have effected a change in manners, and have dissipated the darkness of that barbarism which clouded the light of the understanding, are certainly subjects worthy of all thinking beings.

Let us begin with experimental philosophy, which a hundred years ago scarcely was known. Descartes published his Principia in the year 1644. Newton followed, and explained the laws of motion and gravity *, and displayed the mechanism of the universe with astonishing precision. Long after his time philosophers † visited the places, and verified, as well in Lapland as under the equator, those truths which this great man had divined without leaving his chamber. We have now learned with certitude

* In 1687.

† La Condamine and Maupertuis.

that

that the earth is flattened toward its poles. Newton did more. Aided by his prisms *, he decomposed the rays of light, and manifested its primitive colours. Toricelli weighed the air †, and found the proportion of weight between a column of the atmosphere and a column of mercury. To him we are indebted for the barometer. The air-pump was invented at Magdebourg by Otto Gueric ‡. He perceived from the friction of amber a new property in nature, that of electricity. Dufaie § made experiments, in consequence of this discovery, which demonstrate that the secrets of nature are inexhaustible. It seems exceedingly probable that only by the multiplication of electrical experiments can any knowledge be collected from that science which shall be useful to society. Ellert ¶, by mixing two liquors transparently white, produced a water of a deep blue colour. He farther made experiments on the transformation of metals, and the solid and nitrous particles of waters. Lieberkuhn ‖, by the aid of injections, rendered the ramifications of the finest fibres and veins palpable; the insinuating threads of which serve as canals for the circulation of the blood. This is the

* In 1704. † In 1643. ‡ In 1642.
§ In 1733. ¶ In 1746. ‖ In 1743.

geography of organized bodies. Boerhaave *, after Ruyſh, diſcovered the volatile liquor which circulates in the nerves and evaporates after death. The exiſtence of this had never been ſuſpected. This liquor, doubtleſs, is ſent at the will of man to act upon his muſcles and members with a ſwiftneſs equal to that of thought. Hartſöcker † found animalcula in the human ſemen, which may perhaps ſerve as the ſeeds of propagation. Louwenhoeck and Trembley ‡ diſcovered, by their experiments on the polypus, that this ſingular animal multiplies by being divided. Curioſity has incited men to an immenſity of reſearch: their efforts to diſcover the firſt principles of nature have been wonderful, but vain. They are ſituated between two infinites; and it appears to be demonſtrated that the Author of all things has reſerved this ſecret to himſelf.

The advance of philoſophy bore the torch of truth into the darkneſs of metaphyſics. A ſage aroſe in England, who, ſhaking off all prejudices, took experience for his guide. Locke tore the bandage from error, which had in part been looſened by his precurſor the ſceptical Bayle. Other ſages alſo have appeared; ſuch

* In 1707. † In 1678. ‡ In 1703 and 1740.

as

as Fontenelle and Voltaire, in France; the celebrated Thomaſius in Germany*; Hobbes, Collins, Shafteſbury, and Bolingbroke, in England. Theſe great men and their diſciples have given religion a mortal blow. Men began to examine what they before had ſtupidly adored; reaſon overthrew ſuperſtition; diſguſt was conceived for fables, which before had been credited; and the blaſphemies to which men had piouſly been attached were held in horror. Deiſm, or the ſimple worſhip of the Supreme Being, obtained numerous followers. With this religion of reaſon, toleration was eſtabliſhed, and enemies no longer were created by a difference of opinion. Not leſs fatal to the Judaic viſions adopted by our anceſtors was Deiſm, in the preſent times, than the doctrine of Epicurus formerly was to the idolatrous worſhip of the Pagans. The liberty of thinking which England enjoyed had highly contributed to the progreſs of philoſophy. Not ſo the French; the works of their philoſophers labour under the conſtraints with which they were ſhackled by theologians. An Engliſhman thinks aloud; a Frenchman ſcarcely dares ſuffer his opinions to be ſuſpected.

The French authors, in revenge, recompenſe themſelves for the want of freedom in their

* At Halle.

works

works of philoſophy, by treating matters of taſte and what relates to the belles lettres with ſuperiority, and by equalling the poliſhed graces and levity of all that time has preſerved the moſt precious in the writings of antiquity. A diſpaſſionate man would prefer the Henriade to the Iliad. Henry IV. is no fabulous hero. Gabrielle d'Eſtrées will not ſuffer beſide the princeſs Nauſicaa*. The Iliad paints the manners of the Canadians. Voltaire has transformed his perſons into real heroes; and his poem would be perfect, had he poſſeſſed the art of intereſting us more for Henry IV. by expoſing him to greater dangers. Boileau may be compared with Juvenal and Horace. Racine ſurpaſſes all his rivals of antiquity. Chaulieu, incorrect as he is, ſurely, is much preferable in various of his little pieces to Anacreon. Rouſſeau excelled in ſome of his odes; and, to be equitable, we muſt allow that, with reſpect to method, the French have vanquiſhed the Greeks and Romans. The eloquence of Boſſuet approaches that of Demoſthenes. Flechier may paſs for the Cicero of France, without enumerating Patru, Cochin, and ſo many others who have been celebrated pleaders. The Plurality of Worlds and the Perſian Letters form a ſpecies of writing unknown to antiquity, and will attain the lateſt poſterity. Though the

* In the Odyſſey, not the Iliad. T.

French

French have no author who may be compared to Thucydides, they poſſeſs the diſcourſe of Boſſuet on Univerſal Hiſtory; and the works of the ſage preſident De Thou; the Revolutions of Rome by Vertot, a claſſical work; the Decay of the Roman Empire, by Monteſquieu; and in fine too many other fragments, either of hiſtory, belles lettres, commerce, or wit, to be here enumerated.

It may perhaps excite ſurpriſe, that, while letters flouriſhed in France, England and Italy, they have not been equally reſplendent in Germany. The reaſon is, that they have a ſecond time been brought out of Greece, after having enjoyed, toward the downfal of the republic, and under the firſt emperors, all the reſpect they merited. The land was prepared to receive the ſeed; and the protection of the Medicis, eſpecially that of Leo X. greatly contributed to its growth. Literature extended itſelf with facility in England, becauſe that the form of government authoriſes the commons to harangue in parliament. The ſpirit of party animated them to ſtudy, in order that, by employing all the aids of rhetoric, and eſpecially of logic, in their orations, they might gain an aſcendency over the party they oppoſe. Hence does it happen that the Engliſh poſſeſs moſt of the claſſical

claſſical authors; and that they are converſant in the Greek and Latin languages, as well as in ancient hiſtory. The character of their gloomy minds, their taciturnity, and obſtinacy of purſuit, have made them ſucceſsful in the ſublimer parts of the mathematics.

In the time of Francis I. the French had attracted ſome learned men to their court, and theſe, it may be affirmed, ſcattered the ſeeds of knowledge in this kingdom; but the religious wars which ſucceeded ſtifled their progreſs; as a froſt in ſpring retards the productions of the earth. This criſis continued to the end of the reign of Louis XIII. after which cardinal de Richlieu, cardinal Mazarine, and Louis XIV. more eſpecially, gave a moſt powerful protection to the arts and ſciences. The French were envious of the Spaniards and Italians, who had been their predeceſſors in literature; and nature, among them, was productive of thoſe men of happy genius who ſoon ſurpaſſed their competitors.—The French authors have particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves by method and refined taſte.

It was the civil wars that broke out between the reign of Charles V. and the death of Charles II. of Spain, which retarded the progreſs of the arts in Germany. The people were

miſerable, and the princes poor; neceſſaries were firſt to be procured by the return of agriculture; manufactures were to be eſtabliſhed in proportion as materials could be obtained; and theſe, almoſt general cares, prevented the nation from ſhaking off that ruſt of barbariſm with which it is ſtill encumbered. To this we may add, that the arts in Germany wanted that central force which is found in Rome, Florence, Paris, and London. True it is their univerſities maintained learned profeſſors, but pedantic and dogmatical. Their ruſtic ſtate deprived them of pupils. Two men only have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their genius, and done honour to the nation---The one was the great Leibnitz; the other the learned Thomaſius: I make no mention of Wolff, who did but ruminate, and give a new dreſs to that ſyſtem which Leibnitz had developed with ſo much ardour. The learned of Germany were moſt of them apprentices; the French were maſters. This was the reaſon that French works ſpread ſo univerſally, that their language replaced that of the Romans, and that at preſent whoever underſtands French may travel through Europe without the aid of an interpreter. The cuſtom of ſpeaking that language was alſo injurious to the German tongue, which, being only ſpoken by the lower orders, could

not

not acquire that polished harmony which a language gains in good company.

The principal defect of the German is its verbosity; it must be compressed, and by softening some words, the pronunciation of which is disagreeable, it may be rendered sonorous. The nobility studied only the civil law, and, wanting taste for the belles lettres, they imbibed at the universities a disgust for pedantry and its institutors. From the candidates, or theologians, sons of shoe-makers, or taylors, must the Mentor for every such Telemachus be selected; the education which tutors like these were capable of bestowing may well be imagined. The Germans had theatrical exhibitions; but they were gross, and even indecent. Filthy buffoons represented pieces, destitute of genius, which put modesty to the blush. Our barrenness obliged us to have recourse to the abundance of the French; and, in most German courts, French comedians were found, who represented the best dramas of Moliere and Racine.

But what can more merit the attention of the philosopher than the vile degradation into which that nation of kings, that mistress of the universe, in a word, into which the Roman people have fallen! Instead of consuls leading kings into captivity, as in the days of the re-

public, we behold the ſucceſſors of Cato and Emilius robbed of their virility, that they may aſpire to the honour of ſinging on the theatres of princes, who, in the time of Scipio, would have been held in as much contempt as are at preſent the Iroquois—*O tempora! O mores!* Sixty years ago operas, tragedies and comedies were unknown, in Germany*. In 1740 the advancement of induſtry and commerce had rendered Germany a participator of the treaſures which the Indies annually ſhowered on Europe. Theſe ſources of opulence had brought with them eaſe, pleaſure, and, perhaps, thoſe diſorderly manners which have followed. Population, equipages, furniture, liveries, coaches, and ſumptuous tables, all received increaſe. Whatever of good architecture is to be found in the north takes its date about the ſame period. The palace and arſenal of Berlin, the chancellery of the empire, the church of St. John Borromeus at Vienna, the palace of Nymphenbourg in Bavaria, the bridge and Chineſe palace in Dreſden, the palace of the elector at Manheim, and of the duke of Wurtemberg at Louiſburg, are all of them, though

* The royal author ſuppoſes himſelf writing in the year 1740. T.

unequal

unequal to the edifices of Athens and of Rome, ſuperior to the Gothic architecture of our anceſtors. In former ages the courts of Germany appeared to be temples where the bacchanalian rites were celebrated. This debauchery, unworthy as it is of good ſociety, is at preſent baniſhed into Poland, or it is become the amuſement of the populace; at leaſt is only found in ſome eccleſiaſtical courts, where prieſts conſole themſelves with wine for the abſence of a more amiable paſſion, which their vows oblige them to renounce. There was no court of Germany, formerly, that did not abound in buffoons, the groſſneſs of whoſe witticiſms was food for the ignorance of the gueſts, and who, themſelves incapable of wiſdom, were contented to liſten to the folly of others. This cuſtom, which is an eternal diſgrace to good ſenſe, has been aboliſhed, and was only preſerved in the court of Auguſtus II. king of Poland and elector of Saxony *. Ceremony, in which the imbecillity of our anceſtors ſeemed to make all the ſcience of ſovereigns to conſiſt, appeared to undergo a ſimilar fate. Etiquette

* The royal author ſurely forgets that, at the death of his father, in 1740, the academicians of Berlin were the court buffoons. T.

daily ſuffered infringement, and there are courts in which it is intirely aboliſhed. The court of the emperor Charles VI. was, however, an exception; he was too zealous a ſectary of the formalities of the etiquette of Burgundy to ſuffer them to be violated. In his laſt ſickneſs, even a few moments before his death, he gave orders for maſſes to be ſaid; appointed the hour of the celebration of his funeral pomp; and named the perſons who were to carry his heart in a golden box to I know not what convent*. His courtiers admired his grandeur and dignity; ſages blamed his pride, which ſeemed to be his ſurvivor.

Let us particularly remark, that, in conſequence of the money ſpread through Germany, the amount of which certainly was triple to the circulation of former times, luxury not only was doubled, but the number of troops which princes maintained had augmented in proportion. The emperor Ferdinand I. kept an army of ſcarcely thirty thouſand men: Charles VI. in the war of 1733, paid one hundred and ſeventy thouſand, without oppreſſing his people: Louis XIII. kept ſixty thouſand; Louis XIV.

* The father of Frederic did much the ſame; and Charles VI. and Frederic William both died in 1740. T.

two

two hundred and twenty thouſand, and even as many as three hundred and ſixty thouſand, during the war of the ſucceſſion. From this epocha, every, even the moſt petty, prince of Germany had augmented his military force: this was the effect of imitation. In the war of 1613, Louis XIV. raiſed as many men as he could, that he might have a decided ſuperiority over his enemies—he diſbanded none after the peace. This obliged the emperor, and princes of Germany, to keep as numerous forces on foot as they had the power of paying. This cuſtom, once eſtabliſhed, was afterward perpetuated. Wars became more expenſive. The ſupplies neceſſary for magazines, and for the maintenance of a numerous cavalry, and aſſembling them in their cantonments before the opening of the campaign, and ſeaſon of forage, were immenſe. The infantry continually kept up underwent an almoſt total change, in conſequence of the activity of tacticians to bring it to perfection. Before the war of the ſucceſſion one half of the battalions carried pikes, and the other muſkets, and they fought armed ſix deep. The pikes were uſed againſt the cavalry; their muſkets kept up a weak fire, and their matches often made them flaſh in the pan. Theſe inconveniences occaſioned a change of arms; pikes and muſkets were thrown aſide, and were replaced by

fuſils and bayonets, which unite all that fire and ſword poſſeſs the moſt terrible. As they conſtituted the ſtrength of battalions in the fire they kept up, they, ſtep by ſtep, diminiſhed their depth, and gave them a more extenſive front. The prince of Anhalt, who may be called a military mechanic, introduced iron ramrods, and placed the ranks three deep. The late king, by his infinite aſſiduity, introduced a wonderful order and diſcipline among his troops, and a preciſion before unknown in Europe in their motions and manœuvres. The Pruſſian battalion became a walking battery; the quickneſs of the charging of which tripled the fire, and made a Pruſſian equivalent to three adverſaries. Other nations afterward imitated the Pruſſians, but imperfectly. Charles XII. had introduced the cuſtom of adding two cannon to each battalion; and cannon were founded at Berlin, three, ſix, twelve, and twenty-four pounders, ſufficiently light to be worked by ſtrength of arm, and to advance in battle with the battalions to which they appertained. So many new inventions transformed an army into a moving fortreſs, the acceſs to which was formidable and murderous. The French, in the year 1672, invented tranſportable copper pontoons. This eaſy cuſtom of conſtructing bridges rendered

rendered rivers but uſeleſs barriers. To the French alſo is due the art of attack and defence of fortreſſes—Vauban eſpecially approached perfection in the art of fortification. He made the works razant, and covered them ſo by the glacis that, in order to erect batteries in breach, if they are not at preſent placed on the creſt of the covered way, the balls cannot touch the line of maſonry which they are ſent to ruin. Since Vauban they have conſtructed covered ways doubly ſtone faced, and perhaps have too much multiplied the ſections.

The art of mining has, in particular, made the greateſt progreſs. The branches of the covered way are extended to thirty fathoms from the glacis. Well mined forts have major and commanding galleries; their branches riſe to three ſtories. The miner can blow up the ſame point of defence as often as ſeven times. Globes of compreſſion have been invented for attack, which, when they are well applied, ruin all the mines of the place at the diſtance of twenty-five paces from the focus. The true ſtrength of places at preſent conſiſts in their mines, and by the uſe of theſe governors may prolong the duration of ſieges. Fortreſſes can no longer be taken but by the aid of a numerous artillery. Three cannon are ſuppoſed

poſed neceſſary for each battery to diſmount one on the works. To theſe are added ricochet batteries, which ſweep the lines of prolongation; and a ſtrong place is ſeldom ventured to be beſieged with leſs than ſixty mortars to ruin its works of defence. Demi-ſaps, common-ſaps, turning-ſaps, places of arms and cavaliers, with embraſures, are ſo many new inventions which are made uſe of for attack; and which ſpare men, and accelerate the reduction of fortreſſes.

This age has ſeen the revival of light-armed troops; the Auſtrian pandours, the French legions, the Pruſſian free battalions, and the huſſars, originally of Hungary, but imitated in all other armies, have replaced the Numidian and Parthian cavalry, ſo famous in the Roman wars. Any uniform was unknown to the ancient military; and it is not a century ſince this practice was generally adopted. The marine has alſo made great progreſs as well in the conſtruction of ſhips as in rendering the calculation of pilots more exact. But this ſubject being vaſt, I quit it, fearing to engage in too long a digreſſion.

From what we have ſtated, concerning the progreſs of the arts in Europe, it reſults that great advances had been made in the north ſince the war of thirty years. France then enjoyed

joyed the advantage of every thing that appertains to the belles lettres and taſte; England of mathematics and metaphyſics; the Germans of chymiſtry, experimental philoſophy, and erudition: while the Italians began to decline; and Poland, Ruſſia, Sweden, and Denmark, were an age behind the other more poliſhed nations. The ſubject which moſt merits our attention is the change which has been ſeen in the power of kingdoms ſince the year 1640. Some we have contemplated in their growth, others may be ſaid to have remained ſtationary, and a third kind falling to decline and menaced with ruin. The fire of Sweden burſt forth under Guſtavus Adolphus. She, conjointly with France, dictated the peace of Weſtphalia. Under Charles XII. ſhe vanquiſhed the Danes, Ruſſians, and, for a time, diſpoſed of the throne of Poland. She ſeems then to have collected all her powers to appear like a comet, which caſts an exceſs of light, and is afterward loſt in the immenſity of ſpace. She has been diſmembered by her enemies, who have wreſted from her Eſtonia, Livonia, the principalities of Bremen and Verden, and a great part of Pomerania.

The fall of Sweden gave date to the elevation of Ruſſia. The latter power ſeems to have

have riſen from oblivion ſuddenly to appear with grandeur, and, in a ſhort time afterward, to rank with other powers the moſt formidable. What Homer ſays of Jupiter * may be applied to Peter I. he made three ſteps and arrived at the end of the earth: and, in fact, to cruſh Sweden, give ſucceſſive kings to Poland, abaſe the Ottoman porte, and ſend armies to combat the French on their own frontiers, may well be called ſtepping to the end of the earth.

The houſe of Brandenbourg too has been ſeen to leave the electoral bench, and ſeat itſelf on a throne among kings. It made no figure whatever in the war of thirty years; the peace of Weſtphalia gave it provinces which, by good adminiſtration, were rendered opulent. Peace and the wiſdom of the government formed a growing power, almoſt unknown in Europe, becauſe it laboured ſilently, and becauſe its progreſs was not rapid, but the work of time: the world was aſtoniſhed when it began to diſplay itſelf.

The aggrandizement of France, due alike to its arms and its policy, was more prompt and more conſiderable. Louis XV. found his poſſeſſions ſuperior by one third to thoſe of Louis

* Read Neptune. T.

XIII. Franche Compté, Alſatia, Lorraine, and a part of Flanders, annexed to that empire, imparted to it a force highly ſuperior to that of paſt ages. We muſt not forget to add, the ſubjection of Spain to one branch of the houſe of Bourbon; which delivering France, at leaſt for a length of time, from the incurſions which it always had to dread, while the Auſtrian branch were kings of Spain, has at preſent given it the ability of employing its whole force, againſt ſuch of its neighbours as it ſhall judge neceſſary to combat.

Neither are the Engliſh forgotten: Gibraltar and Port Mahon are important acquiſitions for a commercial nation. They are prodigiouſly enriched by every ſpecies of traffic. Perhaps the electorate of Hanover, now ſubjected to them, is not uſeleſs, conſidering the influence it gives them in the affairs of Germany; concerning which they formerly gave themſelves no trouble. It is generally ſuppoſed that the Engliſh nation, ſuſceptible of corruption as it is at preſent, is become leſs free: it is at leaſt more tranquil.

Nor ſhall we paſs the houſe of Savoy in ſilence; it has acquired Sardinia and royalty; has graſped a part of the Milaneſe; and politicians regard it as a canker which is eating into

Lom-

Lombardy. Spain had fixed the throne of don Carlos in the kingdom of Naples. The houſe of Auſtria did not enjoy equal advantages; the war of the ſucceſſion had rendered the emperor, Charles VI. one of the moſt powerful monarchs of Europe. The envy of his neighbours ſoon ſtripped him of a part of his acquiſitions, and placed him on a level with his predeceſſors. After the deſcendants of Charles V. became extinct in Spain, the houſe of Auſtria firſt loſt that kingdom, which paſſed into the family of Bourbon; next a part of Flanders; and afterward the kingdom of Naples and a part of the Milaneſe. Nothing therefore remained to Charles VI. of the ſucceſſion of Charles II. ſome towns in Flanders excepted, and a part of the Milaneſe. The Turks alſo took Servia from him, which in like manner was ceded at the peace of Belgrade. The only thing which the houſe of Auſtria had gained was an eſtabliſhed prejudice, in its favour, a prejudice ſpread through the empire, in England, Holland, and even in Denmark, that the liberties of Europe were annexed to the deſtiny of that houſe.

Portugal, Holland, Denmark, and Poland, ſtill were what they had been, without loſs or increaſe. France and England only had a de-

cided preponderance over other powers; the one by its ſtanding army and great reſources, the other by its fleets and the wealth its commerce had acquired. Theſe rival powers were each jealous of the other's aggrandizement: they imagined they held the balance of Europe, and ſuppoſed themſelves two chiefs of parties, with one of which princes and kings ought to league. Excluſive of the ancient hatred which France preſerved againſt England, ſhe was equally inimical to the houſe of Auſtria, in conſequence of her continual wars with that houſe from the time of the death of Charles the raſh duke of Burgundy. France wiſhed to ſubject Flanders and Brabant, and extend the limits of her domains as far as the very borders of the Rhine. A project like this could not at once be executed; it muſt be promoted by opportunity and ripened by time. The French deſired victory that they might make conqueſts; the Engliſh wiſhed to buy princes that they might make ſlaves; and each held out falſe pretences to the world, that its attention might not be fixed on their ambition.

Spain and Auſtria were nearly equal. Spain only could make war on Portugal, or on the emperor in Italy. The emperor could carry war on every ſide: he had more ſubjects than Spain,

Spain, and, by the aid of intrigue, might add to his forces thoſe of the Germanic body. Spain had the greateſt reſource in her wealth. In this Auſtria had little; and, whatever tax ſhe might lay upon her ſubjects, if war was protracted, foreign ſubſidies were neceſſary to maintain her armies in the field. At this period ſhe was exhauſted by a war with the Turks; and incumbered with the debts which this war had occaſioned her to contract.

Holland, though opulent, interfered in no foreign quarrel; at leaſt, not unleſs neceſſity obliged her to defend her frontiers againſt France. She was chiefly employed in avoiding all occaſion of electing a new ſtadtholder.

Pruſſia, though leſs powerful than Spain and Auſtria, might nevertheleſs appear next in rank. The revenues of Pruſſia, as we have ſaid, did not exceed ſeven millions; the provinces, poor, and indebted by the misfortunes they had ſuffered in the war of thirty years, were incapable of furniſhing their ſovereign with reſources; he muſt therefore depend on what he could ſave. This the late king had done; and, though the treaſures he left were not very conſiderable, they might, in a caſe of neceſſity, be ſufficient not to let any favourable opportunity ſlip; but prudence was requiſite

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in the conduct of affairs, that wars might not be tediously continued, and that projects might be immediately executed. The circumstance most to be complained of was that the kingdom had no regular form. It consisted of small provinces, which might be called scattered, extending from Courland to Brabant. This intersected situation multiplied the neighbours of the state, without giving it consistency, and was the cause that it had many more enemies to fear than if it had been more compact. Prussia therefore only could act when supported by France, or England. The road to France was open, for she had her own glory and the abasement of the house of Austria at heart. Subsidies only could be obtained from the English, who wished to employ foreign forces for their own proper interests.

Russia had not sufficient weight, at that time, in the politics of Europe to give a balance in favour of the party she might espouse. The influence of this new empire extended over the Swedes and Poles. Respecting the Turks, politics had established it as an axiom that, when the French should excite them either against Austria or Russia, these two powers should recur to Thamas Kouli Khan; who, by making a diversion, would free them from their fears on

the part of the Porte. What we have repeated was the common train of politics; exceptions there no doubt occaſionally were, but we here conſider only the ordinary calculation of probabilities.

The ſubject that moſt intereſted Europe was, at this time, the ſucceſſion of the houſe of Auſtria, in caſe of the death of the emperor Charles VI. the laſt male deſcendant of the houſe of Habſpourg. We have ſaid that, to prevent the diſmemberment of this monarchy, Charles VI. had made a family law, known by the name of the Pragmatic ſanction, to aſcertain the heritage to his daughter, Maria Thereſa. This Pragmatic ſanction had been guarantied by France, England, Holland, Sardinia, Saxony, and the Roman empire; nay by the late king Frederic William alſo, on condition that the court of Vienna would ſecure to him the ſucceſſion of Juliers and Berg. The emperor promiſed him the eventual ſucceſſion, and did not fulfil his engagements; by which the king of Pruſſia, his ſucceſſor, was freed from this guarantee, to which his father, the late king, had pledged himſelf, conditionally.

The ſucceſſion of the dutchies of Juliers and Berg, which was in agitation about the year 1740, was at that time the moſt intereſting object

object of the politics of the houſe of Brandenbourg. Frederic William, feeling his end approach, had contracted no alliance; that he might leave his ſon free to form ſuch connections as circumſtances and occaſion ſhould require. After his death, the court of Berlin began to negotiate at Vienna, Paris, and London; that ſhe might perceive which of theſe powers was the moſt favourably diſpoſed to forward her intereſts. They appeared equally cold, becauſe the views of ſtates only unite when reciprocal wants form alliances; and Europe troubled itſelf little whether the king of Pruſſia, or any other prince, obtained the dutchy of Berg. France indeed conſented that the king might have a part of this dutchy; but this was little ſatisfactory to the wiſhes of a youthful and ambitious king, who would have all, or nothing. Let us accurately remark that the emperor Charles VI. did not content himſelf with obſerving the ſimple guarantee of the dutchy of Berg, but that he had promiſed it to the king of Poland, elector of Saxony; and that, during the embaſſy of prince Lichtenſtein to Paris, he gave a ſimilar and formal promiſe in favour of the prince of Sulzbach, heir to the elector Palatine. Muſt every thing be ſacrificed to the court of Vienna? Was it neceſſary to reſt con-

tent with a ſlip of the dutchy of Berg, which France promiſed Pruſſia ſhould poſſeſs, or muſt recourſe be had to arms, for the purpoſe of ſelf-juſtice? In this criſis, the king reſolved to exert all his reſources, that he might make himſelf more formidable; which plan he immediately put into execution. By the aid of œconomy he raiſed fifteen new battalions *, and thus waited for thoſe events which fortune ſhould pleaſe to ſupply, that he might do himſelf that juſtice which others refuſed.

CHAP. II.

Reaſons for making War on the Queen of Hungary after the Death of the Emperor Charles VI. Winter Campaign in Sileſia.

THE acquiſition of the dutchy of Berg met with many difficulties in carrying it into execution. To obtain preciſe ideas, it is neceſſary to imagine ourſelves in the exact ſtate in which the king, at that time, found himſelf. He ſcarcely could bring ſixty thouſand men into the field; his only reſource, for the ſup-

* The regiments of Camas, Munchow, Dohna, Henry, Perſod, Brunſwick, Eiſenach, and Einſiedel.

port

port of any enterprise, was in the treasure which the late king had left. If he wished to undertake the conquest of the dutchy of Berg, it was necessary to employ all his forces; because, it was strongly to be presumed, he must struggle with France, and at the same time take the city of Dusseldorff. The superiority of France was alone sufficient to make him desist, had he not had other impediments, equally considerable and repugnant to his views. These difficulties arose from similar claims, to those of the king, which the house of Saxony made to Juliers and Berg; and from the jealousy with which the house of Hanover beheld that of Brandenbourg. If, under such circumstances, the king had led his whole force to the banks of the Rhine, he might well expect that, leaving his hereditary domains void of troops, he would expose them to be invaded by the Saxons and the Hanoverians; who would not have failed to have made a diversion: and should he leave a part of his army in the marche of Brandenbourg, to guard his states against the ill intentions of his neighbours, he would then be every where too feeble. France had guarantied the Palatine succession to the duke of Salzbach; thereby to obtain the neutrality of the old elector, during the war she made on the

Rhine. It would not have been this guarantee which would have ſtopped the king; for guarantees are generally only words, which are no ſooner given than broken: but it was the intereſt of France to have feeble neighbours on the banks of the Rhine, and not puiſſant princes, capable of reſiſtance. About the ſame time count Seckendorff, who had been confined in the priſons of Grætz, obtained his liberty, on condition of remitting, into the hands of the emperor, all the orders by which he had been authoriſed to give the late king of Pruſſia the moſt ſolemn aſſurances of aſſiſtance; which the emperor had promiſed him, in ſupport of his rights of ſucceſſion to the dutchies of Juliers and Berg.

This introduction ſhews how little favourable circumſtances were to the houſe of Brandenbourg; and what were the reaſons which determined the king to abide by the proviſional treaty, which his father had concluded with France. But, if theſe forcible arguments moderated that ardour after fame with which the king was animated, motives not leſs powerful impelled him to give, at the beginning of his reign, marks of vigour and fortitude, which ſhould render his nation reſpectable in Europe. Good citizens ſighed to ſee the little reſpect in which

which other powers had held the late king, particularly during the latter part of his reign, and at the contempt thrown on the Pruſſian name, by the world in general. As theſe conſiderations had a great influence on the conduct of the king, we think ourſelves obliged to ſay a few explanatory words on that ſubject.

The ſage and circumſpect conduct of the late king had been imputed to his weakneſs. In the year 1727, there were ſome differences between him and Hanover, concerning trifles, which ended in reconciliation. Shortly after he had other diſputes, equally unimportant, with the Dutch; and which were in like manner accommodated. From theſe two examples of moderation, his neighbours and thoſe who envied him concluded he might be inſulted with impunity; that, inſtead of real, his was but apparent ſtrength; that his officers were not men of underſtanding, but fencing-maſters; and his brave ſoldiers mercenaries, who had little affection for the ſtate; and that, with reſpect to himſelf, he continually threatened but never ſtruck. The world, ſuperficial and frivolous in its judgment, gave credit to ſuch opinions; and theſe prejudices were ſoon ſpread over Europe. The fame to which the late king aſpired, a fame more juſt than that of con-

querors, was to render his country happy; to diſcipline his army; and to adminiſter his finances with the wiſeſt order, and œconomy. War he avoided, that he might not be diſturbed in the purſuit of plans ſo excellent. By theſe means, he travelled ſilently on toward grandeur, without awakening the envy of monarchs. In the laſt years of his life, the infirmities of his body had entirely ruined his health; and his ambition never would have conſented that the command of his troops ſhould have been confided to any other than himſelf. Theſe various cauſes, united, rendered his reign happy and pacific.

Had the opinion which was entertained of the king been only a ſpeculative error, truth would in time have undeceived the public; but princes preſumed ſo much to the diſadvantage of his character, that his allies treated him with as little ceremony as his enemies. As a proof of this, the courts of Vienna and Ruſſia agreed with him to place a prince of Portugal on the throne of Poland. This project was quickly abandoned, and they declared themſelves in favour of Auguſtus II. elector of Saxony, without deigning to ſend the leaſt intimation of ſuch a change to the king. The emperor Charles VI. had, on certain conditions,

obtained

obtained a ſuccour of ten thouſand Pruſſians, whom in 1734 the late king ſent to the banks of the Rhine, againſt the French. The emperor believed himſelf placed above the neceſſity of fulfilling ſuch paltry engagements. George II. of England called the late king, his brother the corporal; and ſaid he was king of the high roads, and arch-duſtman of the holy Roman empire. Every act of this monarch ſtamped an impreſſion of the moſt profound contempt. The Pruſſian officers, who, according to the privileges of electors, enliſted ſoldiers in the Imperial cities, were expoſed to a thouſand vexations; they were arreſted and thrown into dungeons, where they were confined with the vileſt raſcals. In fine, theſe exceſſes became inſufferable. An inſignificant biſhop of Liege prided himſelf on the mortifications which he gave the late king. Some ſubjects of the lordſhip of Herſtall, appertaining to Pruſſia, had revolted, and the biſhop granted them his protection. The late king ſent colonel Kreutz to Liege, with a credential letter to accommodate the matter. And who ſhould think proper to refuſe ſuffering him to come into his preſence? Why truly my lord the biſhop; who, three ſucceſſive days, ſaw the attend-

attendants of this envoy in the court of his palace, and as often refuſed him admiſſion.

This event, and many others, the omiſſion of which brevity occaſions, taught the king that a monarch ought to make himſelf, and particularly his nation, reſpected; that moderation is a virtue which ſtateſmen ought not too rigorouſly to practiſe; becauſe of the corruption of the age; and that, at the commencement of a reign, it was better to give marks of determination than of mildneſs.

That we here may collect whatever might tend to animate the vivacity of a youthful prince, aſcending the throne, let us add that Frederic I. when he erected Pruſſia into a kingdom, had, by that vain grandeur, planted the ſcion of ambition in the boſom of his poſterity; which, ſoon or late, muſt fructify. The monarchy he had left to his deſcendants was, if I may be permitted the expreſſion, a kind of hermaphrodite, which was rather more an electorate than a kingdom. Fame was to be acquired by determining the nature of this being: and this ſenſation certainly was one of thoſe which ſtrengthened ſo many motives, conſpiring to engage the king in grand enterpriſes. If the acquiſition of the dutchy of Berg had not even met with almoſt inſurmountable impediments,

pediments, it was in itſelf ſo ſmall that the poſſeſſion would add little grandeur to the houſe of Brandenbourg. Theſe reflections occaſioned the king to turn his views toward the houſe of Auſtria, the ſucceſſion of which would become matter of litigation, at the death of the emperor, when the throne of the Cæſars ſhould be vacant. That event muſt be favourable to the diſtinguiſhed part which the king had to act in Germany, by the various claims of the houſes of Saxony and Bavaria to theſe ſtates; by the number of candidates which might canvaſs for the Imperial crown; and by the projects of the court of Verſailles, which, on ſuch an occaſion, muſt naturally profit by the troubles that the death of Charles VI. could not fail to excite. This accident did not long keep the world in expectation. The emperor ended his days at the palace *La Favorite*, on the twenty-ſixth day of October, 1740. The news arrived at Rheinſberg when the king was ill of a fever. Infatuated by ancient prejudices, the phyſicians would not adminiſter the bark; he took it in their deſpite, for he meditated things much more important than the cure of a fever. He immediately reſolved to reclaim the principalities of Sileſia; the rights of his houſe to which were inconteſtable: and he prepared, at the

ſame time, to ſupport theſe pretenſions, if neceſſary, by arms. This project accompliſhed all his political views; it afforded the means of acquiring reputation, of augmenting the power of the ſtate, and of terminating what related to the litigious ſucceſſion of the dutchy of Berg. Before however he would come to a fixed reſolution, he weighed the dangers he had to encounter, in undertaking ſuch a war, and the advantages he had to hope.

On one hand ſtood the powerful houſe of Auſtria; which, poſſeſſed of advantages ſo various, could not but procure reſources. The daughter of an emperor was to be attacked, who would find allies in the king of England, the republic of Holland, and the princes of the empire; by whom the Pragmatic ſanction had been guarantied. Biron, duke of Courland, who then governed Ruſſia, was in the pay of the court of Vienna, and the young queen of Hungary might incline Saxony to her intereſt, by the ceſſion of ſome circles of Bohemia. The ſterility of the year 1740 might well inſpire a dread of wanting ſupplies, to form magazines and to furniſh the troops with proviſions. Theſe were great riſks. The fortune of war was alſo to be feared; one loſt battle might be deciſive. The king had no allies, and

and only had raw ſoldiers to oppoſe to the veterans of Auſtria, grown grey in arms, and by ſo many campaigns inured to war.

On the other part, a multitude of reflexions animated the hopes of the king. The ſtate of the court of Vienna, after the death of the emperor, was deplorable. The finances were in diſorder; the army was ruined, and diſcouraged by ill ſucceſs in its wars with the Turks; the miniſtry diſunited, and a youthful, unexperienced princeſs at the head of the government, who was to defend the ſucceſſion from all claimants. The reſult was that the government could not appear formidable. It was beſide impoſſible that the king ſhould be deſtitute of allies. The ſubſiſting rivalry between France and England neceſſarily aſcertained the aid of one of thoſe powers; and all the pretenders to the ſucceſſion of the houſe of Auſtria would inevitably unite their intereſts to thoſe of Pruſſia. The king might diſpoſe of his voice for the Imperial election; he might adjuſt his pretenſions to the dutchy of Berg in the beſt manner, either with France or Auſtria. The war which he might undertake in Sileſia was the only offenſive war that could be favoured by the ſituation of his ſtates, for it would be carried on upon his frontiers,

tiers, and the Oder would always furniſh him with a ſure communication.

The death of Anne, empreſs of Ruſſia, which ſoon followed that of the emperor, finally determined the king in favour of this enterpriſe. By her deceaſe the crown deſcended to young Iwan, grand duke of Ruſſia, ſon of prince Anthony Ulric of Brunſwick, brother-in-law to the king, and of the princeſs of Mecklenburgh. Probabilities were that, during the minority of the young emperor, Ruſſia would be more occupied in maintaining tranquillity at home than in ſupport of the Pragmatic ſanction, concerning which Germany could not but be ſubject to troubles. Add to theſe reaſons, an army fit to march, a treaſury ready prepared, and, perhaps, the ambition of acquiring renown. Such were the cauſes of the war, which the king declared againſt Maria Thereſa of Auſtria, queen of Hungary and Bohemia.

This ſeemed to be the period of change and revolution. The princeſs of Mecklenburgh Brunſwick, mother of the emperor Iwan, was with her ſon under the tutelage of the duke of Courland, to whom the empreſs Anne dying confided the adminiſtration of the empire. This princeſs ſuppoſed herſelf by birth ſuperior to ſubjection. As the mother of the emperor,

ſhe

ſhe rather imagined ſhe herſelf was his proper guardian than Biron, who was neither a native of Ruſſia nor a relation of Iwan. She artfully excited the ambition of marſhal Munich; Biron was arreſted, baniſhed to Siberia, and the princeſs of Mecklenburgh ſeized on the government.

This change appeared to be advantageous to Pruſſia; for its enemy Biron was exiled, and the huſband of the regent, Anthony of Brunſwick, was brother-in-law to the king. To a good underſtanding the princeſs of Mecklenburgh united the caprices and defects of a woman ill educated. Her huſband, weak and deſtitute of genius, had no merit, except the bravery of inſtinct. Munich, the engine of their elevation and the true hero of Ruſſia, was the depoſitary of ſovereign authority. Under the pretence of this revolution, the king ſent baron Winterfeld on an embaſſy into Ruſſia, to congratulate the prince of Brunſwick, and his conſort, on the fortunate ſucceſs of their undertaking. The real motive, the hidden object of this miſſion, was to gain Munich, who was the father-in-law of Winterfeld, that he might favour the deſigns which were ſoon to be put in execution. In executing this Winterfeld

terfeld had all the happy ſucceſs that could be hoped.

Whatever precaution might be taken at Berlin, to conceal the meditated expedition, it was impoſſible to form magazines, prepare artillery, and put the troops in motion ſo ſecretly as not to be ſeen: the world began to ſuſpect ſomething was intended. Damrath, the Imperial envoy at Berlin, informed his court that a ſtorm was gathering, and that it might probably burſt on Sileſia. The council of the queen replied, from Vienna, "We will not, we cannot, give "faith to the intelligence you ſend." The marquis of Botta however was ſent to Berlin, to compliment the king on his acceſſion to the throne; or rather to judge if Damrath had not excited falſe alarms. The art and penetration of the marquis ſoon perceived what was intended; and, on the day that he received his audience, after having paid the uſual congratulations, he enlarged on the inconveniences of the journey he had made, and dwelt much on the bad roads of Sileſia, which had been ſo deſtroyed by inundations that they could no longer be travelled. The king did not ſeem to underſtand him, and anſwered that the worſt that could happen, to thoſe who ſhould travel theſe roads, would be to beſpatter themſelves.

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Though the king was firmly determined on the part he ſhould take, he thought proper to attempt accommodation with the court of Vienna, for which purpoſe count Gotter was ſent thither. He was to declare, to the queen of Hungary, that, in caſe ſhe would do juſtice to the claims of the king on Sileſia, he offered his aſſiſtance againſt all her enemies, open or covert, who ſhould wiſh to diſmember the ſucceſſion of Charles VI. and to give his vote for the imperial election of the grand duke of Tuſcany. As it was to be ſuppoſed theſe offers would be rejected, Gotter was, in that caſe, authoriſed to declare war againſt the queen of Hungary.

The diligence of the army was ſuperior to that of the ambaſſador; it entered Sileſia, as will be ſeen, two days before the arrival of count Gotter at Vienna. Twenty battalions* and thirty-ſix ſquadrons were ſent toward the frontiers of Sileſia, and were to be followed by ſix battalions, deſtined to blockade the fortreſs of Glogau. Feeble as ſuch an army was, it appeared to be ſufficient to ſeize on a defenceleſs country. It had beſide the advantage of amaſſing magazines for the coming ſpring,

* December.

which a large army would have devoured during the winter. Before the king departed to join his forces, he gave another audience to the marquis of Botta, in which he repeated the declarations that were to be made at Vienna by count Gotter. Botta exclaimed,—" You are " going, Sire, to ruin the houſe of Auſtria and " overwhelm yourſelf." " It depends upon the " queen," replied the king, " to accept the of- " fers which are made." This occaſioned the marquis to pauſe; he recollected himſelf, however, and replied, with an ironical air and tone, " Yours are fine troops, I allow, Sire; ours have " not the ſame appearance, but they have ſeen " the wolf. Think I conjure you on what you " are going to undertake." The king was vexed, and anſwered, warmly, " You think my " troops are fine; I will convince you they are " good." The marquis made further remonſtrances that the execution of this project might be deferred; but the king gave him to underſtand it was too late, and that the Rubicon was paſſed.

The attack on Sileſia, having become public, was thought ſo daring as to cauſe a very ſingular effervescence in the minds of men. The feeble and the timorous preſaged the deſtruction of Pruſſia. Others ſuppoſed the prince abandoned

doned every thing to chance, and apprehended that he had taken Charles XII. for his model. Soldiers hoped for good fortune, and foretold preferment. The grumblers, ſome of whom are found in all countries, envied the ſtate that increaſe of which it was ſuſceptible. The prince of Anhalt was enraged that he had not conceived the plan, and that he had not been the great engine of its execution. He, like another Jonah, propheſied of miſeries which fell neither on Nineveh nor Pruſſia. This prince regarded the Imperial army as his cradle: he had obligations to Charles VI. who had beſtowed the brevet of princeſs on his wife, and he feared the aggrandizement of the king, who would annihilate a neighbour like himſelf. Theſe ſubjects of diſcontent induced him to inſpire diffidence and terrors in all minds. He wiſhed to intimidate the king himſelf, had that been practicable; but every thing had been too well planned, and affairs were too far advanced to be able to recede.

To prevent however the ill effect which the opinions of a great general, as was the prince of Anhalt, might make upon the officers, the king thought proper, before his departure, to aſſemble thoſe of the garriſon of Berlin, and ſpeak to them in the following terms—"I

Sam Brown Jun.r

" have undertaken a war, gentlemen, in which " my only allies are your valour and good will. " My cauſe is juſt, and my reſources are in the " hands of fortune. Remember inceſſantly the " fame your anceſtors have acquired, on the " plains of Warſaw, at Fehrbellin, and during " the expedition into Pruſſia. Your deſtiny is " in your own hands. Diſtinction and recom- " penſe attend the acts of thoſe by whom they " ſhall be merited. But I have no need to " incite in you the love of renown, for that is " continually before your eyes, and is the ſole " object worthy your attention. We are to " face ſoldiers who, under prince Eugene, ob- " tained the higheſt reputation. Although this " prince no longer is in exiſtence, ſtill con- " queſt will be an increaſe of honour, when we " ſhall have tried our ſtrength againſt ſuch " brave warriors. Adieu: depart, I will im- " mediately follow to the rendezvous of fame, " which now awaits us."

The king departed from Berlin after a grand maſked ball, and arrived at Croſſen on the 21ſt of December. As chance would have it, on that very day a cord, apparently worn out, to which the cathedral bell was ſuſpended, broke; the bell had a fall, and this was interpreted to be a bad omen; for ſuperſtitious opinions ſtill

influenced the national ſpirit. To eradicate ſuch ill impreſſions, the king, on the contrary, interpreted this to be an advantageous token. The fall of the bell, according to him, denoted the abaſement of the high; and, as the houſe of Auſtria was infinitely higher than that of Brandenbourg, it very clearly prognoſticated the advantages the latter ſhould obtain. Whoever knows the public knows that ſuch reaſons are very ſufficient and convincing.

The army entered Sileſia on the 23d of December *. The troops marched by cantonments, as well becauſe there was no enemy as becauſe the ſeaſon would not admit of encampment. Wherever they came, they diſperſed a written abſtract of the rights of the houſe of Brandenbourg to Sileſia. A manifeſto at the ſame time was publiſhed, the ſubſtance of which was that the Pruſſians took poſſeſſion of this province to guard it againſt irruption from any third power; which clearly indicated that they would not be expelled with impunity. Theſe precautions made the people and nobility not regard the entrance of the Pruſſians into Sileſia as the invaſion of an enemy, but as the aid which an officious neighbour would lend

* 1740.

his ally. Religion likewiſe, that ſacred prejudice among the vulgar, concurred in favour of Pruſſia. Two thirds of Sileſia are compoſed of proteſtants; who, long oppreſſed by Auſtrian fanaticiſm, looked up to the king, as to a ſaviour ſent from heaven.

Aſcending the Oder, the firſt fortreſs that is met with is Glogau. This place is ſituated on the left ſide of the river. It is of moderate extent, and ſurrounded by a bad rampart, the ſmalleſt part of which was of ſtone. The moat was fordable in many places: the counterſcarp was almoſt deſtroyed. As the ſeverity of the ſeaſon prevented a formal ſiege, it was blockaded; neither indeed was the heavy artillery come up. The court of Vienna had ſent preciſe orders to Wenzel Wallis, the governor, not to commit the firſt hoſtilities. He thought that a blockade was not a ſiege, and ſuffered himſelf peaceably to be cooped up in his ramparts. After the peace of Belgrade, the greateſt part of the Auſtrian army had remained in Hungary. On hearing of the irruption of the Pruſſians, general Braun (Brown) was ſent into Sileſia, where he ſcarcely could aſſemble three thouſand men. He attempted to ſeize on Breſlau both by force and artifice, but without effect. This city enjoyed privileges ſimilar to thoſe of the Impe-

Imperial towns. It was a ſmall republic, governed by its magiſtrates, and was exempted from receiving a garriſon. The love of liberty and Lutheraniſm preſerved its inhabitants from the ſcourge of war. They reſiſted every ſolicitation of general Braun, who however might at length have prevailed, had not the king haſtened his march to force him to retreat. While this paſſed, prince Leopold of Anhalt arrived at Glogau, with ſix battalions and five ſquadrons. He relieved the troops that were at the blockade, and the king immediately departed with the army grenadiers, ſix battalions, and ten ſquadrons, to gain Breſlau without loſs of time. After a march of four days he came to the gates of that capital, while marſhal Schwerin, filing along the foot of the mountains, directed his march by Liegnitz, Schweidnitz and Frankenſtein, to drive the enemy from that part of Sileſia.

On the firſt of January, the king ſeized on the ſuburbs of Breſlau without reſiſtance; and ſent colonels Borck and Goltz to ſummon the city to ſurrender. Some troops, at the ſame time, paſſed the Oder and cantoned at the Dome. Thus the king was maſter of both ſides of the river, and effectually blockaded this ill-provided city, which ſoon was obliged to treat. It is

farther to be obſerved that, the moats of the city being frozen, the citizens had reaſon to dread a general aſſault. The zeal of the Lutheran religion cut ſhort the tedioufneſs of negotiation. A fanatical ſhoemaker brought over the low people, inſpired them with his own enthuſiaſm, and raiſed them in ſuch numbers that they obliged the magiſtrates to ſign an act of neutrality with the Pruſſians, and open the city gates.

No ſooner had the king entered the capital than he diſcharged all perſons in office, who were in the ſervice of the queen of Hungary. This ſtroke of authority prevented all the private plotting which might have been practiſed, by the old ſervants of the houſe of Auſtria, and all after cabals againſt the intereſts of Pruſſia.

That affair ended, a detachment of infantry paſſed the Oder, to attack an Auſtrian garriſon of three hundred men, in Namſlau; who, a fortnight afterward, ſurrendered themſelves priſoners of war. One regiment of foot only was left in the ſuburbs of Breſlau, and the king directed his march toward Ohlau, into which Braun had thrown colonel Formentini, with four hundred men. This town takes its name from a ſmall river, which runs under its walls. It was ſurrounded by a bad rampart, half in ruins,

ruins, and a dry ditch. The caſtle, which was ſomewhat ſtronger, could not be taken without artillery. While diſpoſitions were made for a general aſſault on this paltry place, the commander capitulated. The garriſon deſerted at leaving the town, and a hundred and twenty men only remained, who with their commander were eſcorted to Neiſs. The enemy had a garriſon of twelve hundred men at Brieg, to blockade which, as well as other places, general Kleiſt inveſted it with five battalions and four ſquadrons.

While the king had taken or blockaded the fortreſſes on the banks of the Oder, marſhal Schwerin had arrived at Frankenſtein, approaching the river Neiſſe, which ſeparates Upper and Lower Sileſia. He fell in with the dragoons of Lichtenſtein, whom he drove toward Ottmachau. This epiſcopal caſtle has a bridge over the Neiſſe. Braun, to cover and facilitate his retreat, threw in three companies of grenadiers. Theſe marſhal Schwerin blockaded, and on the morrow the king joined him with mortars, and ſome twelve pounders. As ſoon as the batteries were capable of playing, major Mufflin, commander of the garriſon, ſurrendered at diſcretion. There was now only the town of Neiſs to take; but this by its ſtrength

ſtrength was ſuperior to all the others. This place was ſituated beyond the Neiſſe, fortified by a good rampart of earth, with a moat of ſeven feet water in depth, and ſurrounded by low and marſhy lands, which had been overflowed by Rothe, who was the governor. It is overlooked, toward Lower Sileſia, by a height which is eight hundred paces diſtant. The ſeverity of the ſeaſon prevented the operations of a formal ſiege. It therefore only could be taken by aſſault, bombardment, or blockade. Rothe rendered aſſault impracticable; he cauſed the ice of the moat to be broken every morning; he watered the ramparts which were immediately frozen; and he had furniſhed the baſtions and curtains with quantities of beams, and ſcythes, to repel aſſailants. Bombardment therefore was attempted, and twelve hundred bombs and three thouſand red-hot balls were thrown in vain. The firmneſs of the commander obliged the Pruſſians to abandon the place, and go into winter quarters. Colonel Camas, who had been ſent on an expedition againſt Glatz, rejoined the army; he had failed in his attempt for want of taking his meaſures well.

While the Pruſſians were cantoned round Neiſs, marſhal Schwerin, at the head of ſeven battalions and ten ſquadrons, penetrated into Upper

Upper Sileſia. He diſlodged general Braun from Jægerndorff, Troppau, and the caſtle of Grætz. The Auſtrians retired into Moravia; the Pruſſians took up their quarters behind the Oppa, and extended as far as Jablunka, on the frontiers of Hungary.

Count Gotter was at Vienna, while theſe military operations were paſſing, where he negotiated, rather in conformity to cuſtom than with any hope of ſucceſs. The haughtineſs of his language might have intimidated any other court than that of Charles VI. The courtiers of the queen of Hungary proudly replied that it was not for a prince, whoſe office, in quality of arch-chamberlain of the empire, it was to preſent the baſon to waſh the hands of the emperor, to preſcribe laws to his daughter. Gotter, that he might not be outdone by Auſtrian oſtentation, had the boldneſs to ſhow the grand duke a letter, which the king had written to him, in which were theſe words:— "If the grand duke will ſeek deſtruction let "him." The fortitude of the duke ſeemed ſhaken. Count Kinſky, chancellor of Bohemia, the moſt haughty man of this ſupercilious court, took up the converſation, treated every propoſition of count Gotter as injurious to the ſucceſſors of the Cæſars, reanimated the grand duke,

duke, and contributed more than all the other miniſters to break off this negotiation.

Europe was amazed at the unexpected invaſion of Sileſia. Some accuſed it of being the flouriſh of levity; others regarded it as the enterprize of frenzy. Robinſon, the Engliſh ambaſſador, who reſided at Vienna, affirmed that the king of Pruſſia deſerved political excommunication.

At the ſame time that count Gotter departed for Vienna, the king ſent general Winterfeld into Ruſſia. He there found the marquis of Botta, who ſuſtained the intereſts of the court of Vienna with all the warmth of his character. The good ſenſe of the Pomeranian however was, on this occaſion, ſuperior to the ſagacity of the Italian. Winterfeld, by the credit of marſhal Munich, concluded a defenſive alliance between Ruſſia and Pruſſia. This was an event as advantageous as could have been deſired, under ſuch critical circumſtances.

After the troops had entered into winter-quarters, the king left Sileſia, and came to Berlin, to make the requiſite preparations for the next campaign. A reinforcement of ten battalions and twenty-five ſquadrons was ſent to the army; and, as the intentions of the Saxons and Hanoverians appeared to be equivocal,

vocal, it was determined to aſſemble thirty battalions and forty ſquadrons near Brandenbourg, under the command of the prince of Anhalt, to obſerve the conduct of theſe neighbouring powers. The prince choſe Genthin as the moſt proper place for his encampment, and where he might equally keep both Saxons and Hanoverians in check. Moſt ſovereigns ſtill remained in a ſtate of uncertainty; they could not foreſee the approaching cataſtrophe. The embaſſy of count Gotter to Vienna, at the very time that the Pruſſian troops made an irruption into Sileſia, was to them enigmatical; and they were endeavouring to divine whether Pruſſia was the ally or the enemy of the queen of Hungary.

Of all the powers of Europe, France was undoubtedly the moſt proper to aſſiſt the Pruſſians, in their conqueſt. The French had ſo many reaſons to be the enemies of the Auſtrians that their intereſts muſt lead them to declare themſelves the friends of the king. That he might ſound the coaſt, he wrote to cardinal de Fleuri; and, though he touched but lightly on affairs, he ſaid enough to be underſtood. The cardinal ſpoke plainer in his reply *. He an-

* In a letter dated at Iſſi, January 25, 1741.

ſwered

ſwered without diſguiſe—" That the guarantee " of the Pragmatic ſanction granted by Louis " XV. to the emperor, was no tie upon the " former, becauſe of the clauſe *ſave and except* " *the claims of a third:* that, farther, the late " emperor had not fulfilled the principal article " of the treaty, by which he had undertaken " to procure to France the guarantee of the " empire for the treaty of Vienna." The remainder of the letter contained an angry declamation againſt the ambition of England, a panegyric on France, and on the advantages which might reſult from her alliance, with a detail of the reaſons that might induce the electors to place the elector of Bavaria on the Imperial throne. The king continued this correſpondence; he ſhewed the cardinal the ſincere deſire he had to ally himſelf to the moſt chriſtian king, and aſſured him of every facility, which ſhould depend upon himſelf, promptly to terminate this negotiation.

Sweden wiſhed to play a part in the riſing troubles. She was the ally of France; and, at the inſtigation of that power, had ſent a body of troops into Finland, under the command of general Buddenbrock. This, having inſpired Ruſſia with jealouſy, accelerated the alliance the

latter made with Pruſſia. But that alliance was no ſooner formed than in danger of being deſtroyed. The king of Poland had ſent the handſome count Lynar to Peterſburg. This ambaſſador pleaſed the princeſs of Mecklenburg, the regent of Ruſſia; and, as the paſſions greatly influence the deliberations of the underſtanding, the regent was preſently on good terms with the king of Poland. This amour might have become as fatal to Pruſſia, as that of Paris and the beauteous Helen had been to Troy. Its effects were prevented by a revolution, which we ſhall relate in its place.

The greateſt enemies of the king were, as uſual, his neareſt neighbours. The kings of Poland and England, who relied upon the intrigues which Lynar carried on in Ruſſia, concluded between them an offenſive alliance; by which they divided the Pruſſian provinces. Their imagination fattened on that prey; and, while they declaimed againſt the ambition of a youthful prince, they were already enjoying his ſpoils, in the hope that Ruſſia and the princes of the empire would concur, in giving ſucceſs to their own avidity. The court of Vienna ought to have ſeized this moment to have come to an accommodation with the king. Had it then ceded the dutchy of Glogau, he would have been ſatisfied,

satisfied, and would have assisted this court against its other enemies; but it seldom happens that the compliances or refusals of men are well timed. The signal for war was given to Europe. Ministers were every where sounding, negotiating, and intriguing, to arrange their parties and form alliances; but the troops of no power were ready; none were provided with magazines; and the king profited by this crisis, to execute his grand projects.

CHAP. III.

Campaign of 1741. *Negotiations for Peace. Homage of Breslau. Return to Berlin.*

THE reinforcement for the army in Silesia arrived at Schweidnitz in the month of February. The Austrians on their part also prepared for war. They released marshal Neuperg from the prisons of Brunn, where he had been detained ever since the peace of Belgrade, to confide to him the command of that army which was to reconquer Silesia. The marshal assembled his troops in the environs of Olmutz, and sent general Lentulus, with a detachment, to occupy the defiles of the principality of Glatz, by

by which Lentulus found himſelf able to cover Bohemia, and join the army of Neuperg in its meditated operations on the Neiſſe. The Auſtrian huſſars already preluded war; they ſlipt in between the Pruſſian poſts, and endeavoured to carry off ſmall parties and intercept convoys. Some trifling ſkirmiſhes paſt, which all were as favourable to the infantry as they were unfavourable to the cavalry of the king.

Arriving in Sileſia, the king propoſed to viſit all his quarters, that he might inform himſelf concerning a country with which he was unacquainted. For this purpoſe he left Schweidnitz, and came to Frankenſtein. General Derſchau, who commanded in that part, had advanced two poſts further. The one was at Silberberg, and the other at Wartha, both in the defiles of the mountains. The king wiſhed to viſit them; the enemy got intelligence of this, and attempted to take him. By miſtake they fell on an eſcort of dragoons, poſted in relay near the village of Baumgarten, between Silberberg and Frankenſtein. Colonel Ditfort, who commanded that eſcort, was too ignorant to manœuvre with advantage againſt light troops; he was beaten and loſt forty horſemen. A firing was heard at Wartha. The king, who was there, haſtily aſſembled ſome troops, to fly to the aid

of his dragoons, who were at a mile's diſtance; but he arrived after all was over. It was a thoughtleſs act of the ſovereign to become an adventurer ſo ill accompanied. Had the king been taken priſoner, on this occaſion, the war had been ended; the Auſtrians would have been triumphant without a blow; the Pruſſian infantry, excellent as it was, would have become uſeleſs, and all the great projects of the king would have vaniſhed.

The nearer the opening of the campaign approached *, the more ſerious was the aſpect of affairs. The ſpies were unanimous in their reports that Auſtrians ſtrengthened themſelves in their poſts; that new troops were arriving; and that they meditated the ſurpriſe of the Pruſſians, in their quarters, either by penetrating through Glatz or Zuckmantel. A hundred dragoons and three hundred Auſtrian huſſars threw themſelves into Neiſs, about the ſame period. This was a ſufficient indication of the deſigns of the enemy, and was the reaſon that the king gave orders to narrow his quarters. He ought immediately to have aſſembled his troops; but he was inexperienced, and this was properly his firſt campaign.

* March.

The

The ſeaſon was not ſufficiently advanced to convert the blockade of Glogau and that of Brieg into ſieges. A project however was formed ſuddenly to ſeize on Glogau, and prince Leopold of Anhalt was ordered to put it in execution, without loſs of time. On the 9th of March, the town was at once attacked in five different parts, and taken in leſs than an hour. The very cavalry freed the ramparts, ſo ruinous were the works. Not a houſe was pillaged, not a citizen was inſulted; and Pruſſian diſcipline ſhone in all its glory. Wallis and his whole garriſon were made priſoners of war. A new-raiſed Pruſſian regiment was put in poſſeſſion, the works were inſtantly begun to be repaired, and prince Leopold, with the corps he commanded, joined the king at Schweidnitz.

The taking of Glogau was not all. The troops were too much ſcattered to be able, in caſe of neceſſity, to unite. Thoſe quarters eſpecially which marſhal Schwerin occupied, in Upper Sileſia, occaſioned the moſt inquietude. The king wiſhed the marſhal to collect them, and fall back toward the Neiſſe, where the king would join him with all the forces of Lower Sileſia. Schwerin was not of this opinion; he wrote that, if he might be reinforced, he would engage to maintain his quarters till the ſpring.

For once, the king put more faith in his marſhal than in himſelf. His credulity had nearly become fatal to him; and, as if it were neceſſary he ſhould add error to error, he put himſelf at the head of eight ſquadrons and nine battalions, to repair to Jægerndorff. He came up with the marſhal at Neuſtadt. "What "news of the enemy?"—was the firſt queſtion. "I have none," replied the marſhal; "except "that the Auſtrian troops are diſperſed along "the frontiers, from Hungary as far as Braunau, "in Bohemia; and I expect the return of my "ſpies every moment." The king arrived at Jægerndorff on the morrow, and his intention was to depart the next day, to open the trenches before Neiſs, where marſhal Kalckſtein waited his coming, with ten battalions and as many ſquadrons. The duke of Holſtein, who was then at Frankenſtein, was alſo to join the king, with ſeven battalions and four ſquadrons.

At the very moment of the king's departure *, and while he was giving his laſt orders, as well to the marſhal as to prince Leopold, ſeven Auſtrian dragoons arrived. The information theſe deſerters gave was, that they had quitted the army at Freudenthal, which is only a mile

* April 2d.

and

and a half from Jægerndorff; that their cavalry was there encamped; and that it waited the arrival of the infantry, and the artillery, to traverſe the Pruſſian quarters, and oblige them to raiſe the blockade of Neiſs. Skirmiſhing at this very inſtant was heard before the town, and every body believed the van-guard of general Neuperg was on the point of inveſting Jægerndorff. There were only five battalions in this unfortunate place, five three pounders, and ſufficient powder for forty charges. The ſituation would have been deſperate, had Neuperg known how to profit by occaſion; but the mountain brought forth a mouſe. The enemy wiſhed to know if the Pruſſians were ſtill in their quarters; and, for this purpoſe, they ſent their light troops to ſkirmiſh before each town, in order to bring their reports to the officers.

The deſign of the enemy being manifeſt, the king did not heſitate a moment to aſſemble the army. The troops of Lower Sileſia had orders to paſs the Neiſſe at Sorge, and thoſe of Upper Sileſia to join the king at Jægerndorff. On the fourth of April, the king left Neuſtadt, with all theſe corps collected, keeping pace with the enemy's army, that marched by Zuckmantel and Ziegenhals toward Neiſs. On the mor-

row * he inclined toward Steinau, a mile distant from Sorge, where he had constructed bridges over the Neisse. The blockade of Brieg must be raised, and general Kleist received orders to join the army with his detachment. The duke of Holstein had like orders sent to him repeatedly; those who were sent with them could not deliver their message, and he remained in great tranquillity at Frankenstein, seeing the enemy pass on his right and his left, without in the least troubling himself. Deserters from the Austrian army arrived at Steinau, who affirmed that general Lentulus had the same day joined marshal Neuperg, near Neisse. On receiving this news, the Prussian quarters were contracted immediately round Steinau, and the king chose a post where he might give the enemy a proper reception, in case the Prussians were attacked. To heighten vexation, the quarters at Steinau took fire during the night; and it was only by good fortune that the artillery and ammunition were saved, dragged through narrow streets, the houses of which were all in flames. The troops passed the night under arms, on the ground which the king had chosen for his camp. On the morrow † this small corps, of thirteen

* April 5th. † April 6th.

battalions

battalions and fifteen ſquadrons, after a fatiguing march, arrived at Falckenberg, where information was received that colonel Stechow, who covered the bridge of Sorge with four battalions, had ſeen a large body of the enemy, fortifying themſelves on the other ſide of the river, and who even kept up a warm fire on the Pruſſians. Prince Charles marched thither immediately, with four battalions, and ſent the king word that Lentulus was on the oppoſite ſhore of the Neiſſe, with fifty ſquadrons, and rendered the paſſage abſolutely impracticable; becauſe that the ground was too confined. The direction of marching muſt therefore be changed. The route to Michelau was taken, where there is another bridge over the Neiſſe; where general Marwitz already was, with the troops aſſembled from the quarters of Schweidnitz and the blockade of Brieg. The bridge of Sorge was raiſed without loſs of time; and in the evening all theſe different corps joined the king.

On the morrow *, the army croſſed the Neiſſe at Michelau, intending to march to Grotkau. A courier who had paſſed that town brought diſpatches to the king, ſo that he had no ſuſpicions. A very heavy ſnow fell and in-

* April 8th.

terrupted the light, ſo as to prevent the diſcernment of objects. The march was continued. The huſſars of the van-guard entered the village of Leipe, which is on the road; and, without knowing it, fell in with a regiment of the enemy's huſſars, who were there cantoned. The Pruſſians took forty of the enemy, ſome on foot others on horſeback; and from them intelligence was gained that, half an hour before, Neuperg had taken Grotkau. A lieutenant, named Mitzſchefahl, had commanded there, with ſixty men, and defended himſelf for the ſpace of three hours againſt the whole Auſtrian army. The deſerters further depoſed that the enemy, on the morrow, would march to Ohlau, to take the heavy artillery which had there been depoſited by the king.

On this news the different columns of the army, which were all on the march, were aſſembled. The king ſeparated them into four diviſions, and cantoned them in four villages, each ſufficiently near to the other for the army to be aſſembled, at the given rendezvous, in leſs than an hour. The king took up his quarters in the villages of Pogrel and Alſen, from which he diſpatched various officers to the garriſon of Ohlau, to inform them of his approach, and to draw to himſelf two regiments of cuiraſ-

fiers,

ſiers, who had lately arrived in theſe parts. None of the officers could get thither, becauſe of the enemy's parties, that infeſted the country. The next day, the ſnow was ſo heavy that objects at twenty paces diſtance ſcarcely could be diſtinguiſhed. Intelligence however was received that the enemy had approached Brieg. Had the bad weather continued, the difficulties of the Pruſſians muſt have increaſed. Proviſions began to be ſcarce. Ohlau was to be ſuccoured; and, in caſe of misfortune, there was no place of retreat: but chance ſupplied the want of prudence.

On the morrow, the 10th of April, the weather appeared clear and ſerene; and, though the ſnow was two feet deep, there were no obſtacles to oppoſe any undertaking. The army was aſſembled, at five in the morning, near the mill of Pogrel. It conſiſted of twenty-ſeven battalions, twenty-nine ſquadrons of cavalry, and three of huſſars. It began its march in five columns. The artillery was in the center; the two next were columns of infantry; and the two wings of cavalry. The king knew that the cavalry of the enemy was ſuperiour to that of the Pruſſians, to obviate which inconvenience he placed two battalions of grenadiers between the ſquadrons of each wing. This was the diſ-

poſition

poſition made by Guſtavus Adolphus, at the battle of Lutzen, and which, according to all appearances, will never more be practiſed. In this order the army advanced toward the enemy, following the road which leads to Ohlau.

General Rottembourg, who led the vanguard, paſſing near the village of Pampitz, took ſome twenty priſoners, who confirmed the intelligence which the peaſants of the village of Molwitz had come to give the king; which was that the enemy's army was cantoned in Molwitz, Grunigen, and Hüneren.

As ſoon as the columns came within about two thouſand paces of Molwitz, the army extended itſelf in order of battle, though there was no appearance of an enemy in the field. The right was to be ſupported by the village of Herrendorff. Schulenbourg, who commanded the cavalry of that wing, took his meaſures ſo aukwardly that he did not arrive there. The left was ſupported by the rivulet of Lauchwitz, the banks of which are marſhy and deep. As the cavalry of the right however had not left ſufficient room for the infantry, three battalions were obliged to be withdrawn from the firſt line, of which by ſome lucky chance a flank was formed, to cover the right of the two lines of infantry. This diſpoſition

was

was the principal cauſe of victory. The baggage was ſtowed near the village of Pampitz, about a mile behind the lines, and it was covered by the regiment of La Motte, which juſt then joined the army *. Rottembourg with the vanguard approached Molwitz, which he ſaw the Auſtrians leaving. He ought to have attacked them in this diſorder, if he had not received preciſe orders not to engage; he therefore returned with his corps to the right wing, of which it was a part.

It may appear ſurpriſing that an experienced general, like marſhal Neuperg, ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be ſurpriſed in any ſuch manner. He however was excuſable. He had given orders, to different officers of huſſars, to ſcour the country, eſpecially toward Brieg. Whether it were the reſult of indolence or negligence, theſe officers did not do their duty, and the marſhal had no intelligence of the approach of the king, till he ſaw his army in order of battle facing his cantonments. Neuperg was obliged to arrange his troops while played upon by the Pruſſian artillery, which was ſerved with promptitude and care. The right wing of his cavalry, under the command of Rœmer,

* From Oppeln.

arrived

arrived the firſt. This intelligent and determined officer ſaw that the right wing of the Pruſſians was nearer Molwitz than the left, and ſaw that, if he kept his poſt, Neuperg riſked the loſs of the battle, before the left of his cavalry could come up; therefore, without waiting for orders, he reſolved to attack the right of the Pruſſians. Schulenbourg, to gain the village of Herrendorff, made an ill-conceived quarter wheel to the right, by ſquadrons. Rœmer ſaw this, and without forming attacked the wing that Schulenbourg commanded full ſpeed, in a column. The thirty ſquadrons of the queen's troops, led by him, immediately overturned the ten Pruſſian ſquadrons, each of which preſented its left flank. This routed cavalry, paſſing by and between the lines of infantry, would have totally broken them, had they not fired upon the fugitives, which fire at the ſame time repulſed the enemy. Rœmer was killed; but, what may ſurpriſe every military man was that, the two battalions of grenadiers, who had been placed between the ſquadrons of the right, ſingly maintained their ground, and joined the right of the infantry in good order.

The king, who thought he might rally cavalry as he would ſtop a pack of hounds, was carried

carried away in their route to the center of the army, where he accompliſhed the rallying of ſome ſquadrons, which he led to the right. They were obliged to attack the Auſtrians in their turn; but theſe beaten and haſtily-collected troops did not long make head. They diſbanded, and Schulenbourg periſhed in the charge. The victorious cavalry then falling on the right flank of the Pruſſian infantry, where as we have ſaid the three battalions that could not enter into the firſt line were placed, made three vigorous attacks on this infantry. The Auſtrian officers fell wounded among the ranks; the enemy's horſemen were diſmounted by the bayonet; and the bravery of the infantry repelled the Auſtrians, who loſt many men.

Marſhal Neuperg ſeized this moment. His infantry was in motion to attack the right of the Pruſſians, unſupported by cavalry. Seconded by the Auſtrian horſe, he made incredible efforts to break the ranks of the Pruſſians, but ineffectually. This brave infantry reſiſted attacks like a rock, and by their fire deſtroyed many of the enemy.

The left of the Pruſſians was in leſs danger. This wing which they had refuſed the enemy, was ſupported by the rivulet of Lauchwitz. Beyond this marſh the king's cavalry had

charged that of the queen, and was victorious. The fire of the infantry on the right, however, continued for nearly five hours to be very hot; the ſoldiers began to want ammunition, and robbed the cartridge boxes of the dead, in order to obtain powder. The criſis was ſo great that the oldeſt officers thought there was no reſource, and foreſaw the approaching moment when this corps, deprived of ammunition, would be obliged to yield to the enemy. So however did it not happen, and this ought to teach young commanders not to deſpair too ſoon; for the infantry not only maintained its ground, but gained upon the enemy. Marſhal Schwerin, who perceived this, made a motion with his left which he brought upon the right flank of the Auſtrians. This motion was the ſignal of victory, and of the enemy's defeat. The rout was total. Night prevented the Pruſſians from purſuing their advantages farther than the village of Lauchwitz.

Ten ſquadrons from Ohlau now arrived, but too late. The cauſeway which they had to paſs had been barred by the Auſtrian huſſars, who long had ſtopped them there, and who did not abandon the place till they ſaw their army routed. This battle coſt the queen of Hungary a hundred and eighty officers, and ſeven thouſand horſe

horſe and foot, killed. The enemy loſt ſeven pieces of cannon, three ſtandards, and twelve hundred men taken priſoners. The Pruſſians enumerated two thouſand five hundred dead, among whom was the margrave Frederic, couſin of the king, and three thouſand wounded. The firſt battalion of guards ſuſtained the principal effort of the enemy, loſt half its officers, and, of eight hundred men, had only a hundred and eighty capable of ſerving that remained.

The battle was one of the moſt memorable of the preſent century; becauſe that two ſmall armies then decided the fate of Sileſia, and becauſe the troops of the king there acquired that fame of which they never can be deprived, either by time or envy.

The reader muſt no doubt have remarked, in the relation of the opening of this campaign, that it is difficult to ſay who committed the moſt faults, the king or marſhal Neuperg. If the projects of the Auſtrian general were ſuperior, execution was in favour of the Pruſſians. The plan of the marſhal was judicious and wiſe. By entering Sileſia he ſeparated the king's quarters, penetrated to Neiſs, where Lentulus joined him, and was on the point not only of ſeizing the royal artillery, but of carrying the Pruſſian magazines at Breſlau, the only

magazines of which they were poſſeſſed. But the marſhal might have ſurpriſed the king at Jägerndorff, and by this ſingle ſtroke have terminated the war: he might from Neiſs have carried the corps of the duke of Holſtein, which was cantoned only at the diſtance of a mile *. Had he been a little more active he might have prevented the king from paſſing the Neiſſe at Michelau. From Grotkau he ought to have marched day and night to take Ohlau, and cut off the king from Breſlau. Inſtead of ſeizing theſe opportunities, by an unpardonable ſecurity, he ſuffered himſelf to be ſurpriſed, and was beaten chiefly in conſequence of his own fault.

The king afforded ſtill greater cauſe for cenſure. He received timely intelligence of the plan of the enemy, to prevent which he took no ſufficient meaſures. Inſtead of marching to Jägerndorff, by which he ſtill more divided his troops, he ought immediately to have aſſembled his whole army, and to have placed it in cloſe cantonments, in the neighbourhood of Neiſs. He ſuffered the duke of Holſtein to be cut off, and put himſelf to the neceſſity

* The word mile frequently occurs, and it is to be preſumed it always ſignifies a German mile, which contains from four to ſix, or ſeven miles Engliſh. T.

of

of fighting in a ſituation from which, had miſfortune come, he could not retreat; and in which he riſked the loſs of his army, and being himſelf taken. Being come to Molwitz, where the enemy was cantoned, inſtead of immediately preſſing his march, to ſeparate the cantonments of the queen's troops, he loſt two hours in methodically forming before the village, where there was no appearance of an enemy. Had he only attacked the village of Molwitz, he had taken the whole Auſtrian infantry, in much the ſame manner as twenty-four French battalions were taken at Blindheim: but he poſſeſſed only marſhal Schwerin, in his whole army, who was a man of genius, and an experienced general. His troops had all poſſible good will, but they were acquainted only with the inferior parts of war; and having never been in action, they durſt only creep, fearful of being deciſive. The real ſalvation of the Pruſſians was their bravery and their diſcipline. Molwitz was the ſchool of the king, and of his ſoldiers: he made profound reflections on all the faults he had committed, and endeavoured to correct himſelf in future.

The duke of Holſtein had an opportunity of ſtriking a grand ſtroke; but occaſions on him were loſt. Not having received any orders

from the king, he had marched, without very well knowing why, from Ottmachau to Strehlen. Here he was on the very day of battle, and heard the firing of the two armies. On the 11th the flying Auſtrian troops paſſed within a mile of his poſt. He might have deſtroyed the remainder, but for want of being able to form any reſolution, he left an open field to marſhal Neuperg, who aſſembled the fugitives on the other ſide of the town of Neiſs, and the duke of Holſtein very contentedly joined the king's army near Ohlau. After this junction, and the arrival of other reinforcements, the whole army conſiſted of forty-three battalions, ſixty-ſix ſquadrons of cavalry, and three of huſſars.

In order to profit by the victory, it was reſolved to undertake the ſiege of Brieg. Marſhal Kalckſtein was charged with the conduct of this ſiege, and the army of the king encamped near Molwitz, to cover his operations. Eight days after the trenches were opened the governor Piccolomini capitulated, before the covered way was carried, or before any breach had been made in the works. The army remained three weeks encamped at Molwitz, to afford time to fill up the trenches, and revictual Brieg, the ammunition of which had all been expended. The king profited by this inactivity to exerciſe his

his cavalry, to teach it to manœuvre, and to change its heavineſs into celerity. It was often ſent in diviſions that the officers might learn to take advantage of the ground, and acquire greater confidence in themſelves.

At this time Winterfeld, who had negotiated an alliance in Ruſſia, performed ſo remarkable an action, at the head of a detachment, that he obtained the reputation of being as good an officer as he was a negotiator. He ſurpriſed and beat general Baranay, at Rothſchlot, and took three hundred priſoners. As the Pruſſians enjoyed the countenance of the country, they obtained the beſt intelligence, which in a partiſan war procured them various advantages. We ſhall not, however, relate all ſimilar ſmall actions; for inſtance, of the manner in which the Auſtrians ruined, near Leubus, a new-raiſed regiment of huſſars of Bandemer, took about a hundred Ulans near Strehlen, and burnt Zobten, or how the Pruſſians beat them at Friedwalde, and in other rencontres; for it is not our intention to write a hiſtory of the huſſars, but of the conqueſt of Sileſia.

The battle by which this conqueſt was almoſt decided occaſioned very different ſenſations throughout Europe. The court of Vienna, in expectation of ſucceſs, was irritated and enraged

at its loſſes. In hope of obtaining revenge it drew troops, and a numerous militia, from Hungary, with which it reinforced marſhal Neuperg. The kings of England and Poland began to reſpect the army commanded by the prince of Anhalt, which at firſt they had contemned. The empire ſtood amazed, as it were, to learn that the Auſtrian veterans had been defeated by ſuch raw ſoldiers. France was delighted at the news of this victory: its court flattered itſelf that, by taking part in the war, it ſhould in time be able to give the laſt blow to the houſe of Auſtria. In conſequence of this favourable diſpoſition, marſhal de Belleiſle, ambaſſador from France, to the diet of election, which then ſat at Frankfort, came to the camp*, and propoſed a treaty of alliance, on the part of his maſter, to the king; the principal articles of which related to the election of the elector of Bavaria, the diſmemberment and diviſion of the provinces of the queen of Hungary, and the guarantee which France promiſed for Lower Sileſia, on condition that the king would renounce the ſucceſſion of the dutchies of Juliers and Berg, and promiſe his vote for the elector of Bavaria. A ſketch was made of

* At Molwitz.

this

this treaty; and it was further ſtipulated that France ſhould ſend two armies into the empire, one of which ſhould march to ſuccour the elector of Bavaria, and the other eſtabliſh itſelf in Weſtphalia, to keep both the Hanoverians and Saxons in awe; and finally that, in preference to all things, Sweden ſhould declare war on Ruſſia, to give the latter employment in the protection of its own frontiers.

Advantageous as this treaty appeared, it was not ſigned. The king would not be too precipitate, in affairs of ſuch grand conſequence, and he reſerved to himſelf the liberty of acceding to it as a laſt reſource. Marſhal de Belleiſle indulged his imagination too often. Liſtening to him, it might have been ſuppoſed that all the provinces of the queen of Hungary were put up to auction. One day, in company with the king, appearing to be more thoughtful and abſent than uſual, the king aſked him if he had received any diſagreeable news. "None," replied the marſhal, "but I am embarraſſed to "know what we ſhall do with Moravia." The king propoſed it ſhould be given to Saxony, that by this lure the king of Poland might be drawn into the grand alliance. The marſhal thought the idea admirable, and afterward put it in execution.

The negotiations of Pruſſia were not confined to France alone; they extended to Holland, England, and throughout all Europe. The king having thrown out ſome propoſitions in a letter which he wrote to the king of England, the latter replied that it was true his engagements obliged him to maintain the ſucceſſion of Charles VI. entire, and that it was with pain he beheld any interruption of the good intelligence which had ſubſiſted between the Pruſſians and Auſtrians; that however he would willingly interpoſe, if his mediation could produce a reconciliation between the two courts. He ſent lord Hyndford as ambaſſador from England, and the ſieur Schwichelt as Hanoverian envoy. Theſe two negotiators, though in the ſervice of the ſame prince, had received very different inſtructions. The Hanoverian required that the neutrality of his maſter ſhould be purchaſed by a guarantee of the biſhopricks of Hildeſheim, Oſnabruck, and of the balliages which were mortgaged to him in Mecklenbourg. A counter-project was given him in which the intereſts of Pruſſia were better managed. Hyndford offered the interpoſition of his maſter, to engage the queen of Hungary to cede ſome principalities of Lower Sileſia; but all formal negotiation on theſe points was eluded, till inſtructions were

firſt

firſt received relative to the diſpoſitions of the court of Vienna. Theſe miniſters were in the king's camp, and it ſeemed ſingular that lord Hyndford gave greater umbrage to Schwichelt than marſhal de Belleiſle; and ſtill more ſingular that the Hanoverian ſhould, as he did, moſt eſpecially recommend his negotiations to be kept ſecret from the Engliſh ambaſſador.

Theſe Engliſh and Hanoverians, who flattered the king in his camp, wiſhed only to lull him into ſecurity. They did not act thus in the other courts of Europe. In Ruſſia, the Engliſh miniſter, Finch, ſecretly promoted war. The intrigues of Botta, and the charms of the handſome Lynar, were the deſtruction of the brave Munich. The prince of Brunſwic, general in chief of Ruſſia, incited by his grandmother, by the empreſs dowager, and by thoſe foreign miniſters, who were ſo many firebrands, would have engaged Ruſſia to declare immediate war againſt Pruſſia. Troops were already aſſembling in Livonia, of which the king was informed, and this it was which made him ſuſpect the Engliſh, whoſe duplicity he diſcovered. Their intrigues had, in like manner, extorted a letter from the grand Penſionary of Holland *, which exhorted the king

* Preſented by Ginkel, June 15.

to withdraw his troops from Sileſia. Theſe various machinations of the Engliſh, and eſpecially what was foreſeen in Ruſſia, finally determined the king to ſign the treaty with France, on the conditions which had been ſtipulated by marſhal de Belleiſle. The two following articles were added—That the French ſhould begin their operations before the end of Auguſt; and that this treaty ſhould be kept ſecret till its publication could not be prejudicial to the intereſts of Pruſſia.

No time was loſt in concluding the alliance; expedition was neceſſary; the ill will of the Ruſſians began to be apparent. Six thouſand Danes, and ſix thouſand Heſſians, to whom England granted ſubſidies, were added to the Hanoverian forces who had been encamped ever ſince the month of April. The Saxons were alſo preparing, and it was in agitation to join their troops to thoſe of Hanover. Time, therefore, only could be gained till ſuccours ſhould arrive from France, by amuſing as much as poſſible lord Hyndford, and the ſieur Schwichelt, that they might not even ſuſpect the treaty which had been ſigned. In this the king and his miniſters were ſo ſucceſsful that the negotiation with theſe ambaſſadors, which appeared always on the point of concluſion, continually

nually found ſome new impediment, which obliged lord Hyndford to ſend for more ample inſtructions from his court. It was ever near an end but never ended.

The camp of the king ſeemed to have become a congreſs; but the army was put in motion, and recovered a military air. No ſooner was Brieg revictualled than the army marched to encamp near Grotkau. Marſhal Neuperg was three miles diſtant from that place, behind the town of Neiſs, and in an impenetrable camp. The Pruſſian camp was changed for the convenience of ſubſiſtence; the army occupied the heights of Strehlen, from whence, by approaching Breſlau, it might draw proviſions, and dry fodder the horſe the reſt of the campaign. In this poſt it was at an equal diſtance from Brieg and Schweidnitz, and covered all the Lower Sileſia. Advantage was taken, of the eight weeks which it remained in this poſition, to recruit the infantry, and remount the cavalry; which was performed with ſo much ſucceſs that the army had not been more complete than it then was ſince it had taken the field.

While the king was thus employed in rendering his army more formidable, marſhal Neuperg was conceiving plans which would have been dangerous had time been left him to put them

them in execution. We do not ſuppoſe it will be here unſeaſonable to relate in what manner the king diſcovered theſe plans. In Breſlau there was a conſiderable number of old ladies, natives of Auſtria and Bohemia, who long had been ſettled in Sileſia. They had relations at Vienna and Prague, ſome of whom ſerved in the army of Neuperg. Auſtrian pride, and the fanaticiſm of the Romiſh religion, augmented their attachment to the queen of Hungary. They ached with anger at the very name of Pruſſia: they caballed in ſecret, intrigued, and held a correſpondence with the army of the marſhal, by the intervention of monks and prieſts who became their emiſſaries, and were informed of all the deſigns of the enemy. To ſtrengthen their party, theſe women had appointed what they called their ſittings, which were aſſemblies held almoſt every evening, and where they communicated their intelligence, and deliberated on the means that might be employed to expel an army of heretics out of Sileſia, and deſtroy all ſuch miſcreants. The king gained intelligence of the chief things which paſſed in theſe congregations, and he ſpared no pains to introduce an inſidious ſiſter into their aſſemblies, who, under the pretence

of

of hatred to the Pruſſians, ſhould find a welcome, and inform him of all their plots.

It was by this channel that intelligence was obtained that marſhal Neuperg propoſed by his motions to draw the king from Breſlau, to return thither himſelf by forced marches, and, by the aid of the information he obtained, to ſeize on that capital. This would be to take from the Pruſſians all their magazines, and at the ſame time to cut off their communication with the electorate, which they enjoyed on the Oder. It was immediately determined to foreſtal the enemy, at all events; and, with reſpect to Breſlau, to break that neutrality which the magiſtrates themſelves had made more than one attempt to infringe. To effect this, the ſyndics and ſheriffs the moſt attached to the houſe of Auſtria were ſent for to the camp of the king. The foreign miniſters were at the ſame time invited thither, that their perſons might not be expoſed to any diſorders which the ſurpriſe might occaſion. Some battalions were detached, which, by different routes, arrived in the ſuburb *. A paſſage through the city was demanded for a regiment. While it entered by one gate a cart made a delay at another. Three

* Auguſt the 7th.

battalions

battalions and five ſquadrons profited by this to glide into the city. The infantry occupied the ramparts and ſquares, and took charge of the gates; the cavalry cleared the principal ſtreets; in leſs than an hour all was quiet. Neither diſorder, pillage, nor murder was committed. The citizens paid homage. Three battalions continued in garriſon *, and the remainder rejoined the army. Marſhal Neuperg, who did not ſuſpect he was diſcov ered, had marched toward Frankenſtein, in the hope that the king would immediately fall upon Neiſs, and that he then might execute his deſign on Breſlau; but, perceiving that his project had failed, he wiſhed to conſole himſelf by carrying the magazine which the Pruſſians had at Schweidnitz. In this likewiſe he was diſappointed, by being prevented. The van-guard of the king arrived at the time that his van was at Reichenbach. The Auſtrians beat their way back, and retired toward Frankenſtein.

The king was joined at Reichenbach by new levies, conſiſting of ten ſquadrons of dragoons, and thirteen of huſſars. The marſhal had choſen his poſition judiciouſly: he maintained a communication with the fortreſs of Neiſs, by

* General Marwitz was appointed governor.

Patſchkau;

Patſchkau; drew ſubſiſtence out of Bohemia, by Glatz; and foraged a country which he could not preſerve. His right was ſupported at Frankenſtein, his left on the hills not far from Silberberg, and two rivulets covered his front, and ſecured all approaches. Difficulties did but animate the king; he wiſhed to have the honour of making the Auſtrians decamp, and driving them into Upper Sileſia. But before we come to this operation, it will not be amiſs firſt to caſt a glance on what was paſſing in other parts of Europe.

The queen of Hungary then began to ſee the perils by which ſhe was menaced. The French paſſed the Rhine and coaſted the Danube, making long marches. Fear cauſed her pride to abate. She diſpatched Mr. Robinſon, the Engliſh ambaſſador at her court, to make ſome propoſals of accommodation. Robinſon, aſſuming a haughty tone, informed the king that the queen wiſhed to forget the paſt; that ſhe offered him Limbourg, Spaniſh Guelderland, and two millions of crowns to liquidate his pretenſions on Sileſia; on condition that he would make peace, and that his troops ſhould inceſſantly evacuate that dutchy.

This ambaſſador was a kind of enthuſiaſt with reſpect to the queen of Hungary, and negotiated

ated with all the emphaſis with which he would have harangued the houſe of commons. The king, who was ſufficiently apt at perceiving ridicule, aſſumed a ſimilar tone, and replied that—"It was for princes who had no ſenſe of honour "baſely to ſell their rights; that ſuch propo-"ſitions were more injurious than the con-"temptuous haughtineſs of the court of Vienna "had been;" and with a louder voice, added, "My army would hold me unworthy of the "command, were I to ſign a diſgraceful trea-"ty and loſe the advantages it has given me "by acts which valour has rendered immortal. "Know farther that it would be the blackeſt in-"gratitude to abandon my new ſubjects; thoſe "numerous proteſtants whoſe wiſhes have "called me hither. Would you have me yield "them victims to the tyranny of their perſecu-"tors by whom they would be ſacrificed to "vengeance? How ſhall I, in one ſingle day, "belie all the ſentiments of honour and pro-"bity with which I was born? Were I ca-"pable of ſo cowardly, ſo infamous an act, I "ſhould imagine I beheld my anceſtors riſe "from their graves, and tell me—Thou art no "deſcendant of ours. It is thy duty to com-"bat for the rights which we have tranſmitted "to thee, and theſe thou haſt bartered; that ho-

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" nour which we have left thee as the moſt
" precious part of thy inheritance haſt thou alſo
" bartered. Unworthy to be a prince, a ſo-
" vereign prince, thou art a vile trader, who
" haſt preferred gain to glory.—But no, I will
" never merit ſuch-like reproaches, I will bury
" myſelf and my army under the ruins of Sileſia,
" ſooner than permit the honour and renown of
" the Pruſſian name to ſuffer the ſmalleſt taint.
" This, ſir, is the anſwer I have to return."

Robinſon ſtood amazed at this reply, which he little expected, and with which he returned to Vienna. But though the king ſent back the fanatic, he continued to flatter lord Hyndford, and to lull him into perfect ſecurity. The time for diſcovery was not yet come. To keep well with the maritime powers, the propoſitions of Robinſon were communicated to them. The king's refuſal was palliated by alleging that, knowing the barrier treaty tied the hands of the queen of Hungary, the ceſſions ſhe would have made of Limbourg and Guelderland could not be accepted. In Holland, particularly, great ſtreſs was laid on the deference in which the king held the intereſts of that republic; a deference which he would carry even ſo far as to refuſe Brabant itſelf, were it offered.

It was about this period that the king ſigned the treaty with Bavaria, and promiſed his vote at the diet. Theſe two princes mutually guaranteed to each other Sileſia, on the one part, and, on the other, Upper Auſtria, Tyrol, Briſgau, and Bohemia. The king purchaſed of this elector the principality of Glatz, for four hundred thouſand crowns, which the Bavarian ſold, although he never had it in his poſſeſſion.

But one of the moſt advantageous and deciſive events which then happened broke forth in the north. Sweden declared war on Ruſſia, and by this diverſion deſtroyed the plans of the kings of England and Poland, and of prince Anthony Ulric againſt Pruſſia. Auguſtus, fallen from his high hopes of dividing between himſelf and the king of England the ſtates of Pruſſia, ſwam with the ſtream; and, unable to do better, leagued with the elector of Bavaria for the annihilation of the houſe of Auſtria. Marſhal de Belleiſle, who had not known what to do with Moravia and Obermannhartſberg, erected them into a kingdom and beſtowed them on the Saxons; who, in conſequence of theſe alms, ſigned the treaty on the 31ſt of Auguſt.

The court of Vienna, unable any longer to depend on the intended diverſion of the Ruſ-

ſians, and preſſed on every ſide, ſent back her Engliſh negotiator to the Pruſſian camp, whither he brought a map of Sileſia, on which, with the ſtroke of a pen, the ceſſion of four principalities was indicated. His reception was cold; and he was given to underſtand that what might be good at one conjuncture might at another be the reverſe. The courts of London and Vienna had placed too much dependance on the ſuccours of Ruſſia. According to their calculation, the king muſt infallibly be humbled, ſunken, and reduced, on his knees, to requeſt peace; and little indeed did this fail of happening. Such are the ſports of fortune, ſo common in war, and which ſo often put the conjectural art of the moſt able politicians to the rout.

The French and Bavarians were already openly in action. Auſtria was entered. The troops approached Lintz. By one common and unanimous effort, only, could they hope to ſubdue the queen of Hungary. This was not a time to remain with folded arms. The king, who burnt with impatience to act, endeavoured to cut off marſhal Neuperg from the fortreſs of Neiſs, and to give him battle on his march. This project was not ill imagined, but it failed in execution. Kalkſtein was commanded to march haſtily with ten thouſand men, and pon-

toons, to the village of Woitz, there to throw a bridge over, in order that the army, which would ſoon follow, might find a paſſage on its arrival. He departed at ſunſet, marched all night, and, on the morrow, found himſelf within cannon ſhot of the camp. Whether it were ſlowneſs, want of proper diſpoſition, or that the roads were bad and ſpoilt by the rains ſo as to ſtop him; the army outmarched its vanguard, and arrived, even before Kalkſtein, at the camp of Toupadel and Siegroth. This loſt day could not be recovered; the king himſelf marched to Woitz *, and threw his bridges over the Neiſſe; but the Auſtrian army appeared drawn up in order of battle at about eight hundred paces from the river. From ſome priſoners it was learnt that marſhal Neuperg had only been there a few hours before the king. The army could not march to this bridge in leſs than two hours. It might have been paſſed if the enemy had not prevented the king; but to have croſſed the bridge in preſence of an army, which certainly muſt have beaten the troops in detail, and as they took ground to form, would of all imprudent acts have been the moſt imprudent. This was the cauſe that it was determined, for

* September 4th.

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the day, to take poſt on the heights of Woitz. Soon after the Pruſſians took the camp of Neudorff; and, that they might derive their ſubſiſtence from Brieg, they aſcertained a communication, by occupying the poſts of Lœwen and Michelau.

The ſtorms which threatened the houſe of Auſtria, and the dangers which daily became more evident, at length made the queen of Hungary ſeriouſly determine to diſencumber herſelf of one of her enemies, and break the formidable league by which ſhe muſt have been overwhelmed. She was ſincere in her requiſitions for peace. She no longer cavilled for the city of Breſlau; ſhe only inſiſted on preſerving Neiſs. Lord Hyndford, who then negotiated in her name, pretended that the king, in favour of ceſſions ſo great, muſt aſſiſt the queen of Hungary with his whole force. To this the king replied, that he was ſorry he was under the neceſſity of rejecting his offers, but that he could not violate the faith of treaties which he had ſo lately ſigned with France and Bavaria. So great was the diſtreſs at Vienna that the Bavarians were every moment expected there. The roads ſwarmed with none but fugitive travellers: the court was about to depart. During this general conſternation, the empreſs

dowager wrote to prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic, who then ſerved in the army, the following letter, which is too ſingular to paſs unnoticed.

" Vienna, September 17, 1741.

" MY DEAR NEPHEW,

" I BREAK that cruel ſilence which your " conduct impoſed upon me by ſerving againſt " us, and which I ſhould not do had I any other " means of conjuring the king of Pruſſia to re- " ſtore me, in himſelf, a nephew whom I no " longer can call dear, and worthy of eſteem, " after the affliction you have mutually brought " upon me. Conſolation is in the power of the " king. The queen my daughter will grant " him all that which no other perſon can gua- " rantee, if he will aid to reſtore her to a ſtate " of entire tranquillity, and to extinguiſh the " fire which he himſelf has kindled, and will " not aſſiſt to increaſe his own enemies; for " nothing more than the death of the elector " Palatine is wanting to acquire him new foes; " ſince the aggrandizement of Bavaria and " Saxony will not allow that he ſhould remain " in peaceable poſſeſſion of what the queen has " relinquiſhed to him in Sileſia. Perſuade the " king, therefore, to become our good ally, to " aſſiſt the queen with troops to preſerve thoſe " ſtates

" ſtates the poſſeſſion of which ſhe is envied by
" ſo many enemies. A ſtrict alliance between
" the two houſes would be to their mutual ad-
" vantage, the ſituation of their ſtates being
" ſuch as to aid and ſuſtain their reciprocal
" rights. I wholly rely on your repreſentation,
" and on the high qualities of the king, who,
" having drawn ſo many evils on us, would
" naturally wiſh to have himſelf the honour of
" ſnatching us from the precipice, and of paying
" ſome attention to his individual intereſt, as
" well as to an afflicted aunt and mother, who
" yet, without rancour, is able to ſign herſelf
" your affectionate aunt,

" ELIZABETH."

The ſubſtance of prince Ferdinand's reply to the empreſs dowager was that the king could not, with honour, depart from the engagements he had entered into with France and Bavaria; that he ſincerely pitied the empreſs; that he wiſhed he was able to change her ſituation, on which he had compaſſion, but that the time of accommodation, and of freely acting with the court of Vienna, was paſt. A few days after, another letter from the empreſs dowager, written to prince Louis of Brunſwic, who then was in Ruſſia, was intercepted, in which, though

the ſtyle was not better, there was more ſincerity. The following is a copy of this letter.

" September 21, 1741.

" MY DEAR NEPHEW,

" OUR affairs have taken ſo deſperate a turn " that our caſe may be called that of being ge- " nerally abandoned. We have no longer " any one for us. What may conſole us in our " misfortune is, that God may caſt more than " one Pharaoh into the Red-Sea, and confound " our falſe ſeeming friends, the moſt of whom " cannot any longer believe in a God. True " it is I have not been lulled by ſuch falſe ap- " pearances; and though the elector of Bavaria " has drawn the French upon us, and drives " me hence, I eſteem him to be a worthy prince; " he has not acted with diſſimulation and falſe- " hood, but honeſtly, and ſhewn himſelf imme- " diately. I doubt whether I ſhall any more " date from this place. This is a mournful " year. Preſerve our alliance, and beware of " falſe and apparent friends. I am your affec- " tionate aunt,

" ELIZABETH."

The ſtyle of theſe letters diſcovers the anger of the court of Vienna at the progreſs of the

Pruſſians in Sileſia, and that this court breathed only vengeance. But what language is here? Whoever attacks the houſe of Auſtria does not believe in God! To offer peace at a time when there is liberty to make peace, and to refuſe propoſed conditions, after other treaties have been ſigned, is falſehood and perfidy! This is the language of ſelf-love and pride ſuppreſſing truth and reaſon. Thus the alliance formed againſt the Pragmatic ſanction was conſidered at Vienna as the war of the Titans, who would have ſcaled the heavens to dethrone Jupiter.

The Swedes were not, for their part, ſo ſucceſsful as their allies. A detachment of twelve thouſand men had been cut in pieces by the Ruſſians, near Willmanſtrand. This was a conſiderable check to a kingdom enfeebled and ruined as it had been ever ſince the time of Charles XII. France was mortified, and propoſed, in other parts, to repair that reverſe of fortune which her allies had ſuſtained. She intended that marſhal Maillebois with the army that he commanded ſhould penetrate into Hanover, and make himſelf maſter of that electorate. The king at this time committed a great error, by employing his whole credit to diſſuade the French from this purpoſe, alleging that ſuch an enterprize would render them

odious to all Europe; would make every prince of Germany revolt againſt them; and that, by employing themſelves on a thing of little importance, they would neglect the principal object, which was to cruſh the queen of Hungary with their whole forces. The French might eaſily have refuted ſuch feeble reaſoning. Had they at that time taken Hanover, the king of England never could have made diverſions on the Rhine, as he did in Flanders.

Nothing was wanting to render the treaty which the king had entered into with the elector of Bavaria perfect but the guarantee of France. This Mr. de Valori was preſſed to procure. His court continued to ſtart difficulties relative to the ceſſion of the principality of Glatz, and other portions of Upper Sileſia. It happened, as he was ſpeaking to the king, that he by chance let fall a letter from his pocket. The king, without taking any notice, put his foot upon it, and diſmiſſed the ambaſſador with all poſſible expedition. This letter was from Mr. Amelot, the ſecretary for foreign affairs. It indicated that Glatz and Upper Sileſia ſhould not be guarantied to Pruſſia, unleſs ſome other greater inconvenience ſhould reſult from refuſal. This diſcovery being made, Mr.

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de Valori was obliged to accede to whatever was propoſed.

The deſigns of the French on Hanover took vent, and preſently came to the ear of the king of England, who believed his electorate loſt. He wanted time to parry this blow which menaced him ſo immediately. The meaſures he had taken with Ruſſia and Saxony having equally failed, he became ſerious in endeavouring to eſtabliſh peace between the king of Pruſſia and the queen of Hungary. In conſequence of this lord Hyndford repaired to the Auſtrian camp, where he made ſuch ſtrong remonſtrances to the court of Vienna, and preſſed this court with ſo much energy, by ſhewing that, in order to ſave the remainder of its ſtates, how neceſſary it was ſeaſonably to loſe a part, that this court conſented to the ceſſion of Sileſia, as well as of the town of Neiſs, and a ſlip of Upper Sileſia, renouncing at the ſame time all aſſiſtance againſt its enemies. The king, who knew the duplicity of the Engliſh and Auſtrians, underſtood theſe offers to be ſnares; and, that he might not be amuſed by fine words, which would have kept him idle in his camp, he ſtole a march on the enemy, paſſed the Neiſſe at Michelau, and encamped the next day at Katſcher, while a detachment ſeized on Oppeln,

Oppeln, which was made a depoſit for proviſions. Marſhal Neuperg, on theſe motions, quitted Neiſs, and inclined toward Opperſdorff. The king turned by Friedland, and encamped at Steinau.

Perhaps theſe different manœuvres accelerated the negotiation of lord Hyndford. He came to inform the king that his negotiation had been ſo ſucceſsful that marſhal Neuperg was ready to abandon Sileſia, provided the king would verbally declare he would undertake nothing againſt the queen. The enemy would reſt ſatisfied with a word, by which Pruſſia ſhould acquire provinces, and the troops winter quarters, after having been fatigued by eleven months operations. The temptation was ſtrong. The king wiſhed to try what might be the reſult of this conference. He ſecretly repaired to Oberſchnellendorff, accompanied only by colonel Goltz, where he found marſhal Neuperg, general Lentulus, and lord Hyndford.

It was not without reflection that the monarch took this ſtep. Though he had ſome cauſe of complaint againſt France, this was not ſufficient to break with her. He knew from experience the propenſities of the court of Vienna: nothing friendly was there to be expected. It was evident that the queen of Hungary acceded

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to this convention only to ſow diſtruſt between the allies by making it public. It therefore was neceſſary to exact from the Auſtrians, as a condition *ſine qua non*, that, if they divulged the leaſt part of the ſtipulations agreed on, the king ſhould be authoriſed to break off all farther treaty. The king was certain this could not fail to happen. The draught of the ſtipulations was in the hands of lord Hyndford, as ambaſſador from England. It was agreed that Neiſs ſhould, for form ſake, be beſieged; but that the Pruſſian troops ſhould not be diſturbed in their quarters, which they ſhould take as well in Sileſia as in Bohemia, and particularly that, unleſs rigid ſecreſy was obſerved, every thing that had been agreed on ſhould be to all intents and purpoſes null.

It muſt be acknowledged that, if there be ſuch a thing as fatality, it was eſpecially manifeſt in marſhal Neuperg, who ſeemed deſtined to conclude the moſt humiliating treaties for his ſovereigns. The marſhal ſoon after led his army toward Moravia. The ſiege of Neiſs was immediately begun. The town held out only twelve days; nor was it entirely evacuated by the Auſtrian garriſon before the Pruſſian engineers had traced new works, which afterward claſſed it among the ſtrong towns of Europe.

Europe. The place being taken, the army was divided; one part marched into Bohemia, under the command of prince Leopold of Anhalt; ſome regiments were employed in the blockade of Glatz, and the remainder of the troops of Schwerin took up their quarters in Upper Sileſia.

Francis grand duke of Tuſcany, who was at Preſburg, flattering himſelf that the king would regard theſe parlies as treaties of peace, wrote to demand his vote at the Imperial election. The anſwer returned was civil, but conceived in a ſtyle ſo obſcure and perplexed that the author himſelf underſtood nothing of what he had written. The campaign terminated eleven months after the entrance into Sileſia; and the king, after receiving the homage of his new ſubjects at Breſlau, returned from thence to Berlin. He began to underſtand the trade of war by the faults he had committed; but the difficulties he had ſurmounted formed but a part of thoſe which ſtill remained to be vanquiſhed, before the finiſhing hand could be put to the grand work which he had undertaken.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Political Reaſons of the Truce. War of the French and Bavarians in Bohemia. Spain declares againſt Auſtria. Diet of the Empire. Revolution in Ruſſia. Various Negotiations.

NOT to interrupt the narrative of military events, we ſhall ſatisfy ourſelves with only ſuccinctly touching on the cauſes which occaſioned this kind of ſuſpenſion of arms between Pruſſia and Auſtria. The ſubject is delicate. The conduct of the king was liable to cenſure. It is neceſſary, therefore, to develope the moſt ſecret motives. The reader will pardon our beginning at the ſource, in order to be the more clear.

The purport of the war which the king had undertaken was the conqueſt of Sileſia; the engagements into which he had entered with Bavaria and France were but to accompliſh this grand object. But France and her allies had very different views. The miniſtry of Verſailles were perſuaded that the period of the Auſtrian power was come, and that it was ſoon to be for ever deſtroyed. This miniſtry wiſhed to raiſe four ſovereigns on the ruins of that empire,

empire, the forces of whom might reciprocally balance each other; that is to say the queen of Hungary, who was to keep that kingdom, Auſtria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola; the elector of Bavaria, who ſhould become maſter of Bohemia, Tyrol, and Briſgau; the king of Pruſſia, who ſhould acquire Lower Sileſia; and the elector of Saxony, who ſhould have Upper Sileſia, and Moravia, in addition to his other poſſeſſions. Four ſuch neighbours never could long have agreed, and France was preparing to act the part of arbitrator, and to govern deſpots which ſhe herſelf had created. This would have been to have renewed the politics of the Romans in the moſt flouriſhing period of their republic.

This project was incompatible with the liberties of Germany, and in no wiſe ſuited the king, who laboured for the elevation of his houſe, and who was far from wiſhing to ſacrifice his troops to gain experience, or to raiſe up rivals to himſelf. Had the king become the ſervile inſtrument of French politics, he would have prepared the yoke which he muſt have worn; he would have done every thing for France, and nothing for Pruſſia; and perhaps Louis XV. would have realiſed that univerſal monarchy, the chimerical project of which has been

been attributed to Charles V. Let us add, ſince the truth muſt be ſpoken, that had the king ſeconded, with all vigour, the operations of the French troops, he would have been ſubjected by their exceſs of good fortune; from an ally he would have become a ſubject; would have been carried farther than he intended; and would have found himſelf under the neceſſity of conſenting to every wiſh of France; not having the power to reſiſt, or to find allies who might rid him of ſuch ſlavery.

Prudence therefore ſeemed to require that the king ſhould hold a medium conduct, by which he might eſtabliſh a kind of equilibrium between the houſes of Auſtria and Bourbon. The queen of Hungary was on the brink of the precipice. The truce gave her time to breathe, and the king was certain he might break it, whenever he ſhould think proper, becauſe that the politics of the court of Vienna would induce her to divulge the ſecret. Let us add, for the entire juſtification of the king, that he had diſcovered the ſecret connections which cardinal de Fleuri maintained with Mr. de Stainville, ambaſſador from the grand duke of Tuſcany, at Vienna. He knew that the cardinal was diſpoſed to ſacrifice the allies of France, ſhould the court of Vienna offer him

him Luxembourg and a part of Brabant. It was requiſite therefore to manœuvre adroitly; and eſpecially not to be outwitted by an old politician, who in the laſt war had ſported with more than one crowned head.

The event ſoon juſtified all that the king had foreſeen of the indiſcretion of the court of Vienna. The pretended treaty with Pruſſia was divulged in Saxony, Bavaria, at Frankfort on the Main, and wherever that court had emiſſaries. Count Podowils, miniſter for foreign affairs, had been charged to paſs through Dreſden as he returned from Sileſia, that he might ſound that court, which had inceſſantly indicated great jealouſy and ill-will, concerning whatever intereſted Pruſſia. He there found marſhal de Belleiſle, enraged at what he had juſt heard from one Koch, an emiſſary of the court of Vienna, who, after having made propoſitions of peace, which the marſhal rejected, declared to him that his court had, at all events, come to an accommodation with the king of Pruſſia. Still further, the city of Dreſden was inundated by hand-bills, which adviſed the Saxons to ſuſpend the march of their troops for Bohemia; becauſe that the king of Pruſſia, being reconciled to the queen of Hungary, was preparing to invade Luſatia. The clouded

timidity of count Bruhl was encouraged by the daring fortitude of count Podowils, and the Saxons marched for Bohemia.

In the mean time, the elector of Bavaria communicated a letter to the king, from the empress Amelia, who exhorted him to come to an accommodation with the queen of Hungary, by the month of December; otherwise, that princess would be obliged to ratify preliminaries, which were stipulated between herself and the Prussians. This conduct of the court of Vienna released the king from all his engagements. We shall hereafter see that this court paid dearly for its indiscretion.

The theatre of war, during these negotiations, had often changed. It seemed as if armies had all appointed a general rendezvous in Bohemia. The elector of Bavaria was within two days march of Vienna: had he proceeded, he would have been at the gates of that capital; which, ill-supplied with troops, could have made but feeble opposition. The elector abandoned this grand object, from the puerile apprehension that the Saxons, being left alone in Bohemia, might conquer and keep that kingdom. The French, with ill-conceived finesse, imagined that the elector, by taking Vienna, would become too powerful; for which

reaſon they fortified him in his ſuſpicion of the Saxons. This capital fault was the ſource of all the misfortunes that afterward overwhelmed Bavaria. The army of French and Bavarians was divided. Fifteen thouſand men were confided to M. de Segur, that he might cover Auſtria and the electorate; and the elector, with the chief of his forces, ſeized on Tabor and Budweis, and marched immediately for Prague, where they were joined by the Saxons, as well as by M. de Gaſſion; the former coming from Lowoſitz, the latter from Pilſen.

Marſhal Tærring, and M. de la Leuville, who commanded at Tabor and Budweis, abandoned thoſe towns at the approach of the Auſtrians; in which the enemy not only found a conſiderable magazine, but by their then poſition M. de Segur perceived himſelf cut off from the army of Bohemia. Marſhal Neuperg and prince Lobkowitz, who both came from Moravia, fortified themſelves in this poſt. The elector of Bavaria, who then lay before Prague, unable to beſiege the city in form, becauſe of the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, determined to take it by ſurpriſe. The circumference of the place was vaſt, and the garriſon was too feeble for its defence. By multiplying the attacks it muſt neceſſarily happen that ſome part of the city would

would be found without reſiſtance, and here it might be carried. Prague was therefore aſſaulted on three different ſides. Count Saxe ſcaled the flanked angle of the baſtion of St. Nicholas, toward the new gate; he lowered the drawbridge, and introduced the cavalry through that gate, who, clearing the ſtreets, obliged the garriſon to abandon the gate of St. Charles, which count Rutowſky vainly endeavoured to force. He did not make his aſſault till the enemy had quitted the rampart. The numbers of their enemies obliged the Auſtrians to lay down their arms. The third attack, which was under the direction of M. de Polaſtron, totally failed.

The duke of Lorraine, grand duke of Tuſcany, determined at that time to head his armies, and advanced by haſty marches to ſuccour Prague. Scarcely had he arrived at Königſſaal before he received intelligence that the allies were already maſters of the place. This was a thunderbolt; he returned with precipitation, and his return was leſs a retreat than a flight. The ſoldiers diſbanded, pillaged the villages, and deſerted in bodies to the French. Marſhals Neuperg and Lobkowitz took refuge with their diſcouraged troops behind the marſhes of Budweis, Tabor, Neuhaus, and Wittengau;

the famous camps where Ziſka, the chief of the Huſſites, braved the whole forces of his enemies. Marſhal Belleiſle, who had been detained at Dreſden by the ſciatica ſo long as affairs appeared to remain critical in Bohemia, immediately ſet off for Prague, after its reduction. He detached Polaſtron to Teutſchbrod, and count Saxe to Picheli, to clear the banks of the Saſawa; and d'Aubigné inclined toward the Wotawa, with twenty battalions and thirty ſquadrons. The intention of the marſhal was to puſh forward to Budweis, but the circumſpection of this general ſtopt him ſhort at Piſeck. Thus the inactivity of the French generals gave the Auſtrians time to breathe, and to fortify themſelves in their quarters. Marſhal Belleiſle, who was more flattered by the embaſſies he undertook than the command of armies, ſent to inform the cardinal that his health would not permit him to ſuſtain the fatigues of a campaign, and requeſted to be relieved. The cardinal therefore gave the command to marſhal de Broglio, enfeebled as he had been by two apoplexies; but, being then at Straſbourg, of which he was governor, he appeared to be the general who could join the army in Bohemia with the greateſt ſpeed.

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The marſhal no ſooner arrived than he quarrelled with de Belleiſle, and changed all the diſpoſitions of his predeceſſor. He collected a large body of troops, with which he repaired to Piſeck. The grand duke made pretences to attack. His attempt was fruitleſs. Lobkowitz ſucceeded no better on Frauenberg. The Auſtrians at length, fatigued to no purpoſe, returned to their quarters. The French, who loved their conveniences, took it very ill of the enemy to diſturb them ſo often. They would have been very glad that the Pruſſians had advanced to cover them; but an idiot only would have agreed to ſuch a propoſition. M. de Valori, the French ambaſſador at Berlin, exhauſted himſelf in complaints. He affirmed that the Germans, who were good for nothing but to fight, ought to tilt with the Auſtrians, to give repoſe to the French, who were in every reſpect their ſuperiors. He was quietly heard, till he at laſt wearied himſelf with vain importunities.

So many powers allied againſt the houſe of Auſtria, deſirous of dividing its ſpoils, had excited the cupidity of princes who hitherto had remained in tranquillity. Spain would not continue idle, while every body dreamt of aggrandizement. The queen of Spain, a prin-

ceſs of Parma, formed pretenſions on that principality, and on Placenza, which ſhe called her under petticoat, there to fix her ſecond ſon, don Philip. She ſent twenty thouſand Spaniards, under the command of Montemar, through the kingdom of Naples, at the ſame time that don Philip, with another corps, paſſed through Dauphiny and Savoy, to penetrate into Lombardy. Thus the fire, which in its origin ſeemed to be but a ſpark in Sileſia, continued to ſpread from kingdom to kingdom, and preſently ſet all Europe in flames.

While ſo many armies were rather committing follies, with reſpect to each other, than performing heroic actions, the diet of the empire, which was aſſembled at Frankfort for the election of an emperor, loſt its time in frivolous deliberation; and, inſtead of electing a chief, diſputed concerning robes and gold lace, which ſecondary ambaſſadors pretended they had as great a right to wear as thoſe of the firſt order. The diet was divided into two factions. The one conſiſted of fanatical partiſans of the queen of Hungary, the other of her outrageous enemies. The firſt were for electing the grand duke, the ſecond were as obſtinately bent on the elector of Bavaria. Fortune ſtill favoured the arms of the allies, and the latter gained the aſcendancy by

by which fortune is always followed. The diet however made but a ſlow progreſs.

To form an idea of this aſſembly, and the tedioufneſs of its deliberations, a ſketch of it may not be mal-apropos. The golden bull is regarded as the fundamental law of Germany; to that appeals are made on every occaſion; and, if there be any chicanery, it ariſes from the manner in which this bull is explained. The princes therefore chooſe thoſe doctors who are beſt read in this law, the heavieſt pedants, and thoſe who are moſt conſummate in all the punctilios of formality, and ſend them as their repreſentatives to theſe general aſſemblies. Such civilians diſcuſs forms, but with a ſpirit too bounded to conſider objects in the whole. They are intoxicated with their dignity, and think they enjoy the ſame power that was enjoyed by that auguſt body in the time of Charles of Luxembourg.

In fine the diet, on the firſt of December 1741, was no further advanced than it had been before the convocation of that illuſtrious aſſembly. Had the Auſtrians been ſucceſsful in the field, the grand duke would have had a plurality of votes. Under ſuch circumſtances it was neceſſary to cut ſhort the election, and take advantage of the ſuperiority of votes, to

prevent the Imperial dignity becoming hereditary in the new houſe of Auſtria, by raiſing another family to the throne. To attain this end, the king propoſed to appoint a limited term for the day of election. This expedient was approved, and the diet fixed on the 24th of January, 1742.

This diet and its deliberations made leſs impreſſion on the king of England than matters which concerned him more nearly. The dread he had of the army of Maillebois, which menaced his electorate, was ſo great that he determined to act the ſuppliant at Verſailles, for the guarantee of his poſſeſſions. He ſent his miniſter Hardenberg thither, to ſign a treaty of neutrality with France. Cardinal de Fleuri aſked the king of Pruſſia what he augured from this negotiation; who anſwered, it was dangerous to half offend, and that whoever threatened ought to ſtrike. The cardinal, rather cunning than reſolute, had not a character ſufficiently maſculine to be deciſive. He thought he yielded nothing to chance, while he kept things in ſuſpenſe, and ſigned the treaty. Such temporizing and mitigated conduct has often been prejudicial to the affairs of France; but nature diſpenſes her gifts as ſhe pleaſes. He on whom ſhe beſtows boldneſs cannot be timid;

and

and he who is born too circumſpect is incapable of being audacious.

This year ſeemed to be the epocha of grand events. All Europe was at war for the diviſion of a litigated ſucceſſion. The repreſentatives of princes were aſſembled to elect an emperor who ſhould not be of the houſe of Auſtria; and, in Ruſſia, the young emperor, who was ſtill in his cradle, was dethroned by a revolution in favour of the princeſs Elizabeth. A ſurgeon*, by birth a Frenchman, a muſician, a gentleman of the chamber, and a hundred of the Preobraſzenſkoi guards, corrupted by the money of France, conducted Elizabeth to the Imperial palace, the guards of which they ſurpriſed and diſarmed. The young emperor, his father prince Anthony of Brunſwic, and his mother the princeſs of Mecklenbourg, were arreſted. The troops were aſſembled and ſwore fidelity to Elizabeth, whom they acknowledged for their empreſs. The unfortunate family was ſhut up in the priſons of Riga, and Oſtermann, after having been treated with ignominy, was baniſhed into Siberia; all which was the work only of a few hours. France, hoping to profit

* Leſtoc.

by

by this revolution, which ſhe had accompliſhed, preſently ſaw ſuch hopes vaniſh.

The deſign of cardinal de Fleuri was to retrieve Sweden from the raſh ſtep he occaſioned that nation to take. He thought that a change of ſovereign in Ruſſia might render the new monarch inclined to conclude a favourable peace. With this intent, he ſent one d'Avennes, with verbal orders, to the marquis de la Chetardie, the French ambaſſador at Peterſburg, that he might employ all poſſible means to overthrow the regent, and the generaliſſimo. Such enterpriſes, which would appear raſh in other governments, may ſometimes be accompliſhed in Ruſſia. The national ſpirit is inclined to revolt. The Ruſſians, in common with other people, are diſſatisfied with the preſent and hope better from the future. The regent had rendered herſelf odious, by the weakneſſes ſhe had indulged in favour of a foreigner, the handſome count Lynar, envoy from Saxony. Yet her predeceſſor, the empreſs Anne, had more openly diſtinguiſhed Biron, a native of Courland and a foreigner likewiſe. So true it is that the ſame things ceaſe to be the ſame, when they happen in other times, or to other perſons. If love was the downfal of the regent, a more general love, which the princeſs Elizabeth

beth taught the Preobraſzenſkoi guards, raiſed the latter to the throne. Theſe princeſſes each had the ſame inclination for voluptuouſneſs. The former concealed it under the veil of prudery; her heart only betrayed her: but it was carried by Elizabeth even to the exceſs of debauchery. The one was capricious, with malice; the other a diſſembler but compliant. Both hated labour, and neither of them was born for government.

Had Sweden known how to profit by the occaſion, ſomething great might have been effected, while Ruſſia was agitated with inteſtine troubles. Every thing preſaged ſucceſs; but the deſtiny of Sweden was not that of triumphing over her enemies. She continued in a kind of lethargy, during and after this revolution. Opportunity, that mother of great events, ſhe ſuffered to eſcape. The loſs of the battle of Pultowa was not more fatal to her than was the preſent indolence of her armies.

Elizabeth no ſooner believed herſelf firmly ſeated on the throne, than ſhe diſtributed the higheſt offices in the empire among her partiſans. The two brothers Beſtuchef, with Woronzow, and Trubetſkoi, were admitted of the council. Leſtoc, the promotor of her elevation, became a kind of ſubaltern miniſter, though a ſurgeon.

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He was for France, Beſtuchef for England. Hence aroſe diviſions in the council, and never-ending intrigues at court. The empreſs had no predilection for any one power, but ſhe felt a repugnance for the courts of Vienna and Berlin. Anthony Ulric, father of the dethroned emperor, was the couſin-german of the queen of Hungary, the nephew of the empreſs dowager, and the brother-in-law of the king of Pruſſia. She apprehended leſt the ties of blood ſhould make theſe powers active, in favour of the family on the ruins of which ſhe had raiſed herſelf. She preferred liberty to the ties of marriage, which ſhe held to be too tyrannical. The better to confirm her government, ſhe appointed her nephew, the young duke of Holſtein, to the ſucceſſion; and had him educated at Peterſburg, in quality of grand duke of Ruſſia.

The public are prone to believe that thoſe events which turn to the advantage of princes are the fruits of their foreſight, and ability. In conſequence of this prejudice, the king was ſuſpected of being concerned in the late revolution of Ruſſia, but he was not. He took no part in the affair, and was only informed of it when it became public. Some months before, when marſhal de Belleiſle was at the camp of Molwitz,

Molwitz, the converſation turned on Ruſſia. The marſhal appeared exceedingly diſſatisfied with the conduct of prince Anthony, and his wife the regent; and, in the moment of anger, he aſked the king if he ſhould be ſorry to ſee a revolution in Ruſſia, in favour of the princeſs Elizabeth, to the detriment of the young emperor Iwan, who was his nephew. To which the king replied he acknowledged no kindred among ſovereigns, except thoſe who were his friends. Here the converſation ended and this was all that paſſed.

Berlin, during the winter, was the center of negotiation. France preſſed the king to act with his army; England exhorted him to conclude a peace with Auſtria; Spain ſollicited his alliance; Denmark his advice, relative to a change of party; Sweden demanded his aſſiſtance; Ruſſia his good offices at Stockholm; and the Germanic body, ſighing after peace, made the ſtrongeſt interceſſions that all troubles might be appeaſed.

Affairs did not long remain in this ſituation. The Pruſſian troops ſcarcely remained two months in their winter quarters. The deſtiny of Pruſſia again hurried the king on that theatre which was to be blood-ſtained by ſo many battles; and where the viciſſitudes of fortune were alternately to be felt by the powers at war. The

greateſt

greateſt advantage that the king derived from this ſpecies of truce, was that of rendering his forces more formidable. The acquiſition of Sileſia procured him an augmentation of three millions ſix hundred thouſand crowns to his revenues. The greateſt part of this money was employed in the increaſe of his army. It then conſiſted of one hundred and ſix battalions, and one hundred and ninety-one ſquadrons, ſixty of which were huſſars. We ſoon ſhall ſee the uſe he made of theſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Irruption of the Auſtrians into Bavaria. Departure of the King. Events which happened at Dreſden, Prague, and Olmutz. Negotiation of Fitzner. Expedition of Moravia, Auſtria, and Hungary. Negotiation of Janini. Blockade of Brieg. The King evacuates Moravia, and joins his Army at Chrudim, in Bohemia. What happened in Moravia, after his Departure. Change of the Engliſh Miniſtry. Fruitleſs Negotiation at Chrudim, which occaſioned a Battle, to bring the Auſtrians to a Deciſion.

ALTHOUGH the French were maſters of Prague, and occupied the banks of the Watowa, the Moldau, and the Saſſawa, ſtill the Auſtrians did not deſpair. They had drawn ten thouſand men from Italy, and ſeven thouſand from Hungary, to which they added three thouſand from Briſgau, that came through Tyrol. Theſe corps, which amounted to twenty thouſand men, were headed by marſhal Khevenhuller; who immediately formed the plan of falling on the quarters of de Segur, and driving him from the banks of the Ens. We muſt not omit inſerting a memorial on this ſub-

ject, dated June 29th, 1741, which the king ſent to the elector of Bavaria. The reader there will ſee that all the evil which happened was foreſeen; and that princes who do not quickly correct the bad diſpoſitions they have made, in the field, never fail to be puniſhed; for an enemy is an ill courtier. Far from flattering, he ſeverely chaſtiſes the faults of his opponent, whether king or emperor. The following is the memorial.

Reaſons which ſhould induce the Elector of Bavaria to puſh the War in Auſtria.

" THE poſition of the Pruſſian troops, by " giving employment to a conſiderable part of " the Auſtrian forces, will keep marſhal Neu- " perg in Sileſia. The army of the allies, hav- " ing no enemy to oppoſe, ought to puſh its " operations along the Danube, and gain Au- " ſtria with promptitude. The elector will " find his enemy unprovided, and will meet " with no reſiſtance in ſeizing on Paſſau, Lintz, " Ens, and from thence approaching to Vi- " enna. Should this capital be taken, the " puiſſance of Auſtria may be ſaid to be torn " up by the roots. Bohemia, which by ſuch a " march will be ſeparated, unprovided with

" troops, and deprived of ſuccour, muſt fall of
" itſelf. War muſt be made in Moravia, Au-
" ſtria, and even in Hungary. In the preſent
" ſtate of affairs, this operation is equally eaſy
" and ſafe; and it is indubitable that it will
" oblige the queen of Hungary to accept ſuch
" conditions of peace as ſhall be preſcribed,
" without delay. Should the elector defer to
" profit by the preſent advantageous circum-
" ſtances, he will give the enemy time to aſ-
" ſemble forces. What is certain to-day will
" be doubtful to-morrow. By turning toward
" Bohemia, the elector will expoſe his here-
" ditary ſtates to the caprice of accident. He
" will hold out a lure to the enemy who will
" well know to profit by the opportunity. My
" opinion is that Romans will never be taken
" but in Rome; that therefore the occaſion
" of ſeizing on Vienna ought not to be ſuffered
" to eſcape. This is the only means of ter-
" minating the preſent differences, and of ob-
" taining a glorious peace."

This memorial was no ſooner read than for-gotten. The elector, who was no ſoldier, thought that ſuperior reaſons engaged him to act otherwiſe. Khevenhuller profited by his errors. Toward the end of December * he

* 1741.

paſſed the Ens in three places. Segur, inſtead of falling with all his forces on one of theſe three corps, to cut them off in detail, retired toward the town of Ens, and even there did not think himſelf in ſafety. A panic terror haſtened his flight. He fled in a breath to Lintz, where he fortified himſelf. Khevenhuller did not give him time to recover his underſtanding, but hotly purſued; and the world heard, with aſtoniſhment, that fifteen thouſand Auſtrians blockaded fifteen thouſand French, in Lintz. Such is the aſcendancy that a ſingle man may give his troops over thoſe of his opponent.

The elector of Bavaria, in conſternation at a reverſe ſo little expected, had recourſe to the friendſhip of the king, and conjured him in the moſt tender terms not to abandon him, but to ſave his ſtate and his troops, by a powerful diverſion. He requeſted the Pruſſians might penetrate through Moravia into Auſtria, that Segur might have time to breathe.

It is neceſſary, for a moment, to recollect the ſituation of the armies. The poſition of the principal army of the queen of Hungary was very judicious. It had the Danube on its back; its right was covered by the marſhes of Wittingau; its left by the Moldau and Budweis;

weis; and its front by Tabor. The allies, with their troops, deſcribed a kind of ſemicircle round theſe quarters; ſo that, in their operations, they would have an arch to deſcribe, and the Auſtrians, who were in the centre, only the chord. Still more, the Auſtrian troops, being in cloſe quarters, covered the operations of Khevenhuller againſt the French. They approached Auſtria, from which they drew their proviſions and ſuccours. They kept one foot in Bohemia; ſo that, at the opening of the campaign, they might hope to re-eſtabliſh their affairs. To diſlodge their army from a poſt ſo advantageous, it was abſolutely neceſſary that the allies ſhould make a general effort; in order that the Auſtrians, attacked on all ſides, ſhould fall beneath the number of their enemies. This plan was propoſed to marſhal Broglio, whoſe concurrence never could be obtained.

Though the want of harmony and good-will, among the allies, was the cauſe that the moſt deciſive project for obtaining a ſuperiority for the arms of the French and Bavarians was rejected, it was nevertheleſs important to ſupport the elector, on the eve of his obtaining the Imperial crown. Mitigated conduct was no longer ſeaſonable. Either a verbal truce muſt be kept, which aſcertained nothing, and

which the Auſtrians had ſo openly infringed, or the allies of Pruſſia muſt be relieved from their ſuſpicions, by ſome bold ſtroke. The expedition into Moravia was the only one which circumſtances permitted the king to undertake; becauſe it would render him more neceſſary, and would place him in a ſituation of being equally courted by both parties. On this he determined; well reſolved however to employ as few troops as poſſible, and as many of thoſe of the allies as he could obtain. The Saxons, who at that time guarded the banks of the Saſawa, were in readineſs to join a corps of Pruſſians, who were to enter Moravia. Thence that ſmall army might march toward Iglau, diſlodge prince Lobkowitz, who commanded there, and puſh forward as far as Horn, in Lower Auſtria. This manœuvre muſt either force Khevenhuller to abandon M. de Segur, or oblige the principal army of the queen to quit Wittingau, Tabor, and Budweis; in which caſe de Broglio, having nothing before him, might march to the ſuccour of Lintz.

The difficulty of the plan conſiſted in obtaining the conſent of the court of Dreſden, to the junction of the Saxon and Pruſſian troops. Marſhal Schwerin received orders to ſeize on Olmutz, with the corps which had wintered in Upper

Upper Silesia; and the king afterward explained, to M. de Valori, the purport of this expedition, and the utility which would thence result to France. Such being the only means which could save the troops blockaded in Lintz, the king determined to go to Dresden, and sent M. de Valori off a day before his departure, that he might sound the ministry, and prepare them for the propositions that were to be made. It was agreed that M. de Valori should give a signal on the arrival of the king. The signal was given, and no sooner had the king rid himself of the first customary compliments, and ceremonies, than he entered into conversation with count * * * concerning his project.

Of this project we shall give an abstract; but to understand it well we must go a little back. Augustus, the late king of Poland, had drawn up a plan for the division of the succession of the emperor Charles VI. Of this the court of Vienna obtained information. Prince Lichtenstein, passing through Dresden in 1735, under the reign of his successor, being dissatisfied with count Sulkowsky, minister and favourite, assured * * * that, if he could procure him a plan of this partition, he and his court would spare nothing which might accomplish the downfal of Sulkowsky, and procure

him his place. * * * had the perfidy to accept this propoſition. He had the writing copied, and remitted to the prince of Lichtenſtein.

The Saxons declared againſt the houſe of Auſtria; and, preciſely before the arrival of the king, the queen of Hungary had ſent the old maid Kling to Dreſden, whoſe profeſſion was that of intrigue, and who, having taken part in the education of the queen of Poland, maſked the commiſſion with which ſhe was charged under the pretence of an ordinary journey; the ſole end of which commiſſion was to gain upon the affections of a princeſs, with whom ſhe had long been connected.

Scarcely had ſhe arrived at Dreſden before ſhe repaired to count * * *. Taking him aſide, ſhe drew the partition project from her pocket, and aſked — "Do you know this? "Either promiſe me immediately to make the "Saxon troops evacuate Bohemia, or I will "diſcover your treaſon, and you are undone." * * * promiſed whatever ſhe pleaſed. Neither would his timidity ſuffer him to diſoblige the king; and he had a repugnance to entruſt the Saxon troops to the command of a neighbour, whom ſix months before he had wiſhed to ſtrip of his ſtates. Add to this he was averſe

to

to contribute to the elevation of the elector of Bavaria, whom he envied the acquisition of the Imperial dignity. These different sensations contended in his mind; fear was at last victorious, and led him to confide the Saxon troops to the king, well determined to withdraw them as soon as possible.

In the afternoon, the king held a conference. Count * * *, count Saxe, M. de Valori, Mr. Desaleur, and count Rutowsky, were present. The king explained the means which he thought might best save Segur and Bavaria. He had a map of Moravia, on which he pointed out the plan of the campaign. His intention was to fall on the quarters of the Austrians, from all parts: de Broglio, in consequence, was to attack prince Charles of Lorraine, who commanded the army near Frauenberg, while the Prussians and Saxons should take them in flank, toward Iglau. Count Saxe objected that marshal de Broglio had scarcely sixteen thousand men, and that the expedition of Iglau would fail for want of forage and subsistence. The first objection was unanswerable. The king undertook to obviate the second, by going to Prague and concerting with Sechelles, the intendant of the army, the means of furnishing the Saxons with provisions.

The king of Poland in the interim entered the chamber. After mutual civilities, the king wiſhed to do him the honour of communicating the uſe to which he meant to put his troops. Count * * * had immediately folded up the map of Moravia. The king re-demanded this map; it was again opened, and his majeſty became a kind of itinerant ſtage doctor, diſplaying his merchandize to the beſt of his ability. He particularly inſiſted that the king of Poland never could poſſeſs, if he would not give himſelf the trouble of taking, Moravia. Auguſtus replied yes and no, with a countenance that denoted languor. * * *, whom this converſation rendered impatient, interrupted it, by announcing to his maſter that the opera was going to begin. The conquering of ten kingdoms would not have detained the king of Poland a minute longer. To the opera therefore they went, and the king obtained, in deſpite of all opponents, an affirmation and final reſolution.

It was neceſſary to cut proceedings ſhort, like a city taken by aſſault: there were no other means of ſucceeding at this court. On the morrow, at ſix in the morning, the king invited father Guarini to come to him, who was at once a kind of favourite, miniſter, buffoon, and

and confeſſor. The king ſpoke ſo as to perſuade him that he only hoped ſucceſs by his intervention. The cunning of the Italian was the dupe of his pride. Father Guarini quitted the king, and went to Auguſtus, whom he confirmed in the reſolution he had taken. The king at length departed from Dreſden, after having overcome all impediments, the ill-will of count * * *, the want of reſolution of Auguſtus, and the tergiverſations of count Saxe; who, little occupied concerning Bavaria, ſtill had the chimeras of Courland in his brain, and believed that, in order to make his court, it was neceſſary he ſhould, as far as poſſible, counteract the Pruſſians.

When the king arrived at Prague, Lintz ſtill held out; but count Tærring had very inconſiderately ſuffered himſelf to be beaten by the Auſtrians. Some attempts were made to inſpire marſhal de Broglio with activity, but in vain. The king immediately concerted with M. de Sechelles the means of furniſhing ſubſiſtence to the Saxons. Sechelles anſwered—"impoſſibilities ſhall become poſſible"—a ſentence which ought to be written in letters of gold over the office-doors of all army-contractors. Sechelles did not ſatisfy himſelf with ſaying this; he performed all he promiſed.

From

From Prague, the king paſſed by his quarters in Bohemia. On the road, he learnt that Glatz had capitulated; and he continued his journey toward Moravia. He had appointed to meet count Saxe and Polaſtron at Landſkron, to confer on the enſuing operations. Polaſtron was a man of ſo much religion that he ſeemed to be born rather to tell his beads than to make war. The king from thence repaired to Olmutz, on which marſhal Schwerin had lately ſeized. Magazines were to have been formed in this town, but Sechelles was not there to ſuperintend. The ſtay of the king in this place was too ſhort to obviate this inconvenience, and the beſt meaſures which ſeemed to preſent themſelves were obliged to be taken. While the king was at Olmutz, one Fitzner, a counſellor of the grand duke of Tuſcany, came thither, charged with ſome propoſitions from the court of Vienna. The king, giving too much way to his impatience, and without hearing what Fitzner had to ſay, ſpoke without full-ſtop or comma in his diſcourſe; an unpardonable fault in negotiation, during which prudence requires a patient hearing ſhould be given, and a deliberate reply. He rehearſed all the infractions which had been committed by his court on the truce of Oberſchnellendorff, and

and exhorted the queen to come to an accommodation with her enemies. Fitzner informed the king of the diſgraceful capitulation which Segur had lately ſigned at Lintz; from which the king took an opportunity of extracting new reaſons to haſten peace, by inſinuating that the Engliſh had only their own intereſt in view, and would finally ſacrifice the queen, to the advantages they would endeavour to obtain for their commerce. Thus was Fitzner obliged to re-ſwallow the things he was ordered to ſay, and it was mutually agreed to maintain a ſecret correſpondence, by the means of a certain canon named Janini.

While theſe things were paſſing, news arrived from Frankfort on the Main, which announced the election and coronation of the elector of Bavaria, Charles VII. The court of Vienna however did not reſt inactive; and, while negotiations were ardently carried on, nothing was neglected, which reſource could yield, to repel by force its numerous enemies. Fifteen thouſand regulars were raiſed in Hungary; the ban and arriere ban were proclaimed throughout the kingdom, which muſt produce nearly forty-thouſand men. The intention of this court was to form two armies; one of which was to penetrate by Hradiſch into Moravia; and the other

other to pafs by the Jablunka, and gain, in Upper Silefia, the rear of the Pruffian army, while prince Charles fhould advance from Bohemia, to attack the king in front.

The king had not taken more than half the troops that wintered in Upper Silefia, amounting to fifteen thoufand men; at the head of whom he joined the French and Saxons, near Trebitch. Another corps by his orders occupied Wifchau, Hradifch, Kremfir, and the frontiers of Hungary, to cover his operations. The flowneſs, added to the ill-will, of the Saxons, was the occafion that days and even weeks were loft in this expedition, which lofs was of great prejudice to affairs. A fingle example will afford fufficient proof. Budifchau is a pleafure-houfe, rich and magnificent, appertaining to count Bur. This, out of complaifance, was appointed the head quarters of the Saxons, and counts Rutowfky and Saxe found themfelves fo much at their eafe there that it was impoffible to make them proceed. They ftaid at this place three days. Prince Lobkowitz, in confequence of this delay, had time to withdraw his magazines from Iglau; and, on the approach of the allies, he fell back toward Wittingau. The Saxons occupied Iglau; but no remonftrances could prevail on them

them to advance, either toward the Taya or Horn in Auſtria. It is the fortune of moſt generals, who command auxiliary troops, to ſee all their projects fail, for want of obedience and execution. The Saxons, who were the moſt intereſted in this expedition, were thoſe who were guilty of the moſt ill faith, to counteract its effects.

Theſe diſappointments obliged the king to make new diſpoſitions. He gave the Saxons the quarters neareſt to Bohemia, and the Pruſſians occupied the banks of the Taya, from Znaym as far as Gödingen, a ſmall town which is on the frontiers of Hungary. A detachment of five thouſand men ſoon departed from Znaym, and made an irruption into Upper Auſtria. The panic ſpread to the very gates of Vienna. The court recalled ten thouſand men out of Bavaria to the ſuccour of that capital. Ziethen's huſſars advanced to Stockerau, which is only a poſt from Vienna. This irruption was of great utility, by the quantity of ſubſiſtence which it procured. But the Saxons were very much alarmed in their quarters; every buſh was an Auſtrian; fear magnified every object, and they demanded permiſſion to occupy the quarters of the Pruſſians, which was granted. Polaſtron, recalled into Bohemia by the orders

of

of de Broglio, had quitted the army; ſo that the remainder ſcarcely amounted to thirty-thouſand men.

The king diſcovered, by intercepted letters, that the Hungarians began to aſſemble, on the frontiers of Moravia. There was not a moment to loſe. This militia muſt be diſperſed before its numbers became too conſiderable. Prince Thierry of Anhalt was appointed to this command; who, with ten battalions, as many ſquadrons, and a thouſand huſſars, entered Hungary, carried three of the quarters of the pandours, took twelve hundred men, and ſpread ſuch an alarm in the kingdom that a part of the arriere ban ſoon ſeparated. The expedition thus happily terminated, the prince returned to the army in the vicinity of Brunn; for the Saxons were at Znaym, Sab, and Nickelſbourg; and the Pruſſians at Bohrlitz, Auſterlitz, Schlowitz, and in the neighbourhood of Brunn. Artillery had been demanded of the king of Poland, to beſiege this town; which he, for want of money, refuſed. He had lately expended four hundred thouſand crowns, in the purchaſe of a large green diamond. He wiſhed poſſeſſion, yet refuſed the means.

The expedition of the king therefore failed for many reaſons. Segur had ſuffered himſelf

to

to be taken before ſuccours could arrive; Broglio was paralytic; * * * feared Miſs Kling more than he hoped for Moravia; Auguſtus III. wanted a kingdom, but would not be at the trouble of conquering a kingdom. Should Brunn not be taken, the allies could not even maintain themſelves in Moravia. What was ſtill worſe, the king could place no dependence on the fidelity of the Saxons; he had cauſe to expect they would abandon him at the approach of the enemy. One day, without the leaſt intimation, the Saxons all forſook their quarters, and with precipitation threw themſelves into thoſe which the Pruſſians occupied. About a thouſand Auſtrian huſſars had imparted this panic terror. Quarters were procured for them, and Brunn was more cloſely ſurrounded than before.

The commander of the place was an intelligent man. He ſent people in diſguiſe, to ſet the villages, where the troops were quartered, on fire. There were conflagrations every night. More than ſixteen ſmall towns, villages, or hamlets, were eſtimated to have been conſumed by the flames. Three thouſand men, of the garriſon of Brunn, one day attacked the regiment of Truchſes, in the village of Leſch. This regiment defended itſelf for five hours

with admirable conſtancy and valour. The village was burnt, but the enemy was repulſed, without having acquired the leaſt advantage. Truchſes, Varenne, and ſeveral officers, were there wounded, and there acquired fame.

The efforts which had been made, for the relief of Segur, naturally drew the Auſtrians into Moravia. Prince Charles of Lorraine prepared to march to the relief of Brunn. It was neceſſary to chooſe ground on which to aſſemble the troops, which would at the ſame time be an advantageous camp. Theſe properties were found to be united in the environs of the town of Bohrlitz. The king communicated his deſign of waiting for the enemy in that ſituation to count Saxe; which might have been executed with ſo much the more ſecurity becauſe that the king had been reinforced, by ſix battalions and thirty ſquadrons of his own troops. The count gave an ambiguous anſwer, which was preparatory to excuſes of diſobedience. The moſt ſpecious reaſon he alleged was founded on the number of his troops, which did not amount to more than eight thouſand men. The little faith to be placed in the Saxons cauſed the king to reflect on his ſituation. His own forces did not conſiſt in more than twenty-ſix thouſand men. He could rely only on

theſe,

theſe, and they were inſufficient to make head againſt the army of prince Charles of Lorraine. And wherefore perſiſt in conquering that Moravia for which the king of Poland, who was to poſſeſs it, teſtified ſo much indifference? The only part he had to take was to join the Pruſſian troops, that were in Bohemia. The army of the prince of Anhalt, which would be uſeleſs near Brandenbourg, might be employed to cover Olmutz and Upper Sileſia. The prince therefore received orders to divide his forces immediately, to ſend a part to Chrudim, in Bohemia, and to conduct ſeventeen battalions and thirty-five ſquadrons into Upper Sileſia, where he would be joined by his ſon, prince Didier, with the troops the king would leave in thoſe parts.

Notwithſtanding theſe diſpoſitions, the king ſtill found himſelf in a perilous ſituation. He had continually had cauſe to ſuſpect the Saxons, but their ill faith was not ſufficiently manifeſt. De Broglio releaſed him from this embarraſſment, by demanding the Saxon troops to reinforce himſelf, as he ſaid, againſt prince Charles, who was coming to attack him; though the prince was actually leading his army into Moravia. The king ſeemed to credit the falſe

intelligence of marſhal de Broglio, to rid himſelf of allies in whom he could not confide.

The departure from Moravia was determined on. Fifteen ſquadrons and twelve battalions attended the king into Bohemia. Twenty-five ſquadrons and nineteen battalions remained, under the command of prince Thierry, in an advantageous camp near Olmutz; where this prince might have maintained himſelf, had marſhal Schwerin taken proper care to collect ſufficient proviſions for the troops. De Bulow, who followed the king in quality of Saxon envoy, ſeeing him ready to depart from Moravia, ſaid—"Who, ſire, then ſhall crown my "maſter?" The king replied, crowns were not obtained without heavy artillery; and that it was the fault of the Saxons if this had been wanting for the ſiege of Brunn. The king, well determined never more to command troops that were not at his own diſpoſal, and who were not capable of obedience, purſued his route, paſſing by Zwittau and Leutomiſchel, and arrived on the ſeventeenth of April at Chrudim, to be near prince Leopold, where he ſent his troops into quarters of refreſhment.

The Saxons ſuffered a ſmall check in their retreat. The enemy's huſſars carried off a battalion which conſtituted their rear-guard.

Vain

Vain were perſuaſions to induce them to join the French. They traverſed the Pruſſian quarters, to canton themſelves in the circle of Satz, on the frontiers of their electorate. By their defection, the enfeebled French remained at Piſeck, without ſuccour. The burden of war reſted almoſt wholly on the Pruſſian ſhoulders, and in the weakneſs of the allies the enemy found the moſt flattering hopes of ſucceſs.

While the Pruſſians were recovering from their fatigues in Bohemia, the French ſlumbering at Piſeck, and the Saxons removing with all poſſible ſpeed from the hazards of war, prince Charles re-entered Moravia. Prince Thierry of Anhalt offered him battle, near Wiſchau. He had taken his poſition ſo well that the troops of the queen feared to attack. The Pruſſians remained in that poſition, which they did not quit till they had firſt conſumed the laſt barrel of flour. Prince Thierry paſſed the mountains of Moravia, and encamped between Troppau and Jægerndorff, while the army of the enemy gave no ſigns of purſuit. In this retreat, the new-raiſed dragoons of Naſſau had an affair with the Auſtrian huſſars *, where they ſignalized themſelves by their valour and behaviour.

* At Napagedell,

At the ſame time, the regiment of Canneberg * opened themſelves a paſſage through three thouſand enemies, who would have cut them off from the army, and acquired much renown. The gendarmes, who were cantoned, were attacked by night in a village, to which the enemy had ſet fire. Half of the ſquadrons fought on foot amid the flames, that they might give the other half time to mount; after which they fell unitedly on the Auſtrians, repulſed them, and took ſome priſoners. One colonel Bredow commanded.

Theſe are unimportant facts, but why ſhould ſuch glorious actions be ſuffered to periſh in oblivion, eſpecially in a work of gratitude, conſecrated to the renown of troops ſo brave?

What however might be hoped from this war, after reflecting on the little intelligence to be found among the allies; on the pitiable generals of the French; on the feebleneſs of their army; and on the ſtill greater feebleneſs of the army of the emperor? What could be foreſeen, except that the vaſt projects of the cabinet of Verſailles, which the preceding year had ſeemed capable of accompliſhment, were now become more than doubtful?

* Between Prerau and Grætz.

Such-

Such-like prognoſtics, founded on indubitable facts, warned the king not to adventure too far into the labyrinth, but immediately to ſearch the clue. Other reaſons were added to thoſe we have related, which induced him to renew the negotiation for peace with the queen of Hungary. Lord Hyndford was employed to accompliſh this agreement. He was more proper than any other, having already been concerned in the reconciliation of the two powers, and having his own vanity intereſted to complete the work he had begun. He found the court of Vienna leſs pliant than before. The affair of Lintz, the evacuation of Moravia, and the defection of the Saxons, had reſtored its innate haughtineſs. Its ſecret negotiations at the court of Verſailles gave birth to views ſtill more extended. In all ages the ſpirit of the court of Auſtria has been ſeen to follow the brute impreſſions of nature. Inflated in good fortune, crouching in adverſity, never could it arrive at that ſage moderation which renders men invulnerable to the good or evil that chance diſtributes. Its pride and cunning were again predominant. The ill ſucceſs of this attempt of lord Hyndford ſtrengthened the king in his opinion, that, in order to make any negotiation for peace ſucceed with the Auſtrians,

it was firſt neceſſary they ſhould be well beaten. A fine army that now had taken reſt invited him to tempt the fate of a battle. It was compoſed of thirty-four battalions and ſixty ſquadrons; amounting to nearly thirty-three thouſand men.

Before this was determined on, a change had happened in the Engliſh miniſtry. That free and reſtleſs nation was diſſatisfied with government, becauſe the war in India was to its diſadvantage, and becauſe that Great Britain did not act the reſpectable part becoming her on the continent. They chaſtiſed the king on the back of his miniſter, and he was obliged to part with Sir Robert Walpole, who was replaced by lord Carteret. A ſimilar kind of diſcontent in the paſt century had coſt Charles I. his life. The latter was the work of fanaticiſm; the fall of Walpole only could be attributed to the cabals of a faction. The nobles all ſtruggled to be miniſters: Walpole had too long occupied his place. After having overthrown him, the poſſibility of ſucceſs imparted new effervescence to the ambition of the great, which occaſioned this poſt to paſs from hand to hand, and to become of all the offices of the kingdom the leaſt ſtable.

Cardinal de Fleuri was very ill ſatisfied with this change. The moderate conduct of Walpole was very commodious to him, and he dreaded every thing from the impetuoſity of Carteret, who, like Hannibal, had ſworn implacable hatred to all that bore the name of French. Carteret did not belie the opinion that had been entertained of him. He cauſed ſubſidies to be paid to the queen of Hungary, took her under his protection, ſent Engliſh troops over to Flanders, and, to diminiſh the number of the enemies of Auſtria, pledged himſelf to the king to procure an advantageous peace. Theſe offers were gratefully received; though the king was well determined to owe the obligation of peace to the valour of his troops alone, and not to found his hopes on the incertitude of negotiation.

Marſhal Broglio, who ſaw himſelf at Piſeck with a dozen of dukes and peers at the head of ten thouſand men, made ſo many remonſtrances that the cardinal reſolved to ſend him ſome ſuccour. The men were not aſſembled till the ſpring, and they arrived too late. The French are often reproached with the fault of tardineſs. When the friends of the Auſtrians, they occaſioned them the loſs of Belgrade. Now that they were their enemies, they did them no

harm: that peace reſembled war, and this war reſembled peace. By ſuch childiſh conduct they were the deſtruction of the emperor, and prudence taught moſt of their allies to abandon them. The preſent age was barren of great men, in France; that of Louis XIV. produced a multitude. The adminiſtration of a prieſt had deſtroyed the army. Under Mazarine they were heroes; under Fleuri they were Sybarite courtiers.

CHAP. VI.

Events previous to the Battle of Chotuſitz. Diſpoſition of the Battle. Affair of Sahé. Marſhal de Belleiſle at the Pruſſian Camp. His Departure for Saxony. Peace of Breſlau.

THE army of the king in Bohemia was in three diviſions. Sixteen battalions and twenty ſquadrons covered the general quarters of Chrudim. Ten battalions and twenty ſquadrons, under the command of general Götz, were in the vicinage of Leutomiſchel; and Kalckſtein occupied Kuttenberg with a ſimilar number. Theſe three corps might be aſſembled in eight and forty hours. There were beſides

two

two battalions in the fortreſs of Glatz. One battalion guarded the magazines of Königſgrætz, and three others covered thoſe of Pardubitz, Podiebrad, and Nienbourg; ſo that the Elbe ran in a line parallel to the rear of the Pruſſian quarters, and the magazines were diſtributed in ſuch a manner that, let the enemy approach on what ſide he would, the army might face him as he advanced.

The prince of Anhalt being ſtronger than was neceſſary, and having no enemy to oppoſe, kept eighteen battalions and ſixty ſquadrons to cover Upper Sileſia, and detached general Derſchau, with eight battalions and thirty ſquadrons, to reinforce the army of Bohemia. This reinforcement was on the march when intelligence was brought that prince Charles had quitted Moravia, and marched through Teutſchbrod and Zwittau, to enter Bohemia. It was known alſo that marſhal Königſeck, who commanded that army *a latere*, had ſaid that it was neceſſary to march immediately toward Prague, and to give the Pruſſians battle on the way. He ſuppoſed the latter only fifteen thouſand ſtrong, and judged his own ſuperiority ſufficient to attack a corps ſo feeble without danger. Many people have condemned the marſhal, becauſe that, while making war in the provinces

vinces of the queen herſelf, he was ſo ill informed. This was not entirely his fault; Bohemia inclined more toward the Bavarians than the Auſtrians. The Pruſſians were vigilant, and attentively obſerved thoſe perſons by whom they might be betrayed. Troops arrived, others departed; ſo that movements ſo complicated might not eaſily be unravelled, by countrymen or the common people. The ſpies of Königſeck might do their duty ill, but he ought not to be too lightly condemned. That general perhaps thought that, if marſhal Neuperg had, by his own fault, been beaten at Molwitz, this was not a good reaſon for ſuppoſing the Pruſſians invincible; and his project of expediting the Pruſſians on his road, and taking Prague by ſurpriſe, was great.

On the approach of the Auſtrians, the king had the choice of two parties; either to have the Elbe in his front, or to meet prince Charles and give him battle. The latter was prevalent, not only as the moſt glorious but the moſt utile; becauſe that it muſt haſten a peace, the negotiations of which, as we have ſaid, demanded a deciſive blow. The army of the king aſſembled * immediately round Chrudim,

* May 13th.

which

which was its center. The right was ſupported by Trzenitz, and the left by the rivulet of the Chrudimka. The ſcouts and ſpies, as well as deſerters from the enemy, gave notice that prince Charles would encamp the ſame day at Setſch and Boyanof, and that he would remain there on the 15th. On other ſides it was heard that a detachment of the enemy occupied Czaſlau; that another corps marched to Kuttenberg; and that the huſſars had ſeized on the bridge of Kollin. The deſign of Königſeck appeared to be that of carrying the Pruſſian magazine of Nienbourg, and afterward of advancing toward Prague.

To counteract this, the king departed on the 15th with the van-guard, followed by the army, to gain the poſt of Kuttenberg before the enemy. It was requiſite to haſten the march, that the ovens of the army might be ſet up at Podiebrad. This van-guard was compoſed of ten battalions, ten ſquadrons of dragoons, and ten of huſſars. The king encamped on the heights of Podertzau beſide Cotibortz, where this corps though feeble was in an impregnable poſt. The king, that he might perfectly know his ground, went to reconnoitre, and ſaw from the height a body of ſeven or eight thouſand men, who encamped at the diſtance of half a mile toward Wilincof.

Wilincof. Combining circumſtances with the march of prince Charles, this corps was ſuppoſed to be that of prince Lobkowitz, coming from Budweis, to join the grand army. Prince Leopold who followed the king had orders to advance on the morrow, that theſe two bodies might be capable of reciprocal ſuccour. Nothing however was ſeen in the environs of Podertzau, except numerous ſmall parties, probably ſent by the enemy to reconnoitre the camp. The Pruſſian patroles were active all the night, the horſes were kept ſaddled, and the ſoldiers dreſſed; which put the van-guard beyond the danger of ſurpriſe.

On the morrow *, at break of day, the huſſars brought word, that the camp which had been ſeen at Wilincof, had diſappeared. The troops that had been taken for thoſe of prince Lobkowitz were, in fact, the van-guard of prince Charles; who, that they might riſk nothing, had retired at the approach of the Pruſſians. As ſoon as prince Leopold had paſſed the defile of Hermanieſtitz, the van-guard continued its march. The king, on the route, choſe a poſition for the army; and ſent prince Leopold orders to encamp the right at Czaſlau,

* May 16th.

and the left at the village of Chotuſitz. The van-guard preceded the army only half a mile. It took cantonments between Neuhof, to the right of the Pruſſian army, and Kutteaberg. Here they found a batch of bread prepared for the Auſtrians, and every thing of which the troops might ſtand in need. The van-guard was to aſſemble upon the heights of Neuhof, on a diſcharge of three cannon. This was eaſy to be done, becauſe the moſt diſtant regiments were not more than a quarter of a mile from the others.

Toward the evening, prince Leopold ſent an officer to report to the king that the march of the army had been retarded, by the artillery and heavy baggage; that, not arriving at the camp till ſun-ſet, he had been prevented from taking Czaſlau, and that he had learnt that prince Charles encamped at Wilincof, that is to ſay at a mile's diſtance from the Pruſſian camp. This was all preparatory for the enſuing battle; to begin which the king departed, on the 17th, at four in the morning, to join prince Leopold. Arriving on the heights of Neuhof, the whole Auſtrian army was diſcovered; which, during the night, had gained Czaſlau, and which was advancing in four columns to attack the Pruſſians.

The

The following is the order in which prince Leopold arranged the troops. They were on a plain, the left of which inclined toward the park of Spiſlau. Between this park and the village of Chotuſitz the ground was marſhy, and interſected by ſome ſmall rivulets. At the end of the right was the neighbourhood of Neuhof, ſupported by a continuation of ponds, having a height in front. The king ordered marſhal Buddenbrock to occupy that height with his cavalry, and prince Leopold to ſtrike the tents, place two thirds of the infantry in the firſt line, and leave a ſpace in the right of the ſecond line, where the infantry of the van-guard might form. The whole of the van-guard, as well cavalry as infantry, arrived on full trot to join the army. The dragoons were placed on the ſecond line, at the wing which marſhal Buddenbrock commanded, and the huſſars on the flanks; and in the third the infantry formed the flank, and the ſecond line of the right wing; for the Pruſſians had been taught, by the battle of Molwitz, the importance of guarding the flanks.

Scarcely were the troops incorporated before the cannonade began. Eighty-two pieces of Pruſſian artillery kept up a hot fire. Marſhal Buddenbrock had formed his cavalry on a height

height which was in his front, ſo that his right outwinged the left of prince Charles. He attacked the enemy with ſo much impetuoſity that he overthrew all oppoſition. The duſt was prodigious, which was the cauſe that the cavalry could not profit by its advantage ſo much as might have been expected. The huſſars of Bronikowſky, newly raiſed, had been part of the van-guard of the king. Their uniform was green. The cavalry did not know and miſtook them for the enemy. A cry ran through the corps, "*We are cut off,*" and this firſt victorious line fled as if routed.

Count Rottembourg, who was with the dragoons of the ſecond line, overthrew a body of the enemy that had ſtood firm. He afterward fell on the flank of the Auſtrian infantry, which he uſed very ill, and which he would have cut in pieces, had not ſome cuiraſſiers and Auſtrian huſſars fallen upon him, flank and rear. Rottembourg was wounded, and his forces, thrown into confuſion, retreated from the pell mell multitude with difficulty. The cavalry however rallied; and when the duſt was laid there did not appear on the ground where the combat had been ſo hot above five ſquadrons of the enemy. Theſe were the dragoons of Wurtemberg, commanded by colonel Bretlach.

During

During this conteſt of the cavalry, there appeared a certain wavering in the enemy's infantry, which beſpoke its indeciſion; and marſhal Königſeck reſolved to make an attack on the left of the Pruſſians with his right. This was a judicious ſtep, becauſe prince Leopold, having been too dilatory in forming the troops, had not had time to occupy the moſt advantageous ground on the left. He had haſtily garniſhed the village of Chotuſitz, which was occupied by the regiment of Schwerin; but diſorderly, and in a bad manner. His own regiment was on the left of this village, but at too great a diſtance; becauſe he had ſuppoſed, without examining the ground, that the cavalry of the left muſt occupy the ſpace which lay between his regiment and the park of Spiſlau: but, this ground being interſected by rivulets, it was not poſſible for the cavalry to form there; whence it reſulted that the left wing of his regiment was *in the air**. The good will of the cavalry however induced it to attempt impoſſibilities. It filed off, in part, through the village of Chotuſitz, and in part over bridges, to form. Here it found Bathiani, with the Auſtrian cavalry, ready formed in front. On

* A military term ſignifying, at a diſtance, cut off from ſuccour. T.

this,

this, the regiments of Waldau, Pruſſia, and Bredow, forced the firſt and ſecond line of the enemy, cut in pieces the regiments of Hungarian infantry, Palfy and Veteſch, which formed the reſerve of the Auſtrians, and, perceiving that their ardour had led them too far, forced the ſecond and after that the firſt line of the enemy's infantry, and thus returned, loaded with trophies, to rejoin the army.

The ſecond line of the left wing of the Pruſſian cavalry was attacked by an Auſtrian corps, as it left Chotuſitz, before it had time to form, and was beaten in detail. Königſeck, perceiving that the regiment of Leopold, being abandoned by the cavalry, had no ſupport, directed all the efforts of his infantry on that ſide. This regiment was obliged to give back, and the enemy profited by the motion to ſet fire to the village of Chotuſitz, in which they were guilty of great folly; for a village which is intended to be taken ought not to be burnt, as the flames prevent entrance; although it is prudent to ſet fire to a village abandoned, in order to impede the purſuit of the enemy. The regiment of Schwerin, perceiving the fire in good time, forſook the village, and formed the left flank. The fire roſe as a barrier, that

prevented the aſſault of the two armies on that ſide.

Notwithſtanding this obſtacle, the enemy attacked the left of the Pruſſians on the right of the village. Among others, a Hungarian regiment of infantry wiſhed to enter that line ſword in hand; but their eſſay was ſo unſucceſsful that ſoldiers and officers, as well as the regiment of Leopold Daun, lay extended before the Pruſſian battalions as if they had thrown down their arms: ſo formidable is a well-handled muſket become.

The king ſeized this moment promptly to attack the left flank of the enemy's infantry, which motion decided the victory. The Auſtrians fell back on their right, and were driven to Dobroya. They were forced upon ground where they could not fight, and their confuſion became general. The whole country was covered with fugitives. Marſhal Buddenbrock followed hotly at their heels, and purſued them with forty ſquadrons, ſupported by ten battalions, to the diſtance of a mile from the field of battle. The Pruſſian trophies conſiſted in eighteen cannon, and two pair of colours: they took twelve hundred priſoners. Though this may not be ranked in the firſt order of battles, ſtill the enemy loſt a number of officers; and if

if the dead, priſoners, wounded, and deſerters are included, their loſs may be eſtimated, without exaggeration, at ſeven thouſand men. A quantity of ſtandards would likewiſe have been taken had they not had the precaution to leave them in the rear, under the guard of three hundred horſe. The Pruſſians loſt eleven ſtandards, which ought to be the leſs ſurpriſing, becauſe it was the cuſtom of the Auſtrian cavalry, at that time, to fire on horſeback. It was always beaten, but ſtill it was fatal to the horſes of the aſſailants.

The dead of the Pruſſians amounted to nine hundred horſe, and ſeven hundred foot. There were full two thouſand wounded. Generals Werdeck, and Wedel, and colonels Biſmarck, Malzahn, Kortzfleiſch, and Britz, glorioufly loſt their lives on that day. The troops did wonders. The battle only laſted three hours. That of Molwitz had been hotter, more bloody, and was in its conſequences more important. Had the Pruſſians been beaten at Chotuſitz, the ſtate would not have been without reſource; but by gaining the victory they gained peace.

The generals of each army were guilty of errors, which it will be well to examine, that ſuch faults may be avoided in future. Let us begin with marſhal Königſeck. His project

was to ſurpriſe the Pruſſians. He ſeized by night on Czaſlau, and his light troops ſkirmiſhed till the morning with the grand guards of the Pruſſians. Was this purpoſely to keep them alert, and to prevent their being ſurpriſed; or did he intend to inform them of his own deſign? On the day of battle *, he might, at daybreak, have fallen on the camp of prince Leopold, where the king did not arrive till ſix in the morning. What did he? He waited till eight o'clock before he put his army in motion, and the van-guard arrived. What were the faults he committed during the battle? He gave marſhal Buddenbrock liberty to ſeize on an advantageous height, from which the Pruſſian cavalry fell upon and overthrew his left wing. He took the village of Chotuſitz; and, inſtead of employing it intirely to turn the left flank of his enemy, he deprived himſelf of this advantage by ſetting it on fire, and preventing his own troops from paſſing through it, which protected the left of the Pruſſians. He kept his whole attention on the right, and neglected his left wing, which the king outwinged, and forced to retire, as far as the rivulet of Dobroya, whence the confuſion of that wing was communicated to the whole army.

* May 17th.

Thus,

Thus, at the moment when he held victory in his graſp, he ſuffered it to eſcape, and found himſelf obliged to fly to avoid the ignominy of throwing down his arms.

The conduct of the king may be cenſured, becauſe he did not rejoin his army in this camp. He might have confided his van-guard to another officer, by whom it might have been conducted to Kuttenberg as well as by himſelf. But the reproof due to the manner in which the ground was occupied appertains ſolely to prince Leopold. He ought literally to have obeyed the inſtructions ſent by the king. He ought to have been rouſed from his ſecurity, being informed of the deſigns of the enemy by ſkirmiſhes, which continued all the night. He did not make a judicious uſe of the ground on which he was to fight. His errors conſiſted in not having thrown ſome infantry into the park of Spiſlau, which covered the left. This might well have prevented the approach of Bathiani and his cavalry. The cavalry of the prince ought to have ſupported itſelf at this park: had he been vigilant enough to do this in time, the thing was not impracticable. His order of battle, on the right, was leſs defective. By making the changes which have been indicated, his cavalry, on the left, would have had the

ſmall rivulets in its rear, which it was obliged to paſs in the preſence of the enemy, and would have found itſelf on ground where nothing could have prevented it from acting freely. Let us further add that the village of Chotuſitz had not, at the moſt, any thing more than the appearance of a poſt. The church-yard was the only tenable place; but that was ſurrounded by wooden cottages, which would have been in flames as ſoon as the firing of the infantry ſhould begin. The only means of defending this village would have been intrenchment; and, as there was no time for ſuch a work, any intention of maintaining it ought not to have taken birth. The principal fault which prince Leopold committed, in what preceded the action, was that he would not believe the enemy was coming to attack him, till he ſaw the columns begin to form in his front. It was then too late to think of good diſpoſitions. But the valour of the troops triumphed over enemies, obſtacles, impediments of ground, and faults which appertained only to their commanders. Such an army was capable of retrieving a general, and the king himſelf allows that he has more than one obligation, of this kind, to its excellence.

The Auſtrians, after their defeat, halted only when

when they arrived at the village of Habor, three miles diſtant from the field of battle, where they took a fortified camp on the top of the hills. Prince Charles was here joined by a reinforcement of four thouſand men. The king, at the ſame time, received ſix thouſand, under the conduct of general Derſchau, ſent him by the prince of Anhalt, out of Upper Sileſia. The Pruſſians followed the foe: but, when their van-guard appeared, toward evening, in the neighbourhood of Habor, prince Charles decamped that very night, and, paſſing through thick woods, obtained the road of Teutſchbrod. The Pruſſian troops, unable to march further into Bohemia, for want of proviſions, went and encamped at Kuttenberg, that they might be near their magazines.

While prince Charles ſuffered himſelf to be beaten by the Pruſſians, Lobkowitz paſſed the Muldau, at the head of ſeven thouſand men, and audaciouſly appeared before Frauenberg, the caſtle of which might have held out a week, to which he laid ſiege *. De Broglio, having received a reinforcement of ten thouſand men, and being joined by marſhal de Belleiſle, becauſe that the diet of Frankfort had broken up;

* Relation of Willich an eye-witneſs.

de Broglio, I ſay, undertook to ſuccour the place. He ſent his whole corps through a very narrow defile, near Sahé, in which Lobkowitz had placed ſome infantry. The French ſquadrons, leaving the ſtrait without order or diſpoſition, attacked the cuiraſſiers of Hohenzollern and Bernis, that formed the rear-guard of Lobkowitz, and beat them. In the rear of the Auſtrians was a wood, where the Auſtrians ſeveral times rallied; but, as the number of the French increaſed, they at length forced their enemies, and Lobkowitz did not think himſelf in ſafety till he had haſtily gained Budweis. The Auſtrian cuiraſſiers formerly had the character of the pillars of the empire; the battles of Crutzka and Molwitz deprived them of their beſt officers, whoſe places were ill ſupplied. This cavalry therefore fired or attacked in diſorder, conſequently was often beaten, and loſt that confidence in itſelf which is the very inſtinct of bravery.

The French vaunted of the affair at Sahé as of a victory of the firſt magnitude. The battle of Pharſalia did not excite more rumour in Rome than this trifling combat at Paris. The feebleneſs of cardinal de Fleuri had need of being propped by ſome ſucceſsful events, and the two marſhals who were preſent at the con-

teſt

teſt wiſhed to new burniſh old reputation. Marſhal de Belleiſle, intoxicated with his ſucceſs, as well at Frankfort on the Main as at Sahé, and vain of having given Germany an emperor, repaired to the camp of the king, to concert with him the means of awakening the Saxons from their political ſtupor. He choſe an unlucky moment; the king was very far from entering into his views. The many ſecret negotiations which were whiſpered between the Auſtrians and cardinal de Fleuri, as well as anecdotes diſplaying his duplicity, had robbed the king of confidence. It was known that la Chetardie had told the empreſs of Ruſſia that, the moſt certain means of reconciling herſelf with Sweden was to indemnify that power in Pomerania, at the expence of the king of Pruſſia*. This expedient the empreſs refuſed, and imparted the project to the Pruſſian ambaſſador. Cardinal Tencin meanwhile declared to the pope, in the name of his court, that his holineſs ought not to diſturb himſelf concerning the riſe of the Pruſſians; for that, in fit time and place, France would take good care to humble, as ſhe had done to aggrandize, thoſe heretics. The dark conduct of cardinal

* See *Relation de Martefeldt.*

de

de Fleuri rendered him deſerving of every ſuſpicion. He kept one Dufargis at Vienna, who was his emiſſary and negotiator. To circumvent him was therefore indiſpenſably neceſſary; eſpecially when we add to ſo many political reaſons that of finance, the ſtrongeſt and moſt deciſive of all. There ſcarcely were a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns in the treaſury. With a ſum ſo ſmall, it was impoſſible to make the neceſſary preparations for the following campaign. No reſource was to be had in loans, nor thoſe expedients to which ſovereigns have recourſe, where opulence is the characteriſtic of their kingdoms.

Theſe conſiderations collectively were the cauſe that full powers were ſent to count Podewils, who was then at Breſlau, authorizing him to ſign a peace with lord Hyndford, who alſo had full powers from the court of Vienna. This too was the reaſon that the king entered into none of the meaſures propoſed to him by marſhal de Belleiſle, and that the audiences of the latter paſſed only in compliments and panegyric. It might be foreſeen, by the ſituation in which marſhal de Broglio had put himſelf, that he was expoſed to receive ſome check. It was not for the intereſts of Pruſſia that Auſtria ſhould be inflated with any new advantage, previous to

the ſigning of the peace. To prevent any ſuch adverſe accident, the king informed marſhal de Broglio of the motions of prince Charles, which tended to a junction with prince Lobkowitz. He remonſtrated to him that he muſt expect to be attacked by the united forces of Auſtria, and that if he would not vigorouſly puſh Lobkowitz, before the arrival of prince Charles, he ought at leaſt to revictual Frauenberg.

The marſhal laughed at the advice of a young man, paid no regard to it, and tranquilly remained at Frauenberg, without very well knowing why. The Auſtrians preſently came up, carried one of his detachments at Tein, and, paſſing the Muldau, pillaged the whole baggage of the French. Broglio, infinitely aſtoniſhed at what had happened, could only fly to Piſeck, from which place, having given his whole command in the few words, "the army "muſt march," he retired to Braunau; whence he was driven by three thouſand Croats, and purſued to the very walls of Prague.

This ill news occaſioned a courier to be ſent off to Breſlau, to haſten the concluſion of peace. The eloquence of lord Hyndford, ſtrengthened by the victory of the Pruſſians, appeared more perſuaſive to the Auſtrian miniſtry than it had done

done formerly. They liſtened to the counſels of the king of England, and the following are the preliminary articles which were ſigned at Breſlau.

I. The queen of Hungary ceded to the king of Pruſſia Upper and Lower Sileſia, with the principality of Glatz; except the towns of Troppau, Jægerndorff, and the high mountains ſituated beyond the Oppa.

II. The Pruſſians undertook to repay the Engliſh one million ſeven hundred thouſand crowns; which ſum was a mortgage loan on Sileſia.

The remaining articles related to a ſuſpenſion of arms, an exchange of priſoners, and the freedom of religion and trade.

Thus was Sileſia united to the Pruſſian ſtates. Two years were ſufficient for the conqueſt of that important province. The treaſures which the late king had left were almoſt expended; but provinces that do not coſt more than ſeven or eight millions are cheaply purchaſed. Circumſtances particularly favoured this atchievement. It was neceſſary that France ſhould ſuffer herſelf to become a party in the war; that Ruſſia ſhould be attacked by Sweden; that timidity ſhould cauſe the Hanoverians and Saxons to remain inactive; that ſucceſs ſhould

be

be uninterrupted; and that the king of England, though an enemy of the Pruſſians, ſhould, in his own deſpite, become an inſtrument of their aggrandizement. What moſt contributed to this conqueſt was an army that had for two and twenty years been forming, and by its admirable diſcipline rendered ſuperior to all the ſoldiers of Europe. Add to this, generals that were true citizens; wiſe and incorruptible miniſters; and, finally, a ſpecies of good fortune which often accompanies youth, and deſerts age.

Had the undertaking failed, the king would have been deemed a raſh prince, enterprizing beyond his ſtrength. Succeſs made him ſuppoſed happy. In reality, fortune only beſtows fame; and he whom fortune favours is applauded, while he on whom ſhe frowns is blamed.

After the ratifications were exchanged, the king withdrew his troops out of Bohemia: ſome of them marched through Saxony to return to their native country, others were ſent into Sileſia, being deſtined to guard this new conqueſt.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Peace. Notification to the Allies. War of Italy. The Hanoverians join the Engliſh in Flanders. War of Finland. Capitulation of Friedrichſham. Duke of Holſtein called to the Swediſh Succeſſion. March of Maillebois into Bohemia, and afterward into Bavaria. Negotiations of the French and Engliſh at Berlin; and other Events to the Year 1743.

PROPRIETY required that a peace ſo lately concluded ſhould be notified to the former allies of Pruſſia. The king had good reaſons for what he did; but ſome of them were of a nature not to be made public, and others could not be repeated without loading France with reproaches. Far from wiſhing to offend that power, the king was deſirous of paying her every reſpect: he only would not ſuffer himſelf to incur the dangers to which ſhe had expoſed herſelf; and, after having been an actor, determined to become a ſpectator of the ſcene.

The feelings of the cardinal at this reverſe of ſyſtem, by which his moſt hidden purpoſes were overturned, were well foreſeen. His ſecret motives were very different from thoſe with which

which he amuſed the public. They were really as follow. He preſumed ſo highly on the name of France that he imagined a handful of men were ſufficient to maintain Bohemia. His intention was to make the allies bear the whole weight of the war, and to be active or remiſs, in military affairs, according as the intereſts of France ſhould dictate; that thus he might manage the negotiations for peace to the utmoſt advantage of Louis XV. This was a very different conduct to that which he was obliged to hold by the treaty of alliance.

The emperor, of all the allies of France, had the greateſt cauſe of complaint. Marſhal de Broglio was neither a Catinat nor a Turenne; and little dependance could be placed on marſhal Törring and the Bavarian troops. As for the elector of Saxony, jealous as he was of the aggrandizement of the houſe of Brandenbourg, he had this obligation to the king, that being included in the peace of Breſlau he thus might honourably retrieve an ill-adviſed ſtep. Auguſtus III. indeed was ſo little informed of the manner in which his troops were employed that, when count Wartenſleben was ſent to announce to him, in the name of his ally, the gain of the battle of Czaſlau, he aſked the count if his troops had behaved well. Wartenſleben replied

plied they were not preſent; and that, long before the battle, they had retreated into the circle of Saatz, on the frontiers of Saxony. The king appeared aſtoniſhed, and called for count * * *, who gave him ſome inſignificant reaſons, by which he was appeaſed.

There being ſo little good will on the part of his allies, the king found no great difficulty in making his apology. The following is the copy of a letter which he wrote to cardinal de Fleuri *.

" SIR, AND COUSIN,

" IT is known to you that, ſince the commencement of our mutual engagements, I " have, with inviolable fidelity, ſeconded every " plan of the king your maſter. By my re- " monſtrances I aſſiſted in gaining the Saxons " from the party of the queen of Hungary. I " gave my vote in favour of the elector of " Bavaria; I accelerated his coronation; with " my whole power I aided in overawing the " king of England; I brought Denmark over to " your intereſt; in fine, by negotiation and by " war, I contributed as much as in me lay in " ſuſtaining the party of my allies; although

* June 10, 1742.

" the

" the effects have never been ſufficiently cor-
" reſpondent to my good wiſhes. Notwith-
" ſtanding that my troops, exhauſted by the
" continual fatigues of 1741, demanded reſt,
" which ſeemed to be their due, I was not deaf
" to the preſſing ſolicitations of marſhal de
" Belleiſle, but employed them in Bohemia,
" there to cover the left wing of the allies. I
" did more. To relieve M. de Segur, when
" blockaded in Lintz, my zeal for the com-
" mon cauſe tranſported me into Saxony;
" where, by importunity, I obtained the con-
" ſent of the king of Poland that his troops, in
" concert with mine, ſhould make a diverſion
" in Moravia. They marched to Iglau, from
" which prince Lobkowitz haſtily retired. This
" diverſion muſt have been effective, had M.
" de Segur patiently waited its conſequences;
" and had marſhal de Broglio been ſufficiently
" in force on the Wotawa to ſecond my efforts.
" But the precipitate haſte of the firſt, the ſmall
" army of the latter, the want of will in the
" Saxon generals, and finally the want of artil-
" lery for the ſiege of Brunn, rendered this ex-
" pedition fruitleſs; and obliged me to quit
" a province the Saxons were to poſſeſs, but
" which they had not a deſire to conquer. On
" my return from Bohemia, I marched againſt

" prince Charles of Lorraine, whom, that I might
" ſave the city of Prague, I attacked; and
" which, had he not been routed, he would
" have beſieged. I purſued him as far as the
" ſubſiſtence of my army would permit. No
" ſooner did I hear that prince Charles had
" taken the road to Tabor and Budweis, than
" I informed marſhal de Broglio of this, and
" adviſed him to force prince Lobkowitz to re-
" treat, whom he had lately vanquiſhed at
" Sahé, before the prince ſhould be joined by
" the army of the queen of Hungary. Inſtead
" of thinking proper to act thus, or of returning
" to Piſeck, where the ground was favourable,
" the marſhal divided his troops into detach-
" ments. You are informed of the misfor-
" tunes which were the reſult. At preſent Ba-
" varia is cut off from Bohemia, and the Au-
" ſtrians, maſters of Pilſen, in ſome manner
" intercept the ſuccours which marſhal de
" Broglio may expect from France. Notwith-
" ſtanding the promiſes which the Saxons
" made to marſhal de Belleiſle, far from pre-
" paring to fulfil theſe promiſes, and join the
" French, I learn that they quit Bohemia, and
" return to their electorate. In a ſituation like
" this, the conduct of the Saxons being more
" than ſuſpicious, and from which there is no-

" thing

" thing to hope, on the part of M. de Har-
" court, I behold in the future a tedious, an
" endleſs war, the principal burden of which
" would fall upon me. The money of Eng-
" land, on one hand, ſets all Hungary in arms;
" and, on the other, by the efforts of the em-
" preſs queen, her provinces are productive of
" nothing but ſoldiers. The Hungarians pre-
" pare to fall on Upper Sileſia. The Saxons,
" ill-diſpoſed as I know them to be, are capable
" of acting in concert with the Auſtrians, and
" of making a diverſion into my hereditary
" ſtates, which at preſent are without defence.
" Thus doth futurity preſent the moſt gloomy
" proſpects; and, in a ſituation thus critical,
" though with bitterneſs of heart, I ſee myſelf
" obliged to fly from the ſhipwreck, and ſeek
" an aſylum. Though events ſo unfortunate
" have obliged me to take a part which is juſ-
" tified by neceſſity, you will ever find me faith-
" fully fulfilling engagements, the execution of
" which depends upon myſelf alone. I ſhall
" never revoke that renunciation I have made
" of the countries of Juliers and Berg; nor ever
" trouble, directly or indirectly, the eſtabliſhed
" order of ſucceſſion. I will rather turn my
" arms againſt myſelf than againſt the French.
" I ſhall ever be found equally eager in con-

" curring to procure advantage to the king " your maſter, and good to his kingdom. The " courſe of the war has been one continued " ſucceſſion of marks of good will toward my " allies; of this you muſt be as much convinced " as of the authenticity of the facts I have here " ſtated. I am perſuaded, Sir, you will re- " gret, with me, the caprice of that deſtiny " which has rendered deſigns ſo ſalutary to " Europe, as ours were, abortive.

" I am, &c."

The following is the Anſwer of the Cardinal *.

" SIRE,

" YOUR majeſty will eaſily judge how great " was the grief which the letter you did me " the honour to addreſs to me, on the 10th " of this month, occaſioned. The melancholy " event, which overthrows all our projects in " Germany, might have been redreſſed, could " your majeſty have ſuccoured marſhal de " Broglio, and at leaſt have ſaved the city of " Prague. But you found this to be im- " poſſible, and we are obliged to ſubmit to " your better judgment and prudence. Great

* June 20, 1742.

" faults

" faults it is true have been committed. Any " rehearſal of them would be uſeleſs; but, " could we have united all our forces, the evil " would not have been without remedy. The " paſt muſt be forgotten; and we muſt think " only of peace, ſince your majeſty believes " peace to be neceſſary, and ſince that the " king is no leſs deſirous of it than is your ma- " jeſty. Do you, Sire, regulate the conditions, " and we will give full powers to marſhal de " Belleiſle to ſign whatever ſhall be ſtipulated. " I know the good faith and generoſity of your " majeſty too well, to entertain the leaſt ſuſ- " picion that you will conſent to abandon us, " after the authentic proofs we have given of " our fidelity and zeal for the intereſts of Pruſ- " ſia. Your majeſty becomes the arbitrator of " Europe, nor will you ever act a more glo- " rious part. Conclude this part therefore, Sire, " by protecting your allies, and the intereſts of " the emperor, as much as poſſible. In my " preſent affliction I have nothing farther to " add, but that my good wiſhes will inceſ- " ſantly be for the proſperity of your majeſty, " and that I am, with all reſpect, &c."

Thus ended an alliance in which each party endeavoured to outwit the other; in which the troops of the various ſovereigns were as diſobedient to their commanders as if diſobedience had been their duty; in which camps reſembled a ſtate of anarchy; and the plans of generals were ſubmitted to be reviſed by an old prieſt; who, without any knowledge of war, or the ſituation of places, unſeaſonably often rejected or approved thoſe important projects by which war was to be decided. This was the true miracle which was the ſalvation of the houſe of Auſtria; a more prudent conduct would have rendered its deſtruction inevitable.

As ſoon as the ratifications were exchanged between the Pruſſians and Auſtrians, the peace was guarantied by the king of England, with all formal ſolemnity. Lord Carteret was the principal promoter of this peace; for he flattered himſelf he ſoon ſhould engage Pruſſia to take part in the war he meditated againſt France. He had already aſſembled in Flanders, as we have ſaid, ſixteen thouſand Engliſh, as many Hanoverians, and ſix thouſand Heſſians. The king of Sweden, landgrave of Heſſe, had a like number in the ſervice of the emperor; and it might have happened that Heſſians muſt have been bound in honour to have murdered

Heſſians:

Heſſians: ſo blinded are men by ſordid intereſt.

Thoſe troops that were collecting in Brabant did not inſpire France with ſufficient fears to make her neglect all endeavours to ſave marſhal de Broglio. Maillebois was ſent with his army into Bohemia, to the aid of the marſhal and the army of France beſieged in Prague. The Pariſians, who delight in turning all things to ridicule, called this the army of the Mathurins, becauſe it went to the releaſe of priſoners. Maillebois paſſed the Rhine at Manheim, and directed his march toward Eger. After the Pruſſians had concluded peace, and the Saxons had returned home, fortune had openly declared for the queen of Hungary. Prince Charles, having taken Pilſen, came and encamped near Prague. De Broglio had taken a poſition, near Bubenitz, which was exceedingly diſadvantageous. This the enemy's cannon obliged him to abandon, and to ſeek refuge, with all his forces, in Prague, in which city he was ſoon beſieged. The German troops of the queen inveſted it on the leaſt extended ſide; and the Hungarians, Croats, and irregular troops, ſurrounded it from the Ratſchin to the New-gate, and eſtabliſhed communications, by bridges, on the Upper and Lower Muldau. The moſt memorable event dur-

ing this ſiege was the grand ſally of the French, in which they killed and took three thouſand men of the enemy, and ſpiked the cannon of their batteries. The marſhals de Belleiſle and de Broglio re-entered Prague triumphant, followed by their priſoners, and their trophies.

Although the French rendered themſelves formidable to the Auſtrians, by their vigorous defence, the ſtate of their army was not the leſs to be pitied. Their ſituation was worthy of compaſſion, as well from the want of harmony among their chiefs as the miſeries to which they were expoſed. So great was the dearth that they killed and ate their horſes; the ſhambles could ſcarcely ſupply the tables of the marſhals.

In this deſperate ſituation they had no proſpect but of death or ignominy, till marſhal de Maillebois was ſent to their deliverance. Had full powers been given to this marſhal, the affairs of Bohemia might have aſſumed a different aſpect; but the cardinal at Verſailles led him in a ſtring. Opportunities were loſt to him, becauſe he durſt not profit by them. The court of Vienna was ſenſible of the blow which the cardinal might ſtrike. To parry this they had recourſe to artifice, which to them was a ſubſtitute for ſtrength. Count Ulefeld, miniſter

of

of foreign affairs to the queen of Hungary, knowing the character of the cardinal, amuſed him ſo effectually by negotiation that he gave Khevenhuller time to haſten from Bavaria, and join prince Charles of Lorraine. The French ſuffered themſelves to be ſo far trifled with that the Auſtrians gained a march upon them, and reduced Maillebois to the choice of a battle or a retreat. He was generally blamed for not coming to action with prince Charles; but he was innocent. We know with certainty that his court had given him poſitive orders to riſk nothing. Theſe he obeyed; and, as it was impoſſible he ſhould approach Prague without a battle, he fell back toward Eger.

This diverſion, though incomplete, produced advantageous effects in favour of the troops ſhut up in Prague. Marſhals de Belleiſle and de Broglio, freed from the Auſtrian army, ſent out large detachments, to collect proviſions, and revictual the city. Maillebois, having become uſeleſs in Bohemia, in which he ſcarcely had gained footing, marched by Ratiſbonne and Straubingen, and joined marſhal Seckendorff, who commanded the emperor's troops in Bavaria. Had the army of Maillebois been able to keep that of prince Charles longer in Bohemia, Seckendorff might have recovered Paſſau,

Paſſau, Straubingen, and all the towns which then held out for the Auſtrians. Maillebois in vain attempted to retake Braunau. Prince Charles followed him into Bavaria; and, as the ſeaſon was advanced, and both the armies exhauſted by fatigue, each went into winter-quarters.

The affairs of the houſe of Auſtria were in an uncertain ſituation in Italy. The Spaniards, under the command of Montemar, had penetrated into Ferrara. Marſhal Traun having obliged them to retreat a little, the queen of Spain, who would not ſuffer her generals to become effeminate, ſent count Gages into Italy to relieve Montemar.

The year 1742 might be called the year of diverſions. The incurſion of marſhal Khevenhuller in Bavaria; that of the king in Moravia; the army of the Engliſh aſſembled in Flanders; the march of Maillebois into Bohemia; the fleet of admiral Matthews threatening to bombard Naples in order to force the king to a neutrality; and the paſſage of don Philip through Savoy, to engage the king of Sardinia to withdraw his troops from the Auſtrian army on the river Panaro; all are inſtances of this.

But not one of theſe diverſions intirely anſwered the end which thoſe who projected them had propoſed.

propoſed. After the retreat of Maillebois, Prague was inveſted by a corps of light troops, Croats, and Hungarians.

While all this was paſſing in the ſouth of Europe, the government of the new empreſs grew ſtrong at Peterſburgh. The miniſters of that princeſs were ſufficiently adroit to lull the ambaſſador of France, and Löwenhaupt who commanded the Swediſh troops in Finland, to ſleep. The Ruſſians very ably employed this time in reinforcing their army. No ſooner did general Laſcy, who commanded the Ruſſian troops, find himſelf ſufficiently in force, than he advanced; and no ſooner did he appear than the Swedes every where retreated. The name of Ruſſian, which they had held in ſuch contempt at the battle of Narva, was to them become a name of terror. Impregnable poſts were no longer thought places of ſafety. After having fled thus from place to place, they ſaw themſelves ſhut up, at Friedrichſham, by the Ruſſians, who there cut off their laſt retreat. The Swedes had finally the weakneſs to throw down their arms, and ſign an ignominious capitulation, which ſtamped diſgrace on the nation. Twenty thouſand Swedes paſſed under the yoke of twenty-ſeven thouſand Ruſſians. Laſcy diſ-

armed

armed the Swedes, and ſent them home. The Finlanders took the oath of fidelity.

How humiliating was this example to the pride of nations! Thus do kingdoms and empires, after having raiſed themſelves, become enfeebled, and haſten toward their fall! Well may we exclaim, on this ſubject, "vanity of "vanities, all is vanity." The political cauſe of theſe changes may, in all probability, originate in the various forms of government which have happened in Sweden. While the ſtate was monarchical, war was held honourable. It was uſeful for the defence of the country, and never could become formidable. In a republic it was the reverſe. The government muſt, in its own nature, be pacific, and ſoldiers held diſgraceful. Every thing was to be feared from generals who might gain the affection of the army; for they might effect a revolution. Ambition and intrigue are active in republics, which are inſenſibly degraded by corruption; and the true ſtimulus to honour is loſt, becauſe fortune may be attained by means which do not require any merit in the candidate. Neither are ſecrets ever kept in republics. The enemy is informed of, and enabled to counteract, all their deſigns. But the French took an ill time to awaken the ſpirit of conqueſt, which was

not

not then intirely extinct in the minds of the Swedes, and to engage them in a war with Ruſſia, when Sweden wanted money, diſciplined troops, and more eſpecially good generals. The ſuperiority which the Ruſſians obtained obliged the Swedes to ſend ſenators to Peterſburgh, to offer the ſucceſſion of the crown to the young grand duke, prince of Holſtein, and nephew of the empreſs. Nothing could be more humiliating for that nation than the refuſal of the grand duke, who held the crown unworthy his acceptance. The marquis of Botta, at that time Auſtrian ambaſſador at Peterſburgh, paid the duke the compliment of ſaying—" I wiſh it were as eaſy for the queen my " miſtreſs to preſerve as it is for your highneſs " to reject kingdoms."

On this refuſal of the grand duke, the prieſts and peaſants, who have votes in the diet, wiſhed the prince royal of Denmark might be choſen to ſucceed their king. The ſenators of the French faction gave their ſuffrages in favour of the prince de Deux Ponts; but the empreſs declared for the biſhop of Eutin, the uncle of the grand duke, and her will was ſuperior to the influence of every other party. The election of this prince did not happen till the year 1743, ſo much were the reſolutions of the diet held

in

in ſuſpenſe by the cabals that were formed at Stockholm.

After the peace of Breſlau there was no end to negotiation. The Engliſh deſigned to impel the king to become a party in their projected war. The French would engage him in meaſures wholly incompatible with that neutrality which he had promiſed to obſerve. The emperor ſolicited his mediation. But the king remained unſhaken. The longer the war ſhould continue the more would the reſources of the houſe of Auſtria be exhauſted; and the longer Pruſſia ſhould remain at peace the more would ſhe acquire power.

The moſt difficult thing in ſuch a conjunction was to keep up the balance between the belligerent powers, that neither might too much preponderate. The emperor muſt not be ſuffered to be dethroned, nor the French to be driven out of Germany; and though arms were interdicted to the Pruſſians, by the peace of Breſlau, they might effect theſe purpoſes by the aid of intrigue. An opportunity ſoon offered. The king of England propoſed to ſend troops from Flanders to the aid of the queen of Hungary. Such a ſuccour would inevitably have been deſtructive to the emperor and France. A danger ſo preſſing reduced the king to the neceſſity

neceſſity of employing the ſtrongeſt remonſtrances. He went ſo far as to menace the king of England with invading his electorate, ſhould he venture to paſs the Rhine with foreign troops, and introduce them into the empire without the conſent of the Germanic body.

Gentler inſinuations induced the Dutch not to ſuffer their forces to join thoſe of the allies of the queen of Hungary. The French, thus having time to breathe, provided for their defence.

Pruſſia did not ſucceed ſo well in the project ſhe had formed for the ſupport of the emperor, the purport of which was to maintain the troops of this prince in Bavaria. The French had two reaſons to induce them to concur. The firſt was that, by abandoning Bavaria, they would be obliged to repaſs the Rhine, and to think of defending their own provinces. The ſecond that, having made an emperor, it would have been diſgraceful to them to have abandoned him; and, as it may be ſaid, to have delivered him up to the mercy of his enemies. But their generals had loſt all recollection, and were ſubdued rather by terror than by reaſon. To replace their troops, in ſome ſort, it was in contemplation to procure an aſſociation of the circles, which ſhould form an army of neutrality.

lity. Under this pretence, the king might have ſent thither his own forces, and that army would have covered Bavaria; but the affair failed from the ſervile fear in which the princes of the empire were held by the houſe of Auſtria. The queen of Hungary threatened; they trembled, and the diet came to no reſolution. Had France ſupported this project, by money properly diſtributed, it would have ſucceeded. The worſt œconomy of a king is that of not knowing when to expend his treaſures.

Thus ended the year 1742, the various events of which ſerved as a prelude to a war that was carried on with the greateſt fury. The French alone were deſirous of peace. The king of England, preſuming too much on the feebleneſs of the French government, believed it might be depreſſed by a ſingle campaign. The queen of Hungary concealed her ambition under the veil of ſelf-defence. We ſhall hereafter ſee how ſhe became, inſtead of a principal in the war, the auxiliary of her allies.

Pruſſia endeavoured to profit by the peace ſhe poſſeſſed for the re-eſtabliſhment of her finances. Her reſources were exhauſted, and it was neceſſary laboriouſly to collect new ones, to bring what ſtill was defective in the receipts of

of Silesia to perfection, which haste had hitherto prevented, and to pay the debts of the Austrians to England. Five towns were at the same time undertaken to be new fortified; which were, Glogau, Brieg, Neiss, Glatz, and Cosel. An augmentation of eighteen thousand men was made to the troops; all which demanded money, and great œconomy, to accelerate its execution. The guarding of Silesia was committed to thirty-five thousand men, who had been instrumental in its conquest. Thus, far from growing effeminate in times of tranquillity, peace became to the Prussian troops the school of war. Magazines were formed in the fortresses; the cavalry acquired agility and intellect; and all the military departments concurred, with equal ardour, in the strengthening of that discipline which formerly rendered the Romans the conquerors of the world.

END OF PART I.

THE

HISTORY

OF

MY OWN TIMES.

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POSTHUMOUS WORKS

OF

FREDERIC II.

KING OF PRUSSIA.

THE HISTORY OF MY OWN TIMES.

PART II.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Events of the Years 1743, *and* 1744, *and of all which preceded the Pruſſian War.*

IT is ſaid to be a capital fault in politics, to confide in a reconciled foe, and the maxim is well founded; but it is ſtill a greater fault for a feeble power long to wreſtle with a puiſſant monarchy, which has reſources not to be ob-

tained by the former. This is a neceſſary reflection, to give a previous anſwer to thoſe who cenſured the conduct of the king. Was it neceſſary, ſaid they, he ſhould head a league to cruſh the new houſe of Auſtria, and afterward ſuffer that ſame houſe to recover the force which drove the French and Bavarians out of Germany? But what was the intention of the king? Was it not the conqueſt of Sileſia? How might he execute this had the war continued, not having ſufficient reſources to furniſh thoſe great expenditures which muſt neceſſarily have been incurred? It became him to be active in negotiation, and, as much as in him lay, to preſerve an equilibrium between the belligerent powers. Peace gave him time to breathe, and to prepare for war. The animoſity between France and Auſtria was likewiſe ſo great, and their intereſts were ſo oppoſite, that any reconciliation between theſe inimical empires appeared to be very diſtant. He had therefore to reſerve himſelf for great occaſions. The ill ſucceſs of the French armies had made ſo ſtrong an impreſſion upon the mind of cardinal de Fleuri, that his health was affected, and ſickneſs carried him off at the beginning of the year. He had formerly been biſhop of Frejus, preceptor to Louis XV. was a cardinal of the Romiſh church, and during ſeven-

ſeventeen years prime miniſter. In this poſt he had maintained himſelf, where few miniſters grow old, by the art of captivating the confidence of his maſter, and carefully baniſhing thoſe from the court whoſe genius was liable to give him umbrage. He healed the wounds which the war of the ſucceſſion and the ſyſtem of Law had given France. His œconomy was as uſeful as his acquiſition of Lorrain was glorious to the kingdom. If he neglected the army and the navy, it was becauſe he would owe all to negotiation, for which he had abilities. His mind, like his body, ceded to the weight of years. He was too much praiſed during his life, too much blamed after his death. His was neither the haughty ſoul of Richlieu, nor the ſubtle ſpirit of Mazarin; theſe were lions, who devoured the ſheep; Fleuri was a wiſe paſtor, who watched for the preſervation of his flock. Louis XV. wiſhed to erect a monument to the memory of the cardinal, for which a deſign was made, but never was executed. Scarcely was he dead, before he was forgotten. Chauvelin, who had been exiled by cardinal de Fleuri, imagined that, though in diſtant baniſhment, ſtill he could carry the vacant place. He wrote to Louis XV. blaming the adminiſtration of his enemy, and highly vaunting of himſelf.

This hafty ftep was the cauſe that the place of his exile was made ſtill more diſtant from the court than Bourges, to which he had firſt been baniſhed. The king of France gave notice of the death of his miniſter, to foreign courts, much in the ſtyle of a prince who announces his acceſſion to the throne. The following is a literal copy of a letter he wrote to the king of Pruſſia.

" Sir and Brother,

" After the loſs I have lately had of the " cardinal de Fleuri, in whom I placed all " my confidence for the adminiſtration of my " affairs, and the wiſdom and information of " whom I never can ſufficiently regret, I would " not defer perſonally to renew thoſe aſſurances " to your majeſty, which he communicated to " you in my name, and which I often have " charged him to repeat, of the perfect friend- " ſhip which I have for your majeſty's perſon, " and of the ſincere deſire I always have had to " be able to confer with you on all things which " may promote our common intereſts. I doubt " not I ſhall receive from your majeſty ſuch an " anſwer as I wiſh, and your majeſty may be " aſſured you will, on all occaſions, find the " ſame diſpoſition in me to contribute to your " glory and advantage, and to prove how much " I am, &c."

Notice at the ſame time was given from the depart-

department of foreign affairs, that the king was henceforth determined to govern for himſelf, and required to be perſonally addreſſed. Hitherto Louis XV. had been the pupil, and the cardinal de Fleuri the tutor. After the death of Mazarin, Louis XIV. went into mourning for his miniſter. No one mourned for de Fleuri; he was forgotten before his funeral oration had been delivered. During the adminiſtration of the cardinal, the different reins of government, uniting and ending all in one, were in his hands; he was the center of the ſtate radii, all of which, whether appertaining to finance, war, naval, or political affairs, ended in, and were by him directed. After his death the king wiſhed, in concert with his miniſters who were at the head of theſe four departments, to ſuperintend himſelf. In eight days his ardour was extinct, and France was governed by four ſubaltern kings, each independent of the other. This mixed government was productive of circumſtantial inſpection in each department. But thoſe general views, which reunite and embrace one great whole, for the good and intereſt of the ſtate, were wanting to the royal councils. That we may form ſome idea of the choice of miniſters, let us ſuppoſe a chancellor of the duke of Orleans, his imagination full of Cujas,

and Bartholius, appointed miniſter of war, at a time when all Europe was in flames; and a former captain of dragoons, named Ori, placed at the head of the finances. Maurepas dreamed of rendering Louis XV. ſovereign of the ocean, and the king would have become ſo, if the diſcourſes of an amiable man could have effected this miracle. The confined mind of Amelot reſembled eyes afflicted with the myopes, which ſcarcely can diſtinguiſh the neareſt objects. This Areopagus at that time governed France; it was properly an ariſtocracy, or rather a veſſel navigating a ſtormy ſea without a compaſs, and having no other guide than the impulſe given by the winds. The armies were not proſperous under this new adminiſtration, though the army of Maillebois, in concert with the Bavarians, was ſtill on the frontiers of Auſtria. Prince Lobkowitz, with ſixteen thouſand Hungarians, continued to keep marſhal Belleiſle blockaded in Prague, with ſixteen thouſand French. The troops of the marſhal were moſtly compoſed of infantry, and thoſe of the prince of cavalry. This ſituation diſturbed Mr. d'Argenſon; and, whether from impatience, ill-humour, or want of conſideration, this heroical lawyer expedited an order to marſhal Belleiſle to evacuate Prague. Such an order was much more eaſy

to

to give than to execute. The marſhal, on its reception, made proper diſpoſitions, and the garriſon left the city on the 18th of December at night, during a very ſevere froſt. He gained three marches on prince Lobkowitz, and filing through a difficult route, which gave but little advantage to the cavalry of the enemy, he marched along the banks of the Eger, and, on the 10th day of his march, arrived at the city of that name. Four thouſand men periſhed of cold and hunger, in conſequence of the forced marches they were obliged to make; and this ruined army, reduced now to the number of eight thouſand, was divided. Such as were ſtill capable of ſerving joined Maillebois in Bavaria, and ſuch corps as were entirely thinned were ſent into Alſatia to recruit. Thus was Bohemia conquered and loſt, without a victory gained either by the French or Auſtrians ſuch as might decide the fate of kingdoms. In any other country than France, a retreat like that of marſhal de Belleiſle would have excited a general conſternation; but there ſmall things are treated with dignity, and great with levity. The Pariſians only laughed, and wrote ſongs on the marſhal. Sonnets certainly do not merit a place in a grave hiſtorical work like this, except ſo far as they mark the ge-

nius of a nation, for which reaſon we think we ought not to omit the following:

Quand Belle-Iſle partit une nuit
De Prague à petit bruit,
Il dit voyant la lune:
Lumière de mes jours,
Aſtre de ma fortune,
Conduiſez-moi toujours.

At London, on a like occaſion, a faſt would have been proclaimed; the hoſt would have been expoſed at Rome, and men beheaded at Vienna. An epigram is a better conſolation. The retreat of marſhal Belleiſle underwent the fate of all human actions; there were fanatics who in their zeal compared it to Xenophon's retreat of the ten thouſand, while others on the contrary ſaid a flight ſo ſhameful had no parallel but in the defeat of Guinegaſt. They both were wrong. Sixteen thouſand men, who evacuated Prague, and retired from Bohemia before ſixteen thouſand other men, by whom they were purſued, had neither the ſame dangers to encounter nor countries ſo vaſt to traverſe as the troops of Xenophon, returning from the fartheſt part of Perſia into Greece. But neither ought we to run into the exceſs of affirming that a march, on which the French could not be ſurrounded by the enemy, was a total defeat. The diſpoſitions of marſhal Belle-

iſle

iſle were good; the only reproach to which he is liable is that of not having taken ſufficient care of his troops.

From that time fortune ſmiled on the queen of Hungary. Marſhal Traun defeated Gages in Italy, who had paſſed the Panaro to the attack. This victory did not ſatisfy the court of Vienna. Marſhal Traun had not done enough; battles were required which ſhould produce the greateſt effects. The marſhal was judged as Apollo was by Midas; he however was the firſt of their generals who had been victorious over their enemies. The houſe of Auſtria began to regain provinces loſt, and ſecure thoſe which were threatened; but this did not prevent its being oppreſſed by the weight of the war, under which perhaps it would have ſunken, had not the good will of its allies revived with the firſt glimmerings of proſperity. The king of England ſhewed marks of the utmoſt zeal for the ſupport of the queen of Hungary. One of the principal motives which occaſioned him to act thus was the inveterate hatred in which he held France. In his youth he had ſerved againſt that nation at the battle of Oudenard; he charged at the head of a Hanoverian ſquadron, and gave very diſtinguiſhed tokens of valour. He was ambitious of heading armies, that he might

might participate the glory of heroes: occaſion now preſented itſelf; he had troops in Flanders, and thus, declaring for the queen and paſſing the ſea, no perſon could diſpute with him the command of his forces. What was more, he found means to augment his Hanoverian treaſury by the ſubſidies which his Engliſh ſubjects paid him for his Hanoverian troops. War was neceſſary to lord Carteret, that he might maintain himſelf in the good opinion of his ſovereign, and in that of the Engliſh nation. The commerce of theſe iſlanders had found impediments ſince they had been at war with Spain; in order to bring this conteſt of commerce to a deciſion, ſome great ſtroke was neceſſary by land, and in Europe. France was ſaid to be half ruined by the efforts ſhe had made in ſupport of Bavaria and Bohemia; ſhe was allied to Spain, and by enfeebling one of theſe powers the other would be enfeebled. The French therefore muſt be vanquiſhed, either in Germany or in Flanders, in order to gain a ſuperiority by ſea, which might produce real advantages to the trade of England. The king, his miniſter, and the nation, all concurring to effect the ſame end, though from different views, it was determined to ſend thoſe Engliſh, Hanoverian, and Heſſian troops, that were then in Flanders,

Flanders, into the heart of Germany. Convenient as this project was to the king of England, it was equally inconvenient to the king of Pruſſia; he was obliged not to loſe ſight of that political equilibrium, which during the war it was his intereſt to maintain, between the belligerent powers. Should the houſe of Auſtria gain a deciſive ſuperiority in the empire over the houſe of Bavaria, Pruſſia would loſe the influence it had in general affairs; therefore the king of England and the queen of Hungary, blinded by the ſucceſs which they well might expect, muſt be prevented from dethroning the emperor. Remonſtrance was the only means which ſuited the king of Pruſſia; and making uſe of thoſe arguments which a German prince might properly employ, who ſhould be zealous for his country, and the liberty of the Germanic body, he conjured the king of England, unleſs he had moſt important reaſons, not to render the empire the theatre of that war which was ready to burſt out; and to recollect that no member of the Germanic body was permitted, without the ſanction of the diet, to introduce foreign forces into his country. This was all the king was able to perform, under the circumſtances in which he was: he could not depend upon France, having rendered her indiſpoſed toward him

him by the peace of Breſlau; he could not break with the Engliſh, who were the ſole guarantees he had for the conſervation of that peace; things were not yet at that extremity which ſhould require him again to plunge his ſtates in a new war; he therefore could do no more than content himſelf with the promiſe of the king of England, who engaged to undertake nothing againſt either the dignity of the emperor, or his patrimonial provinces.

Not with the Engliſh alone did he negotiate; another treaty was attempted by the king at Peterſburgh, concerning matters which intereſted him more directly. This was to obtain from the empreſs of Ruſſia her guarantee of the treaty of Breſlau. Here he was oppoſed by the Engliſh and Auſtrians with all their powers, though not avowedly. The two Beſtuchefs, brothers and miniſters of the empreſs, found means, by the difficulties to which they themſelves gave birth, continually to put off the concluſion of that buſineſs. The queen of Hungary held the ceſſion ſhe had made of Sileſia to be an act of conſtraint, from which ſhe might appeal, when time ſhould ſerve, by accuſing neceſſity as having forced her, from the rigorous circumſtances in which ſhe then was, to accede to this ceſſion. The Engliſh were deſirous of depriving the king

of all support, that they might make him entirely their dependent. However princes may endeavour to conceal views like these, it is very difficult to render them impenetrable.

About this time the peace of Fredericsham was ratified between Russia and Sweden; the loss of a barren part of Finland was the least evil of which Sweden had to complain. The despotism exercised by the Russians at Stockholm was the very excess of national disgrace. A subject of the empress was considered, in Sweden, as a Roman senator in the time of Cæsar would have been in Gaul. An unfortunate nation never wants enemies. The Danes were desirous of profiting by the calamities of Sweden. The diet of Stockholm had assembled to ratify the peace so lately concluded with Russia, and to nominate a successor to the throne. The king of Denmark, with a design of uniting the three crowns of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway on the head of his son the prince royal, excited a rebellion in the province of Carelia, raised the clergy, and corrupted some citizens; but the execution of the plan was attended with so many difficulties, that it was abortive before it took birth. The Danish and Swedish troops were assembled on the frontiers; the diet of Stockholm eagerly sought for aid, and requested

the interpoſition of the king of Pruſſia, that he might effect an accommodation between his neighbours. The king intereſted himſelf in their behalf; and the king of Denmark replied that, out of reſpect to his exhortations, he would not be too precipitate. What will ſeem almoſt incredible is that theſe ſame Swedes, who had ſo lately made ſuch a diſhonourable peace with Ruſſia, implored the protection of the empreſs againſt the Danes! Elizabeth granted their requeſt, and ſent general Keith, with gallies containing ten thouſand men, to their relief. It was then that by the aid of theſe troops the prince of Holſtein, biſhop of Lubec, was elected inſtead of the Daniſh prince to be the ſucceſſor of the old king of Sweden, landgrave of Heſſe. Thus, almoſt in the courſe of the ſame year, Sweden was vanquiſhed, protected, and finally beſtowed upon the prince of Holſtein, by the empreſs of Ruſſia. The ſenate of Stockholm conſoled itſelf for ſo many misfortunes by the exerciſe of cruelties. Generals Buddenbrock and Löwenhaupt periſhed upon the ſcaffold. Perfidy and treachery were laid to their charge, but neither was proved; they were guilty only of ignorance and exceſs of weakneſs.

But it is time to quit theſe tragical ſcenes of the north, and, turning ſouthward, take a view

of what paſſed in Bohemia, after it had been abandoned by the French. The queen of Hungary went to Prague to receive homage from that kingdom, toward the recovery of which her fortitude had contributed as much as or more than the valour of her armies. The very day of her coronation ſhe learnt that marſhal Khevenhuller, having marched from Scharding to Braunau, had driven general Minucci, who commanded a corps of ſeven or eight thouſand imperialiſts, from the latter place. The particulars of that affair were related to us by Pruſſian officers, who ſerved that campaign among the Auſtrians as volunteers. Khevenhuller advanced toward Scharding, which is ſituated upon the Inn near the frontiers of Auſtria. His troops, leaving their winter quarters, marched thither by different routes. Notwithſtanding the precautions which that able officer took to conceal his intentions, marſhal Seckendorff was informed of them, and ſent orders to general Minucci to retire from Braunau. This general of little underſtanding neither knew how to make his retreat according to the orders of his ſuperior, nor to chooſe an advantageous poſt, where he might wait for, and reſiſt the enemy. Khevenhuller preſently came in the front of the Bavarians, which he found was not to be attacked, having a deep ravine

ravine which ſeparated the two armies; its right was ſupported by Braunau, which had been haſtily fortified during the laſt winter: but equal to the ſtrength of this ſituation in the front and on the right, was its weakneſs on the left. Khevenhuller ſaw this at the firſt glance, and detached Berlichingen at the head of a body of cavalry, who turned the imperialiſts, and, taking a private road, fell upon the weak wing which was unſupported, while Nadaſti with his Huſſars attacked the forces of Minucci in front. It was not a battle; the Bavarians took to flight without thinking of defence; a part of their cavalry eſcaped into Braunau, and their infantry found refuge under the glacis of the town. Minucci, with the greateſt part of his troops and the town of Braunau, immediately ſurrendered to their conqueror; ſome remains of the cavalry took the road to Burghauſen, where the imperialiſts ſtill had a body of troops. The French, who were at Oſterhofen, did not expect the approach of the Auſtrians. Old Broglio, who commanded that army, in conjunction with marſhals Maillebois and Seckendorff, had been earneſtly entreated by the latter to be before-hand with the enemy, and to aſſemble troops before Khevenhuller could undertake any enterprize, but in vain. Broglio's enemies have even

even pretended, that he was not sorry to see the ill success of a war to which marshal Belleisle had most contributed. Others affirm, with more appearance of truth, that he had orders from his court to return into France and abandon Bavaria: be this as it may, his conduct seemed to authorize this latter opinion; for the court, on his return, gave no tokens of dissatisfaction. The Austrians knew how to profit by the advantage they had of being united in a body, and acting against separate corps. The prince of Lorrain arrived in the camp, and immediately dislodged the French from Deckendorff; all gave way before him, and the French troops, as he approached, continually received orders to retire. Some considerable rivers, the sources of which are in the province of Tyrole, and which, traversing Bavaria, empty themselves into the Danube, gave those generals who wished to defend themselves an opportunity of disputing the passage; but prince Charles passed them unresisted. Broglio decamped from Straubingen, where he had a large magazine, leaving behind him a feeble garrison, which was sacrificed to the enemy. A succour of ten thousand French had already arrived to join him at Donawerth; these became the companions of his flight; and, in despite of the most

earneſt remonſtrances of Seckendorff, the French abandoned him, and did not halt till they came to Straſbourg, where marſhal de Broglio gave a ball the very day of his arrival, apparently to celebrate the brilliant campaign which he had juſt concluded. The unfortunate Seckendorff employed himſelf in aſſembling the remains of his imperialiſts, who had behaved ſo ill at Braunau, and joining them to the corps which was at Burghauſen, haſtily retired thence toward Munich, which he forſook to join the French army; but, being aſſured that theſe troops determined to re-paſs the Rhine, he wrote to inform marſhal Broglio that, as the French abandoned the emperor, the emperor ſaw himſelf obliged to abandon them, and ſeek for ſafety where it could be found. He immediately requeſted prince Charles of Lorrain and marſhal Khevenhuller to agree to a ſuſpenſion of arms, and obtained ſomething equivalent, for the Auſtrians promiſed him not to moleſt the Imperial troops ſo long as they ſhould occupy a neutral territory in the empire. Blinded by their ſucceſs, the Auſtrians deſpiſed theſe troops too much to wiſh to diſarm them. They flew toward the Rhine, inflated by the chimerical hope of re-conquering Lorrain. Proſperity in war is often more dangerous than misfortune; ſome it inſpires

inſpires with too much ſecurity, and others with too much temerity. The greateſt general in the world would be one who, under various fortunes, ſhould preſerve an equal mind, and who never ſhould ſeparate activity from prudence. While prince Charles of Lorrain was journeying toward the Rhine, Germany was over-run by a new foreign army, which, under the pretence of protecting it, concurred in its ruin. The king of England had ſent his Hanoverian and Engliſh troops toward the Lower Rhine, under the command of lord Stair. George paſſed the ſea himſelf and came to Hanover, to put himſelf afterward at the head of his army. Lord Stair, who was at Höchſt, riſked the paſſage of the Maine. The French, who were watching him, ſoon obliged him to return to his former poſition. This ſchool-boy conduct made the king of England apprehenſive that his general, whoſe temperament was too hot, might commit ſome greater imprudence, and he haſtened to take upon himſelf the command of his forces. His army conſiſted of ſeventeen thouſand Engliſh, ſixteen thouſand Hanoverians, and ten thouſand Auſtrians, amounting in all to forty-three thouſand men. Some Hanoverian regiments and ſix thouſand Heſſians were likewiſe on their march to join

them. Lord Stair had acted with ſo little prudence that his men wanted bread, and his horſes forage: to remedy this inconvenience, the king marched and encamped near Aſchaffenbourg; but this means was inſufficient to repair the negligence they had been guilty of, in not collecting ſufficient provender: the Rhine might have afforded ſupplies, and the king, by marching further from that river, found himſelf more ſtraitened than by the Maine and the French, who guarded the oppoſite ſhore, and by the barren mountains of Speſhard which lay in his rear. He perceived his fault but too ſoon; marſhal Noailles could ſtarve the Engliſh monarch in his camp; and, as he foreſaw he could not long there remain, Noailles conceived a deſign worthy of the greateſt commander. He took Dettingen, and threw two bridges over the Maine, by the ſide of which he cauſed fords to be prepared for his cavalry: all theſe things were executed without their coming to the knowledge of the king of England; they were the prelude to the battle which ſoon was to be fought. To obtain a more preciſe idea, it is neceſſary to know that the Engliſh army, famiſhed near the ſources of the Maine, could only find ſubſiſtence by taking the road to Hanau; its left extended on the banks

banks of the Maine, where it leaves the hills, and croſſed the ſmall plain of Dettingen. Marſhal Noailles conſequently had a detachment ready to ſeize on Aſchaffenbourg the moment it ſhould be vacated by the Engliſh. Along the Maine he had erected maſked batteries, the very mouths of which the columns of the allied army muſt face on their march. The chief of his army was to paſs the Maine, and draw up behind a rivulet which runs from the Speſhard-hills, and falls into the Maine. Theſe troops were preciſely to intercept the road to Hanau. At this paſs then the king of England was to meet with an army in front and batteries in flank. Had marſhal Noailles exactly followed the project he had ſo wiſely conceived, the king of England muſt have been forced either to attack the French army in a moſt advantageous poſt, to open the road to Hanau ſword in hand, or to retire into the deſerts of Speſhard, which muſt infallibly have made him diſband his troops for want of ſubſiſtence. Hunger drove the Engliſh from Aſchaffenbourg, as Noailles had foreſeen. The troops which had been encamped in corps did not march by columns, but followed at ſtated diſtances, firſt the Hanoverians, then the Engliſh, and laſtly the Auſtrians. The king was in his coach near

his Hanoverian troops, when he was informed that his van-guard was attacked by a heavy body of French cavalry, and ſoon after that the whole French army had paſſed the Maine, and, to oppoſe him, had formed itſelf in order of battle. The king mounted his horſe, that he might examine for himſelf: the French began their cannonade; his horſe took fright, and was running away with him into the midſt of his enemies, had he not been ſtopped by the activity of a groom. George diſmounted and fought on foot at the head of one of his Engliſh battalions. The troops had a ſmall copſe to paſs, which gave them time to advertiſe the other corps of the danger with which they were threatened. The duke of Aremberg and general Neuperg haſtened, with their Auſtrians, to form their army in front of the French, as well as circumſtances would permit; the field of battle, not having more than twelve hundred paces in front, obliged the allies to arrange themſelves in ſeven or eight lines. The French did not ſuffer them tranquilly to finiſh this diſpoſition; they were attacked by the royal houſehold troops, who pierced through four lines of cavalry, overthrew all they encountered, and enacted prodigies of valour: they would perhaps have carried off the honours of the day, had they

not

not continually found new lines to encounter. Theſe reiterated attacks having thrown them into diſorder, the Auſtrian regiment of Stirhein, perceiving it, made them retreat in their turn. This would not have made the French loſe the battle: we muſt attribute the true cauſe of this loſs to the imprudent motion of the duke de Grammont and the count de Harcourt. They were on the right of the army with the brigade of the French guards, and, without receiving orders ſo to do, thought proper to take the left of the allies in flank, which was toward the Maine. By this manœuvre they prevented their own batteries from playing, which were on the other ſide of the Maine, and which greatly incommoded the allies. The French guards did not ſtand the firſt diſcharge of the Auſtrians, but took to flight in a ſhameful manner, and threw themſelves into the Maine, where ſome of them were drowned, and others carried diſcouragement and terror through the remainder of the army. It was with great difficulty that prince Louis of Brunſwick, who ſerved in the Auſtrian troops, could perſuade the king of England to ſuffer the Engliſh to advance. It was they however who decided the retreat of the French, and drove them to repaſs the Maine. The French, with their uſual

pleaſantry, called this action the battle of broken ſtaffs, becauſe Grammont and Harcourt had made their attack entirely with the hope of obtaining the ſtaff of marſhal, as a recompenſe due to their valour. They alſo named the French guards the ducks of the Maine, and a ſword was hung up at the Hotel de Noailles, with the before-mentioned inſcription, THOU SHALT DO NO MURDER. This marſhal, no doubt, ought not to have continued at his battery beyond the Maine. Had he been preſent at the army, he never would have permitted that unſeaſonable attack of the French guards; and had the troops remained in their poſts, they never could have been diſlodged by the allies. The king of England by this victory gained nothing but ſubſiſtence for his forces. The cannon of the Hanoverians was well ſerved. Some of their regiments, as well as ſome Auſtrian regiments, eſpecially that of Stirhein, diſtinguiſhed themſelves. Neuperg had the greateſt ſhare in the victory, and was well ſeconded by prince Louis of Brunſwick. I know an officer who was on the ground where the king of England ſtood during the battle, at the head of his Hanoverian battalion, with his left foot behind his right, his ſword in his hand, and his arm extended, nearly in the ſame attitude as a fencing

ing maſter would put himſelf, when he was preparing to make a lunge in quarte. He gave marks of bravery, but no orders that related to the battle. The duke of Cumberland fought at the head of the Engliſh guards, and gained admiration for his courage and humanity. Though wounded himſelf, he inſiſted that the ſurgeon ſhould firſt dreſs a French priſoner who was full of gaſhes. The allies never dreamt of purſuing the French; their great care was to gain ſubſiſtence from their magazine at Hanau. The victor, after having ſupped on the field of battle, immediately continued his march that he might approach his proviſions. A very extraordinary circumſtance was that, after the battle had been won, lord Stair wrote a note to marſhal de Noailles, intreating him to take care of the wounded, left on the field which the conquerors abandoned. As the allies all wore green ribbons in their hats, a laurel branch was faſtened on the hat of the king, which he without ſcruple wore. Theſe are wretched trifles, but they paint men.

This victory did not give the king of Pruſſia ſo much pleaſure as it had given to the king of England. It was to be feared that the French miniſtry, who had little fortitude, and were diſ-

couraged

couraged by a continuation of ill ſucceſs, would ſacrifice the glory of Louis XV. and the intereſt of the emperor, to extricate themſelves from difficulties which were continually taking birth, and by which they were ſurrounded. That he might diſcover the intentions of the allies, the king ſent young Finck, under the pretence of congratulating the king of England on his victory, but in reality to watch the conduct of lord Carteret, and diſcover any negotiations which might be carried on in the camp. The prince of Heſſe, William, brother of the king of Sweden, was very well diſpoſed toward the intereſts of the emperor. He was inſtrumental in remitting to lord Carteret ſome propoſitions of accommodation, which ſhould tend to reconcile Bavaria and Auſtria; but the Engliſhman was not ſufficiently cunning to diſſemble his real inclinations, and it was perceived that he did not wiſh any accommodation, that his maſter was for war, that the queen of Hungary deſired the Imperial throne for her huſband, and that they both were alike deſirous of ruining Bavaria. The king of England ſoon renounced the character he had aſſumed of protector of the empire. A borrowed part is difficult to ſuſtain, and men act beſt when they act naturally He haughtily refuſed granting indemnification to various

rious princes, which had been demanded for the ſpoils committed by his troops in their ſtates: he would not even pay for the proviſions and forage which theſe princes had delivered. He employed a ſingular expreſſion in a paper which he cauſed to be printed to elude theſe gratifications. "It is the leaſt," ſaid he, "the princes "of the empire can do to maintain the army of "their deliverer and their ſaviour. However, "he ſhould think proper to reimburſe theſe "ſtates according to their future conduct." By this haughtineſs he completely alienated their affections. The moſt deſpotic monarch does not expreſs himſelf in more imperious terms. The king acted from intereſt, and Carteret was violent. Characters like theſe ſeldom make uſe of moderate expreſſions.

While all this was paſſing upon the Maine, prince Charles of Lorrain purſued the French to the banks of the Rhine. His army was divided into three columns; and, while it advanced toward the frontiers of Alſatia, he and marſhal Khevenhuller repaired to the Engliſh army; this they could the more eaſily do, becauſe marſhal de Noailles had repaſſed the Rhine at Oppenhein. The king of England wiſhed to form a plan by which the two armies ſhould mutually be ſo well regulated that their motions ſhould

all

all tend to the ſame purpoſe, which was, according to the project they had agreed on, to recover Lorrain. For this end, the king of England was to paſs the Rhine at Mayence, and to march directly into Alſatia, that he might facilitate the paſſage of the Rhine at Baſil for prince Charles of Lorrain; then to take Lorrain, and afterward to diſtribute the victorious troops in winter quarters through Burgundy and Champaigne. Deſigns like theſe were vaſt, but the execution of them ill correſponded with their grandeur. The king of England, finding no impediment, paſſed the Rhine at Mayence, and proceeded toward Worms. Prince Charles, leſs fortunate, cauſed ſome troops to paſs on an iſland of the Rhine, and ſome Hungarians to the other ſide: the latter were driven back with loſs, the iſland of the Rhine was abandoned, and this prince languidly remained in Briſgau to the end of that campaign, the commencement of which had been ſo brilliant.

The camp at Worms, by the inactivity of the troops, became the centre of negotiations. The French employed every kind of means to diſcover the temper of the allies; they made ſeveral overtures to lord Carteret, and ventured ſome propoſitions, that they might ſound the ſhore, and find on what conditions peace was to be obtained.

obtained. The intentions of the king of England went much beyond any thing that France could offer with propriety. George, who knew that the king of Pruſſia was informed of theſe conferences, and wiſhed to delude him by taking advantage of the preſent circumſtances, communicated to him a plan of pacification, in which France offered to aſſiſt the queen of Hungary in recovering Sileſia, on condition that ſhe would acknowledge the emperor, and put him in peaceable poſſeſſion of Bavaria. Lord Hyndford made a journey into Sileſia, where the king then was, to communicate this intelligence; but this wore an air of ſuch haſte that, inſtead of convincing the king of the truth of what was told, he was led to ſuſpect that ſuch propoſitions on the part of France were falſe and forged. The diſpoſition of the king of England toward Pruſſia was too well known, and his evil intentions were manifeſt in his conduct to count Finck. All this confirmed the king in the opinion that this friendly communication was a ſnare ſpread for him by the political craft of Carteret. He notwithſtanding aſſured lord Hyndford that he was exceedingly ſenſible of the tokens of friendſhip which the king of England teſtified for him on this occaſion, but that, depending on the good faith of the queen of Hungary,

Hungary, on the wiſdom of king George, and on the guarantee itſelf, he was certain that theſe two powers would never enter into views ſo oppoſite to their engagements, and the accompliſhment of which might be more difficult than was ſuſpected. The Engliſh miniſter was unprepared to receive an anſwer like this, and ſcarcely could prevent his diſcontent from being viſible on his countenance. But what appearance was there that the king of France would have recourſe to an expedient ſo ridiculous to obtain peace from the empreſs queen, as that of plunging himſelf in a new war, and becoming the inſtrument of the grandeur of the houſe of Auſtria, which every permanent intereſt of his own kingdom obliged him to oppoſe? Was it not more natural to imagine that this was a fable invented by lord Carteret, purpoſely to incite the king of Pruſſia againſt France? Might not Carteret thus reaſon: the King of Pruſſia is paſſionate, and eaſily takes fire; a propoſition like that which we have ſent him will tranſport him with anger; lord Hyndford will eaſily profit by this ſo far to increaſe his vexation as to induce him to declare againſt France, in which caſe we ſhall have purchaſed his aſſiſtance at an eaſy rate.

It muſt nevertheleſs be allowed that the information

formation given by lord Hyndford was ſupported by circumſtances ſo ſpecious that they merited to be examined before they were wholly rejected: they were as follow.—A certain emiſſary of France, named Hertzel, had come to the elector of Mayence, to inſinuate certain propoſitions to this prince, which he wiſhed might be known to the Engliſh. The intrigues of the Auſtrians had cauſed the count of Oſtein to be choſen elector of Mayence, inſtead of Schönborn, who had crowned Charles VII. Oſtein was the creature of the Auſtrians, and likewiſe was in the pay of the Engliſh, to whom he had ſold himſelf without reſerve. Count Finck was ſent to Mayence to ſearch into the fact, and every effort was made in France in order to penetrate and arrive at the truth. This was all loſt labour; perhaps Hertzel had himſelf made the propoſitions which gave birth to this ſtory on his own authority. It was a chaos of treachery, and another Œdipus was requiſite to reſolve the enigma.

A more important negotiation began at this time to be formed: the court of Verſailles propoſed to engage the king of Sardinia to take part in the intereſts of France and Spain. A proviſional treaty indeed ſubſiſted between Charles Emanuel and Maria Thereſa, but it

was in ſuch ambiguous and general terms that it might without ill faith be broken. The negotiation of the French was in a fortunate train at Turin, and might have been concluded, had not the French and Spaniards inſiſted too much in bargaining concerning trifles. Lord Carteret was informed of what was tranſacting at Turin, and he did not thus bargain. His offers at the expence of the Auſtrians ſurpaſſed thoſe of France, and he was ſucceſsful with the king of Sardinia. By this treaty the queen of Hungary ceded to the latter the diſtrict of Vegevano, the Tortoneſe, and a part of the dutchy of Parma; while the king of Sardinia guaranteed whatever ſhe poſſeſſed in Italy, which poſſeſſions he engaged to defend with all his forces. This treaty was made and concluded at Worms. The court of Vienna was outrageous at the ceſſions which the Engliſh continually obliged it to make, and looked on the Engliſh as very ſtrange guarantees of the Pragmatic ſanction, on which they were inceſſantly making infractions. The king of Pruſſia thought this diſpoſition favourable toward inſpiring the Auſtrians with more pacific ſentiments. He cauſed it to be repreſented to them that the part they were acting in Europe was ill ſuited to their intereſts, that if the emperor was but the puppet

puppet of Louis XV. they alſo had the character of being the puppets of George II. and that peace was the only means to reſcue them from the tutelage of England. Such repreſentations piqued them the more becauſe that they were founded in fact. This, however, did not prevent the hope they entertained of conquering Lorraine, which induced them to purſue their meaſures.

The king of Pruſſia wiſhed for peace; he preached moderation to all the belligerent powers, endeavoured to ſoften ſome, and to bridle others. It was not eaſy to prevent oil being thrown in the fire, but at length it muſt be extinguiſhed for want of fuel. The beſt intentions are not always ſucceſsful. The guineas of England began to put the republic of Holland in a fermentation. The Orange party was for war, the true republicans for peace. The power of gold at length was ſuperior to all the eloquence of the beſt citizens, and the United Provinces eſpouſed the intereſt of the queen of Hungary, which was foreign to themſelves, and the deſigns of Carteret, of which they were ignorant. They ſent * twenty thouſand men to reinforce the army of Worms; about fourteen thouſand of whom joined it, and the reſt diſbanded themſelves.

* In Auguſt.

Marſhal de Noailles, after having paſſed a part of the campaign behind the Speyerbach, abandoned that poſition to approach Landau; where he was ready to join marſhal de Coigni, who had taken the command of the troops of old de Broglio, in caſe prince Charles of Lorraine ſhould force the paſſage of the Rhine, and penetrate into Alſatia. King George followed the French as far as the Speyerbach, where he ended the campaign, after having razed the lines which the French had formed on its banks. He returned to Hanover, and the troops went into quarters in Brabant, and the biſhopric of Munſter. During his reſidence at Hanover, the king married his daughter Maria to the prince royal of Denmark; after which he began his journey for London, there in a pompous harangue to make a recital of his exploits to his parliament.

To convince ourſelves how inconſequent are the actions of men, we have only to analyze this campaign. An army is aſſembled on the Maine without ſubſiſtence being provided; hunger and ſurpriſe oblige the allies to give battle; they vanquiſh the French, paſs the Rhine, and proceed to Worms; they are ſtopped by the Speyerbach, without finding any expedients to diſlodge their enemies; afterward they advance along the

the Speyerbach, which is abandoned to them by de Noailles; and they receive ſuccours from the Dutch, only to retire into winter quarters in Brabant and Weſtphalia. In the whole of this conduct, there is nothing conſiſtent: it reſembles the operations of a chymiſt, who, in ſearch of the philoſopher's ſtone, diſcovers a colour of which he ſtood in no need. It is not intentionally to criticiſe the conduct of the king of England that we make theſe reflections, for many other generals have acted in like manner: it is ſolely to convince our readers, that men are not ſo rational as they wiſh to believe themſelves.

The ſmall ſucceſs attendant on the Auſtrians and Engliſh, during the campaign of 1743, gave the French time to conſider, and to take neceſſary meaſures. It was true, they had loſt Bavaria; but their ſelf-love was flattered by having prevented their enemies from paſſing the Rhine, and penetrating into Alſatia. Though fortune had often changed ſides in this war, intereſt had as often changed the politics of monarchs. We have ſaid that the king of Sardinia had ſigned the treaty of Worms: this treaty was made public at the very time when he was negotiating with France and Spain, and when the news of the concluſion of an oppoſite

treaty was hourly expected at Verſailles. The miniſtry of Louis XV. were unable to diſſemble their reſentment, which broke forth at finding ſuch marks of duplicity and contempt in the conduct of the king of Sardinia. The French ambaſſador was immediately recalled from Turin; a corps of ten thouſand French troops was ſent to join the marquis de la Mina, who commanded under don Philip in the Genoeſe river. Mina, in order to force the paſſes of Piedmont, endeavoured to penetrate by Chateau Dauphine; but he was intercepted by the king of Sardinia. He had intrenched himſelf there, and occupied two forts which are on hills to the right and left of the paſs. The Sardinians defended themſelves ſo vigorouſly there, that the French and Spaniards, repelled on all ſides, retired into Dauphiny, after having loſt ſix thouſand men in that fruitleſs expedition.

The facility which the court of Vienna had found in engaging the king of Sardinia to become her ally, perſuaded her ſhe might procure a like advantage in Ruſſia, and, by the aſſiſtance of that empire, fortify what ſhe called the good cauſe. France knew this, and ſent the marquis de la Chetardie to Peterſburg, to oppoſe the deſigns of her enemies. This ambaſſador, who by his addreſs had placed Elizabeth on the throne,

throne, ſuppoſed that during his miſſion he ſhould receive marks of gratitude from that court. He was miſtaken: he received the very reverſe. The country was in a ſtate of great commotion; ſo many ſovereigns depoſed had raiſed jealouſies among the grandees who followed their fortunes. A chief only was wanting to give rebellion birth. Thoſe powers that were ſo determined on obtaining ſuccours from Ruſſia, finding they were not to be obtained, profited by the ſeeds of diſcontent which then began to ſprout, to carry on a conſpiracy againſt the empreſs, which fortunately for that princeſs was diſcovered. In order to develop this dangerous project, it is neceſſary to recollect that the court of Vienna had, with chagrin, ſeen that cataſtrophe which dethroned prince Anthony of Brunſwick and his wife. France having taken part in that revolution was ſufficient to have rendered it odious; and the more ſo, becauſe it was to be preſumed that the empreſs Elizabeth would not forget the ſervice ſhe had received from France, and would have a predilection for that power rather than for Auſtria, eſpecially conſidering the near relationſhip of the queen of Hungary to the family dethroned. Recollections like theſe were ſufficient to induce a belief, in the Auſtrian miniſtry, that

they would do right to undertake every thing to effect the ruin of the empress of Russia. The marquis of Botta Adorno, ambassador from the queen of Hungary to Petersburg, had secret instructions to carry on this plot. He was the leaven of that court, which soured the minds of those by whom it was frequented. He excited the anger of the women, and associated with persons of every rank and every character. He added calumny to treason, by giving assurances of the protection of the king of Prussia, for those who should act in behalf of his brother-in-law and nephew, the young dethroned emperor. It was the intention of the marquis of Botta, when he employed the king's name in this plot, to engage him in a quarrel with Russia, if the conspiracy should be discovered. This it happened to be, and the knout informed the empress of Russia that Botta was its author. It was first learnt from a riotous drunken Russian, who held some treasonable conversation in one of the coffee-houses of Petersburg. He was arrested by the police; and the fear of the torture made him, and such of his accomplices as were caught, confess all they knew. Forty persons were seized at Moscow, whose depositions resembled those of the former. The countess Bestuchef had her tongue cut out; the wife

wife of one Beſtuchef, the miniſter's brother, was ſent into Siberia; and a great number of perſons owed the ſucceeding misfortunes of their lives to the ſeductions of the marquis of Botta.

This miniſter had taken the precaution to procure his own removal, by the appointment of another miniſter, before the conſpiracy broke forth, that he might not expoſe his perſon and his character if it ſhould happen to fail. He was in credit at the court of Berlin when the plot was diſcovered; and the king of Pruſſia having learned what had paſſed in Ruſſia, forbade him the court, and joined the empreſs of Ruſſia in demanding ſatisfaction of the queen of Hungary, inaſmuch as Botta had equally offended the empreſs and the king. The odious conduct of the marquis of Botta was in part caſt upon the court to which he belonged. Although the French had given an example of a like enterpriſe, they ought not to have been imitated by the Auſtrians. What muſt become of public ſafety, or of the ſafety of kings themſelves, if the door was thus opened to rebellion, poiſon, and aſſaſſination? What juriſprudence could authoriſe attempts like theſe? Has not the policy of nations honourable means of which it may avail itſelf? And muſt it loſe every ſentiment of probity in its intereſted views, which themſelves

are deceitful? It is lamentable that, in the eighteenth century, humanized and enlightened as it comparatively is, France and Auſtria have rendered themſelves liable to ſuch reproaches.

The queen of Hungary neither avowed nor diſavowed the act of her miniſter. The falſe conduct of the court of Vienna might furniſh that of Berlin with the means of a more intimate union with the court of Peterſburg. The king wrote to Mardefeld, his ambaſſador in Ruſſia; who, being an able negotiator, attempted to extend the treaty which ſubſiſted between the two powers. After many delays, he could obtain nothing more than a ſufficiently vague guarantee of the Pruſſian ſtates, which was conceived in terms ſo ambiguous that it was not worth the pains of procuring. Although this treaty was ineffectual, it might awe courts whoſe intentions were inimical to Pruſſia. French paſte may dazzle as effectually as a diamond. It was the count Beſtuchef who perſuaded the empreſs not to conclude a more intimate alliance with the king of Pruſſia. The marquis de la Chetardie, diſſatisfied with this miniſter, endeavoured to diſplace him, and Mardefeld was authoriſed to ſecond his endeavours; but the experience of Mardefeld could not prevail againſt the fortunate ſtar of Beſtuchef. We

reſerve

reſerve a more ample diſcuſſion of the reſult of all theſe miniſterial intrigues, at the court of Ruſſia, to another opportunity. Foreign courts as buſily plotted at Berlin; the Engliſh did not quit their project of inſenſibly engaging the king in the war they were then making on France; and the French were deſirous he ſhould come to their ſuccour, and make ſome diverſion in their favour. At this interval Voltaire arrived at Berlin: having ſome protectors at Verſailles, he imagined that was ſufficient to authorize him in aſſuming the airs of a negotiator. His lively imagination ſhot forth without reſtraint into the vaſt field of politics: he had no credentials, and his miſſion became a ſport, a ſubject of merriment. Two objects were ever preſent to Pruſſia, during the peaceful moments ſhe enjoyed: theſe were, the ſupport of the emperor, and a general peace. As the emperor had been abandoned by France, the ſole reſource that remained for his ſupport, was to form, as we have already ſaid, a league among the princes of Germany, who might raiſe the ſtandard in aid of the chief of the Germanic body. Vain attempts had already been made to inſpire the princes of Germany with theſe ſentiments. In order to make new efforts, which might determine them to undertake that

which their intereſt and glory required, the king thought proper perſonally to converſe with ſome among them. Under pretence of viſiting his ſiſters, the one margraveſs of Bareith, the other of Anſpach, he made a journey into the empire: he even went as far as Hohen-Oettingen; feigning a curioſity to ſee the remains of the Bavarian army, but really to deliberate with marſhal Seckendorff, concerning the wheels which might be ſet in motion to aid the emperor. Temptations, remonſtrances, reaſons were all ineffectual: the enthuſiaſts of the houſe of Auſtria were ready ſacrifices in her behalf; while thoſe who were attached to the emperor, were ſo intimidated by the reverſe of fortune which had overwhelmed that prince, that they imagined their poſſeſſions would be loſt the very moment they ſhould come to his ſuccour. The ducheſs dowager of Wurtemburg was then at Bareith. She demanded the reſtoration of her ſons from the king, to whom ſhe had confided the care of their education. The king thought it would be more decent for theſe princes to depart under the moſt favourable auſpices, for which purpoſe he had obtained a diſpenſation of age before the uſual time from the emperor. This was a means of attaching theſe young princes to the intereſts of

France and Bavaria. While attentive thus to politics, the king did not neglect the interior government of his ſtates: the fortifications in Sileſia advanced rapidly; the grand canal of Plauen was cut, to obtain a ſhort communication between the Elbe and the Oder; the port of Stetin had been deepened, and the clannel of the Swine rendered navigable. Silk manufactures ſprang up; the inſect which produces that precious material became a new ſource of wealth to the inhabitants of the country, and every door of induſtry was thrown open. The academy of ſciences was renewed; Euler, Lieberkuhn, Pott, Marggraf, became its ornaments; and Maupertuis, ſo famous for his knowledge, and his voyage to Lapland, its preſident.

Thus ended the year 1743. All Europe was buſied in wars and cabals, the cabinets of princes were more active than their armies; the cauſe of war was changed; its firſt end was the ſupport of the houſe of Auſtria, its next was projects of conqueſt. England began to gain an aſcendancy in the balance of power, which prognoſticated nothing but misfortune to France. The fortitude of the empreſs queen degenerated into obſtinacy, and the apparent generoſity of the king of England into a contemptible intereſt for his electorate. Ruſſia was ſtill at peace.

peace. The king of Pruſſia, ever occupied in keeping an equilibrium between the belligerent powers, hoped to obtain this purpoſe, ſometimes by amicable inſinuations, ſometimes by threats, and ſometimes even by oſtentation. But what are the projects of man? To him the future is hidden: he knows not what ſhall happen to-morrow. How may he foreſee events which a chain of ſecondary cauſes may within ſix months produce? Circumſtances often oblige him to act contrary to his intention; and, in the flux and reflux of fortune, prudence has only to conform, to act with conſiſtency, and never to loſe ſight of her ſyſtem: it is impoſſible ſhe ſhould foreſee all events.

CHAP. IX.

Negotiations of the Year 1744, *and of all which preceded the War which Pruſſia undertook againſt the Houſe of Auſtria.*

THE affairs of the emperor became more and more embroiled. Auſtrian ambition augmented with ſucceſs, there no longer were any doubts, it was their intent to dethrone the emperor. The king of England ſilently endeavoured to effect the ſame purpoſe. The feebleneſs

feebleneſs of Charles VII. and the enormous pretenſions of the queen of Hungary, announced, eſpecially to thoſe princes who were enamoured of their liberty, that they could not long remain ſpectators of a war, in which their intereſt and fame demanded they ſhould not ſuffer the ancient enemies of Germanic freedom to gain the aſcendancy. In addition to theſe general conſiderations, the king of Pruſſia had others ſtill more weighty. Neither the queen of Hungary nor the king of England had ſufficient art to conceal their evil intentions; they were manifeſt on every occaſion. Maria Thereſa complaining to king George of the ceſſions which he obliged her to make, eſpecially that of Sileſia, George replied, "Madam, that which is "good to receive is good to return." This anecdote is certain truth; the author has ſeen a copy of the letter. In fine, it was known that England and Auſtria propoſed to force France to conclude peace, in ſuch a manner as that the guarantee of Sileſia ſhould not be a part of the treaty. To this let us add the conduct of the marquis of Botta at Peterſburg; and it will evidently appear that the king of Pruſſia was not to blame to be on his guard, and even to prepare for war, if war ſhould be required by neceſſity.

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As the king had always ſuſpected the enemies with whom he had made peace, he had paid particular attention in preparing for whatever might happen. Œconomy had in ſome manner repaired the breaches of the laſt war, and ſufficient ſums had been amaſſed to ſupply, with prudence, the expences of two campaigns. The fortreſſes, indeed, were rather begun than in a ſtate of defence; but the augmentations of the army were achieved, and ammunition and proviſions were amaſſed enough for one campaign. In a word, the acquiſition of Sileſia having added new ſtrength to the ſtate, Pruſſia was capable of executing with vigour the deſigns of him by whom it was governed.

It remained for him to take ſuch meaſures as that he might have nothing to apprehend from his neighbours, and particularly to preſerve himſelf at liberty, if it ſhould be propoſed to him to act in another manner. Of all theſe neighbours, the empire of Ruſſia merited the moſt attention, as being the moſt dangerous. It is puiſſant and near. The king had leſs dread of the number of its forces than of that ſwarm of Coſſacks and Tartars, who ſet provinces on fire, and murder the inhabitants, or lead them into ſlavery: they ruin thoſe ſtates which they inundate. Evil might be returned for evil to other

other enemies; but to Ruſſia this was impoſſible, at leaſt without a conſiderable fleet, which ſhould protect and ſupply an army the efforts of which ſhould be directed againſt Peterſburg itſelf. With intent to conciliate the friendſhip of Ruſſia, the king ſet every engine in motion; he even negotiated for that purpoſe in Sweden. The empreſs at that time propoſed to marry the grand duke, her nephew, in order to obtain ſucceſſors. Although her choice was not fixed, her inclinations led her to give the preference to the princeſs Ulrica, the king's ſiſter. It was the deſign of the court of Saxony to marry the princeſs Marianne, ſecond daughter of Auguſtus, to the grand duke, that, by the favour of that alliance, credit might be obtained with the empreſs. The Ruſſian miniſter, whoſe venality would have put his royal miſtreſs up to auction, had he found any one rich enough to bid for her, ſold the Saxons a premature contract of marriage. For this the king of Poland paid, and received nothing but promiſes for his money. Nothing could be more contrary to the good of the Pruſſian ſtate than to ſuffer ſuch an alliance to be formed between Saxony and Ruſſia; yet nothing could have been more unnatural than to have ſacrificed a princeſs

of

of the blood royal to ſupplant Saxony: recourſe was had to another expedient.

Among all the marriageable princeſſes of Germany, no one better ſuited the intentions of Ruſſia, and the intereſts of Pruſſia, than the princeſs of Zerbſt. Her father was marſhal of the king's armies; and her mother princeſs of Holſtein, ſiſter of the prince ſucceſſor to the throne of Sweden, and aunt to the grand duke of Ruſſia. We ſhall not here enter into a minute detail of this negotiation: it will be ſufficient to know that more labour was neceſſary to make it take effect, than if the ſubject in queſtion had been the moſt important in the whole world. It was oppoſed by the very father of the princeſs, a Lutheran, ſuch as lived in the age of the reformation. He would not conſent to ſee his daughter become a ſchiſmatic, until a prieſt, not over rigid, had demonſtrated to him that the Greek religion and the Lutheran were much the ſame. Mardefeld ſo artfully hid all the ſprings to which he gave action, from the chancellor Beſtuchef in Ruſſia, that the princeſs of Zerbſt arrived at Peterſburg, to the utter aſtoniſhment of all Europe, and was received by the empreſs at Moſcow with evident marks of ſatisfaction and friendſhip. The road yet was not wholly ſmooth;

ſmooth; there was another impediment to remove. The youthful prince and princeſs were couſins. To vanquiſh this difficulty the popes and the biſhops were gained, and they decided that the marriage was exceedingly conformable to the laws of the Greek church. Baron Mardefeld, not ſatisfied with this firſt ſucceſs, undertook to transfer the impriſonment of the dethroned family from Riga to ſome other place of Ruſſia, and he ſucceeded. The ſafety of the empreſs required theſe perſons ſhould be more diſtant from the neighbourhood of Peterſburg. One revolution had deprived them of the ſceptre; they might regain it by another. They were taken beyond Archangel, into a place ſo barbarous that the very name of it is unknown. While we are now writing theſe memoirs, prince Anthony Ulric of Brunſwick is ſtill there.

The baron of Mardefeld, and the marquis de la Chetardie, who believed themſelves powerful after the arrival of the princeſs of Zerbſt, wiſhed to crown their undertaking by the removal of the grand chancellor, Beſtuchef, who from caprice was the enemy of France and attached to England. He was a man without genius, little able in adminiſtration, haughty from ignorance, deceitful from character, and double in his dealings even to thoſe by whom

he had been bribed. The intrigues of these ministers were of sufficient effect to separate the two brothers. The grand marshal Bestuchef was sent to Berlin, in quality of plenipotentiary from Russia; but the chancellor had taken too deep root at court, and sustained every assault they could make. Mardefeld was artful enough not to appear concerned in these factions. La Chetardie, less cautious, acted without disguise; immediately, without any regard either to his character or the services he had rendered, he was obliged hastily to quit Russia, and in a manner very little honourable.

The empress having come to a determination in her choice of the princess of Zerbst, for the spouse of the grand duke, there was the less difficulty in obtaining her consent to the marriage of Ulrica, princess of Prussia, with the new prince royal of Sweden. Prussia founded her safety on these two alliances: the princess of Prussia, in expectation of the Swedish sceptre, could not become the enemy of the king her brother; and a grand duchess of Russia, educated and maintained in the Prussian territories, and indebted to the king for her fortune, could not, without ingratitude, do him ill offices. Although a more solid alliance with Russia could not then be accomplished, nor could a

more favourable miniſter be ſubſtituted for the chancellor Beſtuchef; ſtill, however, other means were employed to open an iron heart. Such was the ſpecies of rhetoric which the baron de Mardefeld made uſe of, till the year 1745, that he might temporize with the ill will of a man ſo inimical.

The facts we have related will demonſtrate that the intrigues of the king of Pruſſia had not been entirely ſucceſsful, and that all he could obtain from the court of Ruſſia did not perfectly correſpond with his hopes. It was ſtill a great point gained, to have ſoftened for a time the evil intentions of ſo dangerous a power. He who gains time gains every thing.

Another attempt was made to form an aſſociation among the princes of the empire. The langrave of Heſſe, the duke of Wurtemburg, the elector of Cologne, and the elector palatine, might be depended upon; the biſhop of Bamberg began to waver: but their aſſiſtance muſt be bought. No money no prince in Germany. France would not conſent to pay the ſubſidies which were required, and the attempt a third time failed. It were to have been wiſhed that a good underſtanding could have been had with the court of Saxony; but here more obſtacles were met with than in any other

part. The king of Poland was diſſatisfied that the peace of Breſlau had not put him in poſſeſſion of Moravia; he wiſhed to conquer provinces with the pen. He was jealous at perceiving the houſe of Brandenbourg had acquired Sileſia, and that he had gained nothing by this war: he believed his to be the beſt founded pretenſions to the ſucceſſion of Charles VI. he envied the elector of Bavaria in his attainment of the Imperial crown, and he deteſted the French, by whom he affirmed he had been deceived. Propenſities ſo favourable did not eſcape the court of Vienna: that feminine negotiator, an old maid, named Kling, was continually at Dreſden; and ſhe acted ſo artfully on the minds of the king the queen, count ***, and the confeſſor, that ſhe induced them to reſolve on an alliance with the queen of Hungary. All obſtacles ſoon were removed; a defenſive treaty was concluded between Auſtria, England, and Saxony, the ſecret articles of which were ſigned at Warſaw. The contracting parties took good care not to make them public, but this did not prevent the king of Pruſſia from procuring a copy.

As this treaty was one of the principal cauſes of the war which the king afterward declared againſt the queen of Hungary, it will be neceſſary that we here ſhould inſert ſome articles,

which ſhall juſtify in the eyes of poſterity that war of which they were productive.

Article II. " To this effect the allies " engage themſelves anew in an expreſs " guarantee of all kingdoms, ſtates, countries, " and domains, which they now poſſeſs, *or* " *ought to poſſeſs*, in virtue of the treaty of " alliance made at Turin in 1703; of the " treaties of peace of Utrecht and Breda; " of the treaty of peace and alliance, com- " monly called the Quadruple Alliance; of the " treaty of pacification and alliance, concluded " at Vienna the 10th of March, 1731; of the " act of guarantee, granted in conſequence, " and made a law of the empire, the 11th of " February, 1732; of the act of acceſſion, in " like manner ſigned in conſequence at the " Hague the 20th of February, 1732; of the " treaty of peace ſigned at Vienna the 18th of " November, 1738, the acceſſion to which was " made and ſigned at Verſailles the 3d of " February, 1739. All which treaties are fully " referred to and confirmed here, ſo far as " they may concern the allies, and as they are " not ſpecifically departed from by the preſent " treaty."

Whoever reads this article with impartiality muſt find therein the ſeeds of an offenſive alli-

ance againſt the king of Pruſſia. The queen of Hungary has thoſe ſtates guaranteed which ſhe poſſeſſed at the time of the treaties referred to, and which ſhe afterward loſt. If that princeſs and the king of England had been upright in their intentions, ought they not to have equally referred to the treaty of Breſlau in this alliance? Strip the above article of the enigmatical ſtyle in which it is enveloped, and we there ſhall ſee a formal guarantee of the ſtates which the empreſs queen ought to poſſeſs, in conformity to the Pragmatic ſanction, and conſequently of Sileſia. But the thirteenth article of the treaty of Worms, to which the king of Poland had acceded, will even explain the means the court of Vienna meant to make uſe of, for the recovery of its loſt provinces. It is as follows:

Article XIII. "And ſo ſoon as Italy ſhall "be delivered from its enemies, and free from "any apparent danger of being again invaded, "her majeſty the queen of Hungary may not "only withdraw a part of her forces, but, ſhould "ſhe make the requiſition, the king of Sar- "dinia ſhall furniſh her with his own troops, "that ſhe may employ them for the ſecurity of "her ſtates in Lombardy, to the end that ſhe "may have the aid of a greater number of her "own troops *in Germany*. In like manner as, at "the

" the requiſition of the king of Sardinia, the " queen of Hungary ſhall ſend her troops into " the ſtates of the ſaid king, if ſo it ſhould be " neceſſary, to defend the paſſes againſt the " army of any enemy that ſhall undertake to " force them, and to deliver the ſtates of the " king of Sardinia from enemies, and put them " out of danger of being invaded anew."

The queen of Hungary then wiſhes to withdraw her forces out of Italy to employ them in Germany. Againſt whom? Againſt Saxony? She had concluded an alliance with the king of Poland, elector of that country. Againſt Bavaria? She had ſo humbled the emperor that ſhe poſſeſſed his patrimonial provinces. It therefore could only be againſt the king of Pruſſia that ſhe meditated a new war. According to the engagements entered into by the treaty of Breſlau, the king of England ought faithfully to communicate ſuch treaties as he ſhould make to the king of Pruſſia. He took good care to be ſilent concerning this treaty. The reaſon was evident. What had been planned at Worms, and had been ratified at Turin and Warſaw, was to overthrow whatever the king of England himſelf had ſtipulated to perform by the treaty of Breſlau. Theſe new alliances were communicated to the States General, and the tenor of them

was learnt at the Hague. According to the rules of good politics, the courts of Vienna and London ought not ſo ſoon to have unmaſked their intentions. Theſe courts were then in arms, combating againſt France and Spain, from Lombardy to the Rhine, and as far as Flanders. Might they not have foreſeen that, if the king of Pruſſia was not become entirely an idiot, he would not patiently wait till they ſhould have taken meaſures for his deſtruction, and that he would rather uſe his utmoſt efforts to prevent the deſigns of his enemies? It was indubitable that Pruſſia could find no ſecurity in the peace of Breſlau. Security muſt therefore be ſought elſewhere. The ſituation was critical; either the king muſt abandon himſelf to the accidents of chance, or he muſt take violent meaſures, ſubject to the greateſt viciſſitudes. Miniſters repreſented to this prince, that whoever is at preſent well ought ſo to remain, and to be ſatisfied that it is a falſe aſſertion in politics, that war is to be made, in order to be avoided; adding, that it would be wiſe to wait for the good which time ſhould bring. The king replied, they were blinded by their timidity; that it was great imprudence not early to anticipate, when we enjoy the means of guarding againſt, misfortune; that he was ſenſible by

a new

a new war he ſhould expoſe his nobility, his ſubjects, his ſtates, and his perſon, to inevitable dangers; but that the criſis required deciſion, and that the worſt part he could take would be that of not taking any.

In order to perceive at one view the reaſons the king ſuppoſed he had to declare war againſt the queen of Hungary, and the reaſons urged by his miniſters on the contrary part, we ſhall here make uſe of a memoir which he ſent them, written by himſelf, of which the following is a copy:

"To act judiciouſly, we muſt not act too "haſtily. I have well conſidered our preſent "ſituation, and here are the remarks I have "made on the conduct of my enemies, which "I have collected, the better to prove their in-"tentions. 1. Why did the queen of Hun-"gary, at the peace of Breſlau, ſo obſtinately "perſiſt in preſerving to herſelf the high moun-"tains of the Upper Sileſia, which are of ſuch "ſmall worth? Intereſt certainly was not the "reaſon. I perceive another. It was, by the "poſſeſſion of theſe mountains, to preſerve ad-"vantageous paſſes, of which ſhe might aſſure "herſelf whenever ſhe ſhould think proper. "2. What reaſons had the Auſtrians and Eng-"liſh clandeſtinely to oppoſe the guarantee

"of

" of the treaty of Breſlau, which Mardefeld en-
" deavoured to obtain at Peterſburg, if it were
" not that ſuch a guarantee would have pre-
" vented theſe powers from breaking the treaty.
" To this I am anſwered, that the politics of
" the Engliſh are ſimple; that they wiſh to de-
" prive me of all other ſupport, to the end that,
" having no guarantee but that which they ſhall
" grant, I may entirely become their depen-
" dent. I will venture then to aſk the mini-
" ſters, if we admit that the Engliſh ſhould
" have either of theſe intentions, are they fa-
" vourable or unfavourable? 3. Why is not
" lord Carteret in greater haſte to terminate tri-
" fling differences that exiſt, relative to ſome liti-
" gated frontiers, between the country of Minden
" and that of Hanover, to a toll of the Hano-
" verians on the Elbe, and to the bailiwicks
" which are mortgaged to us in Mecklenburgh?
" It is that he has little wiſh to eſtabliſh a per-
" fect harmony between the two courts. Count
" Podewils ſuppoſes that the houſe of Hano-
" ver has an equal intereſt with that of Bran-
" denbourg to terminate theſe differences.
" Wherefore then are they not terminated? But
" the king of England deſires to invade Meck-
" lenburgh, Paderborn, Oſnabruck, and the
" biſhopric of Hildeſheim; and he perceives that
" ſuch

" ſuch views of aggrandizement are incompatible
" with any ſtrict connexion between Pruſſia and
" England. 4. Are the promiſes of a prince
" who fails in his engagements to be depended
" upon? When the king of England aſſembled
" his army on the Rhine, in the year 1743,
" he promiſed not to undertake any thing
" either againſt the hereditary ſtates of the em-
" peror or his dignity; and, at preſent, con-
" jointly with the queen of Hungary, he is tak-
" ing meaſures to oblige him to abdicate. 5.
" Do you recollect the intrigues of the marquis
" of Botta, at the court of Peterſburg; and did
" they not tend to reſtore the baniſhed family
" to the crown? Why did they ſo? Becauſe he
" knew the empreſs Elizabeth was in our in-
" tereſts, and expected that prince Anthony,
" being indebted to the court of Vienna for the
" reſtoration of his family, would forever be-
" come devoted to it, and would participate
" its hatred for every thing that is Pruſſian. To
" what purpoſe did he make uſe of my name,
" in that abominable conſpiracy, if it were not
" to embroil me with the empreſs, ſhould his
" plot happen to be diſcovered? That, ſay you,
" was the effect of the love of the queen of
" Hungary for her relations. Alas! find me
" the ſovereign who pays any reſpect to ties of
" blood.

" blood. 6. You believe the guarantee which " the king of England has granted to the treaty " of Breſlau ought not to be contemned. I " anſwer that all guarantees are, like works in " fillagre, rather proper to pleaſe the eye than " to become uſeful. 7. But I give up all that " I have hitherto ſaid. Can you poſſibly put " any good conſtruction on the treaty of Worms, " and on that of Warſaw? The miniſterial lan- " guage of the Auſtrians is that Italy alone is " the object of this treaty. Read the two articles " which I have cited, and you will clearly per- " ceive they relate to Germany in general, and " that theſe articles have me particularly in view. " 8. The alliance with Saxony is ſtill leſs inno- " cent; it affords a paſſage and aid to the Au- " ſtrians to attack me in my own provinces. " You maintain this alliance is only made to " procure reciprocal preſents, for the miniſters " who are at the head of affairs, in theſe two " courts. This I own was an anſwer I did not " expect. I muſt confeſs you have very tran- " ſcendant underſtandings. 9. Here is another " queſtion. Shall we wait till the queen of " Hungary is free from all embarraſſment; till " ſhe has made peace with France, and has " obliged the emperor to abdicate? I repeat, " ſhall we wait till ſhe can employ her whole

" forces,

" forces, thoſe of Saxony, and the money of
" England, to attack us, with all theſe advan-
" tages, at the very moment when we ſhall be
" deſtitute of allies, and when we ſhall have
" no other reſources than thoſe of our own
" troops? You aſſert that the queen of Hun-
" gary cannot terminate the war in a ſingle
" campaign; that her provinces are ruined;
" her revenues ten years in arrear; and that
" ſhe will not feel how much ſhe herſelf is ex-
" hauſted, till after the peace. I anſwer that
" every body is not of the opinion that her
" finances are ſo much exhauſted as you ſuppoſe.
" Vaſt provinces furniſh vaſt ſupplies. Let it
" be remembered that, at the concluſion of
" the war of ſucceſſion, a war which had en-
" gulphed mints of money, the emperor Charles
" VI. ſingly ſuſtained one campaign againſt
" the French, without foreign ſubſidies, after
" queen Anne had concluded a ſeparate peace
" at Utrecht. Muſt we wait till Hannibal is at
" our gates, before we ſhall declare againſt
" him? Remember count Zinzendorff, in the
" year 1733, betted that the French would not
" paſs the Rhine, at the time that they had actu-
" ally bombarded and taken Kehl. Security adds
" that, when the late king acquired the ulterior
" Pomerania, it was generally imagined Swe-
" den

" den would ſoon or late revive its claims on
" that province, and yet that no ſuch claims
" have been revived. The compariſon is de-
" ceitful, and ſuch reaſoning deſtroys itſelf.
" How can any parallel be drawn between a
" ruined, exhauſted and diſmembered king-
" dom, like that of Sweden, and the puiſſant
" houſe of Auſtria; which, far from having
" ſuffered loſs, actually meditates conqueſt?
" The pertinacious partizans of the queen of
" Hungary affirm that, there is no example
" of the houſe of Auſtria's having begun
" a war for the recovery of loſt provinces.
" Such affirmations muſt be made only to
" the ignorant. Did not that houſe endeavour
" to re-conquer Switzerland? How many wars
" has it undertaken to render Hungary heredi-
" tary? And what was the war which Fer-
" dinand II. made to drive the elector palatine
" Frederic V. out of Bohemia, of which he
" had been elected king by the ſuffrages of
" the people? Was not that a bloody war
" which the houſe of Auſtria made on Bethlem
" Gabor, to wreſt from him Tranſilvania?
" In fine, what is it at preſent that excites the
" queen of Hungary to preſs the French with
" ſo much ardour, if not the hope of re-con-
" quering Alſatia, Lorraine, and of dethroning

" the

" the emperor? Would they reaſon rationally
" at Vienna, ſhould they ſay, it is impoſſible
" that the king of Pruſſia ſhould attack us, for
" none of his anceſtors ever made war upon
" us? Let us not deceive ourſelves. Examples
" drawn from the paſt, even were they true,
" would prove nothing concerning the future.
" The following aſſertion is much more cer-
" tain: Whatever is poſſible may come to
" paſs. 10. To ſtrengthen all theſe arguments
" by more palpable proofs, I need but recal to
" mind what was ſaid by the Auſtrian general,
" Molé, when he paſſed through Bérlin, to
" Mr. von Schmettau. My court is not ſo ill
" informed as to attack Sileſia. We are in
" alliance with the court of Dreſden; the road
" through Luſatia leads more immediately to
" Berlin; it will be moſt agreeable to us there
" to conclude the peace. You ſay Molé ſpoke
" at a venture; but hear what confirms the
" ſuppoſition that the court of Vienna intend-
" ed to make this peace at Berlin. Prince Louis
" of Brunſwick had heard the ſame plan men-
" tioned by the queen of Hungary, in whoſe
" ſervice he was. This he told in confidence
" to his brother, the reigning duke; and the
" latter communicated the fact to me. An
" avowal from the mouth of an enemy is equal

" to

" to demonſtration. My concluſion is that " we have nothing to gain by waiting, but " every thing to loſe; that war therefore muſt " be made, and that it will be better if ſo it " ſhould be, to periſh with honour than to be " overwhelmed with ſhame, when we no " longer have the means of defence."

The king however acted not precipitately. It was not yet time to declare himſelf; he waited a more favourable conjuncture, that he might gain every poſſible advantage. At this period the emperor, believing his affairs deſperate, ſent the count of Seckendorff to Berlin, to obtain the ſupport of the king of Pruſſia. Seckendorff imagined he had power enough to oblige Saxony to change ſides. He affirmed the French would act vigorouſly, and that their intentions were ſincere. He preſſed the king very much to declare himſelf, but the moment was not yet propitious, and he received an anſwer to the following purport.

I. " Before he would act in concert with the " emperor and France, his majeſty previouſly " required that the alliance between himſelf, " Ruſſia, and Sweden ſhould be concluded. " II. That Sweden ſhould promiſe to make a " diverſion in the province of Bremen, at the " ſame time that a French army ſhould attack " Hanover.

" Hanover. III. France ſhould engage to act " offenſively on the Rhine, and to purſue the " Auſtrians with vigour, when the diverſion " which the king propoſed to make ſhould draw " them into Bohemia. IV. Bohemia ſhould " be diſmembered from the ſtates of the queen " of Hungary, and the king ſhould be put " into poſſeſſion of the three circles that lie " the neareſt to Sileſia. V. The allied powers " ſhould make no ſeparate peace, but ſhould " continue firmly united, to act for the pur- " poſe of lowering the new houſe of Auſtria." The article relative to conqueſt was only added to the plan at a venture, and in caſe fortune ſhould favour the enterprize. It was prudent previouſly to agree on a participation, which otherwiſe might, in the end, have cauſed diſagreement among the allies.

Theſe meaſures however were taken with great circumſpection. The king knew the effeminacy of the French in their warlike operations, and the little attachment they had ſhewn for the intereſt of their allies; neceſſity only could effect this new connexion. Preparations muſt be made againſt thoſe contrarieties which might be ſuffered on the part of England, governed by a vindictive king and an intemperate miniſter. The parliament had granted

the monarch all the ſums he had requeſted. Supported by ſo much wealth, he might raiſe land armies, and carry war to the ends of the world. Theſe premiſing propoſitions of alliance were not, however, received at Verſailles ſo favourably as might have been expected. Negotiations were nevertheleſs carried on, that this political criſis might be brought to a happy concluſion. Two pedants, the one French the other German, thought proper to form a project of aſſociation, for the circles of the empire. The firſt was the ſieur de Chavigni, and the ſecond the ſieur von Bunau. Their proceedings were encumbered with all formalities and reſtrictions, according to the laws of the empire, and the golden bull; and their dull and heavy labours were no ſooner read than forgotten. Inſtead of troubling itſelf concerning this aſſociation, the court of Verſailles, by means of ſubſidies, took the troops of Heſſe into the ſervice of the emperor. This deranged the meaſures of the king of England, who had depended upon adding them to his army. An attempt was made to diſſuade the duke of Gotha from granting his troops to the maritime powers; but this was unſucceſsful, for the duke had already received ſubſidies. There was a new miniſtry at Verſailles, that had little

conſidered the ſituation of affairs, and that therefore attributed the ſeparate peace which the king had concluded with the queen of Hungary to his levity. For this reaſon it was neceſſary to rectify the opinion of the miniſtry, on this ſubject, when he deſired to ally himſelf to France. Baron de Chambrier, who had been twenty years ambaſſador from Pruſſia to the court of Verſailles, was aged, had not ſufficient intimacy with the people in power to employ their credit with the king of France, was beſide little accuſtomed to treat on great ſubjects, and was ſcrupulouſly circumſpect. This induced the king to ſend a perſon to that court who was leſs rigid, and more active, that he might know what he had to expect. His choice fell on count Rottembourg. This count had quitted the ſervice of France in 1740 for that of Pruſſia, and had connexions of kindred with the moſt illuſtrious perſons of the court; for which reaſon he might procure intelligence which would have eſcaped any other ambaſſador, and conſequently might give the king information of the inclinations of Louis XV. his miniſters and his miſtreſſes. To ſteer the veſſel well a compaſs was neceſſary. The too great vivacity of count Rottembourg was tempered by the phlegm of the baron de Cham-

brier. They might together do the ſtate great ſervice. Accordingly count Rottembourg departed for Verſailles. He firſt inſinuated the purport of his embaſſy to the duke de Richlieu, and afterward to the dutcheſs de Chateauroux. By them he was ſent to Mr. Amelot, miniſter for foreign affairs, who was not held to be any partiſan of Pruſſia. But cardinal Tencin, marſhal Belleiſle, d'Argenſon the miniſter for the war department, Richlieu, and the king's miſtreſs, declared themſelves in favour of count Rottembourg. Thoſe articles which had been propoſed to marſhal Seckendorff ſerved as a baſis for the negotiation which was begun with France. It was principally inſiſted upon that the French army, of Alſatia, ſhould purſue the Auſtrians and recover Bavaria; and that another French army ſhould, at the ſame time, invade Weſtphalia. The king, on his part, reſerved entering into action till after the alliance between Sweden, Ruſſia and Pruſſia ſhould be concluded. This laſt article left him the liberty of being active or inactive, according as circumſtances ſhould appear to him favourable or unfavourable. He flattered himſelf the moment of rupture might ſtill be removed; but the turn which affairs in general took, and the ſucceſs of the Auſtrian armies in Alſatia,

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ſoon obliged him to declare againſt the queen of Hungary. The Pruſſian alliance was at that time the moſt advantageous event which could happen to France. Her proper intereſt demanded moſt forcibly that ſhe ſhould rouze herſelf, and facilitate theſe arrangements. But who may depend on the ſyſtem of a court governed by, and unſtable from, faction: or on the vigour and activity of troops that are commanded by timid and impotent generals? Toward the ſummer * of the ſame year, count Teſſin came to Berlin, in quality of ambaſſador from Sweden, and demanded the princeſs of Pruſſia, Ulrica, in marriage for the prince of Holſtein, who had been elected ſucceſſor to the throne of Sweden. He was attended by the flower of the nobility. He had all the qualities neceſſary for ſhew, thoſe of dignity, and even thoſe of eloquence. But his mind was frivolous and ſuperficial. The nuptials were celebrated at Berlin with magnificence†. Prince William, brother of the king, eſpouſed the princeſs by proxy. Theſe feſtivals were more magnificent than the preceding had been. A juſt medium, between frugality and profuſion, beſt becomes the ſtate of princes. But, while

* In the month of May.

† In Auguſt.

these balls and rejoicings were held at court, active preparations were making for that campaign which was soon to open.

CHAP. X.

The Campaigns of Italy, Flanders, and the Rhine; and finally the Campaign of the King.

THE campaign of Italy opened, in the month of April, by the passage of the Tanaro, and the taking of Nice and Villa-Franca. The French and Spanish generals could not agree concerning their future operations. The prince of Conti alleged that the passes, which lead from Nice into Piedmont, were impracticable, and that to penetrate into that country other routs must be fought. For this purpose, he marched through the defile of Tenda, attacked the Savoyard forces at Montalbon, forced their barricadoes and nature itself, took fort Dauphine by assault, and thus cut his way into Piedmont. It must be allowed that this beginning of the campaign was one of the most brilliant that had been seen during the war. The prince of Conti advanced and besieged Coni. The king of Sardinia marched to meet him, that he might raise the siege. He was

was beaten by the prince, but the ſwell of the waters, the vigorous reſiſtance of the beſieged, and the want of ſubſiſtence, obliged the prince to raiſe the ſiege and retire into Savoy, after having blown up the fortifications of Demont. This campaign was more honourable to his abilities than uſeful to France. Prince Lobkowitz, who was then on the full march to attack the king of Naples, hearing of the ſucceſs of the prince of Conti, was diſcouraged: he deſpaired of ſucceſs, retired to Monte-Rotondo, and from thence to Florence, with don Carlos and count Gages continually at his heels. We ſhall ſuppreſs the trifling advantages which the French and Spaniards gained over the Auſtrians, that we may come to naval expeditions.

Early in the ſpring, the French and Spaniſh fleets left the road of Toulon, and attacked the Engliſh fleet, commanded by admiral Matthews, in the Mediterranean. The French and Spaniards retired after the battle to Carthagena, and the Engliſh to Port Mahon. Beyond doubt the action was undeciſive, ſince both the fleets retreated. It was nevertheleſs honourable to the Spaniſh admiral Navaro, and to the French commander. The court of France ſent admiral Court into exile, and puniſhed

niſhed various officers who had ſerved on board the fleet, by which ſhe teſtified her diſcontent. The Engliſh, on their part, traduced admiral Matthews before the council of war: the vice-admiral was impriſoned, and both parties were equally diſſatisfied with a drawn battle, the diſgrace of which fell on the French and Engliſh, and the reputation gained on the Spaniards.

Theſe naval actions were but the prelude to the great ſtrokes which were meditated by the court of Verſailles, during this campaign. The principal object was to oblige the Engliſh to recal home the troops they had in Flanders. For this purpoſe, even before the opening of the campaign, count Saxe marched ten thouſand men to Dunkirk, whither the pretender prince Edward alſo repaired. Preparations for embarkment were made. England, alarmed, called for foreign ſupport. Six thouſand Dutch and ſix thouſand Engliſh, of the troops of lord Stair, were tranſported into that kingdom. The Dutch, not having ſhips of war, armed merchant veſſels, and ſent them to their allies to fulfil their engagements. The king of Great Britain, ſtruck with a panic, claimed the Pruſſian contingency. The king of Pruſſia replied he would himſelf head thirty thouſand men, and

paſs

paſs into England, if her king was attacked. George thought this ſuccour too powerful, and deſiſted from his claims. The intention of the council of Verſailles, concerning that enterpriſe, was a political problem for Europe to ſolve. Did the French mean to place prince Edward on the Engliſh throne; or was it a lure to enfeeble the allied army in Flanders? Theſe ſimple preparations for a deſcent produced every advantage of a real diverſion, in favour of France, at the commencement of the campaign. As far as the reſtoration of prince Edward in England was projected, the plan owed its origin to cardinal Tencin. He had received his hat from the nomination of the pretender, and, to teſtify his gratitude, he attempted, as far as he had the power, to procure the crown of England for this pretender's ſon. The expedition failed, becauſe the winds were contrary; the commonplace excuſe of ſailors. It is very certain that the admiral of the fleet, whoſe name was Roquefeuille, durſt not attempt the paſſage of the Straits, in preſence of a ſuperior fleet.

The armies of France had never ſeen a king at their head, ſince Louis XIV. had ceaſed to appear as their commander. They had been diſcouraged by ſome unfortunate campaigns. It was believed that the preſence of their maſter

was the only ſpur capable of awakening, in the troops, the inſtinct of honour and fame. A woman, for the love of her country, undertook to rouſe Louis XV. from the indolent life he then led, and ſend him to command his forces. She ſacrificed to France the intereſts of her heart and her fortune. This woman was the dutcheſs de Chateauroux. She ſpoke with ſo much energy, exhorted and preſſed him ſo powerfully, that the king reſolved on a journey to Flanders. An action ſo generous, and even heroic, merits the more to be inſerted in the annals of hiſtory, becauſe ſuch royal miſtreſſes as had been her predeceſſors employed their power only to the deſtruction of the kingdom.

Louis XV. opened the campaign in Flanders by the ſiege of Menin. Little inſtructed in his profeſſion, the governor ſurrendered after an inſignificant reſiſtance. The French immediately undertook the ſiege of Ypres, which though better defended ſuſtained the ſame fate. The ſuperiority of the French armies conſiſts in laying ſiege. The French are the beſt engineers in Europe, and the numerous trains of artillery they employ aſcertain the ſucceſs of their attacks. Brabant and Flanders form the theatre of their exploits; becauſe there they may diſplay all the art of their engineers. Numerous

merous canals and ſtreams facilitate the tranſportation of warlike ammunition, and they have their frontiers in their rear. They ſucceed much better in a war of ſieges than in the open field.

Let us return to the allies, whom for a moment we have left. The troops that had been commanded by the king of England, the preceding year, wintered, as we have ſaid, in Brabant and Weſtphalia. Thoſe of prince Charles of Lorraine had taken up their quarters in Briſgau and Bavaria. Marſhal de Coigni commanded in Alſatia. The poor remains of the Imperial troops were diſtributed among the emperor's friends. The moſt part of them however were in the environs of Oettingen. This winter the court of Vienna loſt marſhal Khevenhuller. The queen of Hungary ſhed ſome tears in honour of his memory. He was replaced by marſhal Traun, who received the command of the grand army, which bore the name of the prince of Lorraine, but of which in effect Traun was the chief.

As this prince Charles of Lorraine is to act a great part in the preſent hiſtory, we imagine a word concerning his character may not be without its utility. He was brave; beloved by the ſoldiers; underſtood well the providing of magazines;

gazines; was perhaps too eaſy in receiving impreſſions from his favourites; and, indulging in the charms of ſociety, was ſaid to drink ſometimes to exceſs. He had eſpouſed the archdutcheſs Marianne, younger ſiſter of the queen of Hungary, at Vienna; and had taken his bride into Brabant, of which he had been appointed governor. He afterward returned to Vienna, there to receive the orders of the court for the approaching campaign.

The deſign of the Auſtrians was to recover Lorraine, and to oblige the emperor to abdicate the Imperial throne, that he might by this ſacrifice regain his hereditary eſtates. Their army aſſembled at Hailbronn, from thence it advanced toward Philipſbourg, where Seckendorff had taken refuge with the remains of the Bavarian troops. At the news of the approach of prince Charles, marſhal de Coigni reinforced the Imperialiſts, with all the German regiments that ſerved in his army. Every preparative of the prince of Lorraine announced his intention of paſſing the Rhine, which paſſage had been facilitated by the treaty which the king of England had lately concluded with the elector of Mayence. The partiality of this prince for the court of Vienna was too obvious to eſcape notice, and the ſubſidies he received from England

left

left no doubt that, notwithſtanding his neutrality, he would grant the troops of the queen of Hungary a paſſage through Mayence, ſhould it be required.

The Auſtrians, who, in imagination, anticipated their good fortune, could not forbear letting occaſional traits eſcape of haughtineſs and arrogance. They built a bridge at Manheim, and acted deſpotically in the Palatinate. The elector, with good reaſon, took offence. This gave occaſion to diſputes, and ended in a meſſage from prince Charles to the elector, ſignifying that, if he did not immediately grant the bridge of Manheim, it would be carried by force. In the mean time marſhal de Coigni, whoſe intention was to defend the ſhores of the Rhine, from Mayence as far as fort Louis, had poſted himſelf with his principal forces on the banks of the Queich, whence he advanced toward Spire, and ſent detachments as far as Worms, and even to Oppenheim. He made this motion in conſequence of having learnt that baron Bærenklau, with a detachment from the army of the queen of Hungary, had marched to Germerſheim, toward Fribourg. Bærenklau threw a bridge over an arm of the Rhine near Stockſtadt, that he might miſlead the French, and draw them to that quarter. Prince Charles at the

the ſame time made a motion with his army, as if it were his intention to paſs the Necker with his right, and join Bærenklau. The too credulous de Coigni ſuffered himſelf to be deceived by theſe falſe appearances, and was guilty of two ſucceſſive errors; the one in making Seckendorff paſs the Rhine, whom he charged to defend that part of the river which runs between Spire and Lauterbourg; the other in wheeling with his army to Worms and Frankenthal. It was eaſy to imagine that prince Charles had determined to penetrate into Alſatia, and to employ every ſtratagem of war to ſend the marſhal as far from that country as poſſible. He ought likewiſe to have known that the bridge of Mayence was in the power of this prince, in the way of which the French army could throw no impediment. It appears that his plan of defence was defective in every reſpect. His army was divided into corps, that did not even occupy the true poſts where they might have diſputed the paſſage of the Rhine with the enemy. The well informed have been of opinion that he ought to have collected the troops into one body, as well Imperial as French; to have encamped between the Queich and the Speyerbach; to have lined the banks of the Rhine with ſmall detachments, from fort Louis

Louis as far as Philipſbourg; to have made his cavalry ſcour theſe banks, that he might have been informed in time of the part where the enemy ſhould make preparations to paſs; to have kept his troops ready to march at a moment's warning; and without heſitation to have attacked the firſt Auſtrian corps which ſhould have paſſed the Rhine with his whole force. Should prince Charles have made this paſſage at Mayence, it remained for marſhal de Coigni to have choſen the poſts of the Queich or the Speyerbach, which the prince would not have dared to attack. Thus might he, by this poſition, have equally covered Lower Alſatia and Lorraine. The marſhal, whoſe army was not ſo ſtrong as that of the enemy, and who was too much reſtricted in his orders, took very different meaſures.

No ſooner were prince Charles and Traun informed of the falſe ſteps of the French than they detached Nadaſty, on their left, with all the boats that they had ſecretly collected, to throw bridges over the Rhine, at a village called Schreck. Nadaſty immediately cauſed two thouſand Pandours to paſs the Rhine, in boats, under the command of the partiſan Trenck. They ſurpriſed and defeated a detachment of three Imperial regiments; who, by an unpardonable negligence, had taken no precautions

cautions whatever. Nadaſty himſelf already had paſſed the Rhine,* at the head of nine thouſand huſſars; while the troops behind him were very tranquilly finiſhing the conſtruction of the bridges.

When this paſſage was known, Seckendorff with twenty thouſand men joined a body of French, under the command of young de Coigni. They flew to ſuccour the three Imperial regiments, above mentioned, before prince Waldeck had ſtruck his camp at Retingheim to join Nadaſty. All the officers of this army conjured Seckendorff to attack Nadaſty, whom he might eaſily have driven back into the Rhine, by which ſtroke he would have deſtroyed the plans of prince Charles of Lorraine. Seckendorff was obſtinate in refuſal, and ſatisfied himſelf with a ſlight ſkirmiſh with the Hungarians; after which, learning that marſhal de Coigni had retired to Landau, he marched, in all haſte to join him, through Germerſheim.

On the ſecond of July, prince Charles ſaw himſelf maſter of the Rhine from Schreck to Mayence. Nadaſty and the prince of Waldeck were already on the oppoſite ſhore. Bærenklau too had paſſed the river, near Mayence.

* July 1ſt.

Prince

Prince Charles employed three days in croſſing the bridges with the grand army. Scarcely had he ſet foot on the oppoſite ſhore before he ſent a detachment to take Lauterbourg, and ſeize on its lines. Nadaſty puſhed forward to Weiſſenbourg, which he likewiſe took, and poſted himſelf in its lines. The Auſtrians captured ſixteen hundred men in this expedition. De Coigni now perceived how important it was that he ſhould gain the Lower Alſatia before prince Charles, whom he anticipated by re-taking Weiſſenbourg by eſcalade, and forcing the intrenchments, where he met with a vigorous reſiſtance. Nadaſty, diſlodged from this poſt, retreated toward the grand army, which encamped near Lauterbourg, and which durſt not ſuccour Weiſſenbourg, becauſe that it had not yet been joined by the detachments of Bærenklau and Leopold Daun. De Coigni profited by theſe delays and a ſwell of the Rhine, which impeded the junction of the enemy's forces: he paſſed the Motter, near Haguenau, and encamped at Biſchweiler.

The diſtance of marſhal de Coigni inſpired prince Charles with the project of blockading fort Louis, which was ſaid to be ill provided. Nadaſty and Bærenklau, in conſequence, took

poſt at Wœrd,* at Beinheim, and on the iſlands which ſurround fort Louis. The ſwell of the Rhine ſaved the place. The garriſon recovered a communication with Straſbourg, and was reinforced and victualled. This plan having failed, prince Charles ſent his light troops toward the wings of the French army, and into the wood of Haguenau, which prevented the latter from ſending parties beyond the Motter. Embarraſſed by his ſituation, marſhal de Coigni ſent information of it to his court. Louis XV. to ſave Alſatia reſolved himſelf to lead forty thouſand of his beſt troops from his army in Flanders to the ſuccour of de Coigni, who was ordered to temporize and take particular care of his forces. This made the marſhal determine to change his meaſures and to avoid an engagement.

Nadaſty, reinforced by regular troops, began to extend his corps toward the heights of Reichſhofen and Waſenbourg, as if he meant to turn the French camp by Lichtenberg, and Buchſweiler; on which de Coigni retired by Brumat to Straſbourg †. He took poſt on the canal of Molſheim, which he preſently abandoned to gain the defiles of Pfalzbourg and St. Marie aux Mines. Theſe movements

* July 12th.

† July 31ſt.

were

were to prevent prince Charles, who was at Brumat and who was throwing bridges over the Motter, from occupying the paſſes of the mountains, through which the army of the king, coming to join him, was to paſs. On the fourth of Auguſt, the king of France arrived at Metz, where he waited for the troops from Flanders; that, at their head, he might fall on the army of prince Charles, and if poſſible effect its deſtruction.

Marſhal Schmettau had been ſent by the king of Pruſſia to Louis XV. as well to give an account of the motions of the French army as to preſs the king to fulfil his engagements, by purſuing the troops of the queen of Hungary into Bavaria, when they ſhould repaſs the Rhine. Schmettau informed the moſt chriſtian king that the king of Pruſſia would take the field on the 17th of Auguſt, and that he would employ a hundred thouſand men in the diverſion which he was going to make, in favour of Alſatia. The marſhal made every effort to impart activity and vigour to the French armies, and perhaps would have been ſucceſsful, had not Louis XV. fallen ill at Metz.

His ſickneſs began by head-aches, which his phyſicians and ſurgeons believed were occaſioned by an abſceſs in the brain, and declared

the diſeaſe incurable. Immediately was the king ſurrounded by confeſſors, prieſts, and all the paraphernalia which the Roman church employs, to expedite the dying into the other world. The biſhop of Soiſſons, a ſilly fanatic, would not ſell his oils and his ſacraments to his royal maſter, but on condition that he would part with the dutcheſs of Chateauroux. This lady was obliged to leave Metz, after receiving a moſt rigorous order never more to appear in the king's preſence.

But neither could extreme unction nor all the ſacraments ſave the life of the king. A common ſurgeon offered his ſervices, and affirmed he would effect a cure, provided he had liberty to act as he pleaſed. He met with no competitor; and, by the aid of a ſtrong emetic, he removed the malady which had only been occaſioned by indigeſtion. The court phyſicians loſt their reputation, but general affairs did not ſuffer the leſs.

During the king's illneſs, the duke de Harcourt arrived at Pfalzbourg. Nadaſty already had taken Saverne, and endeavoured to penetrate through the defiles which the duke occupied, but in vain. Though frequently attacked, the duke kept his poſt till the 16th, when the ſuccour from Flanders drew near to join

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the army. Prince Charles had received orders to retreat, which he was taking meaſures to execute. To profit by this depended only on marſhal de Noailles; but all was ruined by his exceſs of circumſpection. Schmettau did but loſe his time and his trouble, in endeavouring to inſpire him with courage. And what riſk had France to run? Had marſhal de Noailles been beaten, the forces of the queen muſt ſtill have been obliged to quit Alſatia; and ſhould the French be victorious they muſt deſtroy the Auſtrian army; who, hotly purſued, inſtead of repaſſing their bridges over the Rhine, muſt have been drowned in the river.

The French and Bavarians then ſlowly advanced toward Hochfeld, to which Nadaſty had retreated. Noailles ſent three detachments over the Motter, and learnt from Lœwendahl, who had marched toward Druſenheim, that the Auſtrians had abandoned their camp of Brumat, to regain their bridges at Beinheim. The count de Belleiſle was then ſent to Suffelſheim with a corps, and the French paſſed the Motter and followed the Auſtrians. M. de Belleiſle obliged the enemy to quit the village of Suffelſheim with loſs, and de Noailles began his march to join Lœwendahl. The ſame evening, the French grenadiers attacked

the village of Achenheim, which was defended by Auſtrian grenadiers and Hungarian troops. The French carried the village, and trifled their time in ſuperfluous formalities; by which prince Charles profited to repaſs the Rhine, at Beinheim, over his bridges, which he deſtroyed by break of day.

The French highly vaunted of this affair; but it was mere rhodomontade. The loſs on either ſide did not amount to ſix hundred men; and prince Charles peaceably continued his march, through Suabia and the Upper Palatinate, toward Bohemia.

Schmettau, who remained with the king of France, was in abſolute deſpair at the effeminacy of the French. He preſented memorials to the king; he preſſed the miniſtry; he wrote to the marſhals; but he might ſooner have moved mountains than have awakened this nation from its lethargy.

The deciſive moment in which the French might have ruined the army of the queen being paſt, Schmettau endeavoured to diſſuade the marſhals from the deſign they had taken of laying ſiege to Fribourg; but ſtill it was in vain. All he could obtain was an engagement to ſend ſome reinforcements, of German troops, to the Imperial forces, to aid marſhal Seckendorff to drive

drive the Auſtrians out of Bavaria. The court promiſed that, in the ſpring of 1745, the number of theſe troops ſhould be augmented to ſixty thouſand. Thus, from the commencement of the alliance between Pruſſia and France, the latter failed to fulfil the two principal articles of their treaty. They ſuffered prince Charles to eſcape, unpurſued; and the army they had engaged to ſend into Weſtphalia never made its appearance.

Seckendorff however marched heavily on, counting his ſteps, to approach the Lech; and Louis XV. at the head of ſeventy thouſand French, laid ſiege to Fribourg; which he took at the end of the campaign, and raſed the fortifications.

The advantages of prince Charles, in Alſatia, induced the king of Pruſſia to declare himſelf ſooner than he had intended. It was to be feared that the aſcendancy of the Auſtrian forces would oblige the French to conſent to ſuch conditions as the arrogance of their enemies would have preſcribed; and, in that caſe, there could have been no doubt but that the queen would have employed all her power for the recovery of Sileſia. The political arrangements, however, which the court of Berlin had projected, were very far at this time from being realized. Count Beſtuchef, who imagined

himself firm in power, after he had driven the marquis de la Chetardie out of Russia, engaged the empress Elizabeth to undertake a voyage to Moscow, there to be crowned; and afterward to make a pilgrimage to Kiowie, in honour of I know not what saint.

The empress had her favourites, and Bestuchef desired that these should have their rivals. A new amour rendered the empress invisible at court. This was the triumph of the minister. Orders were presently given that whoever had any negotiation with Russia, instead of addressing themselves to the empress, must in future apply to the minister. This new regulation brought in large sums to count Bestuchef; and Mardefeld perceived with regret that the guineas of England began to prevail, with this minister, over the crowns of Prussia. We must ever be contented, in all our projects, with partial success. The alliance with Russia was not all it might have been wished; but, by vigorously pushing the war, the king might hope to bring it to a conclusion before Russia, slow in her resolutions, had taken any decisive measures, to impede him in the operations of the campaign.

The following is the general arrangement for penetrating into Bohemia, and obliging the queen

queen to recal her troops out of Alſatia. The grand Pruſſian army was to enter, by three columns, into Bohemia: that, at the head of which the king was to be, was to march along the left ſhore of the Elbe, toward Prague. The ſecond, under the conduct of prince Leopold of Anhalt, was to traverſe Luſatia; and, keeping the Elbe on the right, arrive at the ſame time at Prague. Theſe columns covered the artillery and proviſions for three months, which had been embarked on the Elbe, that they might be ſent to Leutmeritz. Marſhal Schwerin, with a third column, was to leave Sileſia by Braunau; and, in like manner and in like time, join the remainder of the army, for the inveſtiture of Prague.

Excluſive of this army, the old prince of Anhalt, with a corps of ſeventeen thouſand men, covered the electorate: and twenty-two thouſand, under the command of Marwitz, were deſtined to defend Upper Sileſia. The emperor had expedited requiſitorial letters, to the king of Poland elector of Saxony, in which he demanded a paſſage through his ſtates, for the auxiliary troops which Pruſſia was to ſend into Bohemia. Auguſtus was then at Warſaw. Theſe letters were conveyed to his miniſters, who governed Saxony in his abſence, by the ſame

ſame Winterfeld who had negotiated at Peterſburg, and had ſo highly diſtinguiſhed himſelf during the firſt campaigns. The Saxons ſtood petrified at this propoſition. They endeavoured to gain time, but the Pruſſians were already in their territories. In vain did they proteſt, and recriminate, againſt a ſtep the principal end of which was to prevent the empire from ſuffering the affront of beholding its emperor oppreſſed, and dethroned. Thus, while they murmured at Dreſden, became furious at Warſaw, ſaw themſelves outwitted at London, and were terrified at Vienna, the king marched immediately toward Pirna, where he was joined by the regiments of the dutchy of Magdebourg, which had taken their rout through Leipſic.

All Saxony was in motion. The troops aſſembled in platoons round Dreſden, which they haſtily began to fortify. Artiſans were even employed to make cuts, in the quarter called the New City. The Saxon miniſters endeavoured to aſſume haughtineſs at the very moment they were in a panic. At ſome times they granted too much; at others were obſtinate concerning trifles. Had the king deſired to ſeize on this country, every thing would have been over in a week. They granted ſubſiſtence;

ence; they lent boats to paſs the Elbe; they ſuffered the fleet, loaded with proviſions, to ſail through the middle of Dreſden; but they doubled the garriſon, mounted the batteries with cannon, cloſed and barricadoed the gates, and refuſed the Pruſſian officers entrance. This conduct of the Saxons clearly announced their ill will. They were ſuppoſed to be ill neighbours, capable of profiting by the misfortunes which might happen to the Pruſſians in this war; but they were not thought to be ſufficiently raſh to ſacrifice themſelves, in behalf of the queen of Hungary; eſpecially when the corps, which was under the command of the old prince of Anhalt, ought to have inſpired them with greater prudence.

A manifeſto preceded the march of the troops, which contained in general the motives of the league of Frankfort, formed between the emperor, Pruſſia, the elector Palatine, and the landgrave of Heſſe, for the ſupport of the ſyſtem of the liberties of the empire, and its chief. Letters patent were at the ſame time diſtributed through Bohemia; by which the ſubjects of that kingdom were required not to take part againſt the auxiliary troops of the emperor, whom they were henceforth to conſider as their lawful ſovereign.

The

The king arrived on the frontiers of Bohemia on the twenty-third of Auguſt. Four regiments of huſſars and four battalions were one day's march before the army; in order to collect neceſſary proviſions for the troops. The margrave, who commanded the ſecond line, entered the camp which the king quitted; and no enemy was found to oppoſe theſe operations. The ſmall fleet, loaded with the magazines, was the firſt which met with any obſtacles in entering Bohemia. It was obliged to paſs at the foot of a rock, on which ſtands the caſtle of Tetſchen. The enemy, who occupied this caſtle, rolled huge ſtones into the Elbe; and added a ſtaccado of piles, to render navigation impracticable. General Bonin was obliged to be detached with ſome troops, who attacked and took priſoner a Hungarian captain, with ſeventy men. The river was preſently cleared, and the navigation rendered free. This incident retarded the march two days. The army inclined toward the river Eger. The huſſars ſurpriſed ſome troops of the enemy at a ſmall town named Murzifai; three hundred of whom they defeated, and took fifty priſoners. From theſe it was learnt that Bathiani was come, from Bavaria toward the Beraun, with a corps of twelve thouſand men; and alſo that he had

thrown

thrown three thouſand men into Prague, to which were added a body of militia conſiſting of twelve thouſand. The king arrived before Prague on the ſecond of September, with the various corps that compoſed his army. He encamped near the chapel of victory. Marſhal Schwerin and prince Leopold inveſted what is called the grand ſide of the city. A week was neceſſary to tranſport the heavy artillery and proviſions, from Leutmeritz to the camp. A battalion was ſent to garriſon this place and guard the magazines, which could not be forwarded for want of horſes; for the Muldau, which falls into the Elbe at Melnick, is not navigable. This time was employed in making every preparative for the ſiege.

During this interval, intelligence was obtained, from the ſpies, that Bathiani had collected a large magazine in the town of Beraun; and the report was confirmed by the huſſars, who were ſent to reconnoitre the roads to that town. The king was tempted to ſeize on this magazine, for which purpoſe he detached general Haake, with five battalions and ſix hundred huſſars. Bathiani was informed of the project, though every poſſible precaution had been taken to keep it ſecret. He reinforced the place; and, when Haake paſſed the bridge of Beraun and

had forced the gate of the town, he perceived two large bodies of cavalry, that were paſſing the river, on his right and his left, to fall on his two flanks. He immediately abandoned the attack, and poſted himſelf on the heights, where he formed his infantry into a ſquare. Having been hotly attacked, by this cavalry and a large body of Hungarian infantry, he found means to inform the camp, at Prague, of the danger with which he was menaced. The king flew to his ſuccour, with eighty ſquadrons and ſixteen battalions; but general Haake had bravely repelled the enemy, and freed himſelf before this aid could come up.

The project on Beraun having thus failed, Bathiani haſtily tranſported his magazine to Pilſen. It would no doubt have been right to have returned to Beraun, driven Bathiani from Pilſen, and carried off his magazine. This would have been the means of preventing the Auſtrian army from profiting by the ſtores which it had found time to collect; and thus would prince Charles have been obliged to remain in Upper Auſtria, and the Pruſſians have been empowered to have kept poſſeſſion of Bohemia. But the proviſions of the army were ill ſerved, and the Pruſſians were in want of a Mr. de Sechelles.

The

The trenches were opened, on the evening of the 10th, before Prague, in three different parts; that is to ſay, at the platform of St. Laurent: at Bubenitz, oppoſite the mill of the Lower Muldau; and at the hill of Ziſka. Count Truchſes commanded the firſt attack; the margrave Charles the ſecond; and the third was committed to marſhal Schwerin. No time was loſt in the firſt night. The marſhal cauſed the fort of Ziſka to be attacked on the morrow, in open day; which he carried, after having thrown bombs into the fort, and taken two ſmall redoubts, that were behind the firſt, and which the French, who had built them, called ſwallow's neſts.

The king, at this time, was at the trench of Bubenitz, which he left, in company with many officers, to take a view of the attack of Ziſka. The enemy perceived the crowd, turned their artillery that way, and a fatal ball carried off prince William, the brother of the margrave Charles, and the ſame who had ſo valiantly fought at Molwitz for his country's glory.

Batteries were advanced with all ſpeed; inſomuch that the curtain, between the baſtion of St. Nicholas and St. Peter, was battered in breach. On the 15th, the batteries of the margrave Charles, by throwing of bombs, ſet fire

to the water-mill, and deſtroyed the dams of the Muldau. The waters became ſo low that they were every where fordable, and the city was liable to be taken by aſſault; there being a ſufficient ſpace, on that ſide, without wall or rampart.

The governor Harſch began to deſpair; and perceiving that, on the morning of the 16th, a heavy body of grenadiers was filing off, from the ſide of Bubenitz, he foreſaw the meditated aſſault, demanded to capitulate, and ſurrendered himſelf and garriſon, which conſiſted of twelve thouſand men, priſoners of war. The ſiege only continued ſix days, and coſt the beſiegers forty dead and eighty wounded. The ſame day the gates were given up, and the garriſon was led into Sileſia; among the fortreſſes of which it was diſtributed.

The taking of Prague was a brilliant opening of the campaign. It was highly probable it would make an impreſſion on the Saxons; that they would now leſs than ever declare in favour of the queen of Hungary; and that they would not, by ſtripping their electorate of troops, deliver themſelves up to the prince of Anhalt, who might ruin Leipſic, which was the centre of their commerce, the nerve of the ſtate, and the ſource of their credit. But Engliſh gold was more

more prevalent, at Dreſden, than the intereſt of Saxony.

The Pruſſian army now had the choice of two operations. The one, which the king preferred, was to paſs the Beraun, drive Bathiani out of Bohemia, ſeize on Pilſen and the conſiderable magazine which there had been formed for the army of prince Charles, and to puſh forward to the defiles of Com and Fort, which, to the Auſtrians, open the road into Bohemia, on the ſide of the Upper Palatinate. True it is that prince Charles might advance toward Eger, where the Saxons might join him; and that, by marching along its banks, he might follow the road which marſhal de Belleiſle had taken, in his retreat from Prague. But whence muſt ſubſiſtence have come for this army? The margravate of Bareuth was too ſterile to furniſh proviſions. Who alſo muſt have defended Auſtria, which Marwitz alone might have conquered, not finding any oppoſition? This no doubt was the project that ought to have been executed. The emperor, the king of France, and particularly marſhal de Belleiſle, inſiſted that the Pruſſians ſhould advance toward Tabor, Budweis, and Neuhaus; in order to eſtabliſh a communication with Bavaria, and make prince Charles fear for the ſafety of Auſtria. Marſhal

de Belleiſle affirmed that the not having occupied theſe poſts, in the year 1741, had been the cauſe of all the misfortunes of the French and Bavarians. But is that which is good under certain circumſtances equally good under certain others? There is no doubt that theſe poſts were neceſſary to the allies, in 1741, who then were in poſſeſſion of Bavaria, and even Upper Auſtria. But, in 1744, Auſtrians only were in theſe provinces. This was beſide affording excellent ſport to the enemy, by obliging the army of Pruſſia to leave its own frontiers, and giving the Saxons the freedom of joining prince Charles, or even of making an attempt upon Prague. The wiſeſt part would have been not to have marched too far from Prague; to have amaſſed in that capital, as well as in Pardubitz and other towns, ſubſiſtence for the troops; and to have waited the approach of the enemy. On this occaſion, the king diſcovered too much weakneſs, in condeſcenſion to his allies; he paid too great a deference to their opinions; and, fearing to be accuſed, if he kept his army reſolutely near Prague, of having no other object than that of aſſuring to himſelf the three circles, which had been promiſed him, he undertook that unfortunate expedition.

Similar faults were committed in the execu-

tion

tion of this plan. The tranſport of flour, from Leutmeritz to Prague, was neglected; the artillery, which had been employed in the ſiege, was not ſent back into Sileſia; and only ſix battalions were left to garriſon that immenſe city; the half of which they were inſufficient to defend. Aſcending on the right of the Muldau, and leaving Prague in the rear, a hilly and difficult country is found, equally ſterile and ill peopled. Advancing eleven miles eaſtward, the town of Tabor is diſcovered; ſituated on a rock, and built in the fifteenth century by Ziſka, the famous Huſſite marauder; who ravaged, while he fought for, his country. In thoſe diſtant times, Tabor was held to be impregnable; but at preſent it may be taken by aſſault. Though its ſituation is advantageous, it is but ſmall and has only an old wall for its defence.

From thence proceeding ſouthward, the Luſchnitze, a ſmall river every where fordable, is found; but the banks of which are in many places ſteep. Paſſing this rock, woods are traverſed for the ſpace of three miles; and, at leaving them, we come to a fruitful plain, on which, at two miles diſtance, ſtands Budweis. This town is ſituated on the Muldau, fortified with works of earth, and an envelope, which

had been begun on one ſide, advancing from Budweis toward the ſouth. Three quarters of a mile on the oppoſite ſide of the Muldau is Frauenberg; a caſtle that ſtands on the top of a hill, become famous by a ſix-months ſiege, which the French there ſuſtained. Such was the country in which the Pruſſian army was to act.

As the Saxons had not hitherto declared themſelves, the army began its march, on the 17th of September, for Conraditze. General Naſſau was detached, with ten battalions and forty ſquadrons, to form the van-guard of the army, which was itſelf divided into two columns: the right, under the command of prince Leopold, kept beſide the Muldau, and was obliged to make roads for itſelf. The left column, led by marſhal Schwerin, took the high road from Prague to Tabor, following the van-guard ſtep by ſtep. Orders were iſſued that theſe columns ſhould not leave a diſtance of more than half a German mile between their camps. Behind the left column the cheſts of flour followed, covered by fifteen hundred men, under the orders of general Poſadowſky.

Tabor, Budweis and Frauenberg yielded, almoſt without defence, to general Naſſau. The army arrived at Tabor on the 26th, where the columns

columns reunited; but Poſadowſky brought up only the half of the cheſts, that is to ſay flour for a fortnight. The draught horſes and oxen had been ſo neglected that half of them had periſhed; although not an enemy had appeared, during the whole march. This was the principal cauſe of all the misfortunes that followed.

Scarcely was the army two days march from Prague before Bathiani ſent a detachment, of ſome thouſands of croats and huſſars, to Beraun and Königſaal. This latter town is ſituated at the confluence of the Beraun and the Muldau, two miles above Prague. Theſe light troops ſo much infeſted the avenues that they intercepted all the quotas, which the flat country was to have ſent in; and ſo effectually cut off all communication that the Pruſſian army was four weeks without receiving any news, either from Prague or of what was paſſing in the reſt of Europe. Two mails, deſtined for the king, were taken; ſo that he was not only ignorant of the march of the Saxons but of the part in which the army of prince Charles at that time was.

It may appear ſtrange that an army, ſo ſtrong as the Pruſſian, could not hold the flat country in awe, oblige it to ſend the neceſſary quotas, procure ſubſiſtence for it, and maintain ſpies in

abundance, who ſhould bring information of the leaſt motion of the enemy. But it ought to be known that, in Bohemia, the nobility, prieſts and land-bailiffs, are very loyal to the houſe of Auſtria; that a difference of religion inſpires this people, who are as ſtupid as they are ſuperſtitious, with averſion invincible; and that the court had commanded the peaſants, who all are ſerfs, to leave their hamlets at the approach of the Pruſſians, hide their corn under ground, and fly into the neighbouring foreſts. To this was added the promiſe of repairing every damage they might ſuſtain, on the part of the Pruſſians.

Thus the army found wilderneſſes only, on its paſſage, and deſerted villages. No peaſant came to the camp to ſell his proviſions; and the people, who dreaded the rigorous puniſhment of the Auſtrians, could not be induced, by any ſum however great, to bring the requiſite intelligence of what related to the enemy. Theſe difficulties were further increaſed by a corps of ten thouſand huſſars; whom the Auſtrians had ſent out of Hungary, and who cut off the communication with the army, in a country which is compoſed of marſhes, woods, rocks, and every ſpecies of defile of which any country is capable. With this ſuperiority of light

light troops, the enemy had the advantage of knowing all that paſſed in the camp of the king; nor durſt the Pruſſians ſuffer their flying parties to venture out, at leaſt not without giving them up for loſt, becauſe of the ſuperiority of thoſe of the enemy: ſo that the troops of the king, intrenched like Romans, were confined within the precincts of their camp.

The want of ſubſiſtence, added to this reſtraint of ſituation, obliged the Pruſſians to return. The advice of marſhal Schwerin was to proceed to Neuhaus, that the fear of the enemy might be increaſed, with reſpect to Auſtria. Prince Leopold maintained it would be beſt to march toward Budweis, which was occupied by general Naſſau. Amid theſe differences, a ſpy brought information that the army of prince Charles was at Protiwin. This intelligence was deciſive, concerning the part that was to be taken. The army repaſſed the Muldau, and encamped on the heights of Wodnian, where it ſcarcely was arrived before this advice was found to be falſe. A miſunderſtanding in conſequence enſued, between marſhal Schwerin and prince Leopold; and the king was often obliged to interpoſe, authoritatively, to prevent the envy of theſe two marſhals from injuring the public good.

Lieutenant-colonel Janus, of the Thiery huſſars, had been detached to preſs the delivery of the quotas, from the inhabitants, which were to be ſent to Tabor; and the neceſſity was the more immediate becauſe that the flour for the army was almoſt finiſhed. Janus marched, with two hundred huſſars, to a village named Muhlhauſen, ſituated on the banks of the Muldau. The enemy was informed of this, and a conſiderable corps of huſſars fell on the Pruſſian. He was brave, and loſt his life rather than ſuffer the diſgrace of having been beaten. His detachment was diſperſed. Nadaſty conſtructed bridges, at this very place, and immediately advanced to attack Tabor. But prince Henry, the king's brother, who had fallen ill there, and colonel Kalnein the governor taught him to know that a town, defended by Pruſſians, was not to be taken by light horſe.

It was now that information was obtained that prince Charles occupied a ſtrong camp behind the Wotawa, two miles from Piſek; that the Saxons had joined him, and that his intention was to cut off the Pruſſians from the Saſawa, conſequently from Prague, by paſſing the Muldau in the rear of the army. The want of ſubſiſtence, the impediments which Nadaſty threw in the way of obtaining any, and the poſſibility

that

that the Auſtrians might make this motion, determined the Pruſſians to approach Tabor. They paſſed the Muldau, over the bridge of Teyn, on the 8th of October. The rear-guard was hotly haraſſed by the pandours and huſſars, upon which they did not make the impreſſion they expected. The brave colonel Rouch of the huſſars took a battalion of Dalmatians, that had been too adventurous, and rejoined the army, triumphant over a corps, very ſuperior to his own, by which he had been attacked. The army again encamped at Tabor, that general du Moulin, who had been detached to Neuhaus, might have time to come up. The Auſtrians were ſo certain of cutting off the Pruſſian army, from Prague, that, by their orders, magazines had been amaſſed for them at Beneſchau, and even in the circle of Chrudim.

The king repented too late of not having better garriſoned the city of Prague. The project of taking winter quarters, between Tabor, Neuhaus, Budweis and Frauenberg, was ill conceived. From thence to Prague there was no town which had ſo much as walls, and, conſequently, by means of which a communication might be eſtabliſhed with the capital. The Muldau was every where fordable, and covered with impenetrable foreſts on its left, in which light

light troops might take poſt, to haraſs the Pruſſian quarters inceſſantly. Had not proviſions however failed, the king might have maintained himſelf between the Saſawa and the Luſchnitze; but the want of theſe is the ſtrongeſt of arguments in war; and, the danger of loſing Prague being added, the Pruſſian army was obliged to take a retrograde motion.

It was ſtill undetermined whether the poſts of Tabor and Budweis were or were not to be abandoned. When the army totally departed, it was no doubt to be feared that the enemy would force theſe towns; and, on the other hand, it was to be conſidered that three hundred ſick or wounded had been obliged to be left at Tabor, for want of baggage waggons. To forſake theſe brave men was painful. It was therefore determined to leave a garriſon in each place, and it was hoped that, if the army ſhould come to action with the Auſtrians, which appeared probable after their junction with the Saxons, the beaten enemy would find theſe poſts in their road, and would be obliged to fall back toward Pilſen. This was entirely falſe reaſoning; for, in urgent caſes, it is better to loſe three hundred ſick than to hazard ſome thouſands of men in towns where they are incapable of defence. If, on the contrary, it

was

was propoſed to give battle, the army ought to be in full force, the better to aſcertain victory; and two ſuch miſerable forts could not prevent prince Charles from retreating, in what manner he ſhould pleaſe. But, it was urged, marſhal Seckendorff was already in Bavaria: he had driven Bærenklau back into Auſtria, and had cleared the electorate of the enemy, Ingoldſtadt, Braunau, and Straubingen excepted. Be it ſo; but the ſucceſs of the Imperialiſts ought not to prevent the Pruſſians from acting prudently: nor were theſe advantages ſufficiently great, for faults to be committed with impunity.

In this ſituation, the poſt of Beneſchau was become of the laſt importance. It was neceſſary to occupy it before prince Charles, becauſe it could not be attacked; and, if in the hands of the enemy, it might decide the fate of the army. The ſole remaining reſource would have been to paſs the Saſawa, at Rattay, in order to procure proviſions from Pardubitz. To this effect, marſhal Schwerin put himſelf at the head of fifteen thouſand men, and took not only the camp of Beneſchau but ſeized alſo on conſiderable magazines, which had there been amaſſed for the Auſtrians. The king joined him on the 14th of October. The vanguard of the enemy was at that time on its march

march for this place. The army remained eight days between Beneſchau and Konopitz; and there the diſagreeable news was brought, which well might be expected, that a detachment of ten thouſand Hungarians had made the regiment of Creutz priſoners, at Budweis, and that of the pioneers, at Tabor. Thus three thouſand able men were loſt, to ſave three hundred ſick. The king, who repented of having as it may be ſaid abandoned theſe regiments, ſent eight different orders to general Creutz, who commanded at Budweis, to evacuate the town and follow the army; but he received not one of them. Budweis ſurrendered, after having conſumed ſuch ſtores as the preſent circumſtances allowed to be left. Tabor was taken, after the trenches were opened, by a breach which the enemy had made in the wall. The firſt of theſe towns ſuſtained a ſiege of eight days; Tabor one of four; and Frauenberg capitulated becauſe the Auſtrians had cut off the ſole canal by which the garriſon could obtain water.

As it was to be feared the army would want proviſions, Winterfeld was detached, with ſome battalions and a regiment of huſſars, to maintain a communication with the magazine of Leutmeritz. But the van-guard of prince Charles,

Charles, of which we have ſpoken, perceiving that the Pruſſians had anticipated their project on Beneſchau, retreated toward Neweclow, and from thence to Marſchowitz, where it was joined by the combined army of the Auſtrians and Saxons. The king heard this intelligence with pleaſure, hoping the moment of revenging the affronts he had received at Tabor and Budweis was come. With this view, on the 24th of October in the afternoon, the army began its march, in eight columns, to attack the enemy. After having paſſed roads which never before were trodden by ſoldiers, toward the decline of day he arrived on a height, which was not more than a quarter of a mile from the Auſtrian army. Here the Pruſſians formed, and paſſed the night. On the morrow, at day-break, the king and his principal officers went to reconnoitre the enemy, and found the Auſtrians had changed their camp, and had taken poſt oppoſite the right flank of the Pruſſians, on a ſteep height, at the foot of which, over marſhy ground, ran a muddy ſtream. This wholly ſeparated the two armies: the Auſtrians were not to be attacked on this ſide. Some battalions of grenadiers were placed in an opening through which the right of the enemy might be ſeen, which was found to be as advantageouſly

ſituated

ſituated as its left. The impoſſibility of ſucceſs, in ſuch an attack, occaſioned the deſign to be abandoned; and it was determined to return to the camp, at Beneſchau.

The grenadiers, who were employed to reconnoitre the enemy, conſtituted the rear-guard. The Auſtrians, who expected an attack, did not perceive the retreat of their enemies; whoſe motions were concealed by a mountain. There only happened a ſlight ſkirmiſh with the rear-guard, and the Pruſſians peaceably recovered their poſt at Beneſchau. It is not aſtoniſhing that an enemy, in which are a hundred and fifty ſquadrons, remaining above eight days in the ſame camp, ſhould at length want forage; eſpecially in a mountainous and woody country, in which it was impoſſible to oblige the flat country to bring in ſubſiſtence. This conſtrained the king to chooſe another camp, that he might obtain forage and at the ſame time approach his ovens.

The army therefore decamped on the morrow, paſſed the Saſawa at Borſchitz, and took poſt at Pyſcheli. General Naſſau was at the ſame time detached, with ten battalions and thirty ſquadrons, to diſlodge a corps of the enemy, conſiſting of ten thouſand Hungarians, regulars and irregulars, from Kamerbourg.

Naſſau attacked the enemy on an advantageous height which he occupied. Some diſcharges from the artillery threw the foe into confuſion, who abandoned the poſt to repaſs the Saſawa at Rattay. Naſſau kept pace with the Auſtrians, and, perceiving they wiſhed to gain Kolin before him, prevented them and ſeized on this poſt himſelf. No one had received any news of this general after the ſkirmiſh of Kamerbourg; nor could he for his part ſend any, ſo greatly did the light troops of Auſtria outnumber thoſe of Pruſſia. The former were in an encloſed country, where they were favoured and informed of all that paſſed, while the Pruſſians could obtain no intelligence.

The Auſtrians were on all ſides active, to procure this ſuperiority over the Pruſſians. They thought to have ſurpriſed colonel Zimernau, at Pardubitz, with his regiment, who, in their fort, had the guard of the magazine. Fifteen hundred grenadiers and ſix hundred huſſars came from Moravia, diſguiſed themſelves like peaſants, and, under pretence of bringing their waggons to the magazine, endeavoured to introduce themſelves into the place. The plot was diſcovered by an Auſtrian, who imprudently diſcharged his piſtol. The guards of the gates and ravelines fired on this

this corps, and killed ſixty men. The defence was very honourable to the vigilance of Zimernau; and the enemy had the regret of having loſt their ſoldiers to no purpoſe.

Soon after the king encamped at Pyſcheli. Prince Charles alſo came and encamped at Beneſchau. The country was at his devotion: the circles brought him proviſions, and he found means of ſubſiſtence ſome days longer, at a place where the Pruſſians muſt have periſhed with hunger, had they there remained. He afterward inclined to Kamerbourg, where he paſſed the Saſawa, directing his march toward Janowitz, keeping the marſhes on his back. The deſign of the prince, or rather of old marſhal Traun, was to oblige the king to chooſe between Sileſia and Bohemia. Should he remain at Prague, the enemy would cut off his communication with Sileſia; and, if he withdrew to Pardubitz, Prague and Bohemia were loſt. This was an excellent project, worthy of admiration, to which marſhal Traun added the ſage precaution of chooſing camps that were not to be attacked, that he might not be obliged to fight. Had the king been able to attack the enemy at the moment he ſhould decamp, he would either have brought on a battle or have gained the poſt of Kuttenberg from him,

by which all his designs would have been frustrated. The want of bread, a reason so often assigned in the narrative of this campaign, prevented his majesty from thus acting.

However, that he might do every thing in his power, the king advanced on the morrow, with one wing of the army. Prince Leopold was to follow with the bread which was expected from Prague. It was the will of good fortune that the king should find, at Kosteletz where he encamped, bread, wine, and viands sufficient for three days, which were intended for the enemy. These he distributed among his troops. His intention was to have gained Janowitz on the morrow, but he was deceived by spies, who assured him that prince Charles was there already. The army therefore turned to the left, and encamped at Kaurzim, a mile from the Elbe. It was then only that information was brought that general Nassau was at Kolin, and that a convoy of bread was incessantly expected from Leutmeritz, for the army. To facilitate this transport, grenadiers were posted at Brandeis and Nienburg.

Prince Leopold, on the morrow, rejoined the army; and the day after it marched to Planiany. It was the enemy's design to have come thither, for which reason subsistence was

there abundantly found. The right wing of the Pruſſians was at the convent of Zaſmucky, a quarter of a mile diſtant from the left of the Auſtrians. The two armies were ſeparated by marſhes and woods. Every thing however was to be feared for Pardubitz, to which the Auſtrians were half a march nearer than the Pruſſians. Eight battalions and ten ſquadrons were ſent thither, under du Moulin who paſſed through Kolin, and covered Pardubitz and the magazines. The principal point therefore was to gain Kuttenberg, and no time muſt be loſt if the enemy was to be outmarched. Although the troops were fatigued by three ſucceſſive marches, it was reſolved by an effort to arrive at Kuttenberg on the morrow, or to force prince Charles to a battle. But neither of theſe things came to paſs. A thick fog, which continued from ſix in the morning till noon, occaſioned half the day to be loſt; and no diligence, in the part that remained, could bring the army further than Groſs-Gubel, where the tents were erected. The army had the town of Kolin and the Elbe in the rear, at the diſtance of half a mile; its two wings were ſupported by villages; a ſmall plain was in front, bound by a tufted wood, where prince Charles encamped. The prince profited by his advanced

vanced poſition, and at night ſent a large detachment to occupy the height of St. John the baptiſt, which is very ſteep, and which overlooks all the environs.

The king wiſhed for a battle before he had conſumed his magazines. This was to his intereſt but not to the intereſt of the Auſtrians; and it was therefore by them very carefully avoided.

While prince Charles and Traun eſtabliſhed themſelves on the ſummits of rocks, Nadaſty came, and placed himſelf on the right of the Pruſſians, with ſix thouſand Hungarians. Guilan, with an equal force, threw himſelf into the wood, which bounds the front of the plain. Trenck and Moratz poſted themſelves with their light troops on the left, to coop up the army in its camp, and prevent all foraging. It may perhaps appear ſtrange that the Pruſſians made no attempts to diſlodge theſe detachments from their neighbourhood; but they had defiles in their van, and could only arrive at the enemy with diſadvantage. The bad nouriſhment of the troops, and the miſery and fatigues they had undergone, occaſioned a great number of ſick; there were not above a hundred men per regiment free from the dyſentery. The officers were no better. The camp forage was con-

ſumed; ſubſiſtence was only to be had from the other ſide of the Elbe. The ſeaſon daily became more ſevere. All theſe reaſons obliged the repaſſing of the Elbe, at Kolin, and the cantonment of the troops, for the preſervation and recovery of the ſick.

The army decamped on the 9th of November, and retreated in ſuch good order that, even ſhould prince Charles attempt a battle, the Pruſſians would have had the advantage of ground. Ten battalions garriſoned the town of Kolin, poſted behind walls which formed a natural entrenchment. Batteries were placed on the eminences moſt near to the town, whence they overlooked the whole ground. Kolin and Pardubitz then became poſts of importance, becauſe they aſcertained the communication with Sileſia as well as with Prague. Between theſe two head poſts others were eſtabliſhed. Beſide the river and behind it the troops were cantoned. Scarcely had the Pruſſians paſſed the Elbe before the pandours attacked Kolin; but they met with ſuch an ill reception that they had no deſire to return. The night of the 12th the queen's grenadiers, with all the Hungarian troops, made a new attempt, and were every where vigorouſly repulſed. They had three hundred ſoldiers killed. The famous marauder Trenck was wounded here.

Prince

Prince Charles thought the campaign ended, and wiſhed to give repoſe to the troops, who ſo well had merited reſt, by the fatigues they had undergone in Alſatia and Bohemia. The court of Vienna thought differently, and gave expreſs orders to the prince to continue his operations. The king flattered himſelf that the enemy would take quarters between the Elbe and the Saſawa; deſigning to fall upon them from Pardubitz and Kolin, and to clear the circles of Czaſlau and Chrudim of Auſtrians. He had taken up his quarters at Turnow near Pardubitz. Thoſe of prince Leopold were not far diſtant from Kolin. At this time the enemy made movements that ſeemed to denote they had ſome deſign on Pardubitz, which induced the prince to approach the place with his quarters on the left.

In the mean time, letters from Vienna were intercepted, which announced a grand deſign, that was to be executed on the 18th of November. General Einſiedel, who commanded at Prague, ſent word that the enemy was making ladders in all the neighbouring villages: and general Naſſau gave intelligence that he expected to be attacked, at Kolin, in a few days. The left wing of the army was at Pardubitz; for which nothing was to be feared.

From mile to mile, beſide the Elbe, there were poſts of infantry; and forty ſquadrons of huſſars were diſtributed between them, to patrol and watch the ſmalleſt motions of the troops of the queen. By theſe precautions, the king muſt neceſſarily be informed in time, ſhould the enemy attempt the paſſage of the Elbe. Properly ſpeaking, therefore, there was nothing to apprehend, but for the city of Prague. The king ſent Rottembourg thither, with his dragoons and three battalions, to reinforce the garriſon. The 18th, that critical day, at length arrived, and produced nothing, on the part of the enemy, but numerous marches and counter-marches. The 19th ſeemed to be more deciſive: diſcharges of heavy artillery, and a warm firing of infantry, were heard, by five o'clock in the morning. The king ſent on every ſide to know whence it proceeded. All were of opinion that it was ſome new attempt on Kolin. The firing they heard was on the right of the army; and, as general Naſſau had expected prince Charles would make ſome attack on his poſt, and as no other intelligence had been received, faith was too eaſily given to theſe ſuppoſitions. This incertitude continued till noon, when an officer of huſſars brought intelligence to the king that the troops of the

queen, during the night, had made bridges near Solnitz; that the negligence of the patroles had been the cauſe that this was not perceived till break of day; that lieutenant-colonel Wedel, whoſe battalion was the neareſt, had marched thither; that, notwithſtanding the fire of fifty cannon, he had three times repelled the Auſtrian grenadiers; that he had diſputed the paſſage with prince Charles for five hours; that the huſſars, whom he had ſent to the army to bring the news of his ſituation, had been killed on the road by the Ulans, who had ſecreted themſelves in the neighbouring woods; and that, for want of being ſuccoured, he had retired in good order, through the foreſt of Wiſchenjowitz, to rejoin the army.

This paſſage of the Elbe was unfortunate. Whether it proceeded from the negligence of the huſſars or not, it decided the fate of the campaign. To waſte time in complaining of ill fortune would be to no purpoſe: the firſt care was to remedy the evil, as far as circumſtances would permit. The army received immediate orders to aſſemble at Wiſchenjowitz, which was the centre of its cantonments. Only three battalions were left at Pardubitz, under the command of colonel Retzau. The army was at the rendezvous at nine in the evening,

and drawn up in order; except the corps of Naſſau, which was at Kolin, and two detached battalions, the one at Brandeis, and the other at Nienburg. The battalion of Wedel loſt two officers and an hundred men, killed and wounded, at the action of Solnitz, which will remain for ever memorable in the annals of Pruſſia. It gained Wedel the ſurname of Leonidas. Prince Charles, ſurpriſed that a ſingle Pruſſian battalion had for five hours diſputed the paſſage of the Elbe, ſaid, to the officers who accompanied him—"The queen "would be happy indeed, had ſhe officers in "her army equal to this hero!"

The critical ſituation of affairs induced the king to aſſemble the chief among his officers, and to deliberate on the part that ought to be taken. Two principal objects were to be conſidered: whether it were beſt to march to Prague, to maintain a footing in Bohemia, or to evacuate Prague, and that kingdom, and retire into Sileſia. Inconveniences attended each ſide of the queſtion. Prince Leopold was of opinion it were beſt to march to Prague; ſince there ſtill was a quantity of flour at Leutmeritz, and becauſe that, if Prague were abandoned, the heavy artillery muſt be ſo likewiſe, for the roads would not permit its retreat; excluſive of the

the riſk which the retiring garriſon would run, having at leaſt thirty miles to march before it could regain, through Leutmeritz and Luſatia, the frontiers of Sileſia. The king's opinion was that it were better to march for Sileſia: becauſe, that was the moſt certain ſtep. The project of keeping Prague gave the enemy an opportunity of cutting off all communication between the army and Sileſia. The Saxons might have done the ſame, on their frontiers; ſo that the army would have been ruined, before the ſpring, for the want of proviſions, recruits, arms, ammunition, and horſes to remount the cavalry. Beſide, all communication being ſtopped, how might money arrive to pay the troops, purchaſe magazines, &c? How could general Marwitz, with twenty-two thouſand men, cover the two Sileſias, againſt the army of the prince of Lorraine?

Theſe reaſons were deciſive for returning into Sileſia; where the army might find every reſource, of which it ſtood in need, for its reeſtabliſhment; where the forts were full of magazines, and the country abounded in ſubſiſtence; where the communication with Brandenbourg might be regained; and, in fine, where neither money, horſes, nor reſources, could be wanting. And, to view things in their true light,

light, the king incurred no other loſs, by retreating out of Bohemia, than that of his heavy artillery. The generals were all of this opinion.

This reſolution, which had been ſuddenly taken, muſt as ſuddenly be executed. The king ſent a confidential and capable man, whoſe name was Bulow, his aid du camp, to give orders to all the detached corps, as well as to the garriſon of Prague, to evacuate Bohemia. General Naſſau was inſtructed to take the road to Chlumetz, or to Nechanitz, to rejoin the army; while the king would make ſuch motions, in the preſence of prince Charles, as beſt might facilitate this junction. Bulow was fortunate enough to paſs ſafe through detachments of the enemy's huſſars, and to carry the orders to thoſe to whom they were addreſſed. This mode of acting became the more neceſſary becauſe that the garriſon of Prague had only ſubſiſtence for ſix weeks; and it would have been taken by famine, had it remained beyond that period.

On the 20th of November the king approached Chlumetz, in order to ſecond the motions of Naſſau; in which poſt he remained, to give this detachment time to gain Bitſchow and Nechanitz. On the 22d the army came, between Pardubitz and Königſgrætz, to the village of Woititz, which covered the defile of Nechanitz.

Nechanitz. The ſick and the baggage were ſent before, under a good convoy, toward Sileſia, in order to lighten the march of the troops. Pardubitz was evacuated by Retzau. On the 24th, the cavalry marched to meet general Naſſau, and eſcorted him to the army. The infantry was made to file off through Königſgrætz, that it might canton in the villages which lie on the other ſide the Elbe. They remained in this poſition on the 25th and 26th.

On the 27th, the army divided into three columns; one of which took the road of the county of Glatz; the ſecond, led by the king, paſſed through the defiles of Braunau; and the third, under the conduct of du Moulin, marched along the road of Trautenau, to Schatzlar. The firſt column was not diſturbed in its march. The brigade of Truchſes, which compoſed the rear-guard of the ſecond column, was attacked, as it paſſed the rivulet Metau, near the village of Pleſs. Truchſes idly amuſed himſelf with ſkirmiſhing with the pandours, and had forty men killed and wounded. An incident that here happened will characteriſe the Hungarian ſoldier. During the ſkirmiſh, ſome pigs were heard ſqueaking in the village of Pleſs. This was the ſignal of a truce: the pandours left the

Pruſſians,

Pruſſians, and ran to the village, to kill animals which they were fonder of eating than they were of fighting. Hiſtory certainly affords few examples of ſkirmiſhes, ſo hot, which have had ſo burleſque a concluſion.

The column of du Moulin was attacked at the village of Elſe; but with ſo little vigour that it merits no conſideration.

The column of the king arrived at Tannhauſen on the 4th of December; where, almoſt at the ſame time, the old prince of Anhalt arrived. Prince Leopold was attacked by a diſeaſe which put his life in danger. Marſhal Schwerin was out of temper, and had left the army before the return into Sileſia. The king was obliged to go to Berlin, in order to make the neceſſary arrangements for the approaching campaign; and, at the ſame time, to pave the way for ſome negotiations, which might be purſued with greater eagerneſs, ſhould circumſtances ſo require.

The following is what happened to the other corps, in their retreat. Winterfeld fortunately brought his detachment to Leutmeritz, in Sileſia: he was haraſſed on his march, but the good diſpoſitions he made held the Hungarians in reſpect.

The garriſon of Prague did not literally fol-

low the orders it had received. Einſiedel ought to have blown up the works of Wiſcherad and St. Laurent; to have burſt the heavy artillery and burnt the carriages; to have thrown the fuſees, belonging to the garriſon of the queen, into the water. But he falſely ſuppoſed that this order would be revoked; and ſuſpended the execution of it till the moment of his departure, when it was too late. When he perceived the time of quitting the city approached, he collected all the horſes he could find, to bring with him the forty-two Auſtrian field pieces, inſtead of the heavy artillery he was obliged to abandon. The garriſon left Prague on the 26th of November. Einſiedel had ſo ill taken his precautions that, while his troops were filing through the gate St. Charles, four hundred pandours were introduced into the city, on the oppoſite ſide. Theſe Hungarians attacked the rear-guard. Count Rottembourg, who commanded there, played ſome cannon loaded with caſe-ſhot on them, which kept them in awe. The garriſon arrived at Leutmeritz on the 30th, where it remained ſome days to procure bread and proviſions. When Einſiedel arrived at Leipe, he learnt that the Saxons meant to diſpute his paſſage into Sileſia; for prince Charles had only followed the king as far

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as Nachod, after which he had taken the road to Moravia, and the Saxons that of the circles of Buntzlau and Leutmeritz. He had ſome ſkirmiſhes on the way with the enemy's light troops, but of little importance. Arriving at Hochwald, a ſmall town two miles diſtant from Friedland, and three from the frontiers of Sileſia, he perceived a large corps, and heard from ſome fugitives and ſpies that this was a Saxon corps, under the command of count Saxe, reinforced by two thouſand Auſtrian grenadiers. Einſiedel, who had never been in a ſimilar ſituation, loſt all firmneſs; he remained long undetermined, whether he ſhould attack the Saxons, who were intrenched behind heaped-up ſnow, or whether he ſhould traverſe Luſatia to gain Sileſia. The enemy had ſo encumbered the road to Friedland, with rubbiſh, that it was become impracticable in this ſeaſon.

Count Rottembourg, perceiving that the incertitude of Einſiedel would ſuffer the troops to periſh with cold and hunger, cauſed the roads of Luſatia to be reconnoitred, and determined to attack count Saxe; taking all conſequences upon himſelf. A captain named Cottwitz, by birth a Saxon, deſerted during night, and informed count Saxe of the deſigns of Rottembourg. The latter, ſeeing himſelf betrayed, profited

profited by treachery itſelf. Early next morning, he began his march, and entered Luſatia. The Saxons were wholly occupied concerning their defence; and they received information at the ſame time that a large body of Pruſſians, under general Naſſau, was marching through Sileſia, to fall upon them in the rear. They were ſo amuſed by this intelligence that the garriſon of Prague fortunately eſcaped. As Rottembourg continued his march, one colonel Vitzthum, who commanded on the frontiers of Luſatia, wiſhed to oppoſe him on his paſſage; but when he perceived the number of the Pruſſians, whom he had to encounter, he deſiſted. The Saxon general Arnheim, under whoſe orders he was, ſent another officer to intercept the march of the Pruſſians; but Rottembourg, overwhelming him with civilities, purſued his route, and arrived the 13th of December on the frontiers of Sileſia, where theſe troops were employed to form a chain of quarters, extending from Luſatia to the county of Glatz.

Such was the end of a campaign the preparatives for which beſpoke the moſt fortunate ſucceſs. This grand armament, which was to ſwallow up Bohemia, and even inundate Auſtria, had the fate of the famous armada, pronounced

nounced invincible, which Philip II. of Spain ſent to conquer England.

It muſt be allowed that it is more difficult to make war in Bohemia than in any other country. This kingdom is ſurrounded by a chain of mountains, which render invaſion and retreat alike dangerous. The city of Prague, when taken, muſt have an army for a garriſon; which too much enfeebles the main body that is to act againſt the enemy. Magazines can only be collected there in winter, when the rigour of the ſeaſon obliges the inhabitants to remain in their villages. Some fertile diſtricts may ſupply ſubſiſtence for grand armies: graſs and hay will not there be wanting; but other mountainous and woody circles are too barren, for an army to remain in them long. Beſide that Bohemia contains no tenable fortreſs; and, if the Auſtrians wiſh to chaſe the enemy from this kingdom without coming to battle, they have it in their power to ſtarve him, by cutting off all communication. The chain of mountains, which ſurround Bohemia, ſupply every thing that an intelligent officer can deſire, from defiles and poſts, proper to intercept convoys. Only one method can be taken to conquer this kingdom.

No general committed more faults than did the

the king, during this campaign. The firſt, certainly, was that of not providing magazines, ſufficient to maintain his army ſix months in Bohemia. It is well known that, to raiſe the great ſuperſtructure of an army, it muſt be remembered the belly is the foundation. But this was not all. He entered Saxony, although he knew that the Saxons had acceded to the treaty of Worms; therefore, he either ſhould have obliged them to change ſides or have cruſhed them before he had ſet foot in Bohemia. He laid ſiege to Prague, and ſent a feeble detachment to Beraun againſt Bathiani. Had not the troops enacted prodigies of valour, they muſt have been loſt. Prague being taken, good policy certainly required he ſhould immediately march, with the half of his army, againſt Bathiani; ruin him before the arrival of prince Charles, and take the magazine of Pilſen; the loſs of which would have prevented the return of the Auſtrians into Bohemia. They would have been obliged again to amaſs ſubſiſtence, which requires time; ſo that, to them, the campaign would have been loſt. If ſufficient zeal were not ſhewn in ſupplying the Pruſſian magazines, the fault muſt not be imputed to the king, but to the contractors, who received the money and left the magazines empty.

But how might the king have the weakneſs to adopt marſhal de Belleiſle's project for the campaign, which led him to Tabor and Budweis, when he himſelf allowed that this project was neither conformable to preſent circumſtances, his own intereſt, nor the laws of war? It is erroneous to carry condeſcenſion too far. The commiſſion of this error drew on numerous others. Was he juſtified in putting his army into cantonments, when the enemy was encamped within a march of his quarters? The advantage of the campaign was wholly for the Auſtrians. Marſhal Traun acted the part of Sertorius, and the king that of Pompey. The conduct of the marſhal is a perfect model, which every general who delights in his profeſſion ought to ſtudy, and if he has the abilities to imitate. The king himſelf owned that he regarded that campaign as his ſchool in the art of war, and Traun as his preceptor. Good fortune is often more fatal to princes than adverſity: during the former they are intoxicated with preſumption, the ſecond renders them circumſpect and modeſt.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

The Auſtrians invade Upper Sileſia and the County of Glatz; are repelled by the Prince of Anhalt and General Lehwald. Negotiations in France. Death of Charles VII. Intrigues of the French in Saxony. Other Negotiations with the French. Negotiations for Peace with the Engliſh. Impediments to the Peace, and the Treaty of Warſaw. Preparations for the Campaign. Departure of the King for Sileſia. The young Elector of Bavaria concludes the Peace of Fuſſen, with Auſtria, in 1745.

1745. SCARCELY had the king quitted the army before the Auſtrians attempted to profit by what they called the panic of the Pruſſians. They entered the Upper Sileſia and the county of Glatz. Marwitz, whoſe corps was cantoned in the environs of Troppau, retired, before the enemy's approach, to Ratibor, where he died. Prince Thierry led this corps, through Coſſel and Brieg, to join the army in the neighbourhood of Neiſs. General Lehwald, who commanded in the county of Glatz, in like manner retired toward the capital, before the enemy came up. Theſe retreats were made

without loſs; becauſe, being made timely, the Auſtrians had no opportunity of profiting by them. The king then ſaw himſelf obliged to return into Sileſia; that, in concert with the old prince of Anhalt, he might take meaſures capable of deranging the projects of prince Charles of Lorraine.

The prince of Anhalt collected a large body, near Neiſs. On the 7th of January*, he paſſed the river and marched immediately to the enemy. His troops diurnally aſſembled at break of day; and, when night came on, went into cloſe cantonments. Traun, on his approach, abandoned the poſt of Neuſtadt, and fell back on the road to Moravia. The Auſtrians, in this retreat, lay five days in the ſnow; many of them periſhed with cold, and many deſerted. The prince of Anhalt could only come up with a part of their rear-guard, ſome of whom he made priſoners; after which he took poſt at Jægerndorff and Troppau. Naſſau, with a corps of ſix thouſand men, cleared Upper Sileſia, toward Ratibor and on the other ſide of the Oder, of the Hungarians by whom it was infeſted. Lehwald, with a like number of troops, returned to Glatz, to chaſe the Auſtrians out of this country, in which they wiſhed to eſtabliſh themſelves. Naſſau eaſily diſlodged the Hun-

* 1745.

garians

garians from Troppau, and fell ſuddenly on Oderberg, and from thence on Ratibor, as ſoon as marſhal Traun made his retreat toward Moravia. Three thouſand of the enemy were ſurpriſed in Ratibor. The Hungarians, having vainly attempted to cut a paſſage ſword in hand, wiſhed to eſcape over the bridge of the Oder; but the crowd was ſo great in paſſing that the bridge broke down. The Pruſſians at the ſame time forced the town, and thoſe of the enemy who were not put to the ſword were either drowned or taken. Another Hungarian corps, commanded by general Caroli, did not wait the approach of Naſſau, and retired from Pleſs in the principality of Teſchen.

Lehwald at the ſame time advanced toward Wenzel Wallis, who had marched to Habelſchwerd, a town ſituated in a valley, on the confines of Moravia. Lehwald entered the county of Glatz by Johanneſberg, and ſoon came up with the enemy, advantageouſly poſted near the village of Plomnitz. A rivulet meandered in their front, the banks of which were in many places difficult of acceſs. Nothing could ſtop general Lehwald. He attacked the Auſtrians*. The troops ſurmounted all obſtacles, forded the rivulet, climbed the hill, and fell ſo im-

* February 13th.

petuouſly and audacioufly upon the enemy that they drove him from his poſt. The Auſtrians attempted to form again, in a wood which was behind the field of battle; but they were prevented by the Pruſſian grenadiers, by whom they were purſued with the bayonet. On the back of the wood was a ſmall plain, and beyond this a coppice, by which the enemy a ſecond time endeavoured to profit; but they were attacked with ſuch ardour that the confuſion and flight became general.

Lehwald had not above four hundred huſſars, which number was thought ſufficient, in a hilly and difficult country. Had he been ſtronger in cavalry, few of the enemy could have eſcaped. This corps, which fled into Bohemia, loſt nine hundred men on the occaſion. The Pruſſians took three cannon and one hundred priſoners, and only loſt thirty ſoldiers killed and wounded. The brave colonel Gaudi, an officer of reputation, was highly regretted: he had rendered an important ſervice to the late king, at the ſiege of Stralſund, where he pointed out a paſſage, by which the intrenchment of the Swedes might be taken, by turning it toward the ſea, which then was at ebb. Succeſs ſo rapid encouraged the Pruſſians, and deprived the troops of the queen of Hungary of all deſire

to

to prolong the campaign. Each party returned into winter quarters, where they peacefully remained.

Fortune had likewiſe ſhewn another mark of favour, in behalf of the Pruſſians, by the birth of a prince*, ſon of the prince and princeſs of Pruſſia. This aſcertained the ſucceſſion to the reigning branch, which till then had only extended to the three brothers of the king.

The court of Berlin waited the arrival of marſhal de Belleiſle, whom Louis XV. ſent to his allies, that he might concert meaſures with them for the opening of the approaching campaign. The marſhal had repaired to Munich, and from thence to Caſſel, where he was adviſed not to paſs through the electorate of Hanover, on his road to Berlin. A ſurer route was indicated, which took him by the Eichsfeld to Halberſtadt. The marſhal, inflated with his character of ambaſſador and title of prince of the empire, rejected the caution; and, in conſequence of this obſtinacy, took the uſual road. Scarcely had he arrived at Elbingerode before he was arreſted by the Hanoverian dragoons. He had the preſence of mind to deſtroy his papers. He was led in triumph to Hanover, the council of which applauded itſelf for

* September 25, 1744.

having taken a marſhal of France, the confidential perſon of the league of Frankfort, and one who enacted ſo ſuperior a part in Europe. He was ſent to England, where Windſor-caſtle became his priſon, and where he remained ſome months, not being exchanged till after the battle of Fontenoy.

The pride of the king of France ſuffered by the affront the Hanoverians gave him, in the perſon of his ambaſſador. At Verſailles it was affirmed the Hanoverians had, in this inſtance, failed in the reſpect due to the Imperial crown, and the rights of nations, by arreſting a man of a public character, like a thief, on the high road. At London they replied that, after war was declared, any French officer who, without paſſport, ſhould enter the territories of the king of England, might legally be taken: that they regarded marſhal de Belleiſle as an officer, and not as an ambaſſador, the latter character not being indubitable, and only real at the court to which he was ſent in that capacity. In reality, this was only an act of revenge, on the part of the king of England, to humble marſhal de Belleiſle. George regarded him as the author of the German war, as the man who had obliged him to give his vote in favour of Charles VII. and by whom he had been conſtrained, in 1741,

to

to accept a neutrality, when marſhal de Maillebois threatened his electorate. Marſhal de Belleiſle therefore was held to be the ſworn enemy of the houſe of Brunſwick.

Louis XV. to theſe public vexations had others of a private nature. The dutcheſs of Chateauroux, baniſhed from Metz, died of grief, at being ſo rigorouſly treated. The recovery of the king awakened his former fires. Love, offended by religion, took vengeance in turn, by rekindling, with additional force in the heart of the king, his paſſion for his miſtreſs. At the moment that her return was in agitation, news was received of her death. Never did ſacrament occaſion ſo much remorſe as that which Louis XV. had received at Metz. He reproached himſelf with the death of a perſon whom he had tenderly loved, felt deſires he was unable to gratify, and his ineffectual regret ſo violently agitated his ſenſibility that, for a time, he retired from the world. The illneſs of this prince, fatal as it was to his allies and his miſtreſs, procured him the beſt ſatisfaction a ſovereign can enjoy; it procured him the name of Louis the well-beloved; an epithet preferable to that of ſaint, or great; which laſt flattery often, but truth ſeldom, beſtows on kings.

If

If the king of France was counteracted in his views, Pruſſia was expoſed to more real miſfortunes, after the diſgraceful campaign of 1744. In Bohemia, from an auxiliary ſhe became a principal in the war; the theatre of which was tranſported from Alſatia to the frontiers of Sileſia. The ill-will of the Saxons was ſufficiently manifeſt to foreſee that, if it depended upon them, they would endeavour to render the Pruſſian ſtates the ſeat of war. To repel theſe enemies exorbitant expences were neceſſary; and even theſe ſcarcely could enſure the flat country from ruin. Such conſiderations cauſed peace to be conſidered as the ſole means of retiring from ſo critical a ſituation. France was engaged efficaciouſly to aſſiſt the Pruſſians. The king wrote a pathetic letter to Louis XV. recalling theſe engagements to mind. By the anſwer of the latter it appeared that he was as unfeeling for the intereſt of his allies as he was ſenſible to what concerned himſelf. The Bohemian war however was purpoſely undertaken to ſave Alſatia.

Nothing was wanting more to embroil the politics of the European powers except the death of the emperor Charles VII. which accordingly happened, on the 18th of January, 1745. This emperor carried benevolence to

exceſs,

exceſs, and liberality to ſuch an extreme that he was himſelf reduced to indigence. He twice loſt his ſtates; and, had not death prevented the misfortunes which awaited him, a third time he would have been obliged to leave his capital like a fugitive. This was the period of the diſſolution of the league of Frankfort, which had already been infringed by the French, who had not fulfilled any one article of that alliance. The name of the emperor had rendered the aſſociation of thoſe princes who had taken up his defence legal; the proceedings had all been conformable to the laws of the empire. No ſooner was he dead than the object of this combination was deſtroyed. The princes of the empire had no longer any common cauſe; nor did the ſame intereſts any longer attach them to Pruſſia.

It was eaſy to foreſee that the new houſe of Auſtria would make all poſſible efforts to regain poſſeſſion of the Imperial crown. The death of the emperor was regarded at Verſailles as a happy cataſtrophe, which would relieve France from her embarraſſments. She was tired of paying him conſiderable ſubſidies; and ſhe flattered herſelf ſhe could make a good exchange, of the Imperial crown for a lucrative peace, with the queen of Hungary. The court

of

of Vienna had the utmoſt advantage in what related to the election; becauſe that a third of the electors were in the pay of England; and becauſe the elector of Mayence, whoſe influence was of weight in the deliberations of the empire, was devoted to the queen of Hungary. And who was the candidate that could be oppoſed to the grand duke of Tuſcany? The elector Palatine was too feeble. The young elector of Bavaria was not, according to the law of the golden bull, yet of age. The Imperial throne was held to be incompatible with that of Poland; therefore the elector of Saxony ſeemed to be excluded. Thus was there only the grand duke of Tuſcany; who was ſupported by the armies of the queen of Hungary, Engliſh gold, and the intrigues of the clergy.

The court of Verſailles felt the difficulties ſhe had to encounter, at preſent, in excluding the grand duke from the throne. Yet did ſhe wiſh to raiſe up rivals, that the conditions of accommodation might be more advantageous. Count Saxe moſt contributed to make the choice of the court fall on Auguſtus III. king of Poland. Mr. d'Argenſon warmly eſpouſed the idea; hoping, by this competitorſhip, to embroil Auguſtus with the queen of Hungary. He expected to find no oppoſition to the execution

cution of this deſign, except from Pruſſia; being exactly informed of the ſubjects of diſcontent which ſubſiſted between the two kings.

The king of Poland had, in effect, neglected nothing to render the king of Pruſſia irreconcileable. From the beginning of the year 1744, he had attempted to make the republic of Poland accede to the alliance which he had lately concluded with the houſe of Auſtria, and which was properly no more than a renovation of the guarantee of the Pragmatic ſanction. He repreſented to the diet, at Warſaw, the neceſſity of augmenting the army of the crown to twenty thouſand men, that he might reſiſt the deſigns of an ambitious neighbour, who would immediately fall upon the republic. He concluded an offenſive and defenſive alliance with Ruſſia; which was every where whiſpered to be againſt Pruſſia. Having paſſed through Sileſia, to repair to the diet of Poland, there was no deceit he did not ſpread, as well at Warſaw as at other European courts, concerning the little regard that was ſhewn to his perſon and his family; though every reſpect was paid him which is due to crowned heads. The paſſage of the Pruſſian troops through Saxony made him exclaim ſtill louder. As an example, it was alleged that, in the year 1711, the

Saxons

Saxons had paſſed through Brandenbourg, to attack the Swedes. Theſe examples were found right, in one caſe; wrong, in the other. Attention had been paid to the intereſts of the king of Poland, by offering to marry his daughter, the princeſs Marian, to the ſon of the emperor. The French and Pruſſian miniſters did not even ſpare very conſiderable temptations to gain *count* * * * †, and to perſuade him to take part with the emperor, but all in vain: the place was already ſeized on, and occupied, by the Engliſh, the Auſtrians, and the Ruſſians. So many marks of ill-will, on the part of the Saxons, did not, previous to the war, prevent the king from permitting ſix regiments, they had in Poland, to traverſe Sileſia on their march into Luſatia.

According to the treaty between the king of Poland and the queen of Hungary, he was, in caſe of war, only to furniſh ſix thouſand men. No ſooner were the Pruſſians in Bohemia than twenty-two thouſand Saxons joined the

† *Count Bruhl.* Aſteriſms occur wherever this miniſter of Poland and Saxony is meant. An expedient ſo puerile muſt have been imagined by the editor: the inveteracy of Frederic was too glaring, too deep, too outrageous, to admit of ſuch falſe delicacy, by which nothing is concealed. The tranſlator however has conformed to his original. T.

Auſtrians; and Saxony forbade the paſſage of the Pruſſian ſubſiſtence and ammunition. This was equivalent to a formal declaration of war. The king of Pruſſia thought proper to inform theſe neighbours, ſo furiouſly his enemies, of the danger they were bringing upon themſelves. The information, which was perhaps ill-timed, offended their vanity, and increaſed the hatred they had to the Pruſſians. When the latter abandoned Bohemia, count * * * attributed their misfortunes to his abilities; affirmed the queen of Hungary owed Bohemia to the valour of the Saxon troops; and vaunted of having driven back the Pruſſians.

Not contented with this rhodomontade, it was the wiſh of his heart to involve the king of Pruſſia and the republic of Poland in a quarrel. It is neceſſary to recollect that there is a ſevere law, in the republic, againſt thoſe who ſhould corrupt a member of the diet. The count, by the aid of bribery, prevailed on a ſtaroſte, named Wilczewſky, to declare, in open diet, that the Pruſſian miniſter had corrupted him with a bribe of five thouſand ducats; which declaration he made with ſo repentant an air, and in a tone of ſo much truth, as to induce belief. But he was ſeverely examined and confounded by his own depoſitions. The diet of

Grodno

Grodno immediately broke up; after having rejected the alliance of Auſtria, and the augmentation of the army.

Poland, at that time, ſwarmed with malecontents; as is uſual in republican ſtates, where liberty only ſubſiſts by the different parties that alternately overawe the ambition of contending factions. Theſe malecontents offered the king of Pruſſia to enter into a confederation, againſt the families of Czartorinſky and Potocky; or, properly ſpeaking, againſt Auguſtus III.* This would have raiſed the king of Poland ſome difficulties; but the king of Pruſſia, far from deſiring to blow up, wiſhing to extinguiſh the embers of war, had the moderation to counſel theſe Palatines not to diſturb the peace of their country. He even offered this prince, by whom he had been ſo highly offended, and who wiſhed to return into Saxony, every ſecurity he could deſire on his paſſage through Sileſia. The refuſal of Auguſtus did not partake of that politeneſs which formerly reigned at his court. He took the road through Moravia, the conqueſt of which he had meditated in 1742. He had a conference with the emperor at Olmutz; and

* He has before been called Auguſtus II. part 1. page 41. That is, as king of Poland, Auguſtus II. and, as elector of Saxony, Auguſtus III. T.

from

from thence he continued his journey, by Prague to Dreſden. * * * and the queen paſſed through Vienna, where they gathered the fruits of their politics.

No ſooner was * * * returned to Dreſden than he expedited his firſt clerk, a man of confidence, one Saul, to the court of Vienna, to regulate, with Bartenſtein the miniſter of the queen of Hungary, the partition of Sileſia. This was a ſecret article, in addition to the treaty of Warſaw. The principalities of Glogau and Sagau were promiſed to the king of Poland, who engaged that his troops ſhould act offenſively in Sileſia; that he would renounce his pretenſions to the Imperial crown; and that he would vote for the grand duke of Tuſcany. He further offered to increaſe his auxiliary corps to thirty thouſand men. Some people differ concerning the advantages which the queen of Hungary promiſed the king of Poland; and pretend that the court of Vienna merely undertook to guard his intereſts at the general peace; and that it promiſed to count * * * the principality of Teſchen, with the dignity of prince of the empire. Be this as it may, it is little apparent that the king ſhould be ſeduced by theſe latter conditions. Probability gives force to the partition of Sileſia, ſtipulated

by the treaty, and appearances are ſtrengthened becauſe that the count de St. Severin, the French ambaſſador in Poland, imagined he had diſcovered this particular, which was generally enough noiſed abroad.

So many treaties between the courts of Vienna and Dreſden increaſed that umbrage which Pruſſia could not but take. The time of marching into field drew on. Cagnoni, the Pruſſian envoy at Dreſden, received orders to demand an explanation, from count * * *, concerning the uſe to which the Saxon troops, that were in Bohemia, were deſtined; and, in a word, to obtain a categorical declaration, whether theſe troops would or would not attack the provinces under the government of Pruſſia. * * * anſwered evaſively and endeavoured to diſſemble intentions which were known to all Europe.

Such were the terms on which the two courts were, when France propoſed to place the Imperial crown on the head of an enemy, by whom the king had been ſo grievouſly offended. Had he conſulted his reſentment only, he would inſtantly have rejected ſuch a propoſition. He was more moderate. Good policy required he ſhould employ all poſſible means to diſunite the two courts that were leagued againſt him; for, ſhould the king of Poland be flattered by

by the title of emperor, his pretenſions and thoſe of the queen of Hungary muſt render them irreconcileable foes. The king would then have had excellent diverſion; for, by coming to an accommodation with the houſe of Auſtria, he might fruſtrate Auguſtus of the throne for which he caballed.

But the project of France was, in execution, impoſſible. The Imperial and Poliſh crowns cannot be united on the ſame head. Hence it was previouſly requiſite Auguſtus ſhould abdicate that of Poland, which he was not permitted to do, according to the laws of the kingdom. The king of Pruſſia, therefore, made no difficulty in agreeing to whatever France required, of acting conjunctively in the performance of ſo chimerical a project. The negotiation at Berlin had been committed to the chevalier de Court, who expected to have found more reſiſtance on the part of the king, in what related to the elevation of his enemy; and he ſuppoſed his conſent was a mark of condeſcenſion for the court of France.

But the king had no reaſon to be equally well ſatisfied with the plans which this ambaſſador propoſed, for the enſuing campaign. In deſpite of honeyed words, it was perceptible that France had no intention to make any ef-

forts in favour of her allies. No arrangement could be obtained for the ſubſiſtence of the army of Bavaria. The opening of the campaign was to be deferred as long as poſſible. The Germans were to beſiege Paſſau, the French Ingoldſtadt, and no one troubled himſelf concerning the attempts the Auſtrians might make in the mean time. The army of Maillebois had retired from the Lahn behind the Maine: this the French wiſhed to reinforce, and leave inactive. The chief ſtrength of the monarchy was to be exerted in Flanders; where Louis XV. had reſolved to make a ſecond campaign: and the diverſion into the electorate of Hanover, ſtipulated in the treaty of Verſailles, was now abſolutely rejected.

After the king had exhauſted all the reaſons he could urge, to induce the French ambaſſador to change his opinion, he wrote a kind of memorial, and ſent it to Louis XV. in which the military operations were adapted to the political views of the two courts, and their movements arranged according to preſent ſituations, preſent circumſtances, and the poſſibility of execution. It was there propoſed, the army of Maillebois ſhould paſs the Lahn, and enter Franconia, Weſtphalia, and the circle of the Lower Rhine, in order to awe the elector of Hanover,

Hanover, and prevent him from ſending ſuccours into Bohemia, to favour the election of the grand duke. This army would likewiſe ſerve as a check to theſe circles, and to protect the elector Palatine and the landgrave of Heſſe, with the other allies of the deceaſed emperor. Should ſuch means even be inſufficient totally to exclude the grand duke from the Imperial throne, they would ſtill empower the French to keep the election in ſuſpenſe; and whoever gains time gains every thing.

In like manner, the king inſiſted that ſubſiſtence ſhould be provided for the army of Bavaria, as well as a good general; and that this army ſhould aſſemble as ſoon as the Auſtrians began to leave their quarters; in order that the Pruſſians and Bavarians ſhould unite their efforts, againſt the common enemy. He alſo informed his allies that the campaign of 1744 had made him renounce the maxim of purſuing his plans with ſo much ardour; and that he would no longer penetrate far into the provinces of the queen of Hungary, unleſs he could be ſupplied with proviſions. That, having the Auſtrians and Saxons his enemies, and being likewiſe menaced by the Ruſſians, he had need to redouble his caution; and that, if the French did not take good meaſures to counteract the

Imperial election, he ſhould be obliged to make peace with the queen of Hungary.

The French, on this, ſent Mr. de Valori to Dreſden, to perſuade the king of Poland to contend for the Imperial throne; but the treaty of Warſaw, the aſcendancy of the Ruſſians at that court, and Engliſh guineas, tied up the hands of Saxony.

This prelude confirmed the court of Berlin in the opinion that the grand duke would become emperor; that the allied army would be unfortunate, in Bavaria; that the French were only intent on the campaign of Flanders; and that their allies would do wiſely to take care of themſelves. It were to be wiſhed that all theſe troubles might have been pacified, and the uſeleſs effuſion of blood prevented: but the embers of diſcord caſt forth new ſparks, over all Europe, and the treaſuries of the great powers were not yet exhauſted.

The Pruſſians, at all events, began to negotiate with the Engliſh; founding their hopes on the ſuppoſition that the minds of men were inclined to peace, and on a late revolution in the Engliſh miniſtry. Since lord Carteret had concluded the treaty of Worms, the opinion of the Engliſh nation, with reſpect to him, was changed. He was reproached with being violent

violent and paſſionate, and to proceed to extremities from too great heat. A general diſcontent obliged the king to part with his miniſter, who had entered into all his views, and who, under the appearance of national good, concealed every ſtep George made in favour of his electorate. The king had the mortification of not being left to diſpoſe of the ſeals, but was obliged to commit them to the duke of Newcaſtle. Lord Harrington was made miniſter, and the people called this new miniſtry the party of the Pelhams; becauſe the perſons who compoſed it were of that family. All the adherents of Carteret were diſplaced, by his ſucceſſors; but they neither could break the treaties he had concluded nor ſuddenly ſtop the impulſe he had given to the general affairs of Europe. Carteret was deceitful, without regarding thoſe appearances which the moſt vicious employ, to diſguiſe their purpoſes. Harrington had the reputation of a man of probity; more timid than his predeceſſor, he repaired this defect by every quality of a worthy man.

Encouraged by the perſonal character of the miniſter, diſpoſitions for a general peace were attempted, through his means. The following

is the ſketch of ſome ideas which were communicated to Harrington. Don Philip was to have an eſtabliſhment in Italy. France was to keep Ypres and Furnes, which ſhe had conquered. In lieu of theſe, Spain ſhould, for twenty years or more, ſuffer the contraband trade of the Engliſh. The allies ſhould accede to the election of the grand duke of Tuſcany, and Pruſſia remain in the poſſeſſion of Sileſia, agreeable to the treaty of Breſlau. The Engliſh miniſtry declined negotiating, according to theſe articles; for the king deſired a continuation of the war, and counteracted every meaſure of the Pelhams to bring it to a concluſion.

The cauſe of this obſtinate refuſal was at length diſcovered at the Hague. The man of the greateſt genius, and at the ſame time the moſt eloquent, in England, lord Cheſterfield, was then in Holland. This lord did not conceal from count Podewils, the Pruſſian ambaſſador to the States General, that the treaty of Warſaw ſhackled the good will of the Pelhams; that, conſequently, the king of Pruſſia could hope for no ſucceſs from negotiation, but ought vigorouſly to oppoſe the deſigns of his enemies, who ſought his deſtruction. This did not prevent the frequent inſinuations of the Pruſſian ambaſſador, at London, from entirely conciliating

conciliating the new miniſtry to the king of Pruſſia; by whom he was aſſured they only waited opportunities to do him ſervice. The advice of lord Cheſterfield was the beſt that could be followed.

Negotiations were continued; but the principal attention of the king turned on every object which beſt might inſure ſucceſs to the following campaign. One of the moſt important no doubt was to form large magazines in Sileſia; to accompliſh which no expence was ſpared. Efforts were made to complete the regiments. The ſoldier was well provided for in winter quarters. The cavalry was remounted and completed. More than ſix millions were drawn from the treaſury, to ſupply all theſe diſburſements. A loan was obtained from the States of one million five hundred thouſand crowns. All theſe ſums were expended to enable the king to repair, in 1745, the errors he had committed in Bohemia, in 1744. Theſe preparations being made, the king departed from Berlin to Sileſia*.

He learnt, on the road, that the elector of Bavaria had ſigned the treaty of Fuſſen, with the queen of Hungary. This peace was thus brought about. Immediately after the death

* March 15th.

of

of the emperor, Seckendorff reſigned the command of the army; but he had ſo ill diſpoſed of their quarters that the troops were all ſcattered; the ground they occupied was too extenſive. The Auſtrians, being maſters of the forts and the courſe of the Danube, ſaw of what importance it was to them to finiſh, in one place, before they began their operations, in another; and judged, by the poſition of the Bavarians and their allies, they might make an eaſy purchaſe. Bathiani anticipated his enemies, who were thrice his ſtrength, but who did not intend to aſſemble before the end of May: at the head of twelve thouſand men, conſtituting his whole force, he appeared between Braunau and Scharding, fell upon the ſcattered quarters of the allies, and took Pfarrkirchen, Wilſhofen, and Landſhut, with the few magazines which the Bavarians there had amaſſed. At the ſame time another Auſtrian detachment paſſed the Danube, at Deckendorff, cut off the Heſſians from the Bavarians, obliged them to croſs the Inn, afterward to lay down their arms, and drove the fugitive Bavarians beyond Munich. The young elector, ſcarcely a ſovereign, was, after the example of his father and grandfather, obliged to fly from his capital. He retired to Augſbourg.

Segur,

Segur, with the French and Palatines under his command, met a fate not more favourable. He was beaten, on his retreat, near Pfaffenhofen. The Auſtrians were in poſſeſſion of the bridge of the Rhine, which obliged him to gain Donauwert before the enemy.

While the Bavarians fled like ſheep without a ſhepherd, and eſcaped to Friedberg, Seckendorff made his appearance at the court of Bavaria, during this total overthrow, not as a hero who finds reſources in his genius when meaner people deſpair, but as a creature of the court of Vienna, and with the intention of ſeducing a youthful unexperienced prince, overwhelmed by misfortunes. During the preceding campaign, the French had ſuſpected that this marſhal had ſuffered himſelf to be corrupted; becauſe he had not acted as might have been expected, in Alſatia, againſt the Auſtrians. He was found to want energy, when he meant to attack, and to be dilatory, when he might purſue the enemy to deſtruction. He was accuſed of having purpoſely ſeparated the quarters of the allies, to deliver them, tied hand and feet, to their foes. It was even affirmed that he had received three hundred thouſand florins of arrears, from the empreſs queen, which were due to him from the emperor Charles VI.

that

that he might prevail on the elector of Bavaria to make peace. It is probable that the court of Vienna had given him a proſpect of advantage, and perhaps had promiſed him that ſum; but it was little capable of diſcharging ſuch a debt, at that time.

The ſtrongeſt teſtimonies againſt him are the meaſures he took to accelerate the treaty of Fuſſen. He produced falſe memorials to the young elector; ſhewed him ſuppoſed letters from the king of Pruſſia, in which the latter informed him of the peace he intended to conclude with the queen of Hungary; magnified imaginary advantages, which the arms of that princeſs had obtained in Flanders and Italy; and conjured him to terminate all differences with her, that he might avoid total ruin. The elector, youthful and inexperienced, was led by the creatures of the court of Vienna, with whom he had been ſurrounded by Seckendorff. His father, the emperor, had ſaid to him, dying—"Never forget the ſervices which "the kings of France and Pruſſia have rendered "you, nor repay them with ingratitude."—Theſe words were ſo ſtrong in his mind that, for a moment, they rendered the hand that held the pen motionleſs: but the abyſs in which he was plunged, the impoſtures of Seckendorff, and

and the hope of better fortune, determined him to ſign the treaty of Fuſſen on the 22d of April, 1745.

By this treaty, the queen of Hungary renounced all indemnification, and promiſed to re-eſtabliſh the elector in the entire poſſeſſion of his ſtates. The elector, on his part, diſclaimed, for himſelf and his poſterity, all pretenſions which the houſe of Bavaria had to the ſtates of the houſe of Auſtria. He acknowledged the validity of the vote of Bohemia, and engaged to give his own vote for the election of the grand duke. He further promiſed to diſcharge his auxiliaries, on condition they ſhould not be diſturbed in their retreat, and that the queen of Hungary ſhould engage to levy no more contributions in Bavaria. Theſe laſt articles were ſo ill obſerved, by the Auſtrians, that they diſarmed the Heſſians, led them priſoners into Hungary, and, under pretext of arrears, ſtill raiſed heavy contributions in Bavaria.

Thus ended the league of Frankfort; and thus Auſtria ſhewed that, in the day of proſperity, there is no yoke more heavy than that which ſhe impoſes. But what could better inſtruct the *biſognoſi di gloria*, or politicians who flatter themſelves they can direct future contingencies, than the abſtract of events at the be-

ginning of this year. The emperor's deceaſe; his ſon at peace with the queen of Hungary; the grand duke of Tuſcany ſoon to become emperor; the half of Europe leagued againſt Pruſſia, by the treaty of Warſaw; Pruſſian gold keeping Ruſſia inactive; and England beginning to favour Pruſſia!

The king had taken good meaſures for ſelf defence. The fame and the fortunes of the Pruſſians were at ſtake on the iſſue of the enſuing campaign.

CHAP. XII.

Campaign of Italy. Campaign of Flanders. Of what paſſed on the Rhine. Events which preceded the Operations of the Year 1745.

NOT hereafter to interrupt the thread of the narration, we think proper in this place to give an abridgment of what paſſed in Italy, Flanders, and on the Rhine, before we come to the operations of the Pruſſian troops, in Sileſia. It is neceſſary to recollect that count Gages had taken his quarters at Terny, and had eſtabliſhed his Spaniards and Neapolitans on both ſides of the Tiber. Lobkowitz had

his quarters at Imola. The army of don Philip was partly in Savoy and partly in the county of Nice. The Spaniards opened the campaign by taking Oneglia. The French and Spaniſh army aſſembled in the neighbourhood of Nice. Prince Lobkowitz then advanced to Ceſena. Count Gagès met and beat him, on the 31ſt of March, near Rimini; and, taking ſeven hundred priſoners, purſued him to Lugo.

Lobkowitz retired thence by Bologna, paſſed the Panaro, and took poſt at Campo Santo. Count Gages paſſed the Panaro, nearly at the ſame time, at Modena; and advanced along the banks of the Trabia; whence he opened a communication with the Infant don Philip, through the ſtates of Genoa. Lobkowitz marched to Parma, where he aſſembled fifteen thouſand men, hoping to prevent the junction of the two armies: but Count Gages paſſed the Apennines and the river Magra, without troubling himſelf concerning the troops that haraſſed his rear; and, marching under the walls of Genoa, gained the valley of Polfevero, which induced the Auſtrians to march to Tortona.

Don Philip and Maillebois quitted the environs of Nice, on the firſt of June, marched along the ſea coaſt, and, aſcending the river of Genoa, continued their route without regarding the

the twelve Engliſh ſhips of war, which cannonaded them, and killed ſome of their men. The Spaniards here felt at once the effects of good and ill fortune. The Piedemonteſe had the cunning to burn eight of their magazines, in the neighbourhood of Ventimiglia. At the ſame time, the Genoeſe declared againſt the king of Sardinia, and added their forces, conſiſting of ten thouſand men, to thoſe of the Infant.

The Auſtrians, who neither knew the merit nor the value of good generals, had taken the command from marſhal Traun, who had ſurpaſſed himſelf the year before, as well in Alſatia as in Bohemia, and choſen prince Lobkowitz, to accompany prince Charles of Lorraine, in his ſtead. Lobkowitz was therefore recalled out of Italy, and count Schulenbourg ſupplied his place, till the arrival of the prince of Lichtenſtein, on whom the court had conferred the command of the army in Italy. Schulenbourg was not more fortunate againſt count Gages than his predeceſſor had been; ſo much had the genius of the Spaniard* the aſcendant over that of the

* Count Gages was not a Spaniard, but an Engliſhman, of rather extraordinary fortunes: ſee a curious note, relative to theſe, in Boyſe's Hiſtorical Review, vol. i. p. 377, octavo. Reading, 1747. T.

Auſtrian

Auſtrian generals. The count drove his new adverſary from Novi to Rivalta, while Don Philip penetrated into Montferrat, by Cairo, ſeized on Aqui, and joined the Neapolitan and Spaniſh army at Aſti. Schulenbourg paſſed the Tanaro, and poſted himſelf at the confluence of that river with the Po, near a ſmall town named Baſſignano. Don Philip ſeized the opportunity, inveſted Tortona, and marched toward the Auſtrians; who, retreating beyond the Po, burnt and deſtroyed all the bridges in their rear.

Tortona and its citadel yielded to the Spaniards. A ſuccour of eight thouſand Spaniards and Neapolitans arriving from Romania, under the command of the duke de la Vieuxville, paſſed through the grand dutchy of Florence, took Placenza and its citadel, and obliged the Auſtrians to quit the territories of Parma. Gages immediately paſſed the Po at Parpanaſſo, while the Infant Don Philip left Alexandria, croſſed the Tanaro, attacked the Auſtrians, on the 27th of September, at Baſſignano, and was victorious. He laid ſiege to Alexandria; which, except the citadel, ſurrendered. Valenza, Vigavano, and many other towns, which we ſhall forbear to enumerate, received law from the conqueror.

Under these circumstances, the prince of Lichtenstein arrived, to take the command of a beaten, enfeebled, and discouraged army. There is no need here to examine whether the court of Vienna could have chosen other generals; certain it is the present one applied no remedy to the ruined state of affairs. The progress of the victors found no opposition: they took Casal, Asti, and Lodi, from the king of Sardinia. The Infant entered Milan victorious; and, with eighteen thousand men, blockaded the citadel. The Spaniards, therefore, at the end of the campaign, were masters of almost all Lombardy, except Turin, Mantua, and some citadels, which they blockaded. This rapid success was due to the genius of count Gages; and, in part, to the aid of the Genoese. Prosperity, as we have said, is confident; and prosperity laid the conquerors of Italy asleep under the shade of their laurels. That they might secure their quarters, it was indispensably necessary that they should possess the citadels of Milan and Alexandria; which, with a little activity, they might have mastered: but they were out of breath, when they had but a few paces more of the race to run.

The arms of the Bourbons prospered, that year, in Flanders, as in Italy. Louis XV. put himself

himſelf at the head of his army, which was compoſed of eighty thouſand men. Marſhal Saxe commanded under him; and, at the opening of the campaign, the French, after various deceptive attempts on different places, ſuddenly inveſted Tournay. This place, one of the principal barrier towns, was garriſoned by nine thouſand Dutch. The goodneſs of its works and the ſtrength of the citadel, which Vauban had built, prepared the aſſailants to expect obſtacles, and to ſurmount difficulties.

The allies, under the command of the duke of Cumberland and marſhal Kœnigſeck, had only fifty thouſand men, to oppoſe to the forces of France. They advanced, however, toward Tournay, and came and encamped in the plains of Anderlech. Their neighbourhood did not prevent the French from opening the trenches, on the firſt of May. The allies, feeling how important was the protection of Tournay, reſolved to hazard every thing, that they might oblige Louis XV. to raiſe the ſiege.

On the ſouth ſide, aſcending the right arm of the Scheld, ſtands the village of Fontenoy; till then an obſcure place, but become famous by the battle which bears its name. Here it was that marſhal Saxe choſe ground, which he thought ſufficiently advantageous, to overturn

the projects of the duke of Cumberland. He left a sufficient number of troops to carry on the siege, and supported his right by the Scheld; garnished the village of Antoing, on the banks of that river, with infantry and cannon; formed two angular lines of infantry, toward mount Trinity, which was at the extremity of his left; ranged his cavalry in the rear of the infantry, making a third line; and, further, flanked the village of Antoing with a battery, from the opposite shore of the Scheld. Three redoubts, supplied with infantry and artillery, covered the front of his battle. Toward the left of his army was a wood, where the French threw up abatis* to render it impracticable.

At break of day, May 11th, the army of the allies marched from the wood of Bary, and formed on the plain in two lines, opposite the French army. The left of the allies began the battle. The Dutch were to attack the villages of Fontenoy and Antoing; this they did with little resolution, and were twice vigorously repulsed by the French. The English then detached some brigades, to seize on the redoubts which covered the front of the French army. The general who was to perform this duty found

* A species of entrenchment. T.

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it perhaps dangerous, and it was not executed. Marſhal Kœnigſeck, judging that his men would be cut off in detail, and to no good purpoſe, determined to ſhorten the diſpute: he attacked the French army, leaving the villages and redoubts in his rear. Had his project ſucceeded, all the French in theſe poſts would have been made priſoners, after the victory, which would have rendered this battle ſimilar to the famous one of Höchſtædt. But the event did not anſwer the intent. Kœnigſeck formed two lines of infantry, oppoſite the gap which is between Antoing and the wood of Bary; and, as he advanced, received the croſs fire of the village and redoubts. His flanks ſuffered, and fell back. His centre, being in leſs danger, continued to advance; and, as his wings reclined to the rear, his corps aſſumed a triangular form; which, by the continuance of the centre and the confuſion, was changed into a column.

This corps, unformed as it was, attacked and overthrew the French guards; pierced the two lines, and perhaps would have gained a complete victory, had the generals of the allies better known how to profit by the confuſion of the enemy. They had opened the centre of the French army: it was eaſy to divide their

column into two; and, by one on the right and the other on the left, they might take all the infantry in flank, which remained to oppoſe them. They ſhould at the ſame time have cauſed the cavalry to advance, and ſuſtain their divided columns. It is probable defeat would have attended the French, had the allies purſued this plan; but, while they were endeavouring to remedy their own confuſion, marſhal Saxe attacked them with the houſehold troops and the Iriſh brigade, which he had kept in reſerve; and ſtrengthened this attack, by playing from ſome batteries haſtily formed.

The Engliſh thus ſaw themſelves aſſailed in turn, and preſſed on all ſides, in front as well as in flank. After a vigorous reſiſtance, they fell back, were broken, and the French purſued them to the wood of Bary.

According to the common opinion, this battle coſt the allies ten thouſand men, ſome artillery, and a part of their baggage. They retired, by Leuſe, under the cannon of Ath, to the camp of Leſſines; leaving the field of battle and the city of Tournay to the French.

Louis XV. and the dauphin were perſonally preſent. They were ſtationed near a wind-mill, which was in the rear. The French ſoldiers afterward called their king Louis of the mill. Certain

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it is that, the day after the battle, Louis ſaid to the dauphin, as he paſſed over the field, bloody and covered with dead—"Here behold victims "ſacrificed to political hatred, and the paſſions "of our enemies. Preſerve this in mind, that "you may not ſport with the lives of your ſub-"jects, and be prodigal of their blood in unjuſt "wars."

Marſhal Saxe, whoſe dropſy did not prevent him from acting as general, received the moſt flattering praiſes from the king. He ſeemed to have been wreſted from the arms of death, to vanquiſh the enemies of France. The king of Pruſſia congratulated him on the glory he had acquired, regarding this victory as an engagement undertaken with the public, who expected ſtill greater things from marſhal Saxe in health, than marſhal Saxe expiring. Europe was overrun with verſified gazettes, proclaiming this great event: but it muſt be acknowledged that the temple of victory, on this occaſion, was ſuperior to that of the muſes. The capture of Tournay atteſted the victory of the French. The garriſon, that had taken refuge in the citadel, ſurrendered on the 19th of June. The capitulation was ſigned, on condition that four thouſand men, who evacuated the place, ſhould

not, for the ſpace of eighteen months, ſerve againſt France.

Louis XV. reinforced his army in Flanders, by a detachment of twenty thouſand men, from the army of the Rhine. The prince of Conti took the command of the latter, inſtead of marſhal Maillebois, who ſerved in Italy. A detachment ſo unſeaſonable was equally inimical to the rules of war and of policy. But, as the motives which occaſioned this conduct require diſcuſſion, the reader will be glad, for his own information, that we ſhould develope theſe motives. France had exhauſted every topic of politics, to perſuade the king of Poland to become a competitor for the Imperial throne. She was not diſcouraged by the ill ſucceſs of her intrigues: on the contrary, ſhe continued to negotiate at Dreſden. Count de St. Severin, who had been a good ſervant of France at that court, had drawn on himſelf the hatred of count * * *, becauſe the art of the Saxon did not agree with the penetrating ſpirit of the French negotiator. * * * was ſo active that St. Severin was replaced, by the marquis de Vaugrenant. The latter thought himſelf more artful than * * *. In reality, they were neither of them ſo; although, in this negotiation, Vaugrenant was the dupe of the Saxon. * * *

perſuaded

perſuaded him that the only part France could take, to obtain an advantageous peace from the queen of Hungary, was not to oppoſe the election of the grand duke; and to keep the army, which the prince de Conti commanded on the Rhine, inactive: he further urged that France might find theſe troops more uſeful on the Scheld than on the Maine.

The miniſters of Louis XV. blindly were caught in this ſnare. They neither examined how ſincere this advice might be nor how conſiſtent it was, with the engagements they had entered into, with their allies. By enfeebling the army of the prince de Conti, they rendered him incapable of oppoſing the enterprizes of the court of Vienna. The grand duke was elected in deſpite of France. Peace was not concluded, and the vanity of the miniſtry of Verſailles would not even ſubmit to reproach.

The troops drawn from that army arrived in Flanders, when, after the taking of the citadel of Tournay, the French army had decamped, and divided into three corps. One took poſt at Courtray; the ſecond at St. Guiſlain; and the third at Condé. Mr. de Chaila beat a detachment of five thouſand men, under the command of general Molé; whom the duke of Cumberland had ſent to throw himſelf into Gand.

Gand. This little check ſpread terror through the army of the allies: it decamped from Bruſſels. Gand, Brugges, and Oudenarde, being no longer protected, ſurrendered to the French, and the campaign ended by the taking of Nieuport, Dendermonde, Oſtend, and Ath: after which, marſhal Saxe ſent his troops into winter quarters, behind the Dender. This campaign reſtored to the arms of France the honour that had been loſt by that of Bohemia. If Louis XIV. ſubjugated a greater ſpace of ground, in the year 1672, he loſt it as faſt as it had been conquered: but Louis XV. ſecured his poſſeſſions, and loſt nothing of what he had gained.

The Spaniards and French had opened the campaign in Italy and Flanders above a month before the troops entered upon action in Silefia. The Pruſſian and Auſtrian armies had not peaceably gone into quarters till the end of February; and they had equal need of reſt, to recover from their fatigues. The king might have anticipated the foe; it was at his option to fall on the Auſtrian quarters in Bohemia; but the riſk of penetrating far, into that kingdom, was greater than that of waiting for the enemy. This conſideration induced him to draw his quarters of cantonment cloſe, in the

centre

centre of Sileſia, ſo as to be equally near to the defiles of the mountains, through which the enemy muſt paſs. To have wiſhed to diſpute fifteen or twenty thouſand roads, which lead out of Bohemia and Moravia into Sileſia, in an extent of twenty-four German miles, would have been the project of phrenzy. The ſureſt way was to attack prince Charles of Lorraine, at the very moment he ſhould leave the defiles; to purſue him into Bohemia; to forage the country for the ſpace of twelve miles, along the frontiers of Sileſia; and, toward the end of autumn, to bring back the troops into this dutchy, there to procure them peaceful quarters. This plan was ſimple, proportionate to the poſſibility of execution, and adapted to circumſtances; there was therefore every reaſon to hope it would ſucceed.

The army was diſtributed in ſuch a manner that ten battalions, ten ſquadrons, and five hundred huſſars, formed a chain, from Luſatia as far as the county of Glatz. The patroles extended toward Schatzlar, Braunau, and Böhmiſch-Friedland. This corps was under the command of lieutenant-general Truchſes. General Lehwald, with ten battalions and five hundred huſſars, guarded the county of Glatz; not including three battalions that were in gar-

riſon in the fortreſs; of which general Fouquet was governor. The margrave Charles defended the frontiers of Upper Sileſia, with ſixteen battalions and twenty ſquadrons. Hautcharmoy, with five battalions and ſixteen ſquadrons, occupied and covered that part of Upper Sileſia which lies beyond the Oder. The main body of the army was between Breſlau, Brieg, Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Neiſs. The king fixed his quarters in the latter town, in which was a contagious malady; an ulcerous diſeaſe, that, in a few days, ended in death. Had it been called the plague, all communication would have been interrupted; as would the delivery of the quotas, for the magazines; and the dread of that malady would have been more fatal, to the opening of the campaign, than any thing the enemy could undertake. This formidable word was therefore ſoftened; the contagion was called the putrid fever, and things continued in their uſual train. So much greater is the impreſſion of words than things, on the minds of men.

Soon after the arrival of the king, ſkirmiſhing began with great vivacity. The enemy ſuppoſed that, by continually haraſſing the Pruſſians, they would be cut off by degrees. Ten or twelve thouſand Hungarians, under the

the command of the old marſhal Eſterhazi, and generals Caroli, Feſtetiſch, Spleni, and Guillani, made incurſions into Upper Sileſia, penetrating as far as they poſſibly could. A major Schafſtedt, who was detached with two hundred men, in the ſmall town of Roſenberg, was attacked by them. The enemy ſet fire to the place; the major ſhewed a bold countenance; but, ſurrounded on all ſides, he could not eſcape, and obtained a capitulation, to rejoin his regiment at Creutzbourg. It was neceſſary to revenge this affront, and humble the preſumption of theſe new-raiſed Hungarian troops. The king therefore ſent detachments againſt them, and fought trifling battles, which were but the prelude to actions more deciſive. As this work is deſtined to conſerve the memory and fame of officers, whoſe valour merited ſo well of their country, we think it our duty to inform poſterity of their heroic actions, that poſterity may be induced to imitate ſuch examples of magnanimity.

The uncommon merit of general Winterfeld cauſed him to be choſen for the head of this expedition. He had ſix battalions and twelve hundred huſſars conſigned to him, with whom he paſſed the Oder, at Coſel, while Goltz, with one battalion and five hundred huſſars, paſſed

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the ſame river at Oppeln; to attack Eſterhazi and his Hungarians in concert. Winterfeld fell on the village of Slowentzit, where he took a hundred and twenty priſoners. Hearing a ſmart firing on his left, he marched thither directly, and found five thouſand Hungarians had ſurrounded the detachment of Goltz. They were attacked, and Winterfeld was completely victorious. Spleni eſcaped, with his huſſars, after the loſs of three hundred men, and his baggage.

Winterfeld did not think he had yet done enough; he continued his purſuit, and on the morrow came up with two thouſand huſſars, who were poſted with a marſh in their rear. Into this marſh he drove them, where moſt of them periſhed, or were taken. By theſe advantages, the Pruſſian huſſars began to acquire a ſuperiority over thoſe of Hungary. Colonel Wartenberg, of the huſſars, likewiſe beat a body of inſurgents, near Creutzbourg, and wholly diſperſed them.

Spring advanced, during this prelude to war; and, the month of April being almoſt over, it was time to aſſemble the army, which entered its quarters of cantonment between Patſkau and Frankenſtein. Roads were prepared for four columns, and cantonments at Jægerndorff, Glatz, and Schweidnitz; as being the places toward

toward which the enemy muſt leave the defiles of the mountains. The magazines which the Auſtrians had formed, and the places where their regular troops began to aſſemble, ſufficiently denoted their intentions. It was well underſtood that the inſurgents and Hungarians they had, in Upper Sileſia, were but meant to deceive, in order to draw the Pruſſians into thoſe parts, while their grand army ſhould enter Sileſia, by Landſhut. This project was not in itſelf reprehenſible; it only failed in the execution. Had the Pruſſians divided their forces, that they might face the enemy on all ſides, they would have been too weak to effect any great purpoſe, on the grand army of prince Charles: and, if they remained collectively, that multitude of light troops, which ſhould find nothing to ſtop its progreſs, would have ſtarved them, at length, by cutting off their ſupplies. The beſt way then was to remain in force; but, at the ſame time, to haſten to a criſis, by bringing on a general engagement.

Meaſures were taken to evacuate Upper Sileſia, toward the end of May, the fortreſs of Coſel excepted. The magazines of Troppau and Jægerndorff were tranſported to Neiſs. Rochow covered this convoy, with twelve hundred horſe and a battalion of grenadiers. Four thouſand

thouſand Hungarians, half huſſars half pandours, attacked, without being able to make any impreſſion on them. The cavalry here firſt made experience of its new manœuvres, and proved their excellence. It was neceſſary to inſpire the enemy with ſecurity, that preſumption might render them negligent, during their intended expedition. To this end, the king employed a man from Schönberg, who was a double ſpy. He paid him handſomely, after which he told him that the greateſt ſervice he could do him would be to inform him of the march of prince Charles, that he might retreat to Breſlau, before the Auſtrians had paſſed the mountains. Further to confirm this ſpy in error, the roads that lead to Breſlau were repaired. The ſpy promiſed largely, heard the roads were repairing, and haſtened back to prince Charles, to inform him that all was flight, and that he would meet no enemy to combat.

As Landſhut now became the principal object of attention, the king detached general Winterfeld thither, to obſerve the motions of the Auſtrians. Some battalions and two regiments of huſſars, Ruſch and Bronikowſky, were committed to his charge, nor was he long before he ſignalized himſelf. Near Hirſchberg,

he defeated eight hundred Hungarians, commanded by a partiſan named Putaſchitz, and took three hundred priſoners. Nadaſty, to revenge an affront like this, committed on Hungary, marched at the head of ſeven thouſand men, intending to attack Winterfeld, near Landſhut, who had only two thouſand four hundred. After a fight of four hours, the Hungarian infantry was totally beaten; and, as Nadaſty was preparing to retreat, general Still, heading ten ſquadrons, belonging to old Möllendorff, arrived, fell on the enemy, and the Hungarians were defeated and ſcourged back to the very frontiers of Bohemia. The Auſtrians loſt ſix hundred men in this affair, and ſome of their principal officers, who were wounded and taken. The priſoners related that Nadaſty had orders to take poſt at Landſhut; and that, had he been ſucceſsful, prince Charles would have certainly followed. Capacity ſo great, and conduct ſo ſage, gained Winterfeld the commiſſion of major-general.

It was neceſſary inſtantly to recal the margrave, Charles, out of Upper Sileſia. The Hungarians had profited, by the evacuation of the quarters, to infeſt all Upper Sileſia with parties. Six thouſand huſſars hovered between Jægerndorff and Neuſtadt; with intent to pre-

vent the communication of the margrave and the army. That he might receive orders to retire to Neiſs, the king detached the huſſars of Ziethen, who cut their way, ſword in hand, through the Hungarians and gave him the letter. The margrave began his march, on the 22d of May, with about twelve thouſand men under his command. The Auſtrians, who foreſaw his retreat, were reinforced, till their number amounted to twenty thouſand; a collection of barbarous nations, and ſome regular troops, that were come from Moravia. On the eve, they occupied all the heights which were in the road of the margrave, and eſtabliſhed three batteries; that, with a croſs fire, greatly incommoded the Pruſſian troops on their march.

Regardleſs of the obſtacles which the enemy threw in his road, the margrave ſent ſome battalions to ſeize the neighbouring heights and moſt conſiderable defiles; and, at the mouth of the paſſes, he formed the regiments of horſe of Geſler and Louis, which fell with all poſſible impetuoſity on the regiment of Ogilvy, cutting the greateſt part of it in pieces; afterward attacking that of Eſterhazi, which formed the ſecond line, and putting it to the ſword; and, rallying again, falling on the dragoons of Gotha, that were to ſuſtain the Auſtrian infantry, and

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put them to the rout, with a prodigious ſlaughter of the fugitives. The enemy left more than eight hundred dead. Their irregular troops, who ſtood ſpectators of the combat, having ſeen the mournful fate of the regulars, fled into the woods with horrible ſhrieks. The margrave, on that day, gave marks of bravery, worthy the blood of his grandfather, the elector Frederic William. General Schwerin, charging at the head of the horſe, which ſucceſſively defeated three different corps, acquired renown more remarkable by this being the day on which the fame of the Pruſſian cavalry commenced.

The promptitude with which audacity or terror is communicated to a multitude is an aſtoniſhing circumſtance. In the year 1741, the Pruſſian cavalry was the moſt heavy, and the leaſt animated, of any corps to be found in the armies of Europe. By exerciſing it, by imparting addreſs and vivacity, and by teaching it to confide in its own force, it made attempts, was ſucceſsful, and became daring. Rewards, penalties, blame and praiſe, properly employed, change the mind of man, and inſpire him with ſentiments of which he would not have been thought ſuſceptible, in a brutal ſtate of nature. Add to theſe ſome eminent examples of courage, which are ſtriking, ſuch as that we

have juſt related, and emulation enters the heart; each deſires to ſurpaſs his fellow, and common men become heroes. Talents are often benumbed in a kind of lethargy; they are ſhaken, awake, exert, and develope themſelves. Merit, eſteemed and rewarded, excites the ardour of the ſpectators. In ancient Rome, the civic and mural crowns, and eſpecially the triumphs of conquerors, were ſpurs to thoſe who might hope to obtain ſuch honours.

It was therefore neceſſary to take high note of the glorious action of Jægerndorff. The margrave, general Schwerin, and thoſe who had ſignalized themſelves there, were received as in triumph. The cavalry impatiently waited an occaſion to equal, nay, to ſurpaſs, theſe heroes. All glowed with the ardour of battle, and the hope of victory. Under circumſtances ſo auſpicious, the army was aſſembled, on the 28th of May, in the camp of Frankenſtein; ſome garriſon troops excepted, and a corps of ſix battalions and twenty ſquadrons; with which general Hautcharmoy made head againſt Eſterhazi. Theſe might retire into the fortreſſes of Coſel, Brieg, and Neiſs, ſhould the ſuperiority of the enemy render this neceſſary.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Battle of Friedberg. March into Bohemia. Of what paſſed there. Battle of Sorr. Return of the Troops into Sileſia.

STILL was the ſituation of the king critical. Politics pointed to precipices; war to perils; and the exhauſted ſtate of the finances to poverty. On occaſions like theſe, the mind muſt diſplay its whole force; and, with a firm eye, ſurvey ſurrounding dangers. It muſt not permit the phantoms of futurity to confuſe its powers; but muſt employ all poſſible, all imaginable, means to prevent ruin, while ruin may be prevented. It muſt eſpecially be careful not to depart from thoſe fundamental principles on which the military and political ſyſtem are eſtabliſhed. The king's plan for the campaign was determined on; yet, that nothing might be neglected, he addreſſed his allies, with every ardour of intreaty and argument, that he might obtain aid. France was the ſole power from which he had any thing to expect. The king expoſtulated on the impoſſibility of his long maintaining a war, the weight of which all fell upon himſelf. He ſummoned the French

to fulfil their treaties, literally; and, as the enemy prepared to invade his ſtates, he preſſed Louis XV. to ſend him the aſſiſtance which, in this caſe, he ought to ſend; or to make ſome poſitive diverſion, which ſhould procure him relief.

The French miniſtry ſeemed little affected by theſe remonſtrances; but treated them lightly, and would have the battle of Fontenoy, and the captures of ſome towns in Flanders, to be underſtood as a conſiderable diverſion. The king addreſſed himſelf immediately to Louis XV. informed him of the little ſatisfaction he derived from the coolneſs of the miniſtry of Verſailles; alleged that he found himſelf in a diſagreeable and difficult ſituation, into which he had been drawn by his friendſhip for the moſt Chriſtian king; that he ſuppoſed Louis had obligations to him, for having ſeconded his efforts, at the time when the Auſtrians were making a progreſs in Alſatia; that the battle of Fontenoy, and the taking of Tournay, were indeed glorious incidents, perſonally, to the king, and advantageous to France; but that with reſpect immediately to Pruſſia, a battle gained on the banks of the Scamander, or the taking of Pekin, would have been equally effectual diverſions. The king added that the French

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ſcarcely afforded employment to ſix thouſand Auſtrians, in Flanders; and that his preſent danger would not ſuffer him to reſt ſatisfied with fine words, but obliged him to demand more poſitive aſſiſtance. The ſimile of Scamander and Pekin diſpleaſed the moſt Chriſtian king; his ill humour was apparent in his reply to the king of Pruſſia, and the latter, in return, was piqued at the tone of haughty coldneſs, which characteriſed this letter.

During theſe altercations, ſo prejudicial to that union which ought to ſubſiſt between allies, the Auſtrians were on the eve of beginning their campaign. Their army, compoſed of the troops of the queen of Hungary and of Saxony, inſenſibly approached the frontiers of Sileſia. The Auſtrians were come from Königſgrætz and the environs of Jaromirtz; and the Saxons from Buntzlau and Königſhoff. They formed their junction at Trautenau, whence they advanced to Schatzlar. They could not ſtop long on the road, and their motions might be nearly calculated. It was therefore time to give general Winterfeld notice, at Landſhut, to retire, on the enemy's approach, and fall back to the corps of du Moulin; and to order them both, afterward, to retreat as far as Schweidnitz; taking care to ſpread the news, as artfully as poſſi-

ble, of the preparations which were making to abandon the foot of the mountains, and retire under the canon of Breſlau.

The double ſpy, of whom we have before ſpoken, collected theſe accounts with avidity, and haſtened in perſon to confirm the intelligence he had brought, to prince Charles, of the retreat of the Pruſſians. Stratagem is often ſuperior to ſtrength, in war; but ſtratagem ſhould be employed only ſeldom, leſt it ſhould loſe its effect, and only on important occaſions. When the intelligence the enemy receives flatters his hopes, he is almoſt certain of being drawn into the net that is ſpread. As Winterfeld and du Moulin were a march in advance of the enemy, they fell back to Schweidnitz, without ſuffering during their retreat.

The army of the king quitted Frankenſtein; and, on the 29th of May, occupied the camp of Reichenbach; whence it had only a ſmall march to Schweidnitz. It paſſed that fortreſs on the firſt of June. The corps of du Moulin and Winterfeld formed its van-guard, and occupied the height of Striegau, on this ſide the Striegauer-Waſſer. General Naſſau, with his corps, guarded the Nonnen-Buſch; and the army encamped in the plain which lies between Jauernick and Schweidnitz; ſo that a ſpace of

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two miles, between Striegau and Schweidnitz, was occupied by one almoſt uninterrupted line of Pruſſian troops. This poſition enabled the king to procure ſeveral advantages. General Wallis, who commanded the van-guard of the enemy, and Nadaſty were the firſt who appeared on the heights of Fribourg. Prince Charles had entered Sileſia by Landſhut; and, purſuing his march to Reichenau, he thence came to Hohen-Hennerſdorff. From this camp he could deſcend into the plain by four roads, thoſe of Fribourg, Hohen-Friedberg, Schwinahaus, and Cauder.

The king had been to reconnoitre theſe environs, to examine the parts, and the ground on which he might arrange his army; and he employed three days in preparing the roads, that there might be no impediment to ſtop his troops, and that they might ruſh on the enemy, when he ſhould appear in the plain. This was all that prudence could do, to guard againſt chance. On the 2d of June, the Auſtrian and Saxon generals held a council of war, near the gibbet of Hohen-Friedberg. Although, from that height, they had a view of the whole plain, they could perceive only ſmall corps of the Pruſſian army; the greateſt part of which was covered by the Nonnen-Buſch, and by the ravines,

ravines, behind which it was purpoſely placed, to keep the enemy ignorant of its ſtrength, and confirm him in the opinion the country would afford no reſiſtance.

Prince Charles choſe the village of Langenöls to encamp, on the morrow. Wenzel Wallis was ordered to ſeize on the magazine of Schweidnitz, with his van-guard, and thence to purſue the Pruſſians to Breſlau. The duke of Weiſſenfels, with his Saxons, was to take Striegau; and from thence to march and lay ſiege to Glogau. Prince Charles, in this project, had forgotten that he had to fight an army of ſeventy thouſand men, well determined not to retreat a foot, without having defended the ground to the laſt extremity. Thus did the deſigns of the Auſtrians and Pruſſians counteract each other; like contending winds, that aſſemble clouds, the ſhock of which produces lightning and thunder.

The king every day viſited his advanced poſts. On the ſecond, he was on a height before the camp of du Moulin, from which the whole country was diſcovered, as were the heights of Furſtenſtein, and even one end of the Auſtrian camp, near Reichenau. The king remained here a conſiderable time, till he ſaw a cloud of duſt, riſing among the mountains, advancing

and deſcending into the plain, and, in a ſerpentine direction, going from Cauder to Fegebeutel and Ronſtock. The duſt afterward ſettled, and the Auſtrian army was diſtinctly ſeen; having left the mountains in eight grand columns. Their right was ſupported by the rivulet of Striegau, and inclined toward Ronſtock and Hauſdorff. The Saxons, who were on the left, extended to Pilgrimſhain.

Du Moulin received immediate orders to raiſe the camp, at eight in the evening, paſs the rivulet of Striegau, and take poſt on a rock, before the town, where there is a topaz quarry, from which it takes its name. The army was put in motion at eight in the evening, filing off on the right in two lines, and obſerving the utmoſt ſilence: the men were even forbidden to ſmoke. The van arrived at midnight near the bridges of Striegau, where they waited till the different corps became compact. On the 4th of June, at two in the morning, the king aſſembled the principal officers, to communicate the order of the battle. This we ſhould omit, were it not that every thing is of conſequence, which relates to a deciſive action. The diſpoſition was as follows:

"The army muſt immediately begin its "march to the right, in two lines; it muſt paſs "the

" the rivulet of Striegau. Let the cavalry put
" itſelf in order of battle oppoſite the left of
" the enemy, toward Pilgrimſhain, and let the
" corps of du Moulin cover its right. Let the
" right of the infantry form on the left of the
" cavalry, oppoſite the groves of Ronſtock. Let
" the left of the cavalry be ſupported by the
" rivulet of Striegau; having the town of this
" name at a diſtance in its rear. Ten ſquadrons
" of dragoons and twenty huſſars that compoſe
" the reſerve muſt take poſt in the rear of the
" centre of the ſecond line, to be employed
" wherever occaſion ſhall call. Behind each
" wing of the cavalry, let a regiment of huſſars
" form a third line, to guard the rear and the
" flank of the cavalry, leſt the ground ſhould
" become more extenſive, or to aid in purſuit.
" The cavalry muſt impetuouſly charge the
" enemy, ſword in hand, and muſt make no
" priſoners during the heat of action; its blows
" muſt be directed at the head: after over-
" throwing and diſperſing the cavalry it ſhall
" aſſail, it is to turn on the infantry of the
" enemy, and take it in flank or rear, accord-
" ing as occaſion ſhall require. The Pruſſian
" infantry is to meet the enemy on a quick
" march; and, if the leaſt opportunity offers, to
" attack with the bayonet. Should it be neceſ-

" ſary

" ſary to charge in the uſual mode, it muſt not
" fire at a diſtance of more than a hundred and
" fifty paces. Should the generals find ſome
" village, on the wings or in the front of the
" enemy, which is not garniſhed with troops,
" they are to occupy it, within and without,
" with infantry that, ſhould circumſtances per-
" mit, muſt take the enemy in flank: but no
" troops are to be placed either in houſes or
" gardens, that there may be no reſtraint or
" impediment, in the purſuit of the van-
" quiſhed."

The officers having returned, each to his poſt, the whole army began to be in motion. Scarcely had its head paſſed the rivulet before du Moulin ſent information that, having perceived infantry of the enemy oppoſite him, on an eminence, he had corrected his poſition; that he had extended it on the right, in order to form on a height oppoſite to the other, and by which he outwinged the left of the enemy. The troops he ſaw were the Saxons; who, having received orders to take Striegau, were highly aſtoniſhed to find Pruſſians in their preſence. The king haſtened to place a battery of ſix twenty-four pounders on mount Topaz; which was exceedingly uſeful, by the great confuſion it cauſed among the enemy. The

Saxons advanced with their whole corps, to the ſupport of the van-guard, that was to take Striegau; and were received by this cannonade, which they little expected. The right wing of the Pruſſian cavalry in the mean time formed under this battery; the body-guard joined the corps of du Moulin, and the left of the wing ended at the groves of Ronſtock.

The Pruſſians, after two ſucceſſive charges, routed the Saxon cavalry, which fled full ſpeed; and the body-guard hewed down the two battalions of infantry, that had firſt preſented themſelves before du Moulin. The Pruſſian grenadiers and the regiment of Anhalt then attacked the Saxon infantry, in the groves where they began to form, repulſed them, and diſlodged them from a mound, on which they were endeavouring to form anew. From thence they croſſed a pond to charge the ſecond line on a marſhy ground; and here the battle, more murderous than the former, was ended with equal celerity. The Saxons again were obliged to fly. Their generals rallied ſome battalions in a triangular form, on a height, to cover their retreat; but the victorious Pruſſian cavalry, of the right, took them in flank; at the very moment they were attacked by the Pruſſian infantry from the wood. Kalckſtein alſo came

up,

up, with ſome troops of the ſecond line, and greatly outwinged the Saxons. They ſaw their extreme danger; and, not waiting to be attacked, preſently took to flight. The Saxons were thus totally beaten, before the left of the army was entirely formed. It was a full quarter of an hour before this left engaged with the Auſtrians.

Intelligence was brought to prince Charles at Hauſdorff, where he had taken up his quarters, that the firing of artillery and ſmall arms was heard. He was in the belief that this proceeded from the attack of the Saxons on Striegau, and paid no attention to the information. Word was afterward brought him that the Saxons were flying, and that they were ſeen ſcattered over every field; on which he haſtily dreſſed himſelf, and ordered the army to advance. The Auſtrians in conſequence ſlowly marched through the plain, between the rivulet of Striegau and the groves of Ronſtock. This plain is level, the ditches excepted, which mark the poſſeſſions of the country people. When the margrave Charles and the prince of Pruſſia came up with the enemy, they charged ſo hotly that the aſſailed gave ground. The Auſtrian grenadiers, with great good ſenſe, took advantage of the ditches we

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have mentioned, and they might have retreated according to rule, had not the regiment of guards twice put them to flight with the bayonet. The regiment of Haake, that of Bevern, and all thoſe expoſed to the enemy's fire, diſtinguiſhed themſelves by acts of bravery.

As there were no more enemies on the right, the king made a quarter wheel, to fall upon the left flank and the rear of the Auſtrians. His right croſſed through the woods and over the marſhes of Ronſtock, which when they left, to attack the enemy, the left of the Pruſſians had already gained conſiderable ground. The cavalry of this left had been impeded. Kiau had ſcarcely paſſed the bridge of the rivulet of Striegau, with a brigade of ten ſquadrons, before it broke. Kiau thought proper to attack the enemy's cavalry: general Ziethen joined him, with the reſerve, overthrew all opponents, and gave general Naſſau, who commanded the impeded cavalry, ſufficient time to paſs the ford. No ſooner had Naſſau formed his wing than he fell upon the remaining cavalry of the enemy, which was in his preſence, and put it to the rout. General Polentz greatly contributed to this ſucceſs. He had ſlipt into the village of Fegebeutel, from which he fired upon the Auſtrian cavalry; and ſome diſcharges, which

which it received in flank, threw it into confuſion and prepared its defeat.

General Geſler, who commanded the ſecond line, ſeeing there were no laurels here to gather, turned toward the Pruſſian infantry; and, finding the Auſtrians in confuſion, commanded the infantry to open and let him paſs; after which, forming in three columns, he fell upon the Auſtrians with incredible fury, a great number of whom were maſſacred. Twenty-one battalions of the regiments of Marchal, Graun, Tungen, Traun, Colowrad, Wurmbrand, and a regiment the name of which we have forgotten, were made priſoners. There were many killed, yet the number of the priſoners amounted to four thouſand. With theſe were taken ſixty-ſix pair of colours. An action ſo remarkable, ſo glorious, deſerves to be written in letters of gold, in the annals of Pruſſia. One general Schwerin, couſin to him of Jægerndorff, and an infinity of officers, whoſe number prevents their names being cited, here acquired immortal fame. This glorious action paſſed at the time that the right of the Pruſſians was marching on the flank of prince Charles, which rendered the diſorder of his troops total. The men all diſbanded, and fled in the utmoſt confuſion toward the mountains. The Saxons retired through

Seyfferſdorff. The main battle of the Auſtrians eſcaped by Kauder, and their wing through Hohen-Friedberg; whither, fortunately, Wallis and Nadaſty were come, to cover their retreat. The Pruſſians purſued them as far as the heights of Kauder, where they halted to take ſome reſt.

The amount of the Pruſſian trophies on that day were—Of priſoners, four generals, two hundred officers, and ſeven thouſand men. Of colours, kettle drums, artillery, &c. ſeventy-ſix pair of colours, ſeven ſtandards, eight pair of drums, and ſixty cannon. The field of battle was heaped with the ſlain. The enemy there loſt four thouſand men, among whom were ſome officers of note. The dead and wounded of the Pruſſian army ſcarcely amounted to eighteen hundred men. Some officers, who on that day fell ſacrifices to their country, merit our regret. Among theſe were general Truchſes, and colonels Maſſow, Schwerin, and During.

This was the third, but not the laſt, battle fought to decide to whom Sileſia appertained. When ſovereigns play for provinces, the lives of men are but as counters. Stratagem prepared, valour fought, the battle. Had not prince Charles been deceived by his ſpies, who were themſelves deceived, he never could

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ſo ſtupidly have fallen into the ſnare that had been ſpread. This confirms the maxim that, thoſe principles ſhould never be departed from which the art of war preſcribes; and that circumſpection ſhould invariably be attended to, which obliges all commanders never to ſwerve from rules which their own ſafety, and the execution of their projects, exact: even when every thing favours ſuch meditated projects, the ſureſt way is never to ſo far deſpiſe the enemy as to ſuppoſe him incapable of reſiſtance. Chance never reſigns its rights. In this very action, a miſtake had nearly become fatal to the Pruſſians. At the beginning of the battle, the king drew ten battalions from the ſecond line, under the command of lieutenant-general Kalckſtein, to reinforce the corps of du Moulin, and ſent one of his aid du camps to order the margrave, Charles, to take the command of the ſecond line of infantry, during the abſence of Kalckſtein. The blundering aid du camp told the margrave to reinforce the ſecond line, with his brigade, which was at the extremity of the left. The king perceived the miſtake in time, and rectified it with promptitude. Had prince Charles profited by this falſe motion, he might have taken the left of the Pruſſians in flank, which was not yet ſupported by the rivulet of Striegau. On trifles like theſe do the deſtiny of kingdoms

and the renown of generals depend. Good or ill fortune is decided in an inſtant. Yet muſt it be confeſſed, the bravery of the troops who fought at Friedberg conſidered, the ſtate ran no riſk. Not a ſingle corps was repulſed. Of ſixty-four battalions, twenty-ſeven only were in action, and carried the victory. The world reſts not more ſecurely on the ſhoulders of Atlas than Pruſſia on ſuch an army.

No one ought to be ſurpriſed that the Auſtrians were not more hotly purſued. The night of the 3d to the 4th had been employed in marching to meet the enemy. The battle, though ſhort, was one continued effort. Ammunition was expended; and ammunition, ſtores and proviſions, were all at Schweidnitz: it was neceſſary to bring them to the army. The rear-guard of prince Charles was compoſed of the corps of Wallis and Nadaſty, that had not been in the action: they occupied the heights of Hohen-Friedberg, to diſlodge them from which would have been raſhneſs. The Pruſſians poſſeſſed the heights of Kauder, but thoſe of Hohen-Friedberg were on their left. It was not therefore for the imprudence of ardour to loſe that which wiſdom had gained. Du Moulin and Winterfeld were detached, on the morrow, to purſue the enemy. They came up with prince Charles near Landſhut. The prince did

did not expect them, ſtruck his camp at their approach, and charged Nadaſty to cover his retreat. Winterfeld attacked the latter, put him to flight, and purſued him to the frontiers of Bohemia; after killing two hundred of his men, and taking a hundred and thirty priſoners. Du Moulin took poſt in the very camp the Auſtrians abandoned.

After the victory, the king recalled Cagnoni, his envoy at Dreſden. Bulau, the envoy of the king of Poland at Berlin, was obliged to depart; as was likewiſe the Saxon reſident from Breſlau. The king declared he regarded the invaſion of Sileſia by the Saxons as an open rupture.

On the 6th, the army followed the corps of du Moulin, and marched for Landſhut. When the king came there, he was ſurrounded by a body of two thouſand peaſants who aſked his permiſſion to maſſacre all the catholics of the country. This animoſity aroſe from the ſeverity of the perſecutions which the proteſtants had ſuffered, from the Romiſh prieſts, during the reign of Auſtria; when the Lutheran churches had been taken from them, to beſtow on the catholics. The king, far from granting a requeſt ſo barbarous, told them they ought rather to conform to the precepts of ſcripture; to bleſs thoſe that curſed them, and pray for thoſe by whom they were perſecuted, to the end that

they might inherit the kingdom of heaven. The peaſants replied he was in the right, and deſiſted from their cruel requeſt.

The van-guard advanced to Starckſtadt, where it heard that the enemy had quitted Trautenau, and filed off to Jaromirtz: it then took poſt at Scalitz. The main army marched for Friedland and Nachod, which were more commodious for ſubſiſtence: after which it left the mountains, and extended along the Metau, a ſmall rivulet, the banks of which are ſteep, and which, running from Neuſtadt, falls into the Elbe, near Pleſs. The Auſtrian camp was behind the Elbe, between Schmirgitz and Jaromirtz. Nadaſty, with a corps of about ſix thouſand men, ſeemed inclined to diſpute the paſſage of the Metau with the Pruſſian van-guard; but Lehwald drove off the Hungarians, without loſs of blood, paſſed the rivulet, and encamped, at a quarter of a mile's diſtance, on the oppoſite ſide. On the morrow, the van-guard was reinforced by eleven battalions, and marched to Caravalhota; whence the king, putting himſelf at its head, puſhed forward to Königſgrætz, and occupied the ground between Ruſeck, which lies toward the Elbe, and Divetz, on the Adler. This rivulet runs from the mountains of Glatz, and empties itſelf into the Elbe, near

near Königſgrætz. The army, under the command of prince Leopold, encamped a quarter of a mile in the rear of the van-guard.

Theſe motions obliged prince Charles to approach Königſgrætz. He poſted himſelf on a height, at the conflux of the Adler and the Elbe, and faced the Pruſſians. His right was ſupported by a marſh; his left was bent toward Pardubitz; and, in the rear, he had a foreſt of two miles extent, which goes toward Holitſch. This prince, by means of three bridges over the Adler, had eſtabliſhed his communication with Königſgrætz, where he had a detachment of eight hundred men. He raiſed a redoubt, before the town, on a ſmall height, which defended it from the approach of the Pruſſians. He was not to be attacked in this poſition; and the king contented himſelf with ſending infantry into the towns of Jaromirtz and Smirgitz, to maintain the Elbe, by detachments of dragoons, and huſſars, and to ſecure and protect his foragers. To view theſe two armies, ranged round Königſgrætz, they would have been ſuppoſed but one body, by which the town was beſieged.

The van-guard, however, and the main battle of the Pruſſians, were ſo advantageouſly ſituated that they were out of danger, from the enemy. Some attempt indeed might have been

made on Königsgrætz; and the place might possibly have been taken. But to what purpose? It neither had fortifications nor magazines; and it must have been abandoned, soon or late. It would therefore only have been to shed blood to no effect.

Those who judge superficially might believe that, under circumstances so propitious, the king ought to have changed the plan of the campaign which he had formed at Neiss; and, with his good fortune, to have extended his views. But they would reason erroneously. Silesia had been saved by the battle of Friedberg: the enemy was beaten, but not annihilated. This battle had not levelled the mountains of Bohemia; over which provisions for the army must pass. The provision chests had been lost, in 1744: and subsistence therefore could only arrive at the camp by the aid of the waggons of the peasants of Silesia. After the departure of the margrave, from Upper Silesia, the Hungarians had surprised the fortress of Cosel, and made incursions even into the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz and Breslau. They might have come upon the back of the army, and have intercepted its subsistence. The king could not remove above ten or fifteen miles from Schweidnitz, whence he could receive provisions only

once

once in five days. Had he carried the war into Saxony, he muſt have abandoned Sileſia, to the diſcretion of the Auſtrians. Conſiderations ſo important induced him to remain firm to his former plan; that is to ſay, to eat up the frontiers of Bohemia, that he might prevent the enemy from wintering there.

The French continued to make ſome attempts on the king of Poland, offering the Imperial crown, which he would not obtain in haſte, as a bait. The only negotiation proper for the Pruſſians was that with England; becauſe that this latter power, alone, could induce the queen of Hungary to make peace. The king of England was then at Hanover, whither he had brought lord Harrington. Young count Podowils, who was ambaſſador at the Hague, received orders to repair to Hanover, and ſound the ſhore, that he might diſcover how lord Harrington and the court were diſpoſed.

As to what regarded the operations of war, it was reſolved to keep footing, as long as poſſible, in Bohemia; carefully to chooſe the beſt camps that could be found, that the troops with which general Naſſau was detached into Upper Sileſia, for the recovery of Coſel, might be but little expoſed, and that every appearance of an offenſive war might be affected, in order to awe the

the enemy, and conceal the real deſign of acting on the defenſive.

Naſſau departed, on the 25th of June, with twelve thouſand men, paſſed through Glatz and Reichenſtein, drove back the Hungarians to Neuſtadt, from which he diſlodged them with loſs, and afterward advanced to Coſel, where he made preparations for the ſiege. This place had been taken by the treachery of an officer of the garriſon, who deſerted. The traitor informed the enemy that the moat was not finiſhed, and that it was fordable at the angle of a baſtion, which he indicated. He paſſed the moat with two thouſand pandours, ſcaled the baſtion and took the place. Foris was governor. There were ſome ſoldiers killed: the remainder, to the number of three hundred and fifty, were made priſoners. This happened two days after the margrave had evacuated Upper Sileſia.

While general Naſſau was thus employed, the king took every care for the ſubſiſtence of the troops; for which purpoſe he detached his heavy cavalry toward Opotſchna, which was half a mile on the left of the two corps of the Pruſſian army. This cavalry every night gave the alarm to prince Charles, to prove what counte-

countenance he kept, which often was bad enough, and to confirm him in the opinion that the king meditated ſome grand deſign, which he would execute when leaſt expected. The Auſtrians were held in this ſuſpenſe for more than a month. The king had a detachment at Hohenbruch on his left, and the jealouſy with which this camp inſpired the Auſtrians made them fear to be attacked in rear. In reality, the Pruſſians might extend to Reichenau and Hohenmauth, and prince Charles would have been obliged to cover Moravia, from which he drew his proviſions. His magazines were eſtabliſhed in gradation; the neareſt was that of Pardubitz; the next that of Chrudim; and further, toward Moravia, was that of Teutſchbrod. Should this march be executed, it would derange the whole Auſtrian œconomy, and put the king in a condition of having his flour from Glatz, inſtead of ſending to Schweidnitz, which would have been at an equal diſtance.

If the king ſhould prefer acting on his right, he might paſs the Elbe, not far from Smirgitz, and aſſume the camp of Clumetz, which was good, and exceedingly advantageous. In his rear would be extenſive plains, which would ſupply forage in abundance; thence he might diſturb the Auſtrians toward Pardubitz; and,

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in ſome manner, cut off the communications of the Saxons with Luſatia. The latter plan was preferred to the former; eſpecially becauſe of the Saxons; the king having received intimation that count * * * meditated an attempt on the marche of Brandenbourg.

The better to conceal his meaning from the enemy, the king detached general Winterfeld, with three thouſand men, to the camp of Reichenau, while the army made a movement to the right, to paſs the Elbe not far from Jaromirtz, where all the detachments were to reunite. The grand army had its right ſupported by a wood, in front of which was an abatis, and its left by the Elbe, near the village of Nechanitz, having the advantage of heights and a glacis, from one extremity of the camp to the other. Du Moulin repaſſed the Metau, with ſix battalions and forty ſquadrons, and took poſt at Skalitz, to aſcertain the communication of proviſions, between Jaromirtz and Neuſtadt, where there was a battalion in garriſon. Perhaps the firſt project of which we have ſpoken would have been ſuperior to this. It has ſince been known that the duke of Weiſſenfels would not have followed prince Charles, toward the frontiers of Moravia. It is only five miles from Reichenau to Glatz, and it is ten from Clum to Schweidnitz,

Schweidnitz, which rendered the tranſportation of proviſions more difficult. But men are guilty of errors, and thoſe who commit the leaſt obtain the greateſt advantages. During the ſtay of the army at Clum, the time was wholly employed in foraging by both armies, and in ſending out parties to intercept each other. Among the Auſtrian officers, colonel Derchoſi only ſignalized himſelf, in this war of ſkirmiſhes. He made ſome captures, which general Fouquet revenged, by the parties that he ſent from Glatz, on the rear of the Auſtrian army, and who vexed them intolerably by the frequent prizes they made.

There was a detached poſt at Schmirſitz, which practiſed a new ſtratagem, to intimidate the Hungarians who came and fired on a redoubt and a centinel, placed near the bridge of the Elbe. It is a jocular affair which will give ſome relief to the continued gravity of the ſubject. Some centinels having been wounded by pandours, the grenadiers of Kalckſtein thought proper to dreſs up a ſcare-crow, in a grenadier's coat, and to ſet it at the place where the centinel ſtood. This puppet they moved with cords, ſo that it might be miſtaken for a man, at a certain diſtance. They then hid themſelves in ſome brambles, near the place. The pandours

came

came up, and fired; the ſcare-crow fell, and they immediately advanced running. As immediately they were ſaluted by a hot fire from the brambles; and the grenadiers, jumping out, made thoſe they had wounded priſoners. After this the pandours no more moleſted the poſt.

Let us return to more important objects.

After the battle of Friedberg, prince Charles inceſſantly importuned the court for reinforcement. Eight regiments were ſent him, drawn from Bavaria, the army on the Rhine, and the garriſon of Fribourg, which had lately been exchanged with the French. But, at the very time that this ſuccour arrived, the duke of Weiſſenfels quitted the Auſtrians; and, inſtead of twenty-four thouſand, left only ſix thouſand Saxons. The following was the reaſon of that retreat. The king had been informed that the king of Poland was in treaty with the Bavarians, to pay them a ſubſidy, and take ſix thouſand of their troops into his ſervice. Theſe men might have made a diſagreeable diverſion into Brandenbourg. All mode of accommodation with Saxony was wanting; the only way to reſtrain that power was to keep it in awe. For this purpoſe, the prince of Anhalt aſſembled his troops, near Halle. He was reinforced by four regiments of infantry; and three of cavalry,

which Geſler brought from Bohemia. The Saxons might expect the prince of Anhalt would act offenſively againſt them, as his corps was ſufficiently ſtrong for their ſubjection. A manifeſto in the mean time appeared, which declared that the king, having the example of the queen of Hungary before his eyes, who had treated the allies and auxiliary troops of the late emperor as enemies, that is to ſay, the Heſſians, the Palatines, and the Pruſſians—the king, I repeat, thought himſelf authoriſed to treat, in like manner, the Saxons as enemies, who were auxiliaries of the queen of Hungary, and to retort upon them the evil they had meditated againſt the ſtates of the king. The arm of the prince of Anhalt was raiſed, and he was ready to ſtrike: the ſigning of the Hanover convention ſuſpended the falling blow.

It muſt be remembered that the French had fulfilled no one of the articles of the treaty of Verſailles; that they refuſed the Pruſſians every ſuccour; that the retreat of the prince of Conti renounced the Imperial throne to the firſt comer; and that the French broke all the ties by which they were united to the princes of Germany. To theſe reaſons another, ſtill more forcible, muſt be added; the totally exhauſted ſtate of the finances. The king therefore was induced

induced to negotiate for peace. The baſis of the Hanover convention was the peace of Breſlau; and king George further engaged to procure the guarantee of all the powers of Europe, whenever there ſhould be a general peace. The king of Pruſſia, on his part, promiſed to acknowledge the grand duke of Tuſcany for emperor. George, after having long wavered between his Hanoverian miniſtry and lord Harrington, ſigned this treaty on the 22d of September. It then ſeemed that the pacification of the empire would immediately follow the convention of Hanover. But, to have calmed the paſſions of the king of England was not ſufficient, there were enemies more irreconcileable, who were bent on lowering the riſing power of the Pruſſians. * * * at Dreſden, and Bartenſtein at Vienna, imagined the moment was come, and were deſirous of profiting by circumſtances which they ſuppoſed ſo favourable. The poſſeſſion of the Imperial crown again inflated the court of Vienna; and the wiſh to divide the ſpoils of an enemy imparted firmneſs to that of Dreſden.

For the better underſtanding of facts, it will perhaps be neceſſary to relate in what manner the Imperial dignity reverted to the new houſe of Auſtria. After the peace of Fuſſen, count

Segur had marched along the Necker to join the prince of Conti. Bathiani followed him, and traverſed the empire to unite himſelf with the duke d'Aremberg, whoſe corps was in quarters at Weilbourg. France ought, at this inſtant, to have made every effort to prevent ſuch a junction. She remained inactive. The pretext for war was to hinder the Imperial dignity from returning to the new houſe of Auſtria. France ſhould therefore have aſſembled her forces in the environs of Frankfort, which would have rendered her miſtreſs of the election. The prince of Conti ſhould have been authorized to drive the duke d'Aremberg out of the neighbourhood of that city; and particularly not to ſuffer him to join Bathiani, and thus permit the Auſtrians to gain an evident ſuperiority over the French. Louis XV. and the prince of Conti had often aſſured the king, in their letters, that they would oppoſe the election of the grand duke, at the hazard of a battle. Theſe were fine words. No battle was fought. The prince of Conti was obliged to detach fifteen thouſand men to Flanders. Count Traun had the command of the army of the empire; and, detaching Bærenklau, ordered him to paſs the Rhine at Biberich. The prince of Conti took the alarm, blew up his bridge of

Aſchaffenbourg, broke down that of Höchſt, and retired to Gerau, on the Rhine. The grand duke repaired in perſon to his army. Traun paſſed the Maine. Bærenklau defeated ſome free companies of the prince of Conti, near Oppenheim, after which the French no longer ſtood their ground. The prince of Conti repaſſed the Rhine, at Germerſheim and at Rheinturkheim. His baggage was taken by the enemy, who diſturbed him much on his retreat. He encamped at Worms, behind the rivulet of Oſthofen, and retired from thence to Mauterſtadt, where he ended a campaign during which the arms of France gained but little glory.

The retreat of the prince of Conti was the ſignal at which the vertigo of the princes of the empire and their attachment to the houſe of Auſtria broke forth. It is really aſtoniſhing, conſidering the haughtineſs and deſpotiſm with which this houſe had governed Germany, that ſlaves ſo vile could be found, as willingly to ſubmit their necks to the yoke. Yet was the majority of this temper. The king of England had the whole electoral college at his diſpoſition; he was maſter of the diet. The elector of Mayence owed his fortune to the houſe of Auſtria, and was but the interpreter of its will.

By

By ancient cuſtom, the dean of the electoral college invites the electors to the diet of election. After the death of Charles VII. the elector of Mayence performed this office, and fixed the opening of the diet for the firſt of June. The baron of Erthal, charged with this embaſſy, came to Prague, and invited the elector of Bohemia, as well as the other electors, which was in contradiction to the deciſion of the laſt diet, by which it had been determined that the vote of Bohemia ſhould be ſuffered to ſlumber. In the beginning of the year 1745, it had been feared, both at Vienna and Hanover, that the army of the prince of Conti would prevent the partiſans of the grand duke of Tuſcany from giving their votes at Frankfort: therefore, it had been in contemplation to chooſe the city of Erfort for the ſitting of the diet. This likewiſe was contrary to the fundamental laws of the Germanic body; eſpecially to the golden bull. The weakneſs of France prevented the queen of Hungary from thus tranſgreſſing.

The diet of the empire aſſembled at Frankfort on the firſt of June. France declared againſt the grand duke; but the army of the prince of Conti, which was to have ſupported this declaration, having diſappeared, this was a tacit confeſſion, on the part of France, of her impotence, by

which ſhe alienated the hearts of all her allies. The envoys of Brandenbourg and the elector Palatine ſent a memorial to the diet, in which they demanded that three points ſhould be examined. I. Whether the ſuffrages of the ambaſſadors invited by the elector of Mayence were admiſſible? II. Whether their reſpective princes enjoyed the freedom required by the golden bull? III. Whether ſome of them were not deprived of this freedom, either by promiſes or by bribes?

The firſt of theſe queſtions related to the Bohemian ambaſſador, who ought not to have been admitted; the ſecond to the Palatine ambaſſador, whoſe ſecretary had been carried off by the Auſtrians, at the gates of Frankfort; and almoſt the whole electoral college was included in the third. The two envoys concluded by proteſting againſt the aſſembly of the diet, which muſt be cenſured as illegal till a redreſs of theſe grievances was obtained, and withdrew from the diet.

As one falſe ſtep leads to another, the Auſtrian cabal overlooked all propriety; and, without any regard to theſe proteſtations, it was determined that the 13th of September ſhould be the day of election. The envoys from Berlin and the elector Palatine retired to Hanau, proteſting

proteſting againſt this aſſembly, as illicit and ſchiſmatic, the reſolutions and acts of which muſt be regarded as null.

The grand duke was elected on the 13th of September, to the great content of the king of England and the queen of Hungary. It remained to examine whether it were better the king ſhould purely and ſimply acknowledge the new emperor, or come to an open quarrel with him, by declaring that he would allow neither the election nor the elected to be legal. The king kept a juſt medium between the two. He was profoundly ſilent; becauſe that, in the firſt place, he could not bring France to act ſo as to overturn what had been done at Frankfort; and, in the ſecond, to acknowledge the emperor, without any neceſſity, would have been to have deprived himſelf of an act of complacency, which in negotiating for peace might be of ſome value.

The queen of Hungary peaceably enjoyed, at Frankfort, the ſpectacle of that Imperial crown which ſhe had taken ſo much trouble to place on the head of her huſband. To him ſhe left the name of emperor; to herſelf ſhe reſerved the authority. Nor was ſhe angry that it was remarked the duke was but the phantom of dignity; and that ſhe was the eſſence. She

diſcovered her haughtineſs too openly, while ſhe remained at Frankfort; princes ſhe treated as her ſubjects; and was even more than impolite to prince William of Heſſe. She openly avowed in converſation, that ſhe would rather loſe her under petticoat than Sileſia. She owned the king of Pruſſia poſſeſſed abilities, but affirmed they were tarniſhed by inconſtancy and injuſtice. The ſecret emiſſaries of the king had inſinuated ſome propoſals for peace at Frankfort, which were all rejected. The fortitude of the empreſs degenerated ſometimes into obſtinacy. She was as a woman intoxicated, at having recovered the Imperial dignity for her deſcendants. Occupied ſolely by ſmiling proſpects of futurity, ſhe thought her grandeur would be degraded, ſhould ſhe negotiate with a prince, whom ſhe accuſed of rebellion, as with an equal.

To this motive of vanity more ſolid reaſons of ſtate were added. From the time of Ferdinand I. the principles of the houſe of Auſtria tended to the eſtabliſhment of deſpotiſm, in Germany. Nothing could be more contrary to ſuch a deſign than to ſuffer an elector to acquire too much power; or to permit a king of Pruſſia, ſtrengthened by the ſpoils of the emperor Charles VI. and employing his forces againſt Auſtrian

Auſtrian ambition, to ſuſtain the liberties of the Germanic body againſt her with too much efficacy.

Such are the true reaſons which prevented the court of Vienna from acceding to the treaty of Hanover. Thoſe of the king of Poland were very different. His principal object was to preſerve the crown of Poland in his family; and, the better to ſecure this, he hoped to gain a communication between Saxony and Poland, through Sileſia, by the war. He was ambitious of poſſeſſing the dutchy of Glogau; or even more, if more might be obtained; and * * *, who ſuppoſed the king of Pruſſia at bay, would not liſten to compoſition. Thus the hopes, well or ill founded, of the two courts prevented the convention of Hanover from ripening into a peace, between theſe three belligerent powers.

The king of England however flattered himſelf that, by continually inſiſting on the ſame ſubject, he might finally bring the empreſs and Auguſtus over to his opinion. The aſſurances he gave the king of Pruſſia of this occaſioned the expedition of Saxony to be ſuſpended. Beſide, under theſe circumſtances, it would have been injurious to have embroiled affairs more than they already were, and to have undertaken

a new war. This moderation, in the conduct of the king, did but serve to put his enemies to confusion; who endeavoured, by calumniating his proceedings, to draw the hatred of all the sovereigns of Europe on his head.

But the measures which it was wished to keep with Saxony did not prevent him from pushing the war, vigorously, against the empress queen. He, who, with arms in his hand, imagines he can soften his enemy by forbearance, deceives himself. Victory alone can enforce peace. For this reason, the operations of Nassau were hastened. Cosel made but a feeble resistance. He opened the trenches on the side of the Lower Oder. Some houses by accident caught fire, and this obliged the governor to surrender, on the 6th of September. General Nassau here took three thousand Croats, and lost only forty-five men at the siege. After having victualled the place, and left a garrison of twelve hundred men, the general and his little army marched to Troppau; from which he sent parties to levy contributions, in some circles of Moravia. He had some skirmishes with the Hungarians, which always ended to his honour and advantage.

But it is time to return into Bohemia, where we have left the Prussian army, at the camp of Clum,

Clum, and the Auſtrian at that of Königſgrætz. The enemy twice attempted to force the ſmall town of Neuſtadt, where major Tauenzien commanded: but they were on both occaſions repulſed, by the bravery of this worthy officer. This was a very important poſt; becauſe it ſecured the communication with Sileſia. Prince Charles, who believed himſelf more ſtrengthened by the ſuccours he had received than enfeebled by the departure of the Saxons, paſſed the Adler and took the camp which the Pruſſians had quitted, between Königſgrætz and Caravalhota. The Pruſſians, in conſequence of this, made a motion: they kept the Elbe in their front, Schmirſitz on their right, and Jaromirtz on their left. Du Moulin guarded his poſt at Skalitz; and general Lehwald occupied the height of Pleſs, at the confluence of the Metau and the Elbe; ſo that the Pruſſians held both theſe rivers.

M. de Valori had taken up his lodgings in the ſuburbs of Jaromirtz. Information was ſent him that he had better enter the town, which he did not believe. An Auſtrian partiſan, named Franquini, between whom and the hoſt of the marquis there was good intelligence, attempted to carry him off. He paſſed through the granges and gardens; but, by miſtake, he

ſeized

ſeized the ſecretary, inſtead of the ambaſſador. This ſecretary, named d'Arget, had the wit to deſtroy all his letters, and to affirm he was Valori, that he might ſave his maſter; taking care not to undeceive Franquini, till the ambaſſador was no longer in danger.

The poſition of the Pruſſian army was not to be attacked; for even, if prince Charles would have attempted the paſſage of the Metau, by the aid of ſeveral bridges thrown over the Elbe, the king might come on the enemy's rear, and cut him off from Königſgrætz. Franquini was the only perſon who occaſioned ſome uneaſineſs, concerning proviſions. He had taken poſt in the foreſt vulgarly called the kingdom of Silva; this wood communicated with the roads of Braunau, Starckſtadt, and Trautenau; and from this he fell on the convoys, that came from Sileſia. Each convoy had a little battle to fight; and it was often neceſſary to ſend ſuccour. This fatigued the troops: they could only feed ſword in hand.

The empreſs queen however began to be weary of the war, by which nothing was decided. Preſſed by the king of England to make peace, ſhe wiſhed at leaſt once more to tempt her fortune, before ſhe threw up her cards, and ſent preciſe orders to prince Charles

to act offenſively; and, if poſſible, to bring the Pruſſians to a battle. To aid him in this important project, ſhe had formed a kind of council, compoſed of the duke d'Aremberg and prince Lobkowitz, whom ſhe ſent to the army, flattering herſelf ſhe had provided againſt all accidents; and that fortune, who had crowned her huſband at Frankfort, would gain her battles in Bohemia.

It was ſoon known, in the Pruſſian camp, that d'Aremberg and prince Lobkowitz had joined prince Charles of Lorraine; and the intentions of the empreſs were nearly divined. Lobkowitz, whoſe temper was violent and impetuous, would tilt inceſſantly. He every day ſent huſſars to ſkirmiſh, and often unſeaſonably; and was very angry when Nadaſty, or Franquini, had received any check. Prince Charles, who knew the Pruſſians, by having acted againſt them during three campaigns, would have preferred a war of ſtratagem to that he was commanded to make: he would have been contented to diſpute ſubſiſtence, to have ſlowly conſumed his enemy, and to have accumulated many ſmall advantages; which, united, are equivalent to the higheſt ſucceſs. The duke d'Aremberg, impotent from age, was of the opinion of the laſt ſpeaker. The two armies were not above

above half a cannon ſhot diſtant from each other. The king, whoſe tent was on an eminence, every day ſaw the generals of the enemy come to reconnoitre his poſition. They might have been taken for aſtronomers, by their obſerving the Pruſſians through their long tubes. They afterward held their deliberations: but nothing could be undertaken againſt a camp which was too advantageouſly ſituated, and too ſtrong, to ſuffer inſult.

The enemy ſoon after gave the alarm to the corps of general Lehwald. Fifteen hundred pandours paſſed the Metau, during the night, and entrenched themſelves on a neighbouring height to that of the Pruſſians. They were to be followed by a ſwarm of light troops. Lehwald did not give them time for this; but, marching at the head of two battalions, drove them with the bayonet from their redoubt, took forty of their men, and purſued them with his huſſars. During their precipitate flight, the bridge over the Metau broke down, and ſeveral were drowned. This brave action of the general prevented the Auſtrians from eſtabliſhing a communication with Franquini, who purpoſed to intercept the convoys coming to the Pruſſian camp.

Prince Lobkowitz did not remain quiet, be-

cauſe

cauſe ſome of his projects had failed: he continually formed new ones, and a third time attempted the taking of Neuſtadt. The town was inveſted, September 7th, by ten thouſand men, of which the king was not informed till the 12th. He inſtantly ſent du Moulin and Winterfeld to its ſuccour. Winterfeld, with three hundred foot of the regiment of Schwerin, forced the paſſage of a wood, defended by two thouſand pandours. The Hungarians loſt two cannon, and were driven down a kind of precipice, which was in their rear. At the approach of the Pruſſians, the ſiege of Neuſtadt was raiſed: the Auſtrians repaſſed the Metau, and retired to their camp. Tauenzien, ſhut up in a paltry defenceleſs place, the wall of which was open in many parts, had five days ſuſtained a ſiege, with trenches opened, againſt ten thouſand enemies; who, the two laſt days, had cut off the canals, which brought water from the ſprings to the city. The walls had been battered by ten pieces of artillery; and a conſiderable gap had been made. We have ſeen towns, fortified by Vauban and Cöhorn, that proportionably have not held out ſo long. It is not therefore the ſtrength of works which defends fortreſſes; but rather the valour and intelligence of the commander.

The

The poſt of Neuſtadt could no longer be defended, ſince water was wanting; yet, by abandoning it, all regard to the ſafety of convoys would be loſt. However, the forage of the neighbourhood being conſumed, it was time to change ſituation, and the walls of the place were demoliſhed. The army paſſed the Elbe, near Jaromirtz, on the 18th of September, and encamped at Kowalkowitz, without any motion being made by the enemy, in oppoſition. It was neceſſary to detach general Polentz from the camp, with a thouſand horſe and three battalions, to cover the new marche and the Oder, againſt a corps of ſix thouſand Ulans, whom the king of Poland had raiſed, and wiſhed to introduce into Saxony, to join his other troops. The remaining detachments returned to the army, the left of which was covered by du Moulin.

Rejoicings were made on that day in the Auſtrian army, to celebrate the election of the grand duke, the officers of which exulted in the title of Imperial. Two days were paſſed in feaſting, during which wine was not ſpared. This perhaps would have been the moment to attack; but the king was deſirous not to depart from his plan. He therefore reſolved to march and encamp at Staudentz. The road thither led through

through a valley, beſide which were woods and hills, that form a part of the foreſt of Silva. Franquini was in ambuſcade, near the village of Liebenthal, on the way the ſecond column was to paſs. Prince Leopold, who led this column, detached ſome battalions, that ſurrounded the wood, at the ſame time that Malachowſky, at the head of ſome hundreds of huſſars, aſcended theſe cragged rocks; and, aided by the infantry, drove the partiſan from his ambuſh. This action, one of the boldeſt cavalry could undertake, was highly glorious to Malachowſky. Twenty Pruſſians were killed, and forty wounded, in this affair.

It was late before the army gained the camp of Staudentz. Lehwald with his corps occupied Starckſtadt; and du Moulin marched to Trautenau, with his detachment, to cover the convoys from Sileſia. Thus the Pruſſians extended along the chain of mountains, which lie on the frontiers of Sileſia, from Trautenau toward Braunau. The country was eaten up, and the enemy could not be able to ſubſiſt there during winter. This formed a barrier, which relieved Sileſia from incurſions, till the approaching ſpring. Forage here was always more ſcarce and difficult than in plains, by the difficult and interſected nature of the ground, which

ſurrounded

ſurrounded the camp. In order that the troops might not be expoſed to affronts, three thouſand horſe and eight thouſand foot were neceſſary for convoys, and to cover the forage: each bottle of ſtraw was bought by a ſkirmiſh. Moratz, Trenck, Nadaſty, and Franquini, were daily in the field. It was the ſchool of partiſans.

Franquini, of all the Auſtrian officers, had the moſt exact knowledge of the roads which lead from Bohemia into Sileſia. Between Schatzlar and Trautenau, he, with four thouſand pandours, attacked a convoy of flour eſcorted by three hundred foot. Young Möllendorff, aid du camp to the king, conducted this convoy. He ſuſtained every effort of the enemy, and took poſt in a church-yard which commanded the defile, where he protected the waggons and defended himſelf for three hours, till ſuccour arrived from du Moulin, by which he was entirely relieved. The enemy left forty dead. The loſs of the eſcort was ſlight; except that Franquini unyoked and carried off the horſes, from about thirty of the waggons.

Though theſe are but trifling actions, yet are they too honourable to the nation, and to thoſe by whom they were fought, to leave them in forgetfulneſs, ſince they may teach emulation to poſterity. The enemy each new day under-

took ſome new enterpriſe. Enjoying the favour of the country, they were informed of the proviſions and ovens of the army which were at Trautenau, and this information was ſufficient to induce them to ſet fire to the four corners of this unfortunate town. In leſs than three hours, the houſes were one heap of cinders. As precaution had been taken to place the caſks of flour in well-vaulted cellars, there were only ſome baggage waggons loſt, which were conſumed by the flames. This inhuman action was a puniſhment to its perpetrators; for, inſtead of gain, the empreſs queen had another town ruined in Bohemia.

Such attempts were but preludes to what the court of Vienna, and its generals, had long been meditating to execute. Prince Charles ſaw the Pruſſians were preparing to quit Bohemia. He followed, and came and encamped at Königſaal, that he might obſerve them more nearly. The camp of Staudentz had not been taken according to all the rules of art. The king had weakened his army by detachments, and he had not men enough to fill the ſpace he had to guard. General Naſſau was in Upper Sileſia; Polentz in the new march of Brandenbourg; du Moulin at Trautenau; who, being obliged to march thither after Fran-

quini had made some attempts on Schatzlar, was there relieved by Lehwald. There only remained, after all these detachments had been made, eighteen thousand men in the army the king commanded; so that it did not occupy all the ground, which the caprice of nature had designed for one more numerous. This army overlooked in certain places the neighbouring heights; but its right was entirely overlooked by a hill, which its weakness would not permit it to occupy. Guards of cavalry and corps of hussars had however been placed on these heights, to maintain them in case of need. The cavalry could not indeed go on reconnoitring parties for more than half a mile; because of woods, defiles, and passes among the mountains.

In revenge, the enemy daily sent parties of four and five hundred horse, who appeared on all sides of the Prussian camp, filing off, passing and repassing the forest of Silva, and drawing toward Marchendorff, where was the small camp of Franquini. The Austrian army was not more than a day's march from that of the king, which made him apprehend prince Charles meant to gain Trautenau before him. To prevent this, by which the enemy would have cut off his corps from Silesia, the king determined

to

to march on the morrow: but firſt, to be better informed of the motion of the Auſtrians, he ſent a detachment of two thouſand horſe, commanded by general Katzler, to reconnoitre the roads of Arnau and Königſſaal, with orders to make priſoners, and to capture the peaſants of the neighbourhood, that information might be obtained of what was paſſing in the camp of prince Charles. Katzler advanced with his corps; and, without knowing it, marched between two columns of Auſtrians, who were ſtealing through the foreſts, that he might gain no intelligence of their march. He perceived a great number of light troops before him, and a body of cavalry following them, much ſuperior to his own; on which he immediately retreated, in good order, and related what he had ſeen to the king. He had ſeen but little.

The troops were ordered to march on the morrow at ten o'clock. On the 30th of September, at four in the morning, while the king was ſurrounded by the generals of the day, to impart to them the diſpoſition of his march, an officer came to give him notice that the grand guards, of the right of the camp, had diſcovered a long line of cavalry; and that, as far as they were able to judge by the extent of the duſt, the whole army of the enemy was approaching.

proaching. At the ſame moment, ſome officers came to report that various Auſtrian corps began to appear, oppoſite the right flank of the camp. On the receipt of this intelligence, the troops had orders to take to their arms inſtantly; and the king repaired to the grand guards, that he might judge for himſelf of his preſent ſituation, and of the part he had to take.

In order to obtain a juſt idea of the battle of Sorr, we ſhould have a clear conception of the ground on which it was fought. The poſition of the army before the battle was—its right was ſupported by a ſmall wood, guarded by a battalion of grenadiers. The village of Burckerſdorff was on the right flank, between Pruſenitz and the road to Trautenau, which was not occupied becauſe it ſtands in a bottom, and the houſes are ſcattered. This bottom continued from the front to the extremity of the right, and ſeparated the camp from a height of a ſuperior kind, which extended from the road of Burckerſdorff to Pruſenitz, and on which the huſſars and camp guards had been placed. The front of the army was covered by the village of Staudentz, beyond which was a ſucceſſion of woods and hills, that were a part of the kingdom of Silva. An impracticable ravine ſupported the left of this ſmall army. Two roads led from the

camp to Trautenau; the one on the right of the camp, leaving Burckerſdorff to the left, paſſed through a ſmall defile, and afterward led through a level plain to Trautenau: the other, from the left of the army, paſſed through a valley full of defiles, by the village of Ruderſdorf, leading to Trautenau rather by paths than a beaten road.

When the king came to his grand guards, he ſaw that the Auſtrians began to form, and judged that it would be more raſh to retreat, through defiles, in the preſence of an army which was ſo near him, than to attack this army, notwithſtanding his prodigious inferiority of numbers. Prince Charles had concluded the king would determine on retreat, and had taken his diſpoſitions accordingly. He wiſhed to engage the rear-guard, and he would certainly have ſucceeded. But the king, without heſitation, reſolved to attack; for it would have been more glorious to have fallen, ſelling life dearly, than to periſh in a retreat, which muſt aſſuredly have ended in ignominious flight.

However great the danger of manœuvring in preſence of an enemy already formed, the Pruſſians, neglecting rules, made a quarter wheel to the right, to preſent a front parallel to that of the foe. This delicate evolution was made

with admirable order and celerity; but the Pruſſians preſented only on one line, while the Auſtrians were three deep; and the extending of their front was obliged to be executed under the fire of twenty-eight pieces of artillery, playing from two of the enemy's batteries, and ſuffering from numbers of royal grenades, which they threw among the cavalry. But nothing could diſconcert the Pruſſians. No ſoldier ſeemed to fear; no individual forſook his rank. Still, with whatever diligence this was performed, the right was, for near half an hour, expoſed to the enemy's cannon, before the left had entirely quitted the camp.

Marſhal Buddenbrock then received orders to attack the cavalry; which he executed without heſitation. The Auſtrians had ill choſen their ground. Behind their cavalry was a kind of precipice; this cavalry was in three lines, which the narrowneſs of the ground would not admit to be arranged at proper diſtances; there ſcarcely was an interval of twenty paces between each line. They diſcharged their carbines, according to cuſtom, but had not time to draw their ſwords, being in part driven into the depth behind them, and in part upon their own infantry. This could not happen otherwiſe; for the firſt line, being broken, muſt neceſſarily fall

fall back upon the ſecond, the ſecond on the third, and there was not any ſpace wherein theſe corps, amounting to fifty ſquadrons, could rally and form.

The firſt brigade of the Pruſſian infantry on the right, animated by this ſucceſs, haſtened to attack the Auſtrian batteries, of which we have ſpoken. Twenty-eight cannon, charged with caſe ſhot, in a moment cleared the ranks of the aſſailants and made them fall back. Five battalions, of which the reſerve was compoſed, came up very ſeaſonably: thoſe who had been repulſed rallied by their ſide; and, with one common effort, theſe ten battalions carried the battery. Lieutenant-general Bonin and colonel Geiſt were the principal leaders in this brave attack.

A large column of the enemy was then perceived marching from their right, and deſcending from the heights, to ſeize on Burckerſdorff. Theſe the king anticipated, by ſending a battalion of Kalckſtein to the village. The ſcattered houſes toward the left were ſet on fire, to cover this battalion: while the infantry of the left formed in the rear. This battalion fired by platoons, on the enemy, as coolly as if on the parade, and the column retired flying. The cavalry of the Pruſſian right then became uſe-

leſs, at the place in which it was. The precipice, down which the Auſtrians had been driven, began at the road to Trautenau; and, diminiſhing as it went, led toward the centre of the Pruſſians, but inclining to the village of Sorr, which was in the van. The cuiraſſiers of Buddenbrock, and ſome huſſars, were therefore left to follow the infantry, in a ſecond line.

The Pruſſian, Rottembourg, and Kiau, gendarmes, amounting to twenty ſquadrons, were ſent to the left of the army, to reinforce that wing; while the infantry of the right took the left of the enemy in flank; and, by repeated advantages, drove it back on the right of the Imperialiſts. The guards in the centre of the line, led on by prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, then attacked a height which the enemy ſtill maintained; and, though it was ſteep and very woody, this height was carried. A ſingularity in this action was that the height was defended by prince Louis of Brunſwick, againſt his brother, prince Ferdinand, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf much on this occaſion.

The field of battle was alternately heights and depths, which continually occaſioned new combats; for the Auſtrians endeavoured to rally on the heights: but, various times repulſed, confuſion at length became general and retreat

was

was ſucceeded by flight. The whole country was covered with ſoldiers without commanders; horſe and foot intermingled. While the victorious Pruſſians marched with great haſte, in purſuit of the vanquiſhed, the cuiraſſiers of Bornſtædt, who fought on the left, ſurrounded the regiment of Damnitz and the battalion of Collowrat, took ten pair of colours, and ſeventeen hundred priſoners. The remainder of the cavalry, on the left, could not come up with the Auſtrian cavalry, which avoided engaging, and retired, in tolerable order, into the foreſt of Silva. The king ſtopped the purſuit at the village of Sorr, after which the battle was called. Behind this village is the foreſt of Silva, of which we have made ſuch frequent mention, and into which the enemy muſt not be purſued, for that would have been, unſeaſonably and unneceſſarily, to have riſked the loſs of all that had been gained. It was quite ſufficient that a corps, of eighteen thouſand men, had beaten an army, of upwards of forty thouſand: beſide that there was nothing to be gained, by venturing a farther purſuit.

The victors loſt prince Albert of Brunſwick; general Blanckenſée; colonels Bredow, Blanckenbourg, Dohna, Ledebour; lieutenant-colonels Lange and Wedel of the guards; and a thouſand

thouſand privates. Illuſtrious victims, who ſacrificed their lives for the good of the ſtate. The number of wounded were ſuppoſed to amount to two thouſand.

The vanquiſhed loſt twenty-two cannon, ten pair of colours, two ſtandards, thirty officers, and two thouſand ſoldiers, who were made priſoners.

Prince Leopold diſtinguiſhed himſelf on that day; and ſtill more marſhal Buddenbrock and general Goltz; who, with twelve ſquadrons, conquered fifty. If this battle was not equally deciſive with that of Friedberg, it was becauſe of the ground on which it was fought. An enemy flying on a plain muſt ſuffer conſiderable loſs; but, in a hilly country, he is protected from the cavalry, which can make no cloſe attacks; and, however ſmall the number of thoſe who rally on the brink of theſe heights, they will be ſufficient to ſtop the purſuit of the victor.

The plan of this battle, conceived by prince Charles of Lorraine, or according to others by Franquini, was excellent and well imagined. The poſt of the Pruſſians was without diſpute bad; they could not be excuſed in having neglected their right, and thinking only of their front, which was in a bottom overlooked by a height not more than a thouſand paces diſtant.

But,

But, though the Auſtrians could project, they wanted the abilities to execute. The following are the faults they committed.

Prince Charles ought to have formed his cavalry of the left before the road of Trautenau, and on the back of the Pruſſian camp; for, by barring this road, the army of the king would neither have had ground to form on nor means of ſupporting its right. The prince might alſo, on his arrival on the ground, have commanded that cavalry to attack the Pruſſian camp on full ſpeed. The ſoldier would then neither have had time to run to arms, form, nor defend himſelf; and victory muſt have been certain. It is ſaid the duke d'Aremberg had, with his column, loſt his way, during the night; and that it had formed with its back turned toward the camp of the king. This is very like the duke d'Aremberg. And it is further ſaid that prince Charles, by this means, loſt much time, which was ſpent in repairing the diſorder. But, when the Pruſſians firſt began to appear in the field, what then prevented the prince from immediately attacking them with his cavalry? His left ſhould have deſcended from a height, on troops employed in forming, and on others that were filing off for the field.

The

The king was found not to have committed leſs faults than his adverſary. He is particularly reproached with reducing himſelf to the neceſſity of fighting, by his ill choice of a poſt: inſtead of which an able general ought never to fight, but when he thinks proper. The king, it is affirmed, ought to have been informed of the march of the Auſtrians. To this he replied that, the enemy being much ſuperior to him in light troops, he was not able to let the five hundred huſſars, who only remained after all the detachments he had made, adventure too far. But, it is added, he ought not to have made ſo many detachments, and have weakened himſelf ſo much, in face of a ſuperior army. He anſwered that the corps of Geſler and Polentz, gone to join the prince of Anhalt, might be regarded as equivalent to the Saxons, who had returned home; that the detachment of general Naſſau had been neceſſary, to draw ſubſiſtence from Sileſia, which muſt totally have failed, had not the Hungarians, who infeſted all that dutchy, been expelled; that the detachments of du Moulin and Lehwald were indiſpenſable for the paſſes of the mountains, which muſt be guarded, or the army would have riſqued being ſtarved by the enemy. There were only horſes ſufficient to bring, on each journey,

journey, flour enough for five days. Had one of theſe convoys failed, the army muſt have been without bread and ſubſiſtence. It is affirmed, the king ought rather to have retreated to Sileſia than to have hazarded a battle in Bohemia. But it was the opinion of the king that a battle loſt in Bohemia was of leſs conſequence than a battle loſt in Sileſia: beſide that a haſty retreat muſt indubitably have drawn the war into this dutchy. Add to this that the ſubſiſtence of the enemy was conſumed, by remaining in Bohemia; and that his own would have been eaten, by retiring into Sileſia. But we ſhall leave the reader to weigh theſe reaſons and determine.

The victory could only be attributed to the narrowneſs of the ground, on which prince Charles came to attack the king, which deprived the enemy of every advantage of ſuperior numbers. The Pruſſians could preſent as extenſive a front as himſelf; his multitude of ſoldiers became uſeleſs, becauſe that his three lines, wanting ſpace between and preſſed one upon the other, could not combat at their eaſe; and, being once confuſed, never could again be formed. Fortunately for Pruſſia, the bravery of her ſoldiers repaired the faults of her general, and puniſhed thoſe of her foes.

While

While the two armies were engaged, the Imperial huſſars pillaged the Pruſſian camp, the left and the centre not having had time to ſtrike their tents. Nadaſty and Trenck profited by this. The king and many officers there loſt all their baggage. The king's ſecretaries even were taken; they had the preſence of mind to tear all their papers. But wherefore ſhould ſuch trifles be remembered, when the mind is occupied by greater and more intereſting objects, the glory and ſafety of the ſtate, in preſence of which every other ought to keep ſilence?

Lehwald, attracted by the report of the battle, came up in time to ſave the baggage of the right, and put an end to the fearful cruelties, which the turbulent and undiſciplined Hungarian troops exerciſed, on ſome of the ſick, and on the women who had remained in the camp. Humanity revolts at ſuch actions, which load thoſe who commit or thoſe who tolerate them with infamy. It muſt be ſaid, in praiſe of the Pruſſian ſoldier, that he is brave without being cruel; and that he has often been ſeen to give proofs of a greatneſs of mind, not to be expected from people of low condition.

Poſterity perhaps will be ſurpriſed that an army, victorious in two regular battles, ſhould retire before the vanquiſhed, and gather no fruit after

after ſuch triumphs. The mountains which ſurround Bohemia, the defiles which divide it from Sileſia, the difficulty of providing ſubſiſtence, the ſuperiority of the enemy in light troops, and finally the enfeebled ſtate of the army, will afford a ſolution to this problem. Had the king endeavoured to eſtabliſh his winter quarters in this kingdom, the following are the difficulties he muſt have encountered. The whole country was entirely foraged. Few towns are to be met with in theſe parts; and thoſe are ſmall, and moſt of them have bad walls; the ſoldiers therefore for their own ſafety muſt have been huddled together, and the army would have been ruined by epidemic diſeaſes. There were ſcarcely waggons enough for the flour; how then might any have been found to have brought forage for the cavalry? Whereas, by quitting Bohemia, the king could remount, recruit, and equip, his troops; procure them abundance, give them repoſe, and thus make them uſeful, if neceſſary, for the approaching ſpring. Beſide which, it appeared probable that, hearing of the battle of Sorr, the empreſs queen would have been more diſpoſed, than formerly, to accede to the treaty of Hanover.

After having for honour's ſake encamped five days on the field of battle, the king withdrew

with his troops to Trautenau. Prince Charles was ſtill at Ertina, ready to return to Königſgrætz, on hearing of the approach of the Pruſſians. Intelligence was brought to this camp that general Naſſau had, on the day of the battle of Sorr, beaten a body of Hungarians, near Leobſchutz, and had taken a hundred and ſeventy priſoners. General Fouquet alſo had found means to carry off four hundred huſſars, between Grulich and Habelſchwerdt, who were taken to Glatz. Warneri, who was at Landſhut, with three hundred horſe, having heard that a new Hungarian regiment, belonging to Leopold Palfy, had marched to Böhmiſch-Friedland, intercepted, ſurpriſed them, and brought in a hundred and forty privates and eight officers, priſoners. But, as misfortune often is mingled with happineſs, Chazot, of the corps of du Moulin, was not ſo lucky, in his attempt on Marchendorff, but was attacked and beaten by the enemy, and loſt eighty men.

After the army had eaten up all the ſubſiſtence, in the neighbourhood of Trautenau, it prepared to return into Sileſia, and took the road to Schatzlar. Of all the paſſes and defiles of Bohemia, the worſt are upon this road. Whether advancing or retreating, every poſſible precaution muſt be taken, to conduct troops with

with ſafety. The ſmall rivulet of Trautenbach ran in a parallel line, behind the camp of the king, on the other ſide of which were rocks and foreſts. The baggage, on the 14th of October, was ſent before, under a good eſcort, in order to facilitate the march. Fifteen battalions were poſted on the hills, to protect the retreat of the army, and afterward to become its rear-guard. The army decamped on the 16th, and marched in two columns. Prince Leopold, who led that of the left, paſſing by Trautenbach, arrived in Sileſia without having met a foe. The column of the right, under the conduct of the king, was preceded by the cavalry: the infantry paſſed the rivulet before that Franquini, Nadaſty, Moratz, &c. were informed of the march of the Pruſſians. They afterward haſtened with ſeven or eight thouſand men. Though all the heights were ſupplied with infantry, the progreſs of the march obliged the rear-guard to quit them ſucceſſively, and the pandours, profiting by theſe ſame abandoned heights, fired on this rear-guard. The ſkirmiſhing continued from eight in the morning till ſix in the evening: they killed a captain and thirty men, and wounded about eighty. The corps of du Moulin had been employed to cover the laſt defile, which leads to Schatzlar, through a valley.

This corps ſtopped the progreſs of the enemy, who ſuffered a loſs of three hundred men, in an attack made by the cavalry, to which the ſmall plain of Schatzlar gave occaſion. The enemy then drew off, and du Moulin, filing to the right, paſſed by the Rehberge (deer hills), and entered the camp, by the route which the king had prepared.

The army remained at Schatzlar till the 19th, when it marched and encamped at Liebau, on the territories of Sileſia. The corps of du Moulin was employed to form a line, along the frontiers. The remainder of the army entered into quarters of cantonment, between Ronſtock and Schweidnitz, where it might aſſemble in ſix hours, and where it ſtill was at its eaſe, becauſe of the numerous towns and villages which are in that flouriſhing country. Here the king waited the diſperſing of the Auſtrian army, before he went into winter quarters.

General Naſſau, who deſired to fix his quarters in Upper Sileſia, ſurpriſed a Hungarian corps at Haſtehim, and drove marſhal Eſterhazi from Oderberg. The huſſars of Wartenberg, who were of this corps, diſtinguiſhed themſelves, vanquiſhed the dragoons of Gotha, took a ſtandard, and made a hundred and eleven priſoners. The general after this marched to Po-

nuba,

huba, and the Hungarians fled to Teſchen, and from thence to Jablunka.

General Fouquet, deſirous of not remaining idle at Glatz, took two hundred huſſars, who had imprudently ſhut themſelves up in Nachod. This able general gave proofs of genius and capacity, during the whole courſe of the war. We ſhall only further ſay that forty parties, who made ſallies from his garriſon, during this campaign, captured more than eight hundred of the enemy.

On the 24th of October, the king was informed that prince Charles had divided his army into three columns. He imagined this was for the purpoſe of afterward extending them, becauſe the ſeaſon for military operations was over, and left the command of the troops to prince Leopold, enjoining him not to ſeparate them further, till he ſhould receive his, the king's, orders; after which he departed for Berlin, where his preſence was become neceſſary; as well to reanimate the negotiations, which began to grow languid, as to find ſupplies for the enſuing campaign, ſhould peace not be concluded during winter.

CHAP. XIV.

Rebellion in Scotland, which occaſions the King of England to quit Hanover, and the Negotiations for Peace to ſlacken. Deſign of the Auſtrians and Saxons on Brandenburg diſcovered. Contradictions in the Advice of the Miniſtry. Plans for the Campaign. The Prince of Anhalt aſſembles his Army at Halle. The King departs for Sileſia. Expedition of Luſatia. The Prince of Anhalt marches to Meiſſen. Battle of Keſſeldſorf. Taking of Dreſden. Negotiation and Concluſion of the Peace.

HAD the negotiations of the Pruſſians, during the year 1745, been as ſucceſsful as their arms, they and their enemies would have equally been ſpared a uſeleſs effuſion of blood; and peace would have been ſooner concluded. But various unexpected incidents rendered the good intentions of the king ineffectual. Scarcely had the king of England ſigned, almoſt againſt his will, the convention of Hanover before the rebellion of Scotland broke out, and he was obliged to be more expeditious than he deſired, on his return to London. The young

ſon

ſon of the pretender paſſed ſecretly over to Scotland, accompanied by ſome confidential perſons, and concealed himſelf in one of the northern iſlands on the coaſt, to give his partiſans time to aſſemble, and arm their tenants, raiſe the Highlanders, and form a militia, which had at leaſt the appearance of an army.

By this diverſion, France armed England againſt England; and a boy, landing in Scotland without troops and without ſuccour, obliged king George to recal his Engliſhmen, who defended Flanders, to ſupport his tottering throne. France acted prudently in this plan, and to this diverſion ſhe owed all the conqueſts ſhe made, as well in Flanders as in Brabant.

The king of England and his miniſters at firſt deſpiſed the youthful Edward, his feeble party, and the riſing rebellion. It was called the ſally of a Jacobite prieſt (cardinal Tencin) at London, and the knight-errantry of a raſh boy. This raſh boy however beat general Cope, who had been ſent againſt him by government, with all the forces that could be haſtily aſſembled. The king was rouſed by this check, which taught him that a ſpark may preſently become a conflagration, in an ariſtocratical government. The affairs of Scotland employed the whole attention of his council; foreign buſi-

neſs was ſuffered to languiſh. The allies of England, thinking this nation at the laſt gaſp, no longer held her in the ſame reſpect. Unfortunately, too, the Hanover convention began to be known; it had been talked of by the Auſtrians and the Saxons, and this might have produced a bad effect on the French, who were the only allies of Pruſſia. Thus it happened that the diverſion of the pretender in Scotland became favourable to the queen of Hungary; for it procured her the liberty of making her laſt efforts againſt the king of Pruſſia, in deſpite of the king of England, whoſe advice was then contemned at Vienna.

The king, being at Berlin, exhauſted every expedient to find ſupplies, which might empower him to continue the war. The revenues of Sileſia were not received as in time of peace; two thirds of them had failed: reſources therefore muſt be ſought for, and were very difficult of diſcovery. The embarraſſment was great, and the dangers with which the ſtate was threatened, by the foe, ſtill much greater. The king was informed of theſe by the following means.

After the marriage of the heir elective to the throne of Sweden with princeſs Ulrica, the king's ſiſter, the Swedes were in part inclined

to

to the intereſt of Pruſſia. Meſſieurs Rudenſchild and Wolfenſtirna, the Swediſh ambaſſadors, one at the court of Berlin the other at Dreſden, were perſonally and particularly attached to the king. Wolfenſtirna was well received in the houſe of * * *, where he made one at the miniſter's card parties. * * * was not ſo circumſpect in his preſence as a firſt miniſter, the depoſitary of his maſter's ſecrets, ought generally to be with the whole world. Wolfenſtirna eaſily diſcovered that the plan of the courts of Vienna and Dreſden was to ſend the army of prince Charles into Saxony; where, joined by the Saxon troops, it was to march during the depth of winter immediately to Berlin. He imparted this diſcovery to Rudenſchild, by whom the king was informed of it, on the 8th of November, the very day on which the trophies of Friedberg and Sorr were hung up in the churches. Rudenſchild added that this project had been formed by * *, *, corrected by Bartenſtein, amplified by Rutowſky, and ſent by Saul to Frankfort, to the queen of Hungary; that * * * was convinced Pruſſia would be cruſhed by this blow, and that it was this firm hope which had prevented the courts of Vienna and Dreſden from inclining to the pacific ſentiments of the king of England; that, further, the

ſpoils of Pruſſia were ſo divided as that the king of Poland was to have the biſhoprics of Magdebourg and of Halberſtadt, with Halle and its territory; and that the empreſs queen was to recover Sileſia. He further informed the king of the cauſe of the hatred which * * * bore him; which was that he had been enraged at the manifeſto which the king had publiſhed, and particularly by the following paſſages.

"While acts of ſuch horror were committed "in Sileſia, and Heaven, the juſt avenger of "crimes, was pleaſed ſo openly to puniſh them, "by misfortunes ſo remarkable and ſo ſevere, "it was frigidly aſſerted, at Dreſden, that Sax-"ony was not at war with Pruſſia; and that the "duke of Weiſſenfels and the troops under his "command had not attacked the hereditary "ſtates of the king, but only his new acquiſi-"tions. The miniſtry of Dreſden gave vent "to reaſoning ſo captious; as if ſcholaſtic "diſtinctions were motives ſufficiently power-"ful to juſtify the illegality of its procedure."

And by the next—"This might have ap-"peared at length to have put the moderation "and patience of the king beyond all bounds; "but his majeſty, taking pity on a neighbouring "people, innocent of the offences he has re-"ceived, and knowing the miſeries and inevita-

"ble

" ble desolations which are caused by war, con-
" tinued to suspend the just effects of his resent-
" ment, that he might tempt new modes of
" accommodation, with the court of Dresden.
" There is reason to presume that, after the
" repeated and last refusals which he has so re-
" cently received, the confidence of the king
" of Poland has been ensnared, by the un-
" worthy perfidy of his ministers. The most
" pathetic remonstrances, and offers the most
" advantageous, prodigal as they were, were
" ineffectual."

It must be confessed that * * * was warmly attacked in these passages, which could not be mistaken by any person; for the ministers, included in the plural, were rather his clerks than his equals. The report too had the greater appearance of truth, because that the king knew the character of count * * *, and the haughtiness of the empress queen. If the project of the Saxons was dangerous to Prussia, it was not less hazardous to themselves: but the passions, and particularly that of revenge, so cloud the understanding of man that, in the hope of gratifying these, he is capable of every rashness.

The violence of the crisis demanded a prompt remedy. The army of the prince of Anhalt received orders to assemble incontinently at Halle;

Halle; and, as decisive measures were necessary, the king believed that, without any thing derogatory to his own authority, he might assemble a council, listen to the voice of experience, and follow whatever sage advice might be given, by those whom he consulted. Whoever takes charge of the interest of a nation ought to neglect nothing for the safety of that nation.

The prince of Anhalt was one of the first to whom the king disclosed the project of * * *. This prince was one of those men whose self opinion is of that kind as to induce them always to give a negative, when others affirm. He seemed to pity the ease with which this accusation against * * * was credited. He said it was little probable that a minister of the king of Poland, and a Saxon by birth, would in sport draw four armies into the states of his master, and expose them to inevitable ruin. The king shewed him a letter, which said that, in two days, general Grune would arrive with his corps at Gera, to join the Saxons at Leipsic; and produced different letters from Silesia, all of which related that the Saxons were amassing large magazines in Lusatia, for the troops of princes Charles, which soon were expected there. His majesty concluded by telling him that he should confide to him the command of

the

the army, which was assembling at Halle. The prince persisted in his incredulity. However, it was visible on his countenance, that he was pleased to behold himself at the head of an army, that might supply him with the means of renovating his former fame.

Count Podewils entered a moment after, and the king found him equally incredulous with the prince of Anhalt. But his incredulity was not the spirit of contradiction, but of timidity. This minister had some money, placed in the stocks at Leipsic, which he feared to lose. Incorruptible in other respects, his weakness would not suffer him to entertain an idea of a rupture with Saxony. It was a disagreeable subject; and, thinking others as fearful as himself, he supposed * * * incapable of so bold a project. In this excellent council, the falsity or verity of the fact was discussed: but no one thought of anticipating the evil which was preparing. The king was obliged to enforce his authority, to induce the prince of Anhalt to make the necessary dispositions, for the subsistence of the army at Halle; and to oblige count Podewils to prepare dispatches for foreign courts, by which they might be informed of the plots of Saxony, and of the resolution of the king to prevent their effects.

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As if there were not yet difficulties enough, additional ones were added. The Ruſſian envoy came and declared to the king, in the name of the empreſs, that the latter hoped the king would abſtain from attacking the electorate of Saxony; becauſe that ſuch a ſtep would oblige her to ſend her contingent to the king of Poland, as had been ſtipulated in her treaty of alliance. The king replied that it was the intention of his majeſty to live in peace with all his neighbours; but that, ſhould any one of them hatch deſigns pernicious to his own ſtates, there was no power in Europe which ſhould prevent him from defending himſelf, and confounding his foes.

Every letter from Saxony and Sileſia confirmed the intelligence of Rudenſchild. In order to be better informed of the motions of prince Charles, the king aſſembled a mixt corps of cavalry, infantry, and huſſars; at the head of which Winterfeld advanced toward Friedland, on the frontiers of Bohemia and Luſatia, with orders, if prince Charles entered Luſatia, to march beſide him on the banks of the Queis, which runs on the frontiers of Sileſia. The purpoſe of the king was to fall on the Saxons on two ſides at once. The army of Sileſia was to act againſt that of prince Charles; and, if poſ-

ſible, ſurpriſe it in its cantonments in Luſatia; or give battle, to drive it back into Bohemia.

During this danger, which kept the whole city of Berlin in alarm, the king put on the beſt countenance he could, that the ſpirits of the people might not be ſuffered to droop. His reſolution was taken. The declaration of the Ruſſians gave him no uneaſineſs, for Ruſſia could not act in leſs than ſix months; and the deſtiny of Pruſſia and of Saxony muſt be decided in much leſs time. Things were at that extremity that he could only vanquiſh or fall. The king feared the incredulity and tardineſs of the prince of Anhalt; and left the corps of Grune, which amounted to ſeven thouſand effective men, ſhould march immediately to Berlin. In order to ſecure the capital as effectually as poſſible, general Haake was left there, with a garriſon of five thouſand men; but, as the city was two miles in circumference, it was impoſſible he ſhould defend it: he was therefore to march, meet, and fight the enemy, on his approach. This, in reality, was an inſufficient precaution, but there were no means of taking any better. Arrangements were made, in caſe of misfortune, to remove the royal family, archives, public offices, and ſupreme councils, to Stetin, as to an aſylum, ſhould fortune forſake the

Pruſſian

Pruſſian arms. The king further wrote a pathetic letter to the king of France; in which he gave an affecting picture of his ſituation, and inſtantly demanded the ſuccour ſtipulated by treaty.

It would be difficult to divine from what motive the prince of Anhalt endeavoured to perſuade the king not to take the command of the army of Sileſia. He carried his importunate remonſtrances ſo far that, at laſt, the king told him he was determined to put himſelf at the head of his forces, and that, when the prince of Anhalt ſhould maintain an army, he might give the command of it to whomſoever he thought proper. After this, the prince was obliged to repair to Halle, and the king departed for Sileſia on the 14th of November, leaving Berlin in conſternation, Saxony in hope, and all Europe in expectation of the events of this winter campaign.

On the 15th, the king arrived at Lignitz. Here he found prince Leopold and general Goltz, who had the inſpection of the proviſions. Letters, received from general Winterfeld, informed him that ſix thouſand Saxons, compoſing the van-guard of prince Charles, had entered Luſatia by Zittau, and that the Auſtrians were preparing to follow. Prince Leo-

pold was informed of all the operations the king had projected. The army of Silesia contained thirty thousand effective men, veteran and chosen troops, accustomed to conquer, recovered from fatigue by four weeks rest, and prompt to encounter difficulties the most dangerous.

Some necessary precautions however were to be taken, before Silesia might be quitted. The town of Schweidnitz must not be abandoned; for it contained magazines, and was not at that time fortified. General Nassau therefore must quit Upper Silesia, and march toward Landshut, to oppose the corps under Hohenems, who had received orders, from his court, to make an incursion into Lower Silesia, on the side of Hirschberg. The situation of the king was somewhat similar to that in which he saw himself before the battle of Hohen-Friedberg, and he had recourse to similar stratagems, to entangle the enemy in similar snares. He affected scrupulously to respect the frontiers of Saxony, and to place his whole attention on gaining Crossen before prince Charles. To strengthen this opinion, Winterfeld punished some hussars, who had committed disorders in Lusatia. The roads to Crossen were prepared, and provisions were collected on the route, so

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that the country people, whom it is always neceſſary firſt to deceive, were fully perſuaded the king had no other object in view. Winterfeld had lately occupied Naumbourg on the Queis, and gave out that he was there only to watch the enemy, as he marched beſide that river, and to arrive firſt at Croſſen.

Prince Charles, who entertained the flattering idea that the Pruſſians were peacefully at repoſe in their winter quarters, that they were diſcouraged alſo, and that he had nothing to fear but a body of three thouſand men, forming a corps of obſervation, ſlumbered in this dangerous ſecurity, and the ſame ſtratagem a ſecond time ſucceeded. So true is it that ſuſpicion is the mother of ſafety; and that a wiſe general ought never to deſpiſe his enemy, but watch his motions, that they may ſerve to guide him in all his operations.

That he might prevent, as much as poſſible, the Auſtrians from receiving information of the movements of the army, the king had three rivers which were in his front lined; the Queis by Winterfeld; the Neiſſe by ſome light troops; and the Bober by other detachments. Whoever came from Luſatia had free paſſage; but an interdiction was laid on all thoſe who wiſhed to croſs the rivers to go into Saxony. By theſe means

means he procured intelligence for himself, and robbed the enemy of information. The news he heard of the latter was the cause that the army presently advanced, and was cantoned on the Queis.

The king fixed his quarters at Holstein; this was on the 22d of November; and he was but a mile from Naumbourg. Four bridges were thrown over the river, that it might be hastily passed, in four columns. The intent of the king was to let the Imperialists pass him; then to take them in the rear, cut off their provisions, and thus force them either to fight or ignominiously to fly, toward the frontiers of Bohemia. But, to follow a plan which had been once adopted, it was necessary to abstain from sending parties into Lusatia; and intelligence was to be obtained only by spies, which is never so certain as that brought by the troops. The expedition was likewise of so important a nature that safety must be preferred to fame.

General Winterfeld, to whom the king had imparted all his projects, informed the latter that the enemy advanced by cantonments; but that they spread so far that their left was at Lauban, and their right at Görlitz. He added that, according to the news the spies brought, they would march on the morrow, and that the

moment for action was come. Hearing this, the army marched in four columns, on the 23d, each of which was led by a lieutenant-general. The rendezvous of these columns was at Naumbourg, and here the king gave them their last instructions. A fog rose in the morning, which was favourable; for it hid every motion of the army from the enemy. There is a stone bridge over the Queis, at Naumbourg, beside which were two fords for the cavalry; and a bridge was hastily thrown over for the second column of infantry. These arrangements made, the generals who led the columns repaired to Naumbourg, and there received orders immediately to pass the Queis. They all had guides appointed, to conduct them to Catholisch Hennersdorf; and they were commanded mutually to succour each other, according as the column, which should fall on the quarters of the enemy, might have need of cavalry, or infantry, to insure success; for exact information was wanting, concerning the places where the army of prince Charles was cantoned, in order to make a more accurate disposition.

The fog dispersed at the moment that the columns had passed the Queis. The right and the left were the cavalry; the two central columns the infantry; each of these was preceded by a regiment

giment of huſſars, to give timely information, to the generals, of what was paſſing in their front. The king was at the head of the firſt column of infantry. A miller's man was the guide of this, who led it to a marſh, where cattle feed, in ſummer, but which, after the rainy ſeaſon, was ſcarcely fit for the march of troops. There was ſome difficulty in extricating the men from this marſh; but, after conſiderable ſearch, a road was found, which was practicable, and which led beſide a wood.

While the troops were filing off, the huſſars of Ziethen came to the village of Catholiſch Hennerſdorf, and ſent advice that it contained two battalions and ſix ſquadrons of Saxons. They added, they would afford the enemy ſufficient amuſement to give the column time to come up. Two regiments of cuiraſſiers, of the fourth column, which was the neareſt, were immediately ordered to advance; and Rochow led on the regiments of Geſler and Bornſtædt. Theſe Polentz was commanded to ſuſtain, with three battalions of grenadiers. It was the before-mentioned marſh, which was thought impracticable, that had deceived the Saxons. They had kept no guard on that ſide; which was the reaſon of their being ſurpriſed. The village of Hennerſdorf is half a mile long.

The action began at four o'clock, toward the eaſtern part, and ended at ſix, at the weſtern end. Polentz took the Saxons in the rear; Rochow attacked them in front; and Winterfeld in flank. The regiments of Gotha and Dalwitz, and the greateſt part of that of Obirn, were made priſoners: among theſe were general Dalwitz, colonel Obirn, and thirty officers. The loſs of the Saxons amounted to ſix cannon, eleven hundred men, two pair of kettle drums, two ſtandards, and three pair of colours. Their baggage was divided among the huſſars, who well had merited this trifling reward.

The army encamped at Catholiſch Hennerſdorf, and the men were informed that, if they were obliged to endure fatigue for ſome few days, it was but to ſpare them future battles. Though half of the army wanted tents, and ſeveral regiments had only linen breeches, they all yielded, with a good grace, to that which they ſaw neceſſity exacted. This fortunate commencement prognoſticated that prince Charles would not withſtand the Pruſſians. It was propoſed to profit by the conſternation which the carrying of one of his quarters muſt occaſion in his army, and immmediately to march on his heels, that he might not have time to recover. On the morrow, the 24th, the day was ſo dim

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and the fog ſo thick that the army was obliged to advance with great precaution. It encamped behind the village of Leopoldſhain; and, for the greater ſecurity, fifteen battalions were placed in this village. The ſcouts brought intelligence that the enemy every where was retiring; that the roads were ſtrewed with waggons without horſes, baggage overthrown, powder carts abandoned, and, in a word, every thing that could atteſt flight. The deſerters, who arrived in great numbers, ſaid that confuſion was ſpread among their troops; becauſe that, for the two laſt days, twenty different or contradictory orders had been iſſued.

Early on the morning of the 25th, advice was received that prince Charles had aſſembled his army at Schönfeld, a league diſtant from the camp of the king. The weather was fine; the king did not heſitate, and he immediately began his march, intending to attack the enemy. As he approached Görlitz, his parties reported that the enemy had ſecretly decamped, and had taken the road to Zittau. The Pruſſian army encamped near Görlitz, which capitulated. Sixty officers and two hundred and fifty men were there made priſoners of war. Some of the officers were ſick; and ſome, who had been wounded at Catholiſch Hennerſdorf, had found means

to escape. There was a magazine at Görlitz, which was of great utility to this expedition.

On the 26th, the army further advanced to the convent of Radomiritz, and the troops were put into cantonments. Bonin and Winterfeld were commanded to march beside a small river, named the Neisse, with seventy squadrons and ten battalions. This manœuvre, which threatened to cut off the enemy from Zittau, caused prince Charles to abandon his camp at Ostritz, to gain Zittau before the Prussians. As his retreat was precipitate, the Prussian hussars made considerable prizes on the Austrian baggage.

On the 27th, the king advanced to Ostritz, and sent Winterfeld to Zittau. The rear-guard of prince Charles was then filing through that town. Winterfeld attacked it, and took three hundred and fifty prisoners. The Austrians lost all their baggage, and set fire to their own waggons, that they might not fall into the hands of their pursuers.

This expedition only continued five days. The Austrians lost their magazines and baggage, and returned into Bohemia, weakened by five thousand men. Ten battalions and twenty squadrons were left in the neighbourhood of Zittau, to guard that important post; and

and Winterfeld was obliged to return into Silesia, with five battalions and five squadrons, to fall on the flanks of Hohenems, while Nassau prepared to attack him in front. This expedition was so fortunate that, in less than twenty-four hours, there were no more Austrians in Silesia. The dragoons of Philibert were defeated by the hussars of Wartenberg; and Hohenems did not yield to prince Charles, either in the promptitude of his retreat or in the loss of his baggage.

The Prussian troops that were in Lusatia went into quarters of refreshment, in the vicinage of Görlitz; general Lehwald excepted, who was detached with ten battalions and twenty squadrons to Bautzen, with orders to push forward toward the Elbe, that the Saxons might be in fear for their capital, and the operations of the prince of Anhalt facilitated. Colonel Brandis, who had remained at Crossen with two battalions, seized on Guben; where he took a large magazine from the Saxons.

During this expedition into Lusatia, no news was received of the prince of Anhalt; but the Saxons divulged that Grune had passed the Elbe at Torgau, and was marching for Berlin. While information like this gave rise to strange reflections, an officer came from Halle, with intelligence that the prince of Anhalt had

marched on the 30th of November; that he meant to have attacked the Saxons in their intrenchments at Leipsic; but that he had found them abandoned; that Leipsic had submitted; and that the Saxons fled toward Dresden. The king sent the officer back, to press the prince of Anhalt to gain Meissen as soon as possible, and to let him know that the corps of Lehwald was only waiting his arrival to form a junction. When it was known at Dresden that prince Charles had been so quickly dispatched, the consternation became so great that the corps of Grune was immediately ordered back, and count Rutowsky was obliged to march his army to protect Dresden.

While the prince of Anhalt marched toward Meissen, and the army of the king remained in suspense, the latter employed his time in renewing a negotiation, with the Saxons, which had so often been interrupted, and which circumstances appeared to throw to a still greater distance. To this effect, he wrote to Mr. Villiers, the English ambassador at the court of Dresden; declaring to him that, notwithstanding the animosity which his enemies so lately and so manifestly displayed against him, and the advantages he had obtained over them, he persevered

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in the reſolution he had taken of preferring moderation to extremity; that he offered peace to the king of Poland, with forgetfulneſs of the paſt, and left the Hanover convention to be the baſis of reconciliation. He did not act thus till after deep reflection. Peace may be obtained when war is ſucceſsful; but, when the enemy is victorious, he is but little diſpoſed to be reconciled. The blood of ſo many brave officers, who ſacrifice themſelves to render their country victorious, might be ſpared. However fortunate the war in Saxony at preſent was, it could only be conſidered as fire in the houſe of a neighbour, which preſently might be communicated to our own. Beſide that it was neceſſary to terminate the war with all expedition, leſt Ruſſia ſhould interfere. The king had nothing to hope from France; and, if theſe ſtruggles did not end during the winter, it well might be expected that, in the ſpring, the queen of Hungary would recal her army from the Rhine, which would there be uſeleſs, and incorporate it with that of Bohemia, which would have given her a great ſuperiority. All pretence for war had likewiſe ſubſided, ſince the death of Charles VII. To this may be added, the harveſt had been ſo bad that corn was become as ſcarce as it was dear; and finance

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was entirely exhauſted. Peace therefore was the only remedy for all theſe evils.

The moderation of the king, in the conditions which he propoſed for peace, may perhaps excite aſtoniſhment: but it ought to be obſerved that his ſituation was ſuch as induced him to calculate every ſtep, and to leave nothing inconſiderately to chance. Firſt, he maintained the diſintereſted principles which he had proclaimed, in his manifeſtos of 1744 and 1745; had he extorted any ceſſion from the king of Poland, he would have confounded the intereſts of this prince with thoſe of the Auſtrians; and would himſelf have planned a union which good policy required he ſhould endeavour to diſſolve. Europe was but too jealous already of his acquiſition of Sileſia: ſuch impreſſions were to be effaced, and not renewed. Add to this that the ſhorteſt means of obtaining peace were to reſtore the poſſeſſions of all parties to the ſtate in which they had been previous to the laſt war. As the propoſed conditions were neither ſevere nor burthenſome, they might procure peace; which ſhould be the more ſtable, by not leaving any germe of animoſity or jealouſy.

Theſe principles were to him as a law, and from which it will be ſeen that, notwithſtanding the ſucceſs with which his enterpriſes were crowned,

crowned, from these he never departed. Who would not have supposed that propositions so reasonable would have been welcomed by the king of Poland? The very reverse however happened. Count * * * could think only of his project. He had brought prince Charles into Saxony, intending to send the army of Rutowsky to join him as well as the corps of count Grune. Proud of such strength, he proposed to subject the destiny of his king and the safety of his country to the fortune of a battle: thus sacrificing every interest, most dear to the majority of men, in order to gratify his individual revenge.

Villiers repaired to court, with the air of a man who brought good news. He demanded an audience; and, to the propositions with which he was charged, added the most pathetic exhortations, to induce Augustus to avoid those misfortunes, by which his people and his person were menaced. The king coldly replied, he would consider of what was to be done. * * * was more explicit with the English ambassador. He loudly insisted on the aid he expected from the Russians; spoke emphatically on the great resources of Saxony; and concluded by saying that, in deference to the king of England, he would deliver a memorial to Villiers, containing

ing conditions, according to which the king of Poland might determine to make peace.

On the morrow, the 1ſt of December, the king of Poland departed for Prague; and the two eldeſt princes for Nurnberg. What a contraſt of pride and weakneſs! After the departure of the court, one of the Saxon counſellors gave a memorial to Mr. Villiers, the ſubſtance of which was—that the king of Poland would accede to the Hanover convention, on condition that the Pruſſians would immediately ceaſe all hoſtilities, would exact no more contributions, would reſtore ſuch as had been received, would evacuate Saxony immediately, and would pay all preceding damage, as well as that which ſhould be cauſed by the retreat of the troops. Villiers augured ill of a peace the conditions of which Saxony dictated with ſo much haughtineſs. This memorial he ſent to the king, aſſuring him of the good intentions of the king of England, and adding that he would not warrant the declaration of the Saxon miniſters. He was explicit.

The king mean time was informed that prince Charles had paſſed the Elbe, at Leutmeritz, and directed his march toward Dreſden. Combining the motion of this army with the precipitate flight of the king of Poland and his children,

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it appeared evident that * * * was determined not to make peace. That he might the better be ready to overthrow the projects of enemies thus enraged, the king removed his quarters to Bautzen, and Lehwald marched to Königsbruck, a mile from Meissen. His majesty answered Mr. Villiers that he had sent for count Podewils to be near his person, that he might facilitate every thing which could contribute to restore peace; that he flattered himself the king of Poland, in like manner, would appoint one of his ministers, that this salutary work might be accomplished, and that, after the preliminaries were signed, hostilities might cease: that, with respect to forage and contributions, for which indemnification was required, the king might require similar indemnification for the havoc committed by the Saxons in Silesia; but that the most certain method would be entirely to erase the article. The king added, he hoped the ambassadors of Russia and Holland would become guarantees to this treaty of peace, and complained of the departure of the king of Poland, as of an unamicable step, injurious to his manner of thinking, and which foreboded ill to the present negotiation. * * * had conducted his master to Prague, that he might the more freely importune him and prevent his being a spectator of the war, or hearing the groans of

his country. He wiſhed to continue him, by the aid of the Auſtrians, in his preſent diſpoſition for maintaining the war. Thus did * * * ſacrifice every thing to the intereſts of the queen of Hungary.

The king well ſaw that there could be no negotiation, but by the aid of victory. It was time to have recourſe with ardour to the operations of war. Luſatia was conquered; all muſt depend on the enterpriſes which the army of the prince of Anhalt might execute. A week had paſſed ſince the king had received any letters from the prince. This incertitude embarraſſed him the more becauſe that there was not a moment to loſe in preparing to act in concert. The bridge of Meiſſen was of the laſt importance, and this was to be ſeized before the enemy might think of deſtroying it; but general Lehwald could not ſeize on the town, ſituated on the left ſhore of the Elbe, unleſs aided by the prince of Anhalt.

Wanting information, the king calculated the marches of the prince, according to which he ſuppoſed he might arrive at Meiſſen on the 8th or 9th of December, at the very lateſt. Lehwald repaired thither about this time, but the prince did not appear. The river abounded with flakes of ice, which prevented general Lehwald

Lehwald from conſtructing a bridge with pontons; and theſe incidents all retarded the expedition.

Mr. Villiers, who was at Prague, ſent off a courier to the king, with diſpatches, to inform him that Auguſtus would not depute any miniſter with full powers; that, far on the reverſe, he expected numerous ſuccours from his allies, with which he would revenge the injuries he pretended the Pruſſians had done to Saxony on the electorate of Brandenbourg; and that he thought proper to quit Dreſden, expecting to have ſtill leſs reſpect paid him, during an open war, than had been paid to him in the manifeſtos, by which this war had been preceded. It was plain that this latter article rather related to * * * than to the king himſelf.

The king replied, in ſubſtance, to Mr. Villiers, that he admired the haughtineſs and inflexibility of the king of Poland; that, without any animoſity to this prince, it was impoſſible to feed an army of eighty thouſand men, in any country, without making that country ſuffer calamities; that, had fortune been propitious to the enemy, inſtead of being the contrary, the ſame moderation would not have been ſhown, in Brandenbourg, as had been diſplayed by the king, in Saxony; that all would have been

pillaged, burnt and deſtroyed, as had been proved, by example, in Sileſia; but that, ſince the king of Poland would have war, war he ſhould have, and hotter than ever.

On the 9th, diſpatches came from the prince of Anhalt, dated at Torgau. He ſaid he had taken two hundred priſoners in this place, and imputed the ſlowneſs of his march to the difficulties of finding proviſions, and waggons. Theſe were pretences to excuſe his delay. He had ſpent nine days in marching nine miles. His conduct was the leſs excuſable becauſe he had a magazine, at his own diſpoſal, at Halle; and had taken one from the enemy, at Leipſic; had no foe in his front, and conſequently was maſter of the forage, proviſions, horſes, and quotas, of the country. His tediouſneſs could only be attributed to his ſpirit of contradiction, and his age. He would not have been vexed to have ſeen the expedition into Luſatia regarded as the fortunate folly of a young man, and he affected an air of circumſpection, and wiſdom, which, added to his long experience, was to form a contraſt to the ardour with which the king purſued his operations.

The prince of Anhalt was not praiſed for his ſlowneſs; which, the king informed him by letter, was exceedingly prejudicial to the good of

of the ſervice; for it had given the Auſtrians time to join the Saxons, and break down the bridge of Meiſſen, which rendered the junction of the two armies almoſt impoſſible. He therefore enjoined him to uſe diligence, and to approach with all poſſible promptitude. The prince in reply promiſed he would be at Meiſſen on the 12th of December; on which, the men were all collected from their quarters. The king left only four battalions and ſome huſſars at Zittau; one battalion at Görlitz; and two at Bautzen. Theſe troops met, on the 13th, at Camentz; general Lehwald excepted, who was already oppoſite Meiſſen.

Here the prince of Anhalt arrived on the 12th; but the Saxon garriſon had eſcaped, through a poſtern gate, to the main army. While the infantry of the prince entered Meiſſen, the horſe, having a hollow way to traverſe, paſſed only one by one. The two laſt regiments, that is to ſay the Röhl and Holſtein dragoons, alighted to wait their turn. This was perceived by Sibilſky, who glided into a thick wood with his Saxons, from which he fell unexpectedly on the Pruſſian dragoons, and carried off two pair of kettle drums, three ſtandards, and a hundred and eighty men. Other ſquadrons mounted, and repulſed the enemy, but the affront was received, and the remedy came too late. This

affair coſt the life of general Röhl, who was ſick, and followed the column in a coach. It muſt be allowed the cold was exceſſive, and that the cavalry had been twelve hours on horſeback: but the ſin was committed in paſſing a wood which had not been previouſly reconnoitred. The ſmalleſt faults are puniſhed in war, for the enemy pardons not.

The 12th was employed in repairing the bridge over the Elbe; and, on the 13th, general Lehwald joined the prince of Anhalt. This bridge of Meiſſen, concerning which ſo many fears had been entertained, the Saxons ought to have deſtroyed: but the Saxon miniſtry, who governed the generals, could not comprehend how a bridge might contribute to the loſs of a country. The bridge was built in part of ſtone, had coſt a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns, and they would never conſent it ſhould be demoliſhed. The council was compoſed of a mixture of pedants and upſtarts. Henecke, who was their preſident, raiſed by fortune from being a footman to the dignity of miniſter, added to the talent of a financier the art of methodically plundering the ſubject. His œconomy ſupplied the prodigalities of the king, and the diſſipations of his favourite. With this ſpecies of credit, he governed Saxony as a ſub-

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ordinate to count * * *, iſſued orders for the army, directed its operations, and to his incapacity muſt the groſs errors of the Saxon generals, during this winter campaign, be attributed.

The army of the king arrived at Königſbruck on the 14th; and the prince of Anhalt, ſpurred forward and impelled as he was, advanced on the ſame day to Neuſtadt; where, in deſpite of the piercing cold, the troops were obliged to encamp. Prince Charles had arrived on the 13th of December with his army near Dreſden. Henecke, who regulated every thing, extended the Auſtrian quarters ſo much that twenty-four hours were neceſſary to aſſemble the army. Prince Charles made proper remonſtrances, that this diſpoſition might be changed; but Henecke, accuſtomed to give law to contractors and farmers general, paid them no reſpect. The prince, who foreſaw count Rutowſky would be attacked, intreated he would give him timely information, ſhould he ſtand in need of his aid, that the diſperſed troops might be collected: but the count replied, he had no need of ſuccour, for that he was ſo ſtrong, in his preſent poſt, that the Pruſſians would never dare to attack him. After marſhal Saxe had won the battle of Fontenoy by the ſuperiority of his artillery, many generals have ſince followed the

ſame method. The diſpoſition of the Auſtrians, at the battle of Sorr, was a copy of this; and the poſt which count Rutowſky held at Keſſelſdorf, was on the model of that of Fontenoy. The difference between count Saxe and his imitators was the cauſe of their different ſucceſs.

The two Pruſſian armies however began their march; that of the prince of Anhalt toward the enemy, and that of the king to paſs the Elbe at Meiſſen. The king ſent fourteen battalions into this town; the remainder of the infantry and the cavalry was cantoned on the right ſhore of the Elbe; ſo that, in caſe of need, by aſſembling his troops, the king might ſuccour the prince of Anhalt, and make head againſt the Auſtrians, ſhould they paſs the Elbe at Dreſden.

The king received, on his arrival at Meiſſen, a letter from Mr. Villiers, which informed him that the extreme diſorder of the affairs of Auguſtus, and the neceſſity to which he was reduced, had finally determined him to accede to an accommodation; that Saul, the Mercury of * * *, would depart for Dreſden, with inſtructions and full powers for the miniſtry; in order that they might labour, conjointly with the Pruſſian miniſtry, for the re-eſtabliſhment of peace; that the queen of Hungary would like-

wife accede, on condition of ſome abatements in the convention of Hanover; and that he, Villiers, would immediately come to Dreſden, that he might mediate between the parties, ſhould there be any neceſſity, and facilitate reconciliation.

Scarcely had the king read this letter before information was brought him that the atmoſphere, toward Dreſden, appeared in flames; and that a dreadful reverberation of artillery was heard. The king reaſonably expected that the prince of Anhalt had engaged the enemy. The cavalry had inſtant orders to ſaddle; and the infantry to take to arms. The king galloped with ſome hundred huſſars along the road to Dreſden; and ſent ſmall parties on all ſides. One of theſe brought in ſix fugitives, of the corps of Sibilſky, who affirmed the Saxons were beaten. What gave credit to this was that not a Pruſſian made his appearance; which muſt have happened, had affairs taken an ill turn. But, night coming on, the king was obliged to return to Meiſſen, leſt he ſhould expoſe himſelf to ſome affront, ſatisfied with the probabilities of the victory of the prince.

Had not fortune been favourable to the latter, the king had determined to aſſemble his troops on the heights of Meiſſen, to march and meet

the beaten army, to put it in the rear, and advance with his own army in front to attack the enemy anew, and purchaſe victory, be the price what it might. The prince of Anhalt deprived him of that pain. The ſame evening, an officer arrived from the army, and rendered the following account to the king of that glorious battle.

The prince had decamped, early on the morning of the 15th, and had marched through Wilſdruf, immediately toward Dreſden. Having paſſed Wilſdruf, his huſſars attacked a body of Ulans, whom they drove before them to Keſſelſdorf, where they perceived the Saxon army in order of battle. Of this they immediately informed the prince. A deep ravine, the bottom of which was in ſome places marſhy, covered the front of the enemy; the greateſt depth of this ravine was toward the Elbe; it extended gradually decreaſing toward Keſſelſdorf, and entirely diſappeared beyond, near the foreſt of Tarrant. The Saxons had ſupported their left by Keſſelſdorf, where the ground, as I have ſaid, was entirely level. This village was defended by all the grenadiers of their army, and by the regiment of Rutowſky; a battery of twenty-four pieces of heavy artillery rendered its approach murderous. The corps of Grune was on the right wing of that army, which was ſupported

ported at Benerich near the Elbe. This place was inattackable, becauſe of the rocks and precipices which interdict all approach. The Saxon cavalry, before the battle, was on the left of Keſſelſdorf, in a line with the reſt of the army, its left toward the foreſt of Tarrant. We know not why count Rutowſky removed and placed it, in a third line, in the rear of his infantry.

When the prince of Anhalt arrived on the field with the head of his army, he immediately judged that the ſucceſs of the day would depend on taking the village of Keſſelſdorf, to carry which he made his arrangements. He began by forming his troops in face of the enemy. The infantry deſtined to attack the village was in three lines, and the dragoons of Bonin formed the fourth. No ſooner were the troops thus diſpoſed than three battalions of grenadiers, with three of his own regiment, attacked the village in front, while Lehwald took it in flank. Twenty-four cannon, loaded with caſe ſhot, aided by the Saxon grenadiers and the regiment of Rutowſky, repulſed the aſſailants. The ſecond attack was not more fortunate, for the fire was too dreadful. But the regiment of Rutowſky left the village and would purſue the Pruſſians. By acting thus it placed itſelf in the front of the batteries which were prevented playing. The

prince of Anhalt profited by the moment, and ordered colonel Luderitz, who commanded the dragoons, to charge. The colonel fell with impetuosity on the Saxons: all who resisted were put to the sword, the rest were taken. The infantry seized at the same time on the village, which they entered on all sides, and took the battery that had rendered this post so formidable. General Lehwald crowned this victory, by obliging all the troops, that had defended the village, to lay down their arms.

The prince of Anhalt, like an able captain, profited by this first success, and immediately gained the enemy's left flank. The cavalry of his right, by one single shock, overthrew the Saxon cavalry, and so dispersed it that it could not rally. All fled, with celerity, to escape troops accustomed to preserve order, and not to divide. The left of the Prussians, under the command of prince Maurice, returned the cannonade of the enemy, till the village of Kesselsdorf was carried; but, impatient afterward to take part in the glory of the day, braving all obstacles, they marched to the Saxons. Rocks to climb, snows which rendered the ground slippy, and foes to face who fought for their country and their homes, all were encountered, and all yielded to the courage of the conquerors.

The

The Saxons and Auſtrians were driven from their cliffs of Benerich. The Pruſſians could not preſerve either the order of battalions or even the form of platoons, ſo ſteep were the heights they had ſcaled; and the cavalry of the enemy attacked them, while thus diſperſed. Certain it is that, had the Saxons been brave, the Pruſſian infantry muſt have been cut in pieces: but this cavalry attacked ſo feebly, and was ſo ill ſupported that, after ſome diſcharges made by the Pruſſians, it diſappeared, and ceded the field of battle to the victors. The cavalry of the left of the Pruſſians could not act, during the action, becauſe of the impracticable precipices by which they were ſeparated from the enemy. The prince of Anhalt ſent them to purſue the fugitives, of whom Geſler made a great number priſoners. The prince of Anhalt gave ſuperior marks of his experience and capacity, during this battle; and the generals, officers, and ſoldiers, all diſtinguiſhed themſelves. Their temerity was juſtified by ſucceſs. Of the Saxons, there remained three thouſand dead on the field: two hundred and fifteen officers, and ſix thouſand five hundred ſoldiers were taken; and they loſt five pair of colours, three ſtandards, one pair of kettle drums, and forty-eight cannon. The Pruſſians had forty-

one

one officers and ſixteen hundred and twenty-one ſoldiers killed; beſides twice as many wounded.

If we examine the errors committed on each ſide, in this battle, we ſhall firſt perceive that count Rutowſky had only thought of the ſafety of his right, in the poſt he had choſen; the left was cut off, and the village of Keſſelſdorf might be turned. Had the Pruſſians further extended their right, the prince of Anhalt might totally have turned the village, and taken it at leſs expence; he was but juſt arrived, and, not having had time to reconnoitre the ground, this alone may ſuffice as an excuſe. The greateſt fault of the Saxons was their ſally from the village; for they prevented their own cannon, which was their beſt defence, from acting againſt the Pruſſians. A fault not leſs conſiderable was that the infantry, poſted between Keſſelſdorf and Benerich, did not keep the brink of the heights, but fell back above a hundred paces; ſo that they did not defend the paſſage of the precipice with ſmall arms, but ſuffered it to be ſcaled, reſerving their fire till the enemy ſhould have conquered the greateſt difficulty. But ſimilar remarks might be made on moſt of the actions of men: they all commit faults, becauſe none among them are perfect; and, if we here take a retroſpect of the errors of this battle,

it is but to teach poſterity not to commit any ſo groſs as were thoſe of the Saxons.

Count Rutowſky and his army arrived at Dreſden full ſpeed. Here they found prince Charles employed in collecting his ſcattered troops. He offered the count to join him, and attack the Pruſſians on the morrow; but the Saxon had more than enough. He alleged, in excuſe, that his infantry was almoſt deſtroyed; that he had loſt ten thouſand men; that he wanted arms and ammunition; and that his ſoldiers were not yet recovered from their panic. He added that the king of Pruſſia would join the prince of Anhalt; that Dreſden wanted proviſions and ammunition; and that, to ſave the remains of the army, it was neceſſary to eſcape to Zeſt; a village in the neighbourhood of the mountains, facing Bohemia. This plan was executed. The Saxons evacuated Dreſden, leaving the militia only in the city. On the 16th, they encamped near Königſtein, and ſent their cavalry into Bohemia, wanting means to feed it longer on the Saxon territories.

On the 16th, the army of the king advanced to Wilſdruf; and on the 17th his troops formed the firſt line, and extended along the rivulet of Plauen. The fortunate ſucceſs of this expedition cauſed the ſlowneſs, which the prince of Anhalt

Anhalt had affected at its commencement, to be forgotten. The battle of Keffelsdorf had caſt a beautiful veil over this error. The king ſaid the moſt flattering things, concerning the renown he had acquired, and omitted nothing which might cajole his ſelf-love. The prince ſhewed the king the field of battle; and the ſurpriſe excited, by the difficulties to be ſurmounted, and of the conſiderable number of priſoners made, though great, was leſs than to ſee the whole country covered with the inhabitants of Dreſden, who peacefully came to meet the Pruſſians.

When the king paſſed through Saxony in 1744, the duke of Weiſſenfels had thrown ten battalions into Dreſden; batteries were raiſed there, ſections were made in the ſtreets, paliſades were planted wherever a ſtake could be driven, and no Pruſſian durſt ſet foot in the capital. In 1745, when the king entered the country at the head of eighty thouſand men, after the Saxon troops had been beaten, the gates of Dreſden were thrown open, and the younger princes of the royal family, the miniſters, and ſupreme councils of the country, all ſurrendered at diſcretion. Such are the contradictions of which the human mind is capable, when it does not act ſyſtematically, and when thoſe

thoſe who are become rulers have learnt to reaſon falſely.

It is probable that the city was deſtitute of proviſions; and that the confuſed deliberations of, and the conſternation which reigned among, the principal miniſters of the king of Poland occaſioned this general deſpair. The princes and miniſters might have eſcaped: Bohemia was not above four miles diſtant.

A thing not leſs aſtoniſhing is that the Saxons, intending to abandon Dreſden, ſhould leave ſix thouſand of their militia there, with whom they might have recruited their troops. The king ſoon took poſſeſſion of the ſuburb of Dreſden, and the governor was ſummoned to ſurrender. He replied that Dreſden was not a fortreſs. The miniſter ſent a memorial, which was to ſerve as a kind of capitulation. The king regulated the conditions, according to his good pleaſure; and, on the 18th, the Pruſſians entered the city. The militia was diſarmed, and ſerved to recruit the troops. Four hundred and fifteen officers, and fifteen hundred men, of the wounded of the battle of Keſſelſdorf, were here taken. The king fixed his quarters in Dreſden, with the head officers of the two armies.

Aſperſions the moſt injurious were propagated, relative to the intentions of the king on that

that capital. It was ſaid the prince of Anhalt had demanded the pillage of Dreſden for his army; to which the ſackage of this city had been promiſed, to encourage it during the battle. The credulity of man only could give credit to ſuch calumny. The prince of Anhalt never durſt make a propoſition ſo barbarous to the king. Beſide that promiſes like theſe might only be made to undiſciplined troops, and not to the Pruſſians, who combat only for honour and fame. The cauſe of their ſucceſs ought ſolely to be attributed to the ambition of the officers, and the obedience of the ſoldiers.

Scarcely was the king at Dreſden before he viſited the royal children, to calm and entirely free them from fear. He endeavoured to ſoften their misfortunes, by ſcrupulouſly rendering them all due honours; the guard of the caſtle was even ſubmitted to their orders.

The king afterward anſwered Mr. Villiers that he had been much aſtoniſhed to receive propoſitions for peace, on the day of battle; that, to cut ſhort negotiation, he had himſelf come to Dreſden: that fortune, having ſeconded his cauſe, had given him the power of warmly reſenting the evil procedure of count * * *, and the duplicity and perfidy he had employed, in all his negotiations; that, far however from thinking

thinking ſo baſely, he proffered, though for the laſt time, friendſhip to the king of Poland; that he waited in expectation that the ſieurs Bulau and Rex would receive full powers, in order without delay to come to a concluſion; and that he would in no manner depart from the engagements into which he had entered with the king of England, in the convention of Hanover; that, far from being blinded by ſucceſs, he neither raiſed nor lowered his pretenſions, and that therefore the queen of Hungary ought not to expect he ſhould change any reſolution. The king ended by requeſting Mr. Villiers to make an exact report of the final reply of the king of Poland; in order that the pacification of Germany and the north might meet with no new impediments.

The king ſoon invited all the Saxon miniſters to meet him, to whom he recapitulated whatever had paſſed, diſplayed his true ſentiments, and the moderate conditions of peace which he propoſed to his enemies. He was happy enough to convince them that theſe conditions were ſuch as they themſelves could have wiſhed, or have dictated, and that their king had no other part to take than that of ſigning.

Arrangements alſo were made that the utmoſt order might be obſerved by the troops. The king

king imparted every poſſible gentleneſs to his proceedings; that this neighbouring and unfortunate country might but lightly feel the ſcourges of a war of which the people were innocent.

In conformity to cuſtom, Te Deum was ſung in the churches, accompanied by a triple diſcharge of the artillery of Dreſden; and the opera of Arminius was performed, in the evening. Theſe trifles are only mentioned becauſe of the anecdotes with which they are connected. Every circumſtance, even to the opera, had been a means, under the management of * * *, of governing the mind of his maſter. He had cauſed the clemency of Titus to be performed, at the time of the diſgrace of Sulkowſky, in reference to the pretended crimes of which he had been pardoned, by the king. Arminius had been played during the laſt war; which was in alluſion to the ſuccour afforded by Auguſtus III. to the queen of Hungary, againſt the French and Pruſſians, whom they accuſed of aiming at univerſal monarchy. The flattering praiſes of Italian poetry, heightened by the charms of harmony, and expreſſed by the flexible organs of eunuchs, perſuaded the king of Poland he was an example to princes, and a mirror of humanity. The muſicians ſuppreſſed a chorus in the opera, which they durſt not ſing in preſence

of

of the Pruſſians, becauſe that the words might juſtly have been applicable, after what had lately happened in Saxony. They were as follow:

Sulle rovine altrui alzar non penſi il ſoglio
Colui che al ſol' orgoglio riduce ogni virtù.

The choruſes of the opera of Auguſtus were as true as the prologues of Louis XIV.

While Te Deum and operas were chanted at Dreſden, Mr. Villiers, who was impatiently expected, arrived from Prague, with full powers and all neceſſary authorities, to the Saxon miniſters, for the concluſion of peace. He was followed by count Frederic Harrach, who came on the part of the empreſs queen, relative to the ſame ſubject. When every thing was prepared at Dreſden to allay the ſtorms of Germany, the king received the following anſwer, from Louis XV. to the affecting letter, which he had written from Berlin, to requeſt his aſſiſtance. This anſwer had been dictated by his miniſters, and had only been tranſcribed by the king.

" SIR, AND BROTHER,

" IN your letter of the 15th of November, " your majeſty confirmed what I before knew, " concerning the convention of Hanover, of " the 26th of Auguſt. I have good cauſe to be " ſurpriſed at a treaty negotiated, concluded,

" ſigned, and ratified, with a prince who is my
" enemy, without having received the leaſt in-
" timation of it myſelf. I am not aſtoniſhed at
" your refuſing to join in violent meaſures, and
" a direct and formal engagement againſt me;
" my enemies ought to have known your ma-
" jeſty. It is an additional injury, to have
" dared to make you ſuch unworthy propoſals.
" I depended on your diverſion: I have made
" two powerful ones, in Flanders and Italy. I
" employed the grand army of the queen of
" Hungary, on the Rhine: my expences, my
" efforts, have been crowned with the greateſt
" ſucceſs. Your majeſty has highly expoſed
" this ſucceſs, in future, by the treaty you have
" concluded, without my knowledge. Had the
" queen of Hungary acceded, her whole Bohe-
" mian army would have been ſuddenly turned
" againſt me; and this would not have been the
" means of procuring peace. I am not the leſs
" ſenſible of the extreme peril you run. Nothing
" can equal my impatience to hear of your
" ſafety; and your tranquillity will inſure mine.
" Your majeſty is in force, is the terror of your
" foes, and has gained conſiderable and glo-
" rious advantages over them. Add to this,
" winter, during which military operations are
" ſuſpended, will alone ſuffice for your defence.

" Who

" Who is more capable of giving your majeſty
" good advice than you yourſelf are? You have
" only to follow that which your underſtanding,
" your experience, and, ſtill ſuperior to all,
" that which your honour ſhall dictate. As to
" the ſuccour, which on my part can only con-
" ſiſt in ſubſidies and diverſions, I have done
" every thing it was poſſible I ſhould do; and
" I ſhall continue to act thus, according to the
" means which beſt may ſecure ſucceſs. I in-
" creaſe my army; I neglect nothing. I haſten
" all that can give an impulſe of the utmoſt vi-
" gour to the approaching campaign. If your
" majeſty has any plans, capable of ſtrengthen-
" ing my enterpriſes, I beg you to communi-
" cate them; as I ſhall ever with the greateſt
" pleaſure concert with you, &c."

On a firſt view, this letter might appear mild and polite; but, when we conſider the diſtreſſing circumſtances of the king of Pruſſia, and the various preceding negotiations with France, a tone of irony will be remarked in it, which was the more miſplaced becauſe it had not been any part of the agreement that the reciprocal engagements, which had been entered into at the treaty of Verſailles, ſhould be anſwered by epigrams. Let us ſtrip this letter of its phraſeology, and examine its real contents.

" I am exceedingly vexed that you have con-
" cluded the treaty of Hanover, without con-
" ſulting me; for, ſhould the queen of Hun-
" gary accept it, prince Charles will return into
" Alſatia. Do not you perceive that the war,
" in Italy and Flanders, which I maintain, is
" a diverſion, made by me in your favour? For
" I have no intereſt in the conqueſt of Flan-
" ders; and concern myſelf little with the eſta-
" bliſhment of my ſon-in-law, Don Philip, in
" Italy. Conti has ſo perfectly overawed the
" principal forces of the queen of Hungary, in
" Germany, that he has repaſſed the Rhine,
" and left her to make an emperor of whom ſhe
" pleaſes. Traun has been able to detach
" Grune into Saxony; and may follow him
" with the remainder of his troops, ſhould the
" queen of Hungary think proper to ſend him
" againſt you. I have done great things this
" campaign. Your name has alſo been men-
" tioned. I am very ſorry for the dangerous
" ſituation in which you are placed, by your
" love of me. Renown is only to be ac-
" quired by ſacrificing yourſelf for France.
" Shew your conſtancy, and continue to ſuffer.
" Imitate the example of my other allies; whom
" indeed I abandoned, but to whom I gave
" alms, when they had been ſtripped of all their
" poſſeſ-

" poſſeſſions. Take counſel of yourſelf, and " of that preſumption from which you have, " very officiouſly, ſometimes given me advice. " You no doubt have ſufficient wiſdom to relieve " yourſelf from all embarraſſment: beſide that " the cold will benumb your enemies, and they " will not be able to fight you. However, " ſhould any misfortune happen to you, I pro- " miſe you that the French academy ſhall write " the funeral oration of your empire, when your " enemies have accompliſhed its deſtruction. " Your name ſhall be inſerted in the martyro- " logy, in which are enregiſtered the names of " thoſe enthuſiaſts who have fallen victims in " the cauſe of France, and of thoſe allies whom " ſhe has condeſcended to abandon. You per- " ceive I have made diverſions; and I have offer- " ed you a ſubſidy to the amount of a million of " livres. Hope much from the ſuperb cam- " paign which I ſhall make next ſummer, and " for which I am now preparing; and you may " depend that I will concert with you, on every " ſubject, in which you will blindly follow my " will, and conform to whatever may promote " my intereſt."

As ſoon as the negotiation for peace was ſo far advanced as to be certain of ſucceſs, the king anſwered the letter, the contents of which have

been recited, by the following; which we inſert, becauſe that the ſubject was equally important and delicate.

"SIR, AND BROTHER,

"AFTER the letter I wrote to your majeſty, "dated November the 15th, I might have ex- "pected ſome effectual ſuccour, on your part. "I ſhall not enter into the reaſons which you "might have for ſubjecting your allies to the "caprices of fortune. For this once the bravery "of my troops has relieved me, from the perils "into which I had run. Had I been trodden "down, by the number of my foes, your ma- "jeſty would have remained ſatisfied with pity- "ing me, and I ſhould have remained without "reſource. How may any alliance ſubſiſt, if "the contracting parties do not concur, with "equal ardour, in their common preſervation? "Your majeſty has wiſhed me to reaſon and "adviſe with myſelf; and ſince you think this "proper, I ſhall ſo act. Reaſon adviſes me to "put a quick end to a war which no longer has "any object; ſince the Auſtrian troops no longer "are in Alſatia, and the emperor is dead. "The battles hereafter to be fought will only "be productive of a uſeleſs effuſion of blood. "Reaſon adviſes me to think on my own ſafety, "and reflect on the great preparations of the "Ruſſians,

" Ruſſians, which threaten my kingdom from " Courland; on the army commanded by mar- " ſhal Traun on the Rhine, which may eaſily " fall back toward Saxony; on the inconſtancy " of fortune; and, finally, on my preſent ſitu- " ation, hopeleſs as I am of any ſuccour from " my allies. The Auſtrians and Saxons have " lately ſent their miniſters to negotiate peace; " I have therefore no choice but to ſign. After " having thus acquitted myſelf of my duty, to " the ſtate I govern, and to my family, I can " have no object more at heart than to be able " to promote the intereſts of your majeſty. " May I be fortunate enough to become inſtru- " mental to the general pacification! Your ma- " jeſty cannot confide your deſigns to any one " more perſonally attached to you than I am, " or who would labour with greater zeal to re- " eſtabliſh concord, and good intelligence, be- " tween the powers which conteſts ſo tedious " have rendered inimical. I entreat you to con- " ſerve the ſame friendſhip toward me, which " I ſhall ever hold precious, and to remain per- " ſuaded that I am—&c."

This was a polite adieu, by alleging reaſons ſo real that it was impoſſible for France to reply.

The Auſtrians and Saxons however ſtill remained in the environs of Pirna; it was neceſ-

ſary to drive them further, that the negotiations might be carried on with greater tranquillity. For this purpoſe, Retzow was detached, with five battalions and ſome ſquadrons of cavalry, toward Freyberg. The apprehenſions which he incited, for theſe parts, accelerated the retreat of the allies into Bohemia. The Saxon troops ſcarcely amounted to fifteen thouſand men. The king of Poland, deprived of his revenues, no longer had money to pay his troops. He could not expect the Ruſſians would be in motion before the ſpring: he felt how ineffectual this ſuccour was, and the neceſſity of the moment obliged him to conſent to peace.

In the mean time, count Harrach arrived at Dreſden. He ſuppoſed that, inflated by ſucceſs, the king, like the Auſtrians, would riſe in his demands, which would become exceſſive; but, preſently undeceived, he thanked the monarch for the facility with which he obviated difficulties. The king replied that, the cauſe of the war having ceaſed, by the death of Charles VII. he had, from that moment, been in the ſame diſpoſition in which he was at preſent. The count let ſome propoſitions of an interview, between the king and the queen of Hungary, eſcape. Theſe were eluded, by examples of inutility, and bad conſequences, reſulting

ſulting from ſuch interviews. But, praiſes of this princeſs being artfully mingled with the refuſal, ſeemed to ſatisfy the count.

On the 25th of December, 1745, the peace was ſigned. The acceſſion of the queen of Hungary to the convention of Hanover was but, purely and ſimply, renewing the peace of Breſlau. The Saxons promiſed never to grant a paſſage through their country to the enemies of the king, under any pretext whatever. It was agreed to exchange the tolls of Furſtenberg for ſome lands of equal value. The king of Poland was bound to pay a million of contributions; for which the electorate ſtood engaged. By the ſame article, he renounced all indemnification for the expences of the war. The king, in return, promiſed the contributions ſhould ceaſe, on the day of ſigning; and that his troops ſhould immediately retire out of Saxony; except from Meiſſen, where the Pruſſian hoſpital was, and which he was permitted to hold till the wounded were cured.

Thus ended the ſecond war; the continuance of which was only ſixteen months, and which was by both parties purſued with extreme inveteracy; in which the Saxons diſcovered all the hatred they had conceived againſt Pruſſia, and all the envy which the aggrandizement of that

neighbouring power inſpired; while the Auſtrians fought for the empire, and to obtain influence over the affairs of the empire, in which they dreaded leſt the Ruſſians ſhould gain power too great; a war in which Pruſſia was ſeen expoſed to the moſt imminent dangers, yet triumphant, in the diſcipline and heroic valour of her troops.

This war gave place to none of thoſe grand revolutions which change the fate of empires; but prevented them, at that period, by obliging prince Charles to quit Alſatia. The death of Charles VII. was one of thoſe events which could not be foreſeen: it deranged the project of tearing the Imperial dignity for ever from the brow of the new houſe of Auſtria. Thus, eſtimating things at their juſt value, we are obliged to own that, in certain reſpects, this war only cauſed a uſeleſs effuſion of blood; and that ſucceſſive victories did but ſerve to confirm the poſſeſſion of Sileſia to Pruſſia.

Should we examine the war, relative to the increaſe or enfeebling of the belligerent powers, we ſhall find that it coſt the Pruſſians eight millions of crowns; and that, when the peace was ſigned, their whole reſource, for the continuation of the war, conſiſted in a reſidue of a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns. The Pruſſians, during

during their two campaigns, took forty-five thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty-ſix priſoners: that is to ſay, twelve thouſand men in Prague; one thouſand ſeven hundred and thirty-nine in ſmall parties; two hundred and fifty in the ſkirmiſhes of Plomnitz and Reinertz, fought by general Lehwald; ſeven thouſand one hundred and thirty-ſix at the battle of Friedberg; three thouſand at the taking of Coſel; five thouſand, on different occaſions, taken by general Naſſau; two hundred and fifty by the huſſars of Ziethen; two thouſand and thirty at the battle of Sorr; four hundred by the troops of the margrave Charles, in Upper Sileſia; four hundred and twenty-ſeven by parties from the garriſon of Glatz; one thouſand three hundred and forty-two by general Winterfeld; two hundred and ſeventy-one by major Warneri; one thouſand three hundred and ninety-two at Catholiſch Hennerſdorf; ſix thouſand ſix hundred and fifty-eight at the battle of Keſſelſdorf; and three thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty-eight at the taking of Dreſden.

The following is the number taken by the Auſtrians. The regiment of Creutz, at Budweis, one thouſand four hundred; a battalion of pioneers, at Tabor, ſeven hundred, and four hundred ſick; three hundred at the evacuation

of Prague; three hundred at Cofel; and one thouſand three hundred and forty in various ſkirmiſhes. In all, four thouſand four hundred and forty: a number very inferior to the loſſes they ſuſtained.

Upper Sileſia ſuffered the moſt in this war. Some parts of the Lower, lying in the neighbourhood of Bohemia, as the circles of Hirſchberg, Strigau, and Landſhut, eſcaped but little better: but theſe are ills which good government ſoon repairs. Bohemia and Saxony equally felt the abode of the grand armies; but they were not totally ruined. The queen of Hungary was obliged to employ all her credit, to procure reſources for the continuation of the war: it is true ſhe drew ſubſidies from the Engliſh; but theſe were inſufficient to ſupply the ſums her armies expended in Flanders, on the Rhine, in Italy, Bohemia, and in Saxony. The war coſt the king of Poland more than five millions of crowns. He paid his debts in paper, by fabricating new bills; for * * * underſtood the art of ruining his maſter methodically. The firſt cares of the king of Pruſſia all tended to the re-eſtabliſhment of his army. He chiefly recruited it by the Auſtrian and Saxon priſoners; of whom he had his choice. Thus were his troops completed at the expence of foreigners; and

and it did not coſt the country more than ſeven thouſand men, to repair the loſſes that ſo many bloody battles had occaſioned. Since the art of war has been ſo well underſtood in Europe, and policy has eſtabliſhed a certain balance of power between ſovereigns, grand enterprizes but rarely produce ſuch effects as might be expected. An equality of forces, alternate loſs and ſucceſs, occaſion the opponents, at the end of the moſt deſperate war, to find themſelves much in the ſame ſtate of reciprocal ſtrength as at the commencement. Exhauſted treaſuries at length are productive of peace; which ought to be the work of humanity, not of neceſſity. In a word, if the fame of, and reſpect due to, arms merit efforts for that attainment, Pruſſia, by gaining theſe, found a recompenſe for the ſecond war ſhe had undertaken: but this was all ſhe found. Yet did this vapour inſpire new envy.

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